draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05.txt   draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-06.txt 
OAuth Working Group J. Richer OAuth Working Group J. Richer
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Experimental M. Jones Intended status: Experimental M. Jones
Expires: February 27, 2015 Microsoft Expires: June 9, 2015 Microsoft
J. Bradley J. Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
M. Machulak M. Machulak
Newcastle University Newcastle University
August 26, 2014 December 6, 2014
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05 draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-06
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines methods for management of dynamic OAuth This specification defines methods for management of dynamic OAuth
2.0 client registrations for use cases in which the properties of a 2.0 client registrations for use cases in which the properties of a
registered client may need to be changed during the lifetime of the registered client may need to be changed during the lifetime of the
client. Not all authorization servers supporting dynamic client client. Not all authorization servers supporting dynamic client
registration will support these management methods. registration will support these management methods.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 27, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 9, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 16 skipping to change at page 2, line 16
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . . . . 5 2. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.1. Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 7 2.3. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Appendix B. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . . 14
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 B.1. Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix C. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . 15
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In order for an OAuth 2.0 client to utilize an OAuth 2.0 In order for an OAuth 2.0 client to utilize an OAuth 2.0
authorization server, the client needs specific information to authorization server, the client needs specific information to
interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 client identifier to interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 client identifier to
use at that server. The OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration use at that server. The OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
Protocol [OAuth.Registration] specification describes how an OAuth Protocol [OAuth.Registration] specification describes how an OAuth
2.0 client can be dynamically registered with an authorization server 2.0 client can be dynamically registered with an authorization server
to obtain this information and how metadata about the client can be to obtain this information and how metadata about the client can be
skipping to change at page 5, line 31 skipping to change at page 5, line 31
is issued, it replaces the token issued in (D) for all subsequent is issued, it replaces the token issued in (D) for all subsequent
calls to the client configuration endpoint. calls to the client configuration endpoint.
(G) The client or developer optionally calls the client (G) The client or developer optionally calls the client
configuration endpoint with a delete request using the configuration endpoint with a delete request using the
registration access token issued in (D). registration access token issued in (D).
(H) The authorization server deprovisions the client and responds (H) The authorization server deprovisions the client and responds
with a confirmation that the deletion has taken place. with a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.
1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials
Throughout the course of the dynamic registration protocol, there are
three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
properties and targets.
o The initial access token is optionally used by the client or
developer at the registration endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0
token that is used to authorize the initial client registration
request. The content, structure, generation, and validation of
this token are out of scope for this specification. The
authorization server can use this token to verify that the
presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. This
token may be shared among multiple instances of a client to allow
them to each register separately, thereby letting the
authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of
registered clients (each with their own distinct client
identifier) back to the party to whom the initial access token was
issued, usually an application developer. This token should be
used only at the client registration endpoint.
o The registration access token is used by the client or developer
at the client configuration endpoint and represents the holder's
authorization to manage the registration of a client. This is an
OAuth 2.0 bearer token that is issued from the client registration
endpoint in response to a client registration request and is
returned in a client information response. The registration
access token is uniquely bound to the client identifier and is
required to be presented with all calls to the client
configuration endpoint. The registration access token should be
protected and should not be shared between instances of a client
(otherwise, one instance could change or delete registration
values for all instances of the client). The registration access
token can be rotated through the use of the client update method
on the client configuration endpoint. The registration access
token should be used only at the client configuration endpoint.
o The client credentials (such as "client_secret") are optional
depending on the type of client and are used to retrieve OAuth
tokens. Client credentials are most often bound to particular
instances of a client and should not be shared between instances.
Note that since not all types of clients have client credentials,
they cannot be used to manage client registrations at the client
configuration endpoint. The client credentials can be rotated
through the use of the client update method on the client
configuration endpoint. The client credentials cannot be used for
authentication at the client registration endpoint or at the
client configuration endpoint.
1.4.1. Credential Rotation
The Authorization Server MAY rotate the client's registration access
token and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret")
throughout the lifetime of the client. The client can discover that
these values have changed by reading the client information response
returned from either a read or update request to the client
configuration endpoint. The client's current registration access
token and client credentials (if applicable) MUST be included in this
response.
The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to
an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at which
point the new registration access token is returned to the client and
the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by both
parties. If the registration access token were to expire or be
rotated outside of such requests, the client or developer might be
locked out of managing the client's configuration.
2. Client Configuration Endpoint 2. Client Configuration Endpoint
The client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource The client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource
that is provisioned by the server to facilitate viewing, updating, that is provisioned by the server to facilitate viewing, updating,
and deleting a client's registered information. The location of this and deleting a client's registered information. The location of this
endpoint is communicated to the client through the endpoint is communicated to the client through the
"registration_client_uri" member of the Client Information Response, "registration_client_uri" member of the client information response,
as specified in Section 3.1. The client MUST use its registration as specified in Section 3.1. The client MUST use its registration
access token in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer access token in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Token [RFC6750]. Token [RFC6750].
The client configuration endpoint MUST require transport-layer
security. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and MAY
support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
server certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. Implementation
security considerations can be found in Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS [TLS.BCP].
Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of different Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of different
HTTP methods [RFC2616]. If an authorization server does not support HTTP methods [RFC2616]. If an authorization server does not support
a particular method on the client configuration endpoint, it MUST a particular method on the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
respond with the appropriate error code. respond with the appropriate error code.
2.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL 2.1. Client Read Request
The authorization server MUST provide the client with the fully
qualified URL in the "registration_client_uri" element of the Client
Information Response, as specified in Section 3.1. The authorization
server MUST NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL
on its own. The client MUST use the URL as given by the server and
MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.
Depending on deployment characteristics, the client configuration
endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that
this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
URL string which combines the client registration endpoint's URL and
the issued "client_id" for this client, with the latter as either a
path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a client with the
client identifier "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a client configuration
endpoint URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
(path parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter). In both of these
cases, the client simply uses the URL as given by the authorization
server.
These common patterns can help the server to more easily determine
the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
against the client to which the registration access token was issued.
If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration
endpoint URL as the client configuration endpoint URL and change
behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
registration access token.
2.2. Client Read Request
To read the current configuration of the client on the authorization To read the current configuration of the client on the authorization
server, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the client server, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the client
configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access
token. This operation SHOULD be idempotent -- not causing changes to token.
the client configuration.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1 GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483 Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
Upon successful read of the information for a currently active Upon successful read of the information for a currently active
client, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with client, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with
content type of "application/json" and a payload, as described in content type of "application/json" and a payload, as described in
Section 3.1. Some values in the response, including the Section 3.1. Some values in the response, including the
"client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be different "client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be different
from those in the initial registration response. However, since read from those in the initial registration response. If the
operations are intended to be idempotent, the read request itself authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration
SHOULD NOT cause changes to the client's registered metadata values. access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its
If the authorization server includes a new client secret and/or previous client secret and/or registration access token. The value
registration access token in its response, the client MUST of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration
immediately discard its previous client secret and/or registration response.
access token. The value of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the
initial registration response.
If the registration access token used to make this request is not If the registration access token used to make this request is not
valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked. make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the client does not have permission to read its record, the server If the client does not have permission to read its record, the server
MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden. MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.
2.3. Client Update Request 2.2. Client Update Request
This operation updates a previously-registered client with new This operation updates a previously-registered client with new
metadata at the authorization server. This request is authenticated metadata at the authorization server. This request is authenticated
by the registration access token issued to the client. by the registration access token issued to the client.
The client sends an HTTP PUT to the client configuration endpoint The client sends an HTTP PUT to the client configuration endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP entity payload with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP entity payload
is a JSON [RFC7159] document consisting of a JSON object and all is a JSON [RFC7159] document consisting of a JSON object and all
parameters as top- level members of that JSON object. parameters as top- level members of that JSON object.
skipping to change at page 10, line 34 skipping to change at page 8, line 34
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png", "logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
"logo_uri#fr":"https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png" "logo_uri#fr":"https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png"
} }
This example uses client metadata values defined in This example uses client metadata values defined in
[OAuth.Registration]. [OAuth.Registration].
Upon successful update, the authorization server responds with an Upon successful update, the authorization server responds with an
HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a
payload, as described in Section 3.1. Some values in the response, payload, as described in Section 3.1. Some values in the response,
including the "client_secret" and r"egistration_access_token", MAY be including the "client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be
different from those in the initial registration response. If the different from those in the initial registration response. If the
authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration
access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its
previous client secret and/or registration access token. The value previous client secret and/or registration access token. The value
of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration
response. response.
If the registration access token used to make this request is not If the registration access token used to make this request is not
valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
skipping to change at page 11, line 9 skipping to change at page 9, line 9
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the registration access token used to with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the registration access token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked. make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST If the client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST
respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden. respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
If the client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the If the client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the
authorization server does not set a default value, the authorization authorization server does not set a default value, the authorization
server responds with an error as described in [OAuth.Registration]. server responds with an error as described in [OAuth.Registration].
2.4. Client Delete Request 2.3. Client Delete Request
To deprovision itself on the authorization server, the client makes To deprovision itself on the authorization server, the client makes
an HTTP DELETE request to the client configuration endpoint. This an HTTP DELETE request to the client configuration endpoint. This
request is authenticated by the registration access token issued to request is authenticated by the registration access token issued to
the client. the client as described in [RFC6749].
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1 DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483 Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id", A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id",
"client_secret", and "registration_access_token" for this client, "client_secret", and "registration_access_token" for this client,
thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used at either the thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used at either the
authorization endpoint or token endpoint of the authorization server. authorization endpoint or token endpoint of the authorization server.
The authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing If possible, the authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate
authorization grants and currently-active tokens associated with this all existing authorization grants and currently-active access tokens,
client. refresh tokens, and other tokens associated with this client.
If a client has been successfully deprovisioned, the authorization If a client has been successfully deprovisioned, the authorization
server MUST responsd with an HTTP 204 No Content message. server MUST responsd with an HTTP 204 No Content message.
If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST
respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported. respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported.
If the registration access token used to make this request is not If the registration access token used to make this request is not
valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
skipping to change at page 12, line 15 skipping to change at page 10, line 15
3. Responses 3. Responses
In response to certain requests from the client to either the client In response to certain requests from the client to either the client
registration endpoint or the client configuration endpoint as registration endpoint or the client configuration endpoint as
described in this specification, the authorization server sends the described in this specification, the authorization server sends the
following response bodies. following response bodies.
3.1. Client Information Response 3.1. Client Information Response
This specification extends the client information response defined in This specification extends the client information response defined in
OAuth 2.0 Core Client Dynamic Registration. The response contains OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration [OAuth.Registration]. The
the client identifier as well as the client secret, if the client is response contains the client identifier as well as the client secret,
a confidential client. The response also contains the fully if the client is a confidential client. The response also contains
qualified URL of the client configuration endpoint for this specific the fully qualified URL of the client configuration endpoint
client that the client may use to obtain and update information about (Section 2) for this specific client that the client may use to
itself. The response also contains a registration access token that obtain and update information about itself. The response also
is to be used by the client to perform subsequent operations at the contains a registration access token that is to be used by the client
client configuration endpoint. to perform subsequent operations at the client configuration
endpoint.
client_id client_id
REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 client identifier. REQUIRED. OAuth 2.0 client identifier.
client_secret client_secret
OPTIONAL. OAuth 2.0 client secret. OPTIONAL. OAuth 2.0 client secret.
client_id_issued_at client_id_issued_at
OPTIONAL. Time at which the client identifier was issued, as OPTIONAL. Time at which the client identifier was issued, as
defined by [OAuth.Registration]. defined by [OAuth.Registration].
skipping to change at page 12, line 46 skipping to change at page 10, line 47
"client_secret" will expire, as defined by [OAuth.Registration]. "client_secret" will expire, as defined by [OAuth.Registration].
registration_access_token registration_access_token
REQUIRED. Access token used at the client configuration endpoint REQUIRED. Access token used at the client configuration endpoint
to perform subsequent operations upon the client registration. to perform subsequent operations upon the client registration.
registration_client_uri registration_client_uri
REQUIRED. Fully qualified URL of the client configuration REQUIRED. Fully qualified URL of the client configuration
endpoint for this client. endpoint for this client.
Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered Additionally, the authorization server MUST return all registered
metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the
authorization server itself. The authorization server MAY reject or authorization server itself. The authorization server MAY reject or
replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted
during the registration or update requests and substitute them with during the registration or update requests and substitute them with
suitable values. suitable values.
The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as
top-level members of a JSON object [RFC7159]. top-level members of a JSON object [RFC7159].
Following is a non-normative example response: Following is a non-normative example response:
skipping to change at page 13, line 37 skipping to change at page 11, line 37
"https://client.example.org/callback", "https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"], "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"], "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic", "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png", "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks" "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
} }
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This specification makes no requests of IANA. This specification requests that IANA extend the OAuth Dynamic Client
Metadata registry with the following entries:
o Client Metadata Name: "registration_access_token"
o Client Metadata Description: OAuth 2.0 bearer token used to access
the client configuration endpoint
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
o Client Metadata Name: "registration_client_uri"
o Client Metadata Description: Fully qualified URI of the client
registration endpoint
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
While the client secret can expire, the registration access token While the client secret can expire, the registration access token
SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively registered. If SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively registered. If
this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in a this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in a
situation where they have no means of retrieving or updating the situation where they have no means of retrieving or updating the
client's registration information. Were that the case, a new client's registration information. Were that the case, a new
registration would be required, thereby generating a new client registration would be required, thereby generating a new client
identifier. However, to limit the exposure surface of the identifier. However, to limit the exposure surface of the
registration access token, the registration access token MAY be registration access token, the registration access token MAY be
rotated when the developer or client does a read or update operation rotated when the developer or client does a read or update operation
on the client's client configuration endpoint. As the registration on the client's client configuration endpoint. As the registration
access tokens are relatively long-term credentials, and since the access tokens are relatively long-term credentials, and since the
registration access token is a Bearer token and acts as the sole registration access token is a Bearer token and acts as the sole
authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
be protected by the developer or client as described in OAuth 2.0 be protected by the developer or client as described in OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750]. Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
Since requests to the client configuration endpoint result in the
transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
response), the authorization server MUST require the use of a
transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the
endpoint. The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and MAY
support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
server certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. Implementation
security considerations can be found in Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS [TLS.BCP].
Since the client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected Since the client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected
resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent
the registration access token from being disclosed though repeated the registration access token from being disclosed though repeated
access attempts. access attempts.
If a client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding If a client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding
registration access token for that client MUST be invalidated at the registration access token for that client MUST be invalidated at the
same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
a client could make requests to the client configuration endpoint a client could make requests to the client configuration endpoint
where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail
skipping to change at page 14, line 37 skipping to change at page 13, line 19
Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol", Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg (work in progress), August 2014. draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg (work in progress), August 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012. 6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012. Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014. Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.
[TLS.BCP] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", November
2014.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek Atkins, to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek Atkins,
Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov,
George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim, Torsten George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat
Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig. Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials
Throughout the course of the dynamic registration protocol, there are
three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
properties and targets.
o The initial access token is optionally used by the client or
developer at the registration endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0
token that is used to authorize the initial client registration
request. The content, structure, generation, and validation of
this token are out of scope for this specification. The
authorization server can use this token to verify that the
presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. This
token may be shared among multiple instances of a client to allow
them to each register separately, thereby letting the
authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of
registered clients (each with their own distinct client
identifier) back to the party to whom the initial access token was
issued, usually an application developer. This token should be
used only at the client registration endpoint.
o The registration access token is used by the client or developer
at the client configuration endpoint and represents the holder's
authorization to manage the registration of a client. This is an
OAuth 2.0 bearer token that is issued from the client registration
endpoint in response to a client registration request and is
returned in a client information response. The registration
access token is uniquely bound to the client identifier and is
required to be presented with all calls to the client
configuration endpoint. The registration access token should be
protected and should not be shared between instances of a client
(otherwise, one instance could change or delete registration
values for all instances of the client). The registration access
token can be rotated through the use of the client update method
on the client configuration endpoint. The registration access
token should be used only at the client configuration endpoint.
o The client credentials (such as "client_secret") are optional
depending on the type of client and are used to retrieve OAuth
tokens. Client credentials are most often bound to particular
instances of a client and should not be shared between instances.
Note that since not all types of clients have client credentials,
they cannot be used to manage client registrations at the client
configuration endpoint. The client credentials can be rotated
through the use of the client update method on the client
configuration endpoint. The client credentials cannot be used for
authentication at the client registration endpoint or at the
client configuration endpoint.
B.1. Credential Rotation
The authorization server MAY rotate the client's registration access
token and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret")
throughout the lifetime of the client in order to minimize the risk
of leakage of these credentials. The client can discover that these
values have changed by reading the client information response
returned from either a read or update request to the client
configuration endpoint. The client's current registration access
token and client credentials (if applicable) MUST be included in this
response.
The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to
an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at which
point the new registration access token is returned to the client and
the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by both
parties. If the registration access token were to expire or be
rotated outside of such requests, the client or developer might be
locked out of managing the client's configuration.
Methods by which the client can request credential rotation are
outside the scope of this document.
Appendix C. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL
The authorization server MUST provide the client with the fully
qualified URL in the "registration_client_uri" element of the Client
Information Response, as specified in Section 3.1. The authorization
server MUST NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL
on its own. The client MUST use the URL as given by the server and
MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.
Depending on deployment characteristics, the client configuration
endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that
this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
URL string which combines the client registration endpoint's URL and
the issued "client_id" for this client, with the latter as either a
path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a client with the
client identifier "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a client configuration
endpoint URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
(path parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter). In both of these
cases, the client simply uses the URL as given by the authorization
server.
These common patterns can help the server to more easily determine
the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
against the client to which the registration access token was issued.
If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration
endpoint URL as the client configuration endpoint URL and change
behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
registration access token.
Appendix D. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-05 -05
o Removed Phil Hunt from authors list, per request. o Removed Phil Hunt from authors list, per request.
o Applied various minor editorial changes from working group o Applied various minor editorial changes from working group
comments. comments.
 End of changes. 23 change blocks. 
147 lines changed or deleted 201 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/