OAuth Working Group                                            J. Richer
Internet-Draft                                     The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Experimental                                   M. Jones
Expires: February 27, June 9, 2015                                          Microsoft
                                                              J. Bradley
                                                           Ping Identity
                                                             M. Machulak
                                                    Newcastle University
                                                         August 26,
                                                        December 6, 2014

       OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
                 draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-05
                 draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-06

Abstract

   This specification defines methods for management of dynamic OAuth
   2.0 client registrations for use cases in which the properties of a
   registered client may need to be changed during the lifetime of the
   client.  Not all authorization servers supporting dynamic client
   registration will support these management methods.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 27, June 9, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.4.  Registration Tokens and Client Credentials  . . . . . . .   5
       1.4.1.  Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7   5
     2.1.  Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.   6
     2.2.  Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.4.   6
     2.3.  Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11   9
   3.  Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  10
     3.1.  Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  10
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  11
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  12
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  13
   Appendix B.  Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . .  14
     B.1.  Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix C.  Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL  . . .  15
   Appendix D.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  16

1.  Introduction

   In order for an OAuth 2.0 client to utilize an OAuth 2.0
   authorization server, the client needs specific information to
   interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 client identifier to
   use at that server.  The OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
   Protocol [OAuth.Registration] specification describes how an OAuth
   2.0 client can be dynamically registered with an authorization server
   to obtain this information and how metadata about the client can be
   registered with the server.

   This specification extends the core registration specification by
   defining a set of methods for management of dynamic OAuth 2.0 client
   registrations beyond those defined in the core registration
   specification.

1.1.  Notational Conventions

   The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
   'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
   are case sensitive.

1.2.  Terminology

   This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization
   code", "authorization endpoint", "authorization grant",
   "authorization server", "client", "client identifier", "client
   secret", "grant type", "protected resource", "redirection URI",
   "refresh token", "resource owner", "resource server", "response
   type", and "token endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and the
   terms defined by the OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration Protocol
   [OAuth.Registration].

   This specification defines the following terms:

   Client Configuration Endpoint
      OAuth 2.0 endpoint through which registration information for a
      registered client can be managed.  This URL for this endpoint is
      returned by the authorization server in the client information
      response.

   Registration Access Token
      OAuth 2.0 bearer token issued by the authorization server through
      the client registration endpoint that is used to authenticate the
      caller when accessing the client's registration information at the
      client configuration endpoint.  This access token is associated
      with a particular registered client.

1.3.  Protocol Flow
   This extends the flow in the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
   Protocol [OAuth.Registration] specification as follows:

        +--------(A)- Initial Access Token (OPTIONAL)
        |
        |   +----(B)- Software Statement (OPTIONAL)
        |   |
        v   v
    +-----------+                                      +---------------+
    |           |--(C)- Client Registration Request -->|    Client     |
    |           |                                      | Registration  |
    |           |<-(D)- Client Information Response ---|   Endpoint    |
    |           |                                      +---------------+
    |           |
    |           |                                      +---------------+
    | Client or |--(E)- Read or Update Request ------->|               |
    | Developer |                                      |               |
    |           |<-(F)- Client Information Response ---|    Client     |
    |           |                                      | Configuration |
    |           |                                      |   Endpoint    |
    |           |                                      |               |
    |           |--(G)- Delete Request --------------->|               |
    |           |                                      |               |
    |           |<-(H)- Delete Confirmation -----------|               |
    +-----------+                                      +---------------+

   Figure 1: Abstract Extended Dynamic Client Registration Flow

   The abstract OAuth 2.0 client dynamic registration flow illustrated
   in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the client or developer
   and the endpoints defined in this specification and its parent.  This
   figure does not demonstrate error conditions.  This flow includes the
   following steps:

   (A)  Optionally, the client or developer is issued an initial access
      token for use with the client registration endpoint.  The method
      by which the initial access token is issued to the client or
      developer is out of scope for this specification.

   (B)  Optionally, the client or developer is issued a software
      statement for use with the client registration endpoint.  The
      method by which the software statement is issued to the client or
      developer is out of scope for this specification.

   (C)  The client or developer calls the client registration endpoint
      with its desired registration metadata, optionally including the
      initial access token from (A) if one is required by the
      authorization server.

   (D)  The authorization server registers the client and returns the
      client's registered metadata, a client identifier that is unique
      at the server, a set of client credentials such as a client secret
      if applicable for this client, a URI pointing to the client
      configuration endpoint, and a registration access token to be used
      when calling the client configuration endpoint.

   (E)  The client or developer optionally calls the client
      configuration endpoint with a read or update request using the
      registration access token issued in (D).  An update request
      contains all of the client's registered metadata.

   (F)  The authorization server responds with the client's current
      configuration, potentially including a new registration access
      token and a new set of client credentials such as a client secret
      if applicable for this client.  If a new registration access token
      is issued, it replaces the token issued in (D) for all subsequent
      calls to the client configuration endpoint.

   (G)  The client or developer optionally calls the client
      configuration endpoint with a delete request using the
      registration access token issued in (D).

   (H)  The authorization server deprovisions the client and responds
      with a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.

1.4.  Registration Tokens and

2.  Client Credentials

   Throughout the course of the dynamic registration protocol, there are
   three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
   properties and targets.

   o Configuration Endpoint

   The initial access token is optionally used by the client or
      developer at the registration endpoint.  This configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0
      token protected resource
   that is used to authorize provisioned by the initial client registration
      request.  The content, structure, generation, server to facilitate viewing, updating,
   and validation deleting a client's registered information.  The location of this token are out
   endpoint is communicated to the client through the
   "registration_client_uri" member of scope for this specification. the client information response,
   as specified in Section 3.1.  The
      authorization server can client MUST use this its registration
   access token in all calls to verify that this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer
   Token [RFC6750].

   The client configuration endpoint MUST require transport-layer
   security.  The server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and MAY
   support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
   requirements.  When using TLS, the
      presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients.  This
      token may client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
   server certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125].  Implementation
   security considerations can be shared among multiple instances found in Recommendations for Secure
   Use of a client to allow
      them to each register separately, thereby letting TLS and DTLS [TLS.BCP].

   Operations on this endpoint are switched through the
      authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of
      registered clients (each different
   HTTP methods [RFC2616].  If an authorization server does not support
   a particular method on the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
   respond with their own distinct the appropriate error code.

2.1.  Client Read Request

   To read the current configuration of the client
      identifier) back to on the party to whom authorization
   server, the initial access token was
      issued, usually client makes an application developer.  This token should be
      used only at HTTP GET request to the client registration endpoint.

   o  The
   configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access token
   token.

   Following is used by the client or developer
      at a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
   display purposes only):

     GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
     Accept: application/json
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483

   Upon successful read of the client configuration endpoint and represents information for a currently active
   client, the holder's authorization to manage the registration server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with
   content type of "application/json" and a client.  This is an
      OAuth 2.0 bearer token that is issued from the client registration
      endpoint payload, as described in response to a client registration request
   Section 3.1.  Some values in the response, including the
   "client_secret" and is
      returned "registration_access_token", MAY be different
   from those in the initial registration response.  If the
   authorization server includes a new client information response.  The secret and/or registration
   access token is uniquely bound to in its response, the client identifier and is
      required to be presented with all calls to the MUST immediately discard its
   previous client
      configuration endpoint.  The secret and/or registration access token should be
      protected and should not be shared between instances token.  The value
   of a client
      (otherwise, one instance could the "client_id" MUST NOT change or delete from the initial registration
      values for all instances of
   response.

   If the client).  The registration access token can be rotated through used to make this request is not
   valid, the use of server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   If the client update method does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
   with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the client configuration endpoint.  The registration access token should be used only at the client configuration endpoint.

   o  The client credentials (such as "client_secret") are optional
      depending on the type of client and are used to retrieve OAuth
      tokens.  Client credentials are most often bound to particular
      instances of a client and should not
   make this request SHOULD be shared between instances.
      Note that since immediately revoked.

   If the client does not all types of clients have client credentials,
      they cannot be used permission to manage client registrations at read its record, the server
   MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.

2.2.  Client Update Request

   This operation updates a previously-registered client
      configuration endpoint.  The client credentials can be rotated
      through with new
   metadata at the use of authorization server.  This request is authenticated
   by the client update method on registration access token issued to the client
      configuration endpoint. client.

   The client credentials cannot be used for
      authentication at sends an HTTP PUT to the client registration configuration endpoint or at the
      client configuration endpoint.

1.4.1.  Credential Rotation

   The Authorization Server MAY rotate the client's registration access
   token and/or client credentials (such as
   with a "client_secret")
   throughout the lifetime content type of the client. "application/json".  The client can discover HTTP entity payload
   is a JSON [RFC7159] document consisting of a JSON object and all
   parameters as top- level members of that
   these values have changed by reading the JSON object.

   This request MUST include all client information response metadata fields as returned to
   the client from either a read previous registration, read, or update request to the client
   configuration endpoint. operation.
   The client's current registration access
   token and client credentials (if applicable) MUST be included NOT include the "registration_access_token",
   "registration_client_uri", "client_secret_expires_at", or
   "client_id_issued_at" fields described in this
   response.

   The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only Section 3.1.

   Valid values of client metadata fields in response to
   an update this request to MUST replace,
   not augment, the client configuration endpoint, at which
   point values previously associated with this client.
   Omitted fields MUST be treated as null or empty values by the new registration access token is returned server,
   indicating the client's request to delete them from the client's
   registration.  The authorization server MAY ignore any null or empty
   value in the request just as any other value.

   The client and MUST include its "client_id" field in the old registration access token SHOULD request, and it
   MUST be discarded by both
   parties. the same as its currently-issued client identifier.  If the registration access token were to expire or be
   rotated outside
   client includes the "client_secret" field in the request, the value
   of such requests, this field MUST match the currently-issued client or developer might be
   locked out of managing the client's configuration.

2.  Client Configuration Endpoint secret for that
   client.  The client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource
   that is provisioned by MUST NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing
   client secret with its own chosen value.

   For all metadata fields, the authorization server to facilitate viewing, updating, MAY replace any
   invalid values with suitable default values, and deleting it MUST return any
   such fields to the client in the response.

   For example, a client's registered information.  The location of this client could send the following request to the client
   registration endpoint is communicated to update the client through registration in the
   "registration_client_uri" member of above
   example with new information:

   Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
   display purposes only):

     PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
     Accept: application/json
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483

     {
      "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
      "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
      "redirect_uris":[
        "https://client.example.org/callback",
        "https://client.example.org/alt"],
      "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
      "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
      "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
      "client_name":"My New Example",
      "client_name#fr":"Mon Nouvel Exemple",
      "logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
      "logo_uri#fr":"https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png"
     }

   This example uses client metadata values defined in
   [OAuth.Registration].

   Upon successful update, the Client Information Response, authorization server responds with an
   HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a
   payload, as specified described in Section 3.1.  The client MUST use its registration
   access token  Some values in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer
   Token [RFC6750].

   Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of response,
   including the "client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be
   different
   HTTP methods [RFC2616]. from those in the initial registration response.  If an the
   authorization server does not support includes a particular method on new client secret and/or registration
   access token in its response, the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
   respond with immediately discard its
   previous client secret and/or registration access token.  The value
   of the appropriate error code.

2.1.  Forming "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration
   response.

   If the registration access token used to make this request is not
   valid, the Client Configuration Endpoint URL

   The authorization server MUST provide the client respond with the fully
   qualified URL an error as described in OAuth
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   If the "registration_client_uri" element of client does not exist on this server, the Client
   Information Response, as specified in Section 3.1.  The authorization server MUST NOT expect respond
   with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the client registration access token used to construct or discover
   make this URL
   on its own.  The request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

   If the client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST use
   respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.

   If the URL as given by client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the
   authorization server and
   MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.

   Depending does not set a default value, the authorization
   server responds with an error as described in [OAuth.Registration].

2.3.  Client Delete Request

   To deprovision itself on deployment characteristics, the authorization server, the client makes
   an HTTP DELETE request to the client configuration
   endpoint URL may take any number of forms.  It endpoint.  This
   request is RECOMMENDED that
   this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
   URL string which combines authenticated by the client registration endpoint's URL and
   the access token issued "client_id" for this client, with to
   the latter client as either a
   path parameter or a query parameter.  For example, described in [RFC6749].

   Following is a client with the
   client identifier "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a client configuration non-normative example request (with line wraps for
   display purposes only):

     DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483

   A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id",
   "client_secret", and "registration_access_token" for this client,
   thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used at either the
   authorization endpoint URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
   (path parameter) or token endpoint of "https://server.example.com/
   register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter).  In both of these
   cases, the client simply uses the URL as given by the authorization server.

   These common patterns can help
   If possible, the authorization server to more easily determine
   the SHOULD immediately invalidate
   all existing authorization grants and currently-active access tokens,
   refresh tokens, and other tokens associated with this client.

   If a client to which has been successfully deprovisioned, the request pertains, which authorization
   server MUST be matched
   against the client to which the registration access token was issued. responsd with an HTTP 204 No Content message.

   If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration
   endpoint URL as does not support the client configuration endpoint URL and change
   behavior based on delete method, the authentication context provided by server MUST
   respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported.

   If the registration access token.

2.2.  Client Read Request

   To read token used to make this request is not
   valid, the current configuration of server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   If the client does not exist on the authorization this server, the client makes an server MUST respond
   with HTTP GET request to 401 Unauthorized and the client
   configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access
   token.  This operation token used to
   make this request SHOULD be idempotent -- not causing changes to immediately revoked.

   If the client configuration.

   Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
   display purposes only):

     GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
     Accept: application/json
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483

   Upon successful read of the information for a currently active
   client, not allowed to delete itself, the authorization server responds MUST
   respond with an HTTP 200 OK with
   content type of "application/json" and 403 Forbidden.

   Following is a payload, as described in
   Section 3.1.  Some values in the response, including the
   "client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be different non-normative example response:

     HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
     Cache-Control: no-store
     Pragma: no-cache

3.  Responses

   In response to certain requests from those in the initial registration response.  However, since read
   operations are intended client to be idempotent, either the read request itself
   SHOULD NOT cause changes to client
   registration endpoint or the client's registered metadata values.
   If client configuration endpoint as
   described in this specification, the authorization server includes a new sends the
   following response bodies.

3.1.  Client Information Response

   This specification extends the client secret and/or
   registration access token information response defined in its response,
   OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration [OAuth.Registration].  The
   response contains the client MUST
   immediately discard its previous identifier as well as the client secret and/or registration
   access token. secret,
   if the client is a confidential client.  The value of response also contains
   the "client_id" MUST NOT change from fully qualified URL of the
   initial registration response.

   If client configuration endpoint
   (Section 2) for this specific client that the client may use to
   obtain and update information about itself.  The response also
   contains a registration access token used to make this request that is not
   valid, to be used by the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   If client
   to perform subsequent operations at the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
   with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to
   make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

   If the configuration
   endpoint.

   client_id
      REQUIRED.  OAuth 2.0 client does not have permission to read its record, the server
   MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.

2.3.  Client Update Request

   This operation updates a previously-registered identifier.

   client_secret
      OPTIONAL.  OAuth 2.0 client with new
   metadata secret.

   client_id_issued_at
      OPTIONAL.  Time at which the authorization server.  This request is authenticated client identifier was issued, as
      defined by [OAuth.Registration].

   client_secret_expires_at
      REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued.  Time at which the registration access
      "client_secret" will expire, as defined by [OAuth.Registration].

   registration_access_token
      REQUIRED.  Access token issued to the client.

   The client sends an HTTP PUT to used at the client configuration endpoint
   with a content type of "application/json".  The HTTP entity payload
   is a JSON [RFC7159] document consisting of a JSON object and all
   parameters as top- level members of that JSON object.

   This request MUST include all client metadata fields as returned
      to perform subsequent operations upon the client from a previous registration, read, or update operation.
   The client MUST NOT include the "registration_access_token",
   "registration_client_uri", "client_secret_expires_at", or
   "client_id_issued_at" fields described in Section 3.1.

   Valid values registration.

   registration_client_uri
      REQUIRED.  Fully qualified URL of the client metadata fields in configuration
      endpoint for this request MUST replace,
   not augment, client.

   Additionally, the values previously associated with authorization server MUST return all registered
   metadata about this client.
   Omitted client, including any fields MUST be treated as null or empty values provisioned by the server,
   indicating the client's request to delete them from the client's
   registration.
   authorization server itself.  The authorization server MAY ignore any null reject or empty
   value in the request just as
   replace any other value.

   The client MUST include its "client_id" field in the request, and it
   MUST be the same as its currently-issued client identifier.  If the
   client includes the "client_secret" field in the request, the value of this field MUST match the currently-issued client secret for that
   client.  The client MUST NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing
   client secret with its own chosen value.

   For all client's requested metadata fields, the authorization server MAY replace any
   invalid values with suitable default values, and it MUST return any
   such fields to the client in the response.

   For example, a client could send the following request to submitted
   during the client registration endpoint to or update the client registration in the above
   example requests and substitute them with new information:
   suitable values.

   The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as
   top-level members of a JSON object [RFC7159].

   Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
   display purposes only):

     PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 response:

     HTTP/1.1
     Accept: 200 OK
     Content-Type: application/json
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
     Cache-Control: no-store
     Pragma: no-cache

     {
      "registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
      "registration_client_uri":
         "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
      "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
      "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
      "client_id_issued_at":2893256800,
      "client_secret_expires_at":2893276800,
      "client_name":"My Example Client",
      "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
         "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
      "redirect_uris":[
        "https://client.example.org/callback",
        "https://client.example.org/alt"],
        "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
      "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
      "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
      "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
      "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
      "client_name":"My New Example",
      "client_name#fr":"Mon Nouvel Exemple",
      "logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
      "logo_uri#fr":"https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png" "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
     }

4.  IANA Considerations

   This example uses client metadata values defined in
   [OAuth.Registration].

   Upon successful update, specification requests that IANA extend the authorization server responds with an
   HTTP 200 OK Message OAuth Dynamic Client
   Metadata registry with content type "application/json" and a
   payload, as described in Section 3.1.  Some values in the response,
   including following entries:

   o  Client Metadata Name: "registration_access_token"

   o  Client Metadata Description: OAuth 2.0 bearer token used to access
      the "client_secret" and r"egistration_access_token", MAY be
   different from those in client configuration endpoint

   o  Change controller: IESG

   o  Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]

   o  Client Metadata Name: "registration_client_uri"

   o  Client Metadata Description: Fully qualified URI of the initial client
      registration response.  If endpoint

   o  Change controller: IESG

   o  Specification document(s): [[ this document ]]

5.  Security Considerations

   While the
   authorization server includes a new client secret and/or can expire, the registration access token
   SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively registered.  If
   this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in its response, a
   situation where they have no means of retrieving or updating the
   client's registration information.  Were that the case, a new
   registration would be required, thereby generating a new client MUST immediately discard its
   previous client secret and/or
   identifier.  However, to limit the exposure surface of the
   registration access token.  The value
   of token, the "client_id" MUST NOT change from registration access token MAY be
   rotated when the developer or client does a read or update operation
   on the client's client configuration endpoint.  As the initial registration
   response.

   If
   access tokens are relatively long-term credentials, and since the
   registration access token used to make this request is not
   valid, a Bearer token and acts as the server sole
   authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST respond with an error
   be protected by the developer or client as described in OAuth 2.0
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   If

   Since requests to the client does not exist on this server, configuration endpoint result in the
   transmission of clear-text credentials (in the server MUST respond
   with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, request and
   response), the registration access token used to
   make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

   If authorization server MUST require the client is not allowed use of a
   transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to update its records, the
   endpoint.  The server MUST
   respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.

   If the client attempts to set an invalid metadata field support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [RFC5246] and MAY
   support additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
   requirements.  When using TLS, the
   authorization server does not set client MUST perform a default value, the authorization TLS/SSL
   server responds with an error as described certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125].  Implementation
   security considerations can be found in [OAuth.Registration].

2.4.  Client Delete Request

   To deprovision itself on the authorization server, the client makes
   an HTTP DELETE request to Recommendations for Secure
   Use of TLS and DTLS [TLS.BCP].

   Since the client configuration endpoint.  This
   request endpoint is authenticated by an OAuth 2.0 protected
   resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent
   the registration access token issued to
   the client.

   Following from being disclosed though repeated
   access attempts.

   If a client is deprovisioned from a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
   display purposes only):

     DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483

   A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id",
   "client_secret", and "registration_access_token" server, any outstanding
   registration access token for this client,
   thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used that client MUST be invalidated at either the
   authorization endpoint or token endpoint of the authorization server.
   The authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing
   authorization grants and currently-active tokens associated with
   same time.  Otherwise, this
   client.

   If can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
   a client has been successfully deprovisioned, could make requests to the authorization
   server MUST responsd with an HTTP 204 No Content message.

   If client configuration endpoint
   where the server does not support authentication would succeed but the delete method, action would fail
   because the client is no longer valid.  To prevent accidental
   disclosure from such an erroneous situation, the authorization server
   MUST
   respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported.

   If treat all such requests as if the registration access token used to make this request is not
   valid, the server MUST respond with was
   invalid (by returning an error HTTP 401 Unauthorized error, as described described).

6.  Normative References

   [OAuth.Registration]
              Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P.
              Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
              draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg (work in progress), August 2014.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
              6749, October 2012.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   If Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.

   [TLS.BCP]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", November
              2014.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The authors thank the client does not exist on this server, OAuth Working Group, the server MUST respond
   with HTTP 401 Unauthorized User-Managed Access
   Working Group, and the registration access token used OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
   their input to
   make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

   If the client is not allowed to delete itself, the server MUST
   respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.

   Following is a non-normative example response:

     HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
     Cache-Control: no-store
     Pragma: no-cache

3.  Responses document.  In response to certain requests from particular, the client following
   individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
   to either the client
   registration endpoint or the client configuration endpoint as
   described in various versions of this specification, the authorization server sends the
   following response bodies.

3.1.  Client Information Response

   This specification extends the client information response defined in
   OAuth 2.0 Core document: Amanda Anganes, Derek Atkins,
   Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov,
   George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim, Torsten
   Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat
   Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.

Appendix B.  Registration Tokens and Client Dynamic Registration.  The response contains
   the client identifier as well as the client secret, if the client is
   a confidential client.  The response also contains Credentials

   Throughout the fully
   qualified URL course of the client configuration endpoint for this specific
   client that the client may use to obtain dynamic registration protocol, there are
   three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
   properties and update information about
   itself. targets.

   o  The response also contains a registration initial access token that is to be optionally used by the client to perform subsequent operations or
      developer at the
   client configuration registration endpoint.

   client_id
      REQUIRED.  OAuth 2.0 client identifier.

   client_secret
      OPTIONAL.  This is an OAuth 2.0 client secret.

   client_id_issued_at
      OPTIONAL.  Time at which the client identifier was issued, as
      defined by [OAuth.Registration].

   client_secret_expires_at
      REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued.  Time at which the
      "client_secret" will expire, as defined by [OAuth.Registration].

   registration_access_token
      REQUIRED.  Access
      token that is used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon authorize the initial client registration.

   registration_client_uri
      REQUIRED.  Fully qualified URL registration
      request.  The content, structure, generation, and validation of the client configuration
      endpoint
      this token are out of scope for this client.

   Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered
   metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the
   authorization server itself. specification.  The
      authorization server MAY reject or
   replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted
   during the registration or update requests and substitute them with
   suitable values.

   The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as
   top-level members of a JSON object [RFC7159].

   Following is a non-normative example response:

     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
     Content-Type: application/json
     Cache-Control: no-store
     Pragma: no-cache

     {
      "registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
      "registration_client_uri":
         "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
      "client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
      "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
      "client_id_issued_at":2893256800,
      "client_secret_expires_at":2893276800,
      "client_name":"My Example Client",
      "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
         "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
      "redirect_uris":[
        "https://client.example.org/callback",
        "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
      "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
      "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
      "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
      "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
     }

4.  IANA Considerations

   This specification makes no requests of IANA.

5.  Security Considerations

   While the client secret can expire, the registration access token
   SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively registered.  If use this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in a
   situation where they have no means of retrieving or updating the
   client's registration information.  Were verify that the case, a
      presenter is allowed to dynamically register new
   registration would clients.  This
      token may be required, thereby generating shared among multiple instances of a new client
   identifier.  However, to limit allow
      them to each register separately, thereby letting the exposure surface
      authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of
      registered clients (each with their own distinct client
      identifier) back to the
   registration party to whom the initial access token, token was
      issued, usually an application developer.  This token should be
      used only at the client registration endpoint.

   o  The registration access token MAY be
   rotated when is used by the developer or client does a read or update operation
   on developer
      at the client's client configuration endpoint.  As the registration
   access tokens are relatively long-term credentials, endpoint and since represents the holder's
      authorization to manage the registration access token is of a Bearer token and acts as the sole
   authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
   be protected by the developer or client as described in OAuth 2.0
   Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].

   Since the client configuration endpoint client.  This is an
      OAuth 2.0 protected
   resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent
   the registration access bearer token that is issued from being disclosed though repeated
   access attempts.

   If the client registration
      endpoint in response to a client registration request and is deprovisioned from
      returned in a server, any outstanding client information response.  The registration
      access token for that client MUST be invalidated at the
   same time.  Otherwise, this can lead is uniquely bound to an inconsistent state wherein
   a the client could make requests identifier and is
      required to be presented with all calls to the client
      configuration endpoint
   where endpoint.  The registration access token should be
      protected and should not be shared between instances of a client
      (otherwise, one instance could change or delete registration
      values for all instances of the authentication would succeed but client).  The registration access
      token can be rotated through the action would fail
   because use of the client is no longer valid.  To prevent accidental
   disclosure from such an erroneous situation, the authorization server
   MUST treat all such requests as if update method
      on the client configuration endpoint.  The registration access
      token was
   invalid (by returning an HTTP 401 Unauthorized error, should be used only at the client configuration endpoint.

   o  The client credentials (such as described).

6.  Normative References

   [OAuth.Registration]
              Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., "client_secret") are optional
      depending on the type of client and P.
              Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic are used to retrieve OAuth
      tokens.  Client Registration Protocol",
              draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg (work in progress), August 2014.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for credentials are most often bound to particular
      instances of a client and should not be shared between instances.
      Note that since not all types of clients have client credentials,
      they cannot be used to manage client registrations at the client
      configuration endpoint.  The client credentials can be rotated
      through the use of the client update method on the client
      configuration endpoint.  The client credentials cannot be used for
      authentication at the client registration endpoint or at the
      client configuration endpoint.

B.1.  Credential Rotation

   The authorization server MAY rotate the client's registration access
   token and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret")
   throughout the lifetime of the client in RFCs order to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., minimize the risk
   of leakage of these credentials.  The client can discover that these
   values have changed by reading the client information response
   returned from either a read or update request to the client
   configuration endpoint.  The client's current registration access
   token and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
              6749, October 2012.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. client credentials (if applicable) MUST be included in this
   response.

   The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to
   an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at which
   point the new registration access token is returned to the client and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.
   the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by both
   parties.  If the registration access token were to expire or be
   rotated outside of such requests, the client or developer might be
   locked out of managing the client's configuration.

   Methods by which the client can request credential rotation are
   outside the scope of this document.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments C.  Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL

   The authorization server MUST provide the client with the fully
   qualified URL in the "registration_client_uri" element of the Client
   Information Response, as specified in Section 3.1.  The authorization
   server MUST NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL
   on its own.  The authors thank client MUST use the OAuth Working Group, URL as given by the User-Managed Access
   Working Group, server and
   MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.

   Depending on deployment characteristics, the OpenID Connect Working Group participants client configuration
   endpoint URL may take any number of forms.  It is RECOMMENDED that
   this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
   URL string which combines the client registration endpoint's URL and
   the issued "client_id" for
   their input to this document. client, with the latter as either a
   path parameter or a query parameter.  For example, a client with the
   client identifier "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a client configuration
   endpoint URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
   (path parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
   register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter).  In particular, both of these
   cases, the following
   individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution client simply uses the URL as given by the authorization
   server.

   These common patterns can help the server to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek Atkins,
   Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov,
   George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim, Torsten
   Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat
   Sakimura, Christian Scholz, more easily determine
   the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
   against the client to which the registration access token was issued.

   If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration
   endpoint URL as the client configuration endpoint URL and Hannes Tschofenig. change
   behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
   registration access token.

Appendix B. D.  Document History

   [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]

   -05

   o  Removed Phil Hunt from authors list, per request.

   o  Applied various minor editorial changes from working group
      comments.

   -04

   o  Incorrect XML uploaded for -03

   -03

   o  Changed draft to be Experimental instead of Standards Track.

   -02

   o  Added more context information to the abstract.

   -01

   o  Addressed issues that arose from last call comments on draft-ietf-
      oauth-dyn-reg and draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-metadata.

   -00

   o  Created from draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-management-00.

Authors' Addresses

   Justin Richer
   The MITRE Corporation

   Email: jricher@mitre.org
   Michael B. Jones
   Microsoft

   Email: mbj@microsoft.com
   URI:   http://self-issued.info/

   John Bradley
   Ping Identity

   Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com

   Maciej Machulak
   Newcastle University

   Email: m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk
   URI:   http://ncl.ac.uk/