draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-00.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01.txt 
Web Authorization Protocol D. Fett Web Authorization Protocol D. Fett
Internet-Draft yes.com Internet-Draft yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track B. Campbell Intended status: Standards Track B. Campbell
Expires: 3 October 2020 Ping Identity Expires: 2 November 2020 Ping Identity
J. Bradley J. Bradley
Yubico Yubico
T. Lodderstedt T. Lodderstedt
yes.com yes.com
M. Jones M. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
D. Waite D. Waite
Ping Identity Ping Identity
1 April 2020 1 May 2020
OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer
(DPoP) (DPoP)
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-00 draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-01
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0 This document describes a mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth 2.0
tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level. tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the application level.
This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access This mechanism allows for the detection of replay attacks with access
and refresh tokens. and refresh tokens.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 43 skipping to change at page 1, line 43
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 October 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 November 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Main Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Main Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. DPoP Proof JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. DPoP Proof JWTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. DPoP Proof JWT Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Checking DPoP Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Checking DPoP Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Token Request (Binding Tokens to a Public Key) . . . . . . . 7 5. Token Request (Binding Tokens to a Public Key) . . . . . . . 8
6. Resource Access (Proof of Possession for Access Tokens) . . . 8 6. Resource Access (Proof of Possession for Access Tokens) . . . 9
7. Public Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Public Key Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. DPoP Proof Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. DPoP Proof Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Signed JWT Swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.2. Signed JWT Swapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.3. Signature Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.4. Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.4. Message Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . 11 10.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values 10.2. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . 14
Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.4. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration . . . . . . . . . 15
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.5. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.6. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.7. Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . . . . 16
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[RFC8705] describes methods to bind (sender-constrain) access tokens This document outlines a relatively simple application-level
using mutual Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication with X.509 mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth access and refresh tokens.
certificates. It enables a client to demonstrate proof-of-possession of a public/
private key pair by including the "DPoP" header in an HTTP request.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] provides mechanisms to sender- Using that header, an authorization server is able to bind issued
constrain access tokens using HTTP token binding. tokens to the public part of the client's key pair. Recipients of
such tokens are then able to verify the binding of the token to the
Due to a sub-par user experience of TLS client authentication in user key pair that the client has demonstrated that it holds via the
agents and a lack of support for HTTP token binding, neither "DPoP" header, thereby providing some assurance that the client
mechanism can be used if an OAuth client is a Single Page Application presenting the token also possesses the private key. In other words,
(SPA) running in a web browser. the legitimate presenter of the token is constrained to be the sender
that holds and can prove possession of the private part of the key
pair.
This document outlines an application-level sender-constraining for The mechanism described herein can be used in cases where potentially
access and refresh tokens that can be used in cases where neither stronger methods of sender-constraining tokens that utilize elements
mTLS nor OAuth Token Binding are available. It uses proof-of- of the underlying secure transport layer, such as [RFC8705] or
possession based on a public/private key pair and application-level [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding], are not available or desirable. For
signing. example, due to a sub-par user experience of TLS client
authentication in user agents and a lack of support for HTTP token
binding, neither mechanism can be used if an OAuth client is a Single
Page Application (SPA) running in a web browser.
DPoP can be used with public clients and, in case of confidential DPoP can be used with public clients to sender-constrain access
clients, can be combined with any client authentication method. tokens and refresh tokens. With confidential clients, DPoP can be
used in conjunction with any client authentication method to sender-
constrain access tokens.
1.1. Conventions and Terminology 1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token", This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token",
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More precisely, if an adversary is able to get hold of an access More precisely, if an adversary is able to get hold of an access
token or refresh token because it set up a counterfeit authorization token or refresh token because it set up a counterfeit authorization
server or resource server, the adversary is not able to replay the server or resource server, the adversary is not able to replay the
respective token at another authorization or resource server. respective token at another authorization or resource server.
Secondary objectives are discussed in Section 9. Secondary objectives are discussed in Section 9.
3. Concept 3. Concept
The main data structure introduced by this specification is a DPoP The main data structure introduced by this specification is a DPoP
proof JWT, described in detail below. A client uses a DPoP proof JWT proof JWT, described in detail below, sent as a header in an HTTP
to prove the possession of a private key belonging to a certain request. A client uses a DPoP proof JWT to prove the possession of a
public key. Roughly speaking, a DPoP proof is a signature over some private key corresponding to a certain public key. Roughly speaking,
data of the HTTP request to which it is attached to and a timestamp. a DPoP proof is a signature over a timestamp and some data of the
HTTP request to which it is attached.
+--------+ +---------------+ +--------+ +---------------+
| |--(A)-- Token Request ------------------->| | | |--(A)-- Token Request ------------------->| |
| Client | (DPoP Proof) | Authorization | | Client | (DPoP Proof) | Authorization |
| | | Server | | | | Server |
| |<-(B)-- DPoP-bound Access Token ----------| | | |<-(B)-- DPoP-bound Access Token ----------| |
| | (token_type=DPoP) +---------------+ | | (token_type=DPoP) +---------------+
| | PoP Refresh Token for public clients | | PoP Refresh Token for public clients
| | | |
| | +---------------+ | | +---------------+
| |--(C)-- DPoP-bound Access Token --------->| | | |--(C)-- DPoP-bound Access Token --------->| |
| | (DPoP Proof) | Resource | | | (DPoP Proof) | Resource |
| | | Server | | | | Server |
| |<-(D)-- Protected Resource ---------------| | | |<-(D)-- Protected Resource ---------------| |
| | +---------------+ | | +---------------+
+--------+ +--------+
Figure 1 Figure 1: Basic DPoP Flow
Figure 1: Basic DPoP Flow
The basic steps of an OAuth flow with DPoP are shown in Figure 1: The basic steps of an OAuth flow with DPoP are shown in Figure 1:
* (A) In the Token Request, the client sends an authorization code * (A) In the Token Request, the client sends an authorization code
to the authorization server in order to obtain an access token to the authorization server in order to obtain an access token
(and potentially a refresh token). The client attaches a DPoP (and potentially a refresh token). The client attaches a DPoP
proof to the request in an HTTP header. proof to the request in an HTTP header.
* (B) The AS binds (sender-constrains) the access token to the * (B) The AS binds (sender-constrains) the access token to the
public key claimed by the client in the DPoP proof; that is, the public key claimed by the client in the DPoP proof; that is, the
access token cannot be used without proving possession of the access token cannot be used without proving possession of the
respective private key. This is signaled to the client by using respective private key. This is signaled to the client by using
the "token_type" value "DPoP". the "token_type" value "DPoP".
* If a refresh token is issued to a public client, it is sender- * If a refresh token is issued to a public client, it is bound to
constrained in the same way. For confidential clients, refresh the public key of the DPoP proof in a similar way. Note that for
tokens are bound to the "client_id", which is more flexible than confidential clients, refresh tokens are required by [RFC6749] to
binding it to a particular public key. bound to the "client_id" and associated authentication
credentials, which is a sender-constraining mechanism that is more
flexible than binding to a particular public key.
* (C) If the client wants to use the access token, it has to prove * (C) If the client wants to use the access token, it has to prove
possession of the private key by, again, adding a header to the possession of the private key by, again, adding a header to the
request that carries the DPoP proof. The resource server needs to request that carries the DPoP proof. The resource server needs to
receive information about the public key to which the access token receive information about the public key to which the access token
is bound. This information is either encoded directly into the is bound. This information is either encoded directly into the
access token (for JWT structured access tokens), or provided at access token (for JWT structured access tokens), or provided at
the token introspection endpoint of the authorization server (not the token introspection endpoint of the authorization server (not
shown). shown). The resource server verifies that the public key to which
the access token is bound matches the public key of the DPoP
proof.
* (D) The resource server refuses to serve the request if the * (D) The resource server refuses to serve the request if the
signature check fails or the data in the DPoP proof is wrong, signature check fails or the data in the DPoP proof is wrong,
e.g., the request URI does not match the URI claim in the DPoP e.g., the request URI does not match the URI claim in the DPoP
proof JWT. proof JWT.
* When a refresh token that is sender-constrained using DPoP is used * When a refresh token that is sender-constrained using DPoP is used
by the client, the client has to provide a DPoP proof just as in by the client, the client has to provide a DPoP proof just as in
the case of a resource access. The new access token will be bound the case of a resource access. The new access token will be bound
to the same public key. to the same public key.
The mechanism presented herein is not a client authentication method. The mechanism presented herein is not a client authentication method.
In fact, a primary use case is public clients (single page In fact, a primary use case of DPoP is for public clients (e.g.,
applications) that do not use client authentication. Nonetheless, single page applications) that do not use client authentication.
DPoP is designed such that it is compatible with "private_key_jwt" Nonetheless, DPoP is designed such that it is compatible with
and all other client authentication methods. "private_key_jwt" and all other client authentication methods.
DPoP does not directly ensure message integrity but relies on the TLS DPoP does not directly ensure message integrity but relies on the TLS
layer for that purpose. See Section 9 for details. layer for that purpose. See Section 9 for details.
4. DPoP Proof JWTs 4. DPoP Proof JWTs
DPoP uses so-called DPoP proof JWTs for binding public keys and DPoP introduces concept of a DPoP proof JWT, which is used for
proving knowledge about private keys. binding public keys and proving knowledge about private keys. The
DPoP proof JWT is sent with an HTTP request using the "DPoP" header
field.
4.1. Syntax 4.1. DPoP Proof JWT Syntax
A DPoP proof is a JWT ([RFC7519]) that is signed (using JWS, A DPoP proof is a JWT ([RFC7519]) that is signed (using JWS,
[RFC7515]) using a private key chosen by the client (see below). The [RFC7515]) using a private key chosen by the client (see below). The
header of a DPoP JWT contains at least the following parameters: header of a DPoP JWT contains at least the following parameters:
* "typ": type header, value "dpop+jwt" (REQUIRED). * "typ": type header, value "dpop+jwt" (REQUIRED).
* "alg": a digital signature algorithm identifier as per [RFC7518] * "alg": a digital signature algorithm identifier as per [RFC7518]
(REQUIRED). MUST NOT be "none" or an identifier for a symmetric (REQUIRED). MUST NOT be "none" or an identifier for a symmetric
algorithm (MAC). algorithm (MAC).
skipping to change at page 6, line 33 skipping to change at page 7, line 21
"y":"9VE4jf_Ok_o64zbTTlcuNJajHmt6v9TDVrU0CdvGRDA", "y":"9VE4jf_Ok_o64zbTTlcuNJajHmt6v9TDVrU0CdvGRDA",
"crv":"P-256" "crv":"P-256"
} }
}.{ }.{
"jti":"-BwC3ESc6acc2lTc", "jti":"-BwC3ESc6acc2lTc",
"htm":"POST", "htm":"POST",
"htu":"https://server.example.com/token", "htu":"https://server.example.com/token",
"iat":1562262616 "iat":1562262616
} }
Figure 2 Figure 2: Example JWT content for "DPoP" proof header
Figure 2: Example JWT content for "DPoP" proof header.
Note: To keep DPoP simple to implement, only the HTTP method and URI Note: To keep DPoP simple to implement, only the HTTP method and URI
are signed in DPoP proofs. Nonetheless, DPoP proofs can be extended are signed in DPoP proofs. The idea is sign just enough of the HTTP
to contain other information of the HTTP request (see also data to provide reasonable proof-of-possession with respect to the
Section 9.4). HTTP request. But that it be a minimal subset of the HTTP data so as
to avoid the substantial difficulties inherent in attempting to
normalize HTTP messages. Nonetheless, DPoP proofs can be extended to
contain other information of the HTTP request (see also Section 9.4).
4.2. Checking DPoP Proofs 4.2. Checking DPoP Proofs
To check if a string that was received as part of an HTTP Request is To check if a string that was received as part of an HTTP Request is
a valid DPoP proof, the receiving server MUST ensure that a valid DPoP proof, the receiving server MUST ensure that
1. the string value is a well-formed JWT, 1. the string value is a well-formed JWT,
2. all required claims are contained in the JWT, 2. all required claims are contained in the JWT,
skipping to change at page 7, line 51 skipping to change at page 8, line 42
nMiLCJ5IjoiOVZFNGpmX09rX282NHpiVFRsY3VOSmFqSG10NnY5VERWclUwQ2R2R1JE nMiLCJ5IjoiOVZFNGpmX09rX282NHpiVFRsY3VOSmFqSG10NnY5VERWclUwQ2R2R1JE
QSIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2In19.eyJqdGkiOiItQndDM0VTYzZhY2MybFRjIiwiaHRtIj QSIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2In19.eyJqdGkiOiItQndDM0VTYzZhY2MybFRjIiwiaHRtIj
oiUE9TVCIsImh0dSI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL3Rva2VuIiwia oiUE9TVCIsImh0dSI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL3Rva2VuIiwia
WF0IjoxNTYyMjYyNjE2fQ.2-GxA6T8lP4vfrg8v-FdWP0A0zdrj8igiMLvqRMUvwnQg WF0IjoxNTYyMjYyNjE2fQ.2-GxA6T8lP4vfrg8v-FdWP0A0zdrj8igiMLvqRMUvwnQg
4PtFLbdLXiOSsX0x7NVY-FNyJK70nfbV37xRZT3Lg 4PtFLbdLXiOSsX0x7NVY-FNyJK70nfbV37xRZT3Lg
grant_type=authorization_code grant_type=authorization_code
&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA &code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&code_verifier=bEaL42izcC-o-xBk0K2vuJ6U-y1p9r_wW2dFWIWgjz- &code_verifier=bEaL42izcC-o-xBk0K2vuJ6U-y1p9r_wW2dFWIWgjz-
Figure 3 Figure 3: Token Request for a DPoP sender-constrained token
Figure 3: Token Request for a DPoP sender-constrained token.
The HTTP header "DPoP" MUST contain a valid DPoP proof. The "DPoP" HTTP header MUST contain a valid DPoP proof JWT. If the
DPoP proof is invalid, the authorization server issues an error
response per Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] with "invalid_dpop_proof" as
the value of the "error" parameter.
The authorization server, after checking the validity of the DPoP The authorization server, after checking the validity of the DPoP
proof, MUST associate the access token issued at the token endpoint proof, associates the access token issued at the token endpoint with
with the public key. It then sets "token_type" to "DPoP" in the the public key. It then sets "token_type" to "DPoP" in the token
token response. response, which signals to the client that the access token was bound
to its DPoP key and can used as described in Section 6.
A client typically cannot know whether a certain AS supports DPoP.
It therefore SHOULD use the value of the "token_type" parameter
returned from the AS to determine support for DPoP: If the token type
returned is "Bearer" or another value, the AS does not support DPoP.
If it is "DPoP", DPoP is supported. Only then, the client needs to
send the "DPoP" header in subsequent requests and use the token type
"DPoP" in the "Authorization" header as described below.
If a refresh token is issued to a public client at the token endpoint If a refresh token is issued to a public client at the token endpoint
and a valid DPoP proof is presented, the refresh token MUST be bound and a valid DPoP proof is presented, the refresh token MUST be bound
to the public key contained in the header of the DPoP proof JWT. to the public key contained in the header of the DPoP proof JWT.
If a DPoP-bound refresh token is to be used at the token endpoint by When a DPoP-bound refresh token is used at the token endpoint by a
a public client, the AS MUST ensure that the DPoP proof contains the public client, the AS MUST ensure that the DPoP proof contains the
same public key as the one the refresh token is bound to. The access same public key as the one the refresh token is bound to. The access
token issued MUST be bound to the public key contained in the DPoP token issued MUST be bound to the public key contained in the DPoP
proof. proof.
6. Resource Access (Proof of Possession for Access Tokens) 6. Resource Access (Proof of Possession for Access Tokens)
To make use of an access token that is token-bound to a public key To make use of an access token that is bound to a public key using
using DPoP, a client MUST prove the possession of the corresponding DPoP, a client MUST prove the possession of the corresponding private
private key by providing a DPoP proof in the "DPoP" request header. key by providing a DPoP proof in the "DPoP" request header.
The DPoP-bound access token must be sent in the "Authorization" A DPoP-bound access token is sent using the "Authorization" request
header with the prefix "DPoP". header field per Section 2 of [RFC7235] using an authentication
scheme of "DPoP". The syntax of the "Authorization" header field for
the "DPoP" scheme uses the "token68" syntax defined in Section 2.1 of
[RFC7235] (repeated below for ease of reference) for credentials.
The Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation [RFC5234] syntax for
DPoP Authorization scheme credentials is as follows:
If a resource server detects that an access token that is to be used token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
for resource access is bound to a public key using DPoP (via the "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="
methods described in Section 7) it MUST check that a header "DPoP"
was received in the HTTP request, and check the header's contents credentials = "DPoP" 1*SP token68
according to the rules in Section 4.2.
Figure 4: DPoP Authorization Scheme ABNF
For such an access token, a resource server MUST check that a "DPoP"
header was received in the HTTP request, check the header's contents
according to the rules in Section 4.2, and check that the public key
of the DPoP proof matches the public key to which the access token is
bound per Section 7.
The resource server MUST NOT grant access to the resource unless all The resource server MUST NOT grant access to the resource unless all
checks are successful. checks are successful.
GET /protectedresource HTTP/1.1 GET /protectedresource HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.org Host: resource.example.org
Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkJlQUxrYiJ9.eyJzdWI Authorization: DPoP eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IkJlQUxrYiJ9.eyJzdWI
iOiJzb21lb25lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbX iOiJzb21lb25lQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbX
BsZS5jb20iLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3Jlc291cmNlLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnIiwibmJmI BsZS5jb20iLCJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3Jlc291cmNlLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnIiwibmJmI
joxNTYyMjYyNjExLCJleHAiOjE1NjIyNjYyMTYsImNuZiI6eyJqa3QiOiIwWmNPQ09S joxNTYyMjYyNjExLCJleHAiOjE1NjIyNjYyMTYsImNuZiI6eyJqa3QiOiIwWmNPQ09S
skipping to change at page 9, line 22 skipping to change at page 10, line 22
50c69bmPJsj8qYlsXfuC6nZcLl8YYRNOhqMuRXu6oSZHe2dGZY0ODNaGg1cg-kVigzY 50c69bmPJsj8qYlsXfuC6nZcLl8YYRNOhqMuRXu6oSZHe2dGZY0ODNaGg1cg-kVigzY
hF1MQ hF1MQ
DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwiandrIjp7Imt0eSI6Ik DPoP: eyJ0eXAiOiJkcG9wK2p3dCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwiandrIjp7Imt0eSI6Ik
VDIiwieCI6Imw4dEZyaHgtMzR0VjNoUklDUkRZOXpDa0RscEJoRjQyVVFVZldWQVdCR VDIiwieCI6Imw4dEZyaHgtMzR0VjNoUklDUkRZOXpDa0RscEJoRjQyVVFVZldWQVdCR
nMiLCJ5IjoiOVZFNGpmX09rX282NHpiVFRsY3VOSmFqSG10NnY5VERWclUwQ2R2R1JE nMiLCJ5IjoiOVZFNGpmX09rX282NHpiVFRsY3VOSmFqSG10NnY5VERWclUwQ2R2R1JE
QSIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2In19.eyJqdGkiOiJlMWozVl9iS2ljOC1MQUVCIiwiaHRtIj QSIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2In19.eyJqdGkiOiJlMWozVl9iS2ljOC1MQUVCIiwiaHRtIj
oiR0VUIiwiaHR1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9yZXNvdXJjZS5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9wcm90ZWN0Z oiR0VUIiwiaHR1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9yZXNvdXJjZS5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9wcm90ZWN0Z
WRyZXNvdXJjZSIsImlhdCI6MTU2MjI2MjYxOH0.lNhmpAX1WwmpBvwhok4E74kWCiGB WRyZXNvdXJjZSIsImlhdCI6MTU2MjI2MjYxOH0.lNhmpAX1WwmpBvwhok4E74kWCiGB
NdavjLAeevGy32H3dbF0Jbri69Nm2ukkwb-uyUI4AUg1JSskfWIyo4UCbQ NdavjLAeevGy32H3dbF0Jbri69Nm2ukkwb-uyUI4AUg1JSskfWIyo4UCbQ
Figure 4 Figure 5: Protected Resource Request with a DPoP sender-
constrained access token
Figure 4: Protected Resource Request with a DPoP sender-constrained Upon receipt of a request for a URI of a protected resource within
access token. the protection space requiring DPoP authorization, if the request
does not include valid credentials or or does not contain an access
token sufficient for access to the protected resource, the server can
reply with a challenge using the 401 (Unauthorized) status code
([RFC7235], Section 3.1) and the "WWW-Authenticate" header field
([RFC7235], Section 4.1). The server MAY include the "WWW-
Authenticate" header in response to other conditions as well.
In such challenges:
* The scheme name is "DPoP".
* The authentication parameter "realm" MAY be included to indicate
the scope of protection in the manner described in [RFC7235],
Section 2.2.
* A "scope" authentication parameter MAY be included as defined in
[RFC6750], Section 3.
* An "error" parameter ([RFC6750], Section 3) SHOULD be included to
indicate the reason why the request was declined, if the request
included an access token but failed authorization. Parameter
values are described in Section 3.1 of [RFC6750].
* An "error_description" parameter ([RFC6750], Section 3) MAY be
included along with the "error" parameter to provide developers a
human-readable explanation that is not meant to be displayed to
end-users.
* An "algs" parameter SHOULD be included to signal to the client the
JWS algorithms that are acceptable for the DPoP proof JWT. The
value of the parameter is a space-delimited list of JWS "alg"
(Algorithm) header values ([RFC7515], Section 4.1.1).
* Additional authentication parameters MAY be used and unknown
parameters MUST be ignored by recipients
For example, in response to a protected resource request without
authentication:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm="WallyWorld", algs="ES256 PS256"
Figure 6
And in response to a protected resource request that was rejected
because the confirmation of the DPoP binding in the access token
failed:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm="WallyWorld", error="invalid_token",
error_description="Invalid DPoP key binding", algs="ES256"
Figure 7
7. Public Key Confirmation 7. Public Key Confirmation
It MUST be ensured that resource servers can reliably identify It MUST be ensured that resource servers can reliably identify
whether a token is bound using DPoP and learn the public key to which whether a token is bound using DPoP and learn the public key to which
the token is bound. the token is bound.
Access tokens that are represented as JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519] Access tokens that are represented as JSON Web Tokens (JWT) [RFC7519]
MUST contain information about the DPoP public key (in JWK format) in MUST contain information about the DPoP public key (in JWK format) in
the member "jkt" of the "cnf" claim, as shown in Figure 5. the member "jkt" of the "cnf" claim, as shown in Figure 8.
The value in "jkt" MUST be the base64url encoding [RFC7515] of the The value in "jkt" MUST be the base64url encoding [RFC7515] of the
JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint (according to [RFC7638]) of the public key to JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint (according to [RFC7638]) of the public key to
which the access token is bound. which the access token is bound.
{ {
"sub":"someone@example.com", "sub":"someone@example.com",
"iss":"https://server.example.com", "iss":"https://server.example.com",
"aud":"https://resource.example.org", "aud":"https://resource.example.org",
"nbf":1562262611, "nbf":1562262611,
"exp":1562266216, "exp":1562266216,
"cnf":{ "cnf":{
"jkt":"0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I" "jkt":"0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I"
} }
} }
Figure 5 Figure 8: Example access token body with "cnf" claim
Figure 5: Example access token body with "cnf" claim.
When access token introspection is used, the same "cnf" claim as When access token introspection is used, the same "cnf" claim as
above MUST be contained in the introspection response. above MUST be contained in the introspection response.
Resource servers MUST ensure that the fingerprint of the public key Resource servers MUST ensure that the fingerprint of the public key
in the DPoP proof JWT equals the value in the "jkt" claim in the in the DPoP proof JWT equals the value in the "jkt" claim in the
access token or introspection response. access token or introspection response.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Authorization Server Metadata
We would like to thank David Waite, Filip Skokan, Mike Engan, and This document introduces the following new authorization server
Justin Richer for their valuable input and feedback. metadata [RFC8414] parameter to signal the JWS "alg" values the
authorization server supports for DPoP proof JWTs:
This document resulted from discussions at the 4th OAuth Security "dpop_signing_alg_values_supported" OPTIONAL. JSON array containing
Workshop in Stuttgart, Germany. We thank the organizers of this a list of the JWS "alg" values supported by the authorization
workshop (Ralf Kusters, Guido Schmitz). server for DPoP proof JWTs
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
In DPoP, the prevention of token replay at a different endpoint (see In DPoP, the prevention of token replay at a different endpoint (see
Section 2) is achieved through the binding of the DPoP proof to a Section 2) is achieved through the binding of the DPoP proof to a
certain URI and HTTP method. DPoP does not, however, achieve the certain URI and HTTP method. DPoP does not, however, achieve the
same level of protection as TLS-based methods such as OAuth Mutual same level of protection as TLS-based methods such as OAuth Mutual
TLS [RFC8705] or OAuth Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] TLS [RFC8705] or OAuth Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding]
(see also Section 9.1 and Section 9.4). TLS-based mechanisms can (see also Section 9.1 and Section 9.4). TLS-based mechanisms can
leverage a tight integration between the TLS layer and the leverage a tight integration between the TLS layer and the
skipping to change at page 11, line 11 skipping to change at page 13, line 27
unnecessarily large "jti" values or store only a hash thereof. unnecessarily large "jti" values or store only a hash thereof.
Note: To accommodate for clock offsets, the server MAY accept DPoP Note: To accommodate for clock offsets, the server MAY accept DPoP
proofs that carry an "iat" time in the near future (e.g., up to a few proofs that carry an "iat" time in the near future (e.g., up to a few
seconds in the future). seconds in the future).
9.2. Signed JWT Swapping 9.2. Signed JWT Swapping
Servers accepting signed DPoP proof JWTs MUST check the "typ" field Servers accepting signed DPoP proof JWTs MUST check the "typ" field
in the headers of the JWTs to ensure that adversaries cannot use JWTs in the headers of the JWTs to ensure that adversaries cannot use JWTs
created for other purposes in the DPoP headers. created for other purposes.
9.3. Signature Algorithms 9.3. Signature Algorithms
Implementers MUST ensure that only asymmetric digital signature Implementers MUST ensure that only asymmetric digital signature
algorithms that are deemed secure can be used for signing DPoP algorithms that are deemed secure can be used for signing DPoP
proofs. In particular, the algorithm "none" MUST NOT be allowed. proofs. In particular, the algorithm "none" MUST NOT be allowed.
9.4. Message Integrity 9.4. Message Integrity
DPoP does not ensure the integrity of the payload or headers of DPoP does not ensure the integrity of the payload or headers of
skipping to change at page 11, line 45 skipping to change at page 14, line 13
[RFC8705] and OAuth Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding]. [RFC8705] and OAuth Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding].
Note: While signatures on (parts of) requests are out of the scope of Note: While signatures on (parts of) requests are out of the scope of
this specification, signatures or information to be signed can be this specification, signatures or information to be signed can be
added into DPoP proofs. added into DPoP proofs.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
10.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration 10.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration
This specification registers the following access token type in the This specification requests registration of the following access
OAuth Access Token Types registry defined in [RFC6749]. token type in the "OAuth Access Token Types" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Params] established by [RFC6749].
* Type name: "DPoP" * Type name: "DPoP"
* Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: (none) * Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters: (none)
* HTTP Authentication Scheme(s): Bearer
* Change controller: IETF * HTTP Authentication Scheme(s): "DPoP"
* Change controller: IESG
* Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]] * Specification document(s): [[ this specification ]]
10.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registration 10.2. HTTP Authentication Scheme Registration
This specification registers the "dpop+jwt" type value in the IANA This specification requests registration of the following scheme in
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values registry [RFC7515]: the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme
Registry" [RFC7235][IANA.HTTP.AuthSchemes]:
* "typ" Header Parameter Value: "dpop+jwt" * Authentication Scheme Name: "DPoP"
* Abbreviation for MIME Type: None * Reference: [[ Section 6 of this specification ]]
* Change Controller: IETF 10.3. Media Type Registration
[[ Is a media type registration at [IANA.MediaTypes] necessary for
"application/dpop+jwt"? There is a "+jwt" structured syntax suffix
registered already at [IANA.MediaType.StructuredSuffixs] by
Section 7.2 of [RFC8417], which is maybe sufficient? A fullblown
registration of "application/dpop+jwt" seems like it'd be overkill.
The "dpop+jwt" is used in the JWS/JWT "typ" header for explicit
typing of the JWT per Section 3.11 of [RFC8725] but it is not used
anywhere else (such as the "Content-Type" of HTTP messages).
Note that there does seem to be some precedence for [IANA.MediaTypes]
registration with [I-D.ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt],
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq], [RFC8417], and of course [RFC7519]. But
precedence isn't always right. ]]
10.4. JWT Confirmation Methods Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods" registry [IANA.JWT] for JWT "cnf"
member values established by [RFC7800].
* Confirmation Method Value: "jkt"
* Confirmation Method Description: JWK SHA-256 Thumbprint
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 7 of this specification ]]
10.5. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification requests registration of the following Claims in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT] established by
[RFC7519].
HTTP method:
* Claim Name: "htm"
* Claim Description: The HTTP method of the request
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 4.1 of this specification ]]
HTTP URI:
* Claim Name: "htu"
* Claim Description: The HTTP URI of the request (without query and
fragment parts)
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 4.1 of this specification ]]
10.6. HTTP Message Header Field Names Registration
This document specifies the following new HTTP header fields,
registration of which is requested in the "Permanent Message Header
Field Names" registry [IANA.Headers] defined in [RFC3864].
* Header Field Name: "DPoP"
* Applicable protocol: HTTP
* Status: standard
* Author/change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]] * Specification Document(s): [[ this specification ]]
10.7. Authorization Server Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].
* Metadata Name: "dpop_signing_alg_values_supported"
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWS
algorithms supported for DPoP proof JWTs
* Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): [[ Section 8 of this specification ]]
11. Normative References 11. Normative References
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
12. Informative References 12. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and W. Denniss,
"OAuth 2.0 Token Binding", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding-08, 19 October 2018,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-
binding-08>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt]
Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Access Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-07, 27 April 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-
token-jwt-07>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-jwsreq]
Sakimura, N. and J. Bradley, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-21,
19 April 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-21>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T. [RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705, and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
IANA, "Media Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
[RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
[IANA.JWT] IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding] [IANA.OAuth.Params]
Jones, M., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and W. Denniss, IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
"OAuth 2.0 Token Binding", Work in Progress, Internet- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding-08, 19 October 2018,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-
binding-08>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [IANA.MediaType.StructuredSuffixs]
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, IANA, "Structured Syntax Suffix Registry",
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-type-structured-
suffixs>.
[IANA.Headers]
IANA, "Message Headers",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/message-headers>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[IANA.HTTP.AuthSchemes]
IANA, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication
Scheme Registry",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes>.
[RFC8725] Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett, Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in "OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-14, 10 February 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/ topics-15, 5 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-14>. draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-15>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Filip Skokan, Mike Engan, Justin Richer,
Michael Peck, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Rob Otto, Dominick Baier, Jim
Willeke, Annabelle Backman, Bjorn Hjelm, Steinar Noem, Aaron Parecki,
Neil Madden, Paul Querna, Dick Hardt, Dave Tonge, Jared Jennings,
Mark Haine and others (please let us know, if you've been mistakenly
omitted) for their valuable input, feedback and general support of
this work.
This document resulted from discussions at the 4th OAuth Security
Workshop in Stuttgart, Germany. We thank the organizers of this
workshop (Ralf Kusters, Guido Schmitz).
Appendix B. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] [[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-01
* Editorial updates
* Attempt to more formally define the DPoP Authorization header
scheme
* Define the 401/WWW-Authenticate challenge
* Added "invalid_dpop_proof" error code for DPoP errors in token
request
* Fixed up and added to the IANA section
* Added "dpop_signing_alg_values_supported" authorization server
metadata
* Moved the Acknowledgements into an Appendix and added a bunch of
names (best effort)
-00 [[ Working Group Draft ]] -00 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Working group draft * Working group draft
-04 -04
* Update OAuth MTLS reference to RFC 8705 * Update OAuth MTLS reference to RFC 8705
* Use the newish RFC v3 XML and HTML format * Use the newish RFC v3 XML and HTML format
-03 -03
* rework the text around uniqueness requirements on the jti claim in * rework the text around uniqueness requirements on the jti claim in
the DPoP proof JWT the DPoP proof JWT
* make tokens a bit smaller by using "htm", "htu", and "jkt" rather * make tokens a bit smaller by using "htm", "htu", and "jkt" rather
skipping to change at page 15, line 26 skipping to change at page 22, line 4
Brian Campbell Brian Campbell
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
John Bradley John Bradley
Yubico Yubico
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Torsten Lodderstedt Torsten Lodderstedt
yes.com yes.com
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Michael Jones Michael Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
David Waite David Waite
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: david@alkaline-solutions.com Email: david@alkaline-solutions.com
 End of changes. 59 change blocks. 
147 lines changed or deleted 423 lines changed or added

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