--- 1/draft-ietf-lisp-sec-10.txt 2016-10-03 15:15:58.888997467 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-lisp-sec-11.txt 2016-10-03 15:15:58.928998489 -0700 @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ Network Working Group F. Maino Internet-Draft V. Ermagan Intended status: Experimental Cisco Systems -Expires: October 15, 2016 A. Cabellos +Expires: April 6, 2017 A. Cabellos Technical University of Catalonia D. Saucez INRIA - April 13, 2016 + October 3, 2016 LISP-Security (LISP-SEC) - draft-ietf-lisp-sec-10 + draft-ietf-lisp-sec-11 Abstract This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- prefix claims in Map-Reply messages. Requirements Language @@ -33,21 +33,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2016. + This Internet-Draft will expire on April 6, 2017. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -93,21 +93,21 @@ functions for routers to exchange information used to map from non- routable Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) to routable Routing Locators (RLOCs). If these EID-to-RLOC mappings, carried through Map-Reply messages, are transmitted without integrity protection, an adversary can manipulate them and hijack the communication, impersonate the requested EID, or mount Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of Service attacks. Also, if the Map-Reply message is transported unauthenticated, an adversarial LISP entity can overclaim an EID- prefix and maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of hosts. A detailed description of "overclaiming" attack is provided - in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats]. + in [RFC7835]. This memo specifies LISP-SEC, a set of security mechanisms that provides origin authentication, integrity and anti-replay protection to LISP's EID-to-RLOC mapping data conveyed via mapping lookup process. LISP-SEC also enables verification of authorization on EID- prefix claims in Map-Reply messages, ensuring that the sender of a Map-Reply that provides the location for a given EID-prefix is entitled to do so according to the EID prefix registered in the associated Map-Server. Map-Register security, including the right for a LISP entity to register an EID-prefix or to claim presence at @@ -143,41 +143,41 @@ PKT-AD: The portion of Map-Reply Authentication Data used to protect the integrity of the Map-Reply message. For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply, Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), Map-Server (MS), and Map-Resolver (MR) please consult the LISP specification [RFC6830]. 3. LISP-SEC Threat Model - LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in - [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats], that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including - manipulations of Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious - ETR EID prefix overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions: - (1) the LISP mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request - message to their intended destination ETR as identified by the EID, - and (2) no man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the - LISP Mapping System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection - of EID prefix overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map-Servers can - verify the EID prefix authorization at time of registration. + LISP-SEC addresses the control plane threats, described in [RFC7835], + that target EID-to-RLOC mappings, including manipulations of Map- + Request and Map-Reply messages, and malicious ETR EID prefix + overclaiming. LISP-SEC makes two main assumptions: (1) the LISP + mapping system is expected to deliver a Map-Request message to their + intended destination ETR as identified by the EID, and (2) no man-in- + the-middle (MITM) attack can be mounted within the LISP Mapping + System. Furthermore, while LISP-SEC enables detection of EID prefix + overclaiming attacks, it assumes that Map-Servers can verify the EID + prefix authorization at time of registration. - According to the threat model described in [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats] - LISP-SEC assumes that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can - be mounted in the access network, outside of the boundaries of the - LISP mapping system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP - mapping system can, for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply - messages, spoofing the identity of a LISP node. Another example of - on-path attack, called overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a - malicious Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID- - prefixes for which it is authoritative. In this way the ETR can - maliciously redirect traffic directed to a large number of hosts. + According to the threat model described in [RFC7835] LISP-SEC assumes + that any kind of attack, including MITM attacks, can be mounted in + the access network, outside of the boundaries of the LISP mapping + system. An on-path attacker, outside of the LISP mapping system can, + for example, hijack Map-Request and Map-Reply messages, spoofing the + identity of a LISP node. Another example of on-path attack, called + overclaiming attack, can be mounted by a malicious Egress Tunnel + Router (ETR), by overclaiming the EID-prefixes for which it is + authoritative. In this way the ETR can maliciously redirect traffic + directed to a large number of hosts. 4. Protocol Operations The goal of the security mechanisms defined in [RFC6830] is to prevent unauthorized insertion of mapping data by providing origin authentication and integrity protection for the Map-Registration, and by using the nonce to detect unsolicited Map-Reply sent by off-path attackers. LISP-SEC builds on top of the security mechanisms defined in @@ -796,25 +796,20 @@ 8. Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge Pere Monclus, Dave Meyer, Dino Farinacci, Brian Weis, David McGrew, Darrel Lewis and Landon Curt Noll for their valuable suggestions provided during the preparation of this document. 9. Normative References - [I-D.ietf-lisp-threats] - Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Threats - Analysis", draft-ietf-lisp-threats-15 (work in progress), - January 2016. - [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . @@ -840,20 +835,25 @@ [RFC6830] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", RFC 6830, DOI 10.17487/RFC6830, January 2013, . [RFC6833] Fuller, V. and D. Farinacci, "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) Map-Server Interface", RFC 6833, DOI 10.17487/RFC6833, January 2013, . + [RFC7835] Saucez, D., Iannone, L., and O. Bonaventure, "Locator/ID + Separation Protocol (LISP) Threat Analysis", RFC 7835, + DOI 10.17487/RFC7835, April 2016, + . + Authors' Addresses Fabio Maino Cisco Systems 170 Tasman Drive San Jose, California 95134 USA Email: fmaino@cisco.com