draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-02.txt		draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-03.txt
	OAuth Working Group M. Jones		OAuth Working Group M. Jones
	Internet-Draft Microsoft		Internet-Draft Microsoft
	Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley		Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
	Expires: September 10, 2015 Ping Identity		Expires: January 7, 2016 Ping Identity
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Limited		ARM Limited
	March 9, 2015		July 6, 2015
	Proof-Of-Possession Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)		Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
	draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-02		draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web		This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
	Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key		Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key
	and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-		and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-
	possession of the key by the presenter. This property is also		possession of the key by the presenter. This property is also
	sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.		sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37		skipping to change at page 1, line 37
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 13		skipping to change at page 2, line 13
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1. Representation for an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession
	3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key . . . . . . . . . . 5		Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.3. Proof-of-Possession Using a Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2. Representation for an Encrypted Symmetric
			Proof-of-Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
			3.3. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession
			Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.4. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.4. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web		This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
	Token (JWT) [JWT] that the presenter of the JWT possesses a		Token (JWT) [JWT] that the presenter of the JWT possesses a
	particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm		particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
	proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter. This property is		proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter. This property is
	also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.		also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key.
	Envision the following two use cases. The first use case describes		Envision the following two use cases. The first use case describes
	the use of a symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use		the use of a symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use
	case uses an asymmetric proof-of-possession key.		case uses an asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
	An OAuth 2.0 authorization server generates a JWT and places an		An issuer generates a JWT and places an encrypted symmetric key
	encrypted symmetric key inside the newly introduced confirmation		inside the newly introduced confirmation claim. This symmetric key
	claim. This symmetric key is encrypted with a key known only to the		is encrypted with a key known only to the issuer and the recipient.
	authorization server and the recipient. The entire JWT is then		The entire JWT is then integrity protected by the issuer. The JWT is
	integrity protected by the issuer (the authorization server). The		then sent to the presenter. Since the presenter is unable to obtain
	JWT is then sent to the presenter. Since the presenter is unable to		the encrypted symmetric key from the JWT itself, the issuer conveys
	obtain the encrypted symmetric key from the JWT itself, the		that symmetric key separately to the presenter. Now, the presenter
	authorization server conveys that symmetric key separately to the		is in possession of the symmetric key as well as the JWT (which
	presenter. Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric key		includes the confirmation claim member). When the presenter needs to
	as well as the JWT (which includes the confirmation claim member).		present the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to demonstrate
	When the presenter needs to present the JWT to the recipient, it also		possession of the symmetric key; the presenter, for example, uses the
	needs to demonstrate possession of the symmetric key; the presenter,		symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol with the recipient.
	for example, uses the symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol		The recipient is then able to verify that it is interacting with the
	with the recipient. The recipient is then able to verify that it is		genuine presenter by decrypting the JWK contained inside the
	interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the JWK		confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this, the recipient obtains
	contained inside the confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this,		the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify cryptographically
	the recipient obtains the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify		protected messages exchanged with the presenter. This symmetric key
	cryptographically protected messages exchanged with the presenter.		mechanism described above is conceptually similar to the use of
	This symmetric key mechanism described above is conceptually similar		Kerberos tickets.
	to the use of Kerberos tickets.
	In the second case, consider a presenter that generates a public/		In the second case, consider a presenter that generates a public/
	private key pair. It then sends the public key to an OAuth 2.0		private key pair. It then sends the public key to an issuer, which
	authorization server (the issuer), which creates a JWT and places a		creates a JWT and places a public key (or an identifier for it)
	public key (or an identifier for it) inside the newly introduced		inside the newly introduced confirmation claim. The entire JWT is
	confirmation claim. The entire JWT is integrity protected using a		integrity protected using a digital signature to protect it against
	digital signature to protect it against modifications. The JWT is		modifications. The JWT is then sent to the presenter. When the
	then sent to the presenter. When the presenter needs to present the		presenter needs to present the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to
	JWT to the recipient, it also needs to demonstrate possession of the		demonstrate possession of the private key. The presenter, for
	private key. The presenter, for example, uses the private key in a		example, uses the private key in a TLS exchange with the recipient or
	TLS exchange with the recipient. The recipient is able to verify		signs a nonce with the private key. The recipient is able to verify
	that it is interacting with the genuine presenter by extracting the		that it is interacting with the genuine presenter by extracting the
	public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT (after verifying		public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT (after verifying
	the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it with the private		the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it with the private
	key in the TLS exchange. The asymmetric key mechanism described		key in the TLS exchange or checking the nonce signature.
	above is conceptually similar to a certificate.
	In both cases the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by the		In both cases the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by the
	application.		application.
	1.1. Notational Conventions		1.1. Notational Conventions
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
	2119 [RFC2119].		2119 [RFC2119].
	skipping to change at page 4, line 33		skipping to change at page 4, line 31
	These terms are defined by this specification:		These terms are defined by this specification:
	Issuer		Issuer
	Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key		Party that creates the JWT and binds the proof-of-possession key
	to it.		to it.
	Presenter		Presenter
	Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key		Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
	cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a		cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a
	recipient. The presenter may be the issuer or a party different		recipient. The presenter may be the issuer or a party distinct
	from the issuer.		from the issuer.
	Recipient		Recipient
	Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key		Party that receives the JWT containing the proof-of-possession key
	information from the presenter.		information from the presenter.
	3. Proof-Of-Possession Representation		3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
	The presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a particular key		The issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses a
	and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-		particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
	possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"		proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
	(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with		(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with a
	the JSON object containing a "jwk" (JSON Web Key) or "kid" (key ID)		JSON object containing a "jwk" (JSON Web Key) member, a "jwe" (JSON
	member identifying the key.		Web Encryption) member, or a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the
			key.
	The presenter can be identified in one of two ways by the JWT,		The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the JWT,
	depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a		depending upon the application requirements. If the JWT contains a
	"sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the subject identified by the		"sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is normally the subject
	JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier will be relative		identified by the JWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier
	to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim.) If the JWT		will be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer)
	contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter is the issuer		claim.) If the JWT contains no "sub" (subject) claim, the presenter
	identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer) claim. The case in		is normally the issuer identified by the JWT using the "iss" (issuer)
	which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is analogous to SAML		claim. The case in which the presenter is the subject of the JWT is
	2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. At least one		analogous to SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation
	of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in the JWT, and in some		usage. At least one of the "sub" and "iss" claims MUST be present in
	use cases, both MUST be present.		the JWT. Some use cases may require that both be present.
	3.1. Proof-of-Possession of an Asymmetric Key		Another means used by some applications to identify the presenter is
			an explicit claim, such as the "azp" (authorized party) claim defined
			by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core]. Ultimately, the means of
			identifying the presenter is application-specific, as is the means of
			confirming possession of the key that is communicated.
			3.1. Representation for an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
	When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the		When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
	value of the "jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing		"jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing the
	the corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example		corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example
	demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:		demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		"iss": "https://server.example.com",
	"aud": "https://client.example.org",		"aud": "https://client.example.org",
	"exp": "1361398824",		"exp": "1361398824",
	"nbf": "1360189224",		"nbf": "1360189224",
	"cnf":{		"cnf":{
	"jwk":{		"jwk":{
	"kty": "EC",		"kty": "EC",
	skipping to change at page 5, line 41		skipping to change at page 5, line 47
	"x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",		"x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM",
	"y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"		"y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA"
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key		The JWK MUST contain the required key members for a JWK of that key
	type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID)		type and MAY contain other JWK members, including the "kid" (key ID)
	member.		member.
	3.2. Proof-of-Possession of a Symmetric Key		3.2. Representation for an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
	When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the value of		When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the "jwe"
	the "jwk" member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted		member is an encrypted JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] encrypted to a key
	to a key known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization		known to the recipient using the JWE Compact Serialization containing
	containing the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are		the symmetric key. The rules for encrypting a JWK are found in
	found in Section 6 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification.		Section 7 of the JSON Web Key [JWK] specification.
	The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could		The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
	subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwk" member:		subsequently be encrypted for use in the "jwe" member:
	{		{
	"kty": "oct",		"kty": "oct",
	"alg": "HS256",		"alg": "HS256",
	"k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"		"k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE"
	}		}
	The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK would be used as the JWE		The UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoding of this JWK would be used as the JWE
	Plaintext when encrypting the key.		Plaintext when encrypting the key.
	The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when		The following example is a JWE Header that could be used when
	encrypting this key:		encrypting this key:
	{		{
	"alg": "RSA1_5",		"alg": "RSA1_5",
	"enc": "A128CBC-HS256",		"enc": "A128CBC-HS256"
	"cty": "jwk+json"
	}		}
	The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of		The following example JWT Claims Set of a JWT illustrates the use of
	an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwk" claim value:		an encrypted symmetric key as the "jwe" member value:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		"iss": "https://server.example.com",
	"sub": "24400320",		"sub": "24400320",
	"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",		"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
	"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",		"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
	"exp": 1311281970,		"exp": 1311281970,
	"iat": 1311280970,		"iat": 1311280970,
	"cnf":{		"cnf":{
	"jwk":		"jwe":
	"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi		"eyJhbGciOiJSU0ExXzUiLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
	andrK2pzb24ifQ. ... (remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"		(remainder of JWE omitted for brevity)"
	}		}
	}		}
	Note that the case in which the "jwk" claim contains an unencoded JWK		3.3. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key
	value and the case in which it contains an encrypted JWK value can be
	distinguished by the type of the member value. In the first case,
	the value is a JSON object containing the JWK and in the second case,
	the value is a string containing the JWE JSON Serialization of the
	encrypted JWK representation.
	3.3. Proof-of-Possession Using a Key ID
	The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a		The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a
	Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the		Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the
	recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In		recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In
	this case, the presenter of a JWT declares that it possesses a		this case, the issuer of a JWT declares that the presenter possesses
	particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm		a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm
	proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"		proof-of-possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf"
	(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with		(confirmation) claim in the JWT whose value is a JSON object, with
	the JSON object containing a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the		the JSON object containing a "kid" (key ID) member identifying the
	key.		key.
	The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT		The following example demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT
	Claims Set of a JWT:		Claims Set of a JWT:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		"iss": "https://server.example.com",
	skipping to change at page 7, line 26		skipping to change at page 7, line 24
	"exp": "1361398824",		"exp": "1361398824",
	"nbf": "1360189224",		"nbf": "1360189224",
	"cnf":{		"cnf":{
	"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"		"kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad"
	}		}
	}		}
	3.4. Confirmation		3.4. Confirmation
	The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain the		The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain the
	"jwk" or "kid" member because a proof-of-possession key may not be		"jwk", "jwe", or "kid" member because a proof-of-possession key may
	the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This is		not be the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token.
	analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		This is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject		SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject
	confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession		confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession
	key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a		key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a
	member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member.		member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member.
	This specification defines a registry for these members in		This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
	Section 5.2 and registers the "jwk" and "kid" members within the		registry for these members in Section 5.2 and registers the "jwk",
	registry.		"jwe", and "kid" members within the registry. Other specifications
			can register other members used for confirmation, including members
			for conveying other proof-of-possession keys, possibly using
			different key representations.
	3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified		3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
	Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter		Proof-of-possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter
	sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by		sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
	the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a		the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
	"challenge".		"challenge".
	The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents		The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents
	are intentionally not described in this specification, as different		are intentionally not described in this specification, as different
	skipping to change at page 8, line 49		skipping to change at page 9, line 5
	legitimate concern, it is outside the scope of this specification,		legitimate concern, it is outside the scope of this specification,
	since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the		since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the
	"cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details,		"cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details,
	please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].		please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	The following registration procedure is used for all the registries		The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
	established by this specification.		established by this specification.
	Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a		Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
	three-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the		after a three-week review period on the oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org
	advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the		mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
	allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s)		However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
	may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a		the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
	specification will be published.		satisfied that such a specification will be published. [[ Note to the
			RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in
			consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name:
			oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
	Registration requests must be sent to the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list		Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
	for review and comment, with an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request		an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWT Confirmation
	for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name		Method: example").
	of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the
	IESG and IANA. Suggested name: oauth-pop-reg-review@ietf.org. ]]
	Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either		Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
	approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision		or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
	to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation		review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
	and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request		applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
	successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period		Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
	longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the		21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
	iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.		iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
	Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes		Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
	determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing		determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
	functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general		functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
	applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,		applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
	and whether the registration makes sense.		and whether the registration makes sense.
	IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s)		IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
	and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing		and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
	list.		list.
	It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are		It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
	able to represent the perspectives of different applications using		able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
	this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of		this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
	registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could		registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
	be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular		be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
	Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other		Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
	Expert(s).		Experts.
	5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration		5.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
	This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA JSON Web		This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA JSON Web
	Token Claims registry defined in [JWT].		Token Claims registry defined in [JWT].
	5.1.1. Registry Contents		5.1.1. Registry Contents
	o Claim Name: "cnf"		o Claim Name: "cnf"
	o Claim Description: Confirmation		o Claim Description: Confirmation
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this document		o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of this document
	5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry		5.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry
	This specification establishes the IANA JWT Confirmation Methods		This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
	registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the		registry for JWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the
	confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that		confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that
	defines it.		defines it.
	5.2.1. Registration Template		5.2.1. Registration Template
	Confirmation Method Value:		Confirmation Method Value:
	The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this		The name requested (e.g., "kid"). Because a core goal of this
	specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,		specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
	it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8		it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
	characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is		characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
	case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a		case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
	case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that		case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that
	there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this		there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
	particular case.
	Confirmation Method Description:		Confirmation Method Description:
	Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Example		Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key
	description").		Identifier").
	Change Controller:		Change Controller:
	For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name		For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
	of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,		name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
	email address, home page URI) may also be included.		address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
	Specification Document(s):		Specification Document(s):
	Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter,		Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
	preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of		preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
	the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also		the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
	be included but is not required.		included but is not required.
	5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents		5.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
	o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk"		o Confirmation Method Value: "jwk"
	o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key or Encrypted JSON		o Confirmation Method Description: JSON Web Key Representing Public
	Web Key		Key
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]		o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
			o Confirmation Method Value: "jwe"
			o Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted JSON Web Key
			o Change Controller: IESG
			o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this document ]]
	o Confirmation Method Value: "kid"		o Confirmation Method Value: "kid"
	o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier		o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]]		o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]]
	6. References		6. References
	6.1. Normative References		6.1. Normative References
	[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",		[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress),		RFC 7516, May 2015,
	January 2015.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
	[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",		[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015,
	draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
	January 2015.
	[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in		(JWT)", RFC 7519, May 2015,
	progress), December 2014.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO		[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
	10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.		10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
	[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
	IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
	May 2008.		May 2008.
	6.2. Informative References		6.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
	Hunt, P., ietf@justin.richer.org, i., Mills, W., Mishra,		Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.
	P., and H. Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession		Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security
	(PoP) Security Architecture",		Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01 (work
	draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-01 (work in progress),		in progress), March 2015.
	March 2015.
	[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,		Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
	"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion		"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
	Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-		Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
	2.0-os, March 2005.		2.0-os, March 2005.
			[OpenID.Core]
			Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
			C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
			<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements		Appendix A. Acknowledgements
	The authors wish to thank James Manger for his review of the		The authors wish to thank Brian Campbell, James Manger, Justin
	specification.		Richer, and Nat Sakimura for their reviews of the specification.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-03
			o Separated the "jwk" and "jwe" confirmation members; the former
			represents a public key as a JWK and the latter represents a
			symmetric key as a JWE encrypted JWK.
			o Changed the title to indicate that a proof-of-possession key is
			being communicated.
			o Updated language that formerly assumed that the issuer was an
			OAuth 2.0 authorization server.
			o Described ways that applications can choose to identify the
			presenter, including use of the "iss", "sub", and "azp" claims.
			o Harmonized the registry language with that used in JWT [RFC 7519].
			o Addressed other issues identified during working group last call.
			o Referenced the JWT and JOSE RFCs.
	-02		-02
	o Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient and updated		o Defined the terms Issuer, Presenter, and Recipient and updated
	their usage within the document.		their usage within the document.
	o Added a description of a use case using an asymmetric proof-of-		o Added a description of a use case using an asymmetric proof-of-
	possession key to the introduction.		possession key to the introduction.
	o Added the "kid" (key ID) confirmation method.		o Added the "kid" (key ID) confirmation method.
End of changes. 48 change blocks.
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