draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-05.txt		draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-06.txt
	Mboned J. Holland		Mboned J. Holland
	Internet-Draft Akamai Technologies, Inc.		Internet-Draft Akamai Technologies, Inc.
	Updates: 7450 (if approved) April 25, 2019		Updates: 7450 (if approved) May 06, 2019
	Intended status: Standards Track		Intended status: Standards Track
	Expires: October 27, 2019		Expires: November 7, 2019
	DNS Reverse IP AMT Discovery		DNS Reverse IP AMT Discovery
	draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-05		draft-ietf-mboned-driad-amt-discovery-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document updates RFC 7450 (Automatic Multicast Tunneling, or		This document updates RFC 7450 (Automatic Multicast Tunneling, or
	AMT) by extending the relay discovery process to use a new DNS		AMT) by extending the relay discovery process to use a new DNS
	resource record named AMTRELAY when discovering AMT relays for		resource record named AMTRELAY when discovering AMT relays for
	source-specific multicast channels. The reverse IP DNS zone for a		source-specific multicast channels. The reverse IP DNS zone for a
	multicast sender's IP address is configured to use AMTRELAY resource		multicast sender's IP address is configured to use AMTRELAY resource
	records to advertise a set of AMT relays that can receive and forward		records to advertise a set of AMT relays that can receive and forward
	multicast traffic from that sender over an AMT tunnel.		multicast traffic from that sender over an AMT tunnel.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on October 27, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 7, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 12, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 42 ¶
	Among relay addresses that still have an equivalent preference after		Among relay addresses that still have an equivalent preference after
	the above orderings, a gateway MUST make a non-deterministic choice		the above orderings, a gateway MUST make a non-deterministic choice
	for relay preference ordering, in order to support load balancing by		for relay preference ordering, in order to support load balancing by
	DNS configurations that provide many relay options.		DNS configurations that provide many relay options.
	The gateway MAY introduce a bias in the non-deterministic choice		The gateway MAY introduce a bias in the non-deterministic choice
	according to information obtained out of band or from a historical		according to information obtained out of band or from a historical
	record about network topology, timing information, or the response to		record about network topology, timing information, or the response to
	a probing mechanism, that indicates some expected benefits from		a probing mechanism, that indicates some expected benefits from
	selecting some relays in preference to others. Details about the		selecting some relays in preference to others. Details about the
	structure and collection of this information is out of scope for this		structure and collection of this information are out of scope for
	document, but a gateway in possession of such information MAY use it		this document, but a gateway in possession of such information MAY
	to prefer topologically closer relays.		use it to prefer topologically closer relays.
	Note also that certain relay addresses may be excluded from		Note also that certain relay addresses may be excluded from
	consideration by the hold-down timers described in Section 2.5.4.1 or		consideration by the hold-down timers described in Section 2.5.4.1 or
	Section 2.5.5. These relays constitute "unusable destinations" under		Section 2.5.5. These relays constitute "unusable destinations" under
	Rule 1 of the Destination Address Selection, and are also not part of		Rule 1 of the Destination Address Selection, and are also not part of
	the superseding considerations described above.		the superseding considerations described above.
	The discovery and connection process for the relay addresses in the		The discovery and connection process for the relay addresses in the
	above described ordering MAY operate in parallel, subject to delays		above described ordering MAY operate in parallel, subject to delays
	prescribed by the Happy Eyeballs requirements described in Section 5		prescribed by the Happy Eyeballs requirements described in Section 5
	skipping to change at page 28, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 29 ¶
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	6.1. Use of AMT		6.1. Use of AMT
	This document defines a mechanism that enables a more widespread and		This document defines a mechanism that enables a more widespread and
	automated use of AMT, even without access to a multicast backbone.		automated use of AMT, even without access to a multicast backbone.
	Operators of networks and applications that include a DRIAD-capable		Operators of networks and applications that include a DRIAD-capable
	AMT gateway are advised to carefully consider the security		AMT gateway are advised to carefully consider the security
	considerations in Section 6 of [RFC7450].		considerations in Section 6 of [RFC7450].
	AMT gateway operators also are encouraged to implement the		AMT gateway operators also are encouraged to take appropriate steps
	opportunistic use of IPSec [RFC4301] when IPSECKEY records [RFC4025]		to ensure the integrity of the data received via AMT, for example by
	are available to secure traffic from AMT relays, or when a trust		the opportunistic use of IPSec [RFC4301] to secure traffic received
	relationship with the AMT relays can be otherwise secured.		from AMT relays, when IPSECKEY records [RFC4025] are available or
			when a trust relationship with the AMT relays can be otherwise
			established and secured.
	6.2. Record-spoofing		6.2. Record-spoofing
	The AMTRELAY resource record contains information that SHOULD be		The AMTRELAY resource record contains information that SHOULD be
	communicated to the DNS client without being modified. The method		communicated to the DNS client without being modified. The method
	used to ensure the result was unmodified is up to the client.		used to ensure the result was unmodified is up to the client.
	There must be a trust relationship between the end consumer of this		There must be a trust relationship between the end consumer of this
	resource record and the DNS server. This relationship may be end-to-		resource record and the DNS server. This relationship may be end-to-
	end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] channel		end DNSSEC validation, a TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG(0) [RFC2931] channel
End of changes. 6 change blocks.
	11 lines changed or deleted		13 lines changed or added
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