draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06.txt		draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-07.txt
	OAuth Working Group M. Jones		OAuth Working Group M. Jones
	Internet-Draft Microsoft		Internet-Draft Microsoft
	Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley		Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
	Expires: May 7, 2016 Ping Identity		Expires: May 27, 2016 Ping Identity
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	ARM Limited		ARM Limited
	November 4, 2015		November 24, 2015
	Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)		Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)
	draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-06		draft-ietf-oauth-proof-of-possession-07
	Abstract		Abstract
	This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web		This specification defines how to express a declaration in a JSON Web
	Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key		Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular key
	and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-		and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof-of-
	possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove		possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove
	possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter		possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter
	being a holder-of-key.		being a holder-of-key.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 38		skipping to change at page 1, line 38
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 27, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 18		skipping to change at page 2, line 18
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . . 6		3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 7		3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 7
	3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric		3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric
	Proof-of-Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		Proof-of-Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession		3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession
	Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.5. Representation of a URL for a Proof-of-Possession Key . . 9		3.5. Representation of a URL for a Proof-of-Possession Key . . 9
	3.6. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.6. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 10
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		6.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		6.2. JWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This specification defines how a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] can		This specification defines how a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] can
	declare that the presenter of the JWT possesses a key and that the		declare that the presenter of the JWT possesses a key and that the
	recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter possesses		recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter possesses
	that key. Proof-of-possession of a key is also sometimes described		that key. Proof-of-possession of a key is also sometimes described
	as the presenter being a holder-of-key. The		as the presenter being a holder-of-key. The
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] specification describes key		[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] specification describes key
	confirmation, among other confirmation mechanisms. This		confirmation, among other confirmation mechanisms. This
	specification defines how to communicate key confirmation key		specification defines how to communicate key confirmation key
	information in JWTs.		information in JWTs.
	Envision the following two use cases. The first use case employs a		Envision the following two use cases. The first use case employs a
	symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use case employs an		symmetric proof-of-possession key and the second use case employs an
	asymmetric proof-of-possession key.		asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
	+--------------+		+--------------+
	| | +--------------+		| | +--------------+
	| |--(4) Presentation of -->| |		| |--(3) Presentation of -->| |
	| | JWT w/ Encrypted | |		| | JWT w/ Encrypted | |
	| Presenter | PoP Key | |		| Presenter | PoP Key | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| |<-(5) Communication ---->| |		| |<-(4) Communication ---->| |
	| | Authenticated by | |		| | Authenticated by | |
	+--------------+ PoP Key | |		+--------------+ PoP Key | |
	| ^ | |		^ ^ | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	(1) Sym. (3) JWT w/ | Recipient |		(1) Sym. (2) JWT w/ | Recipient |
	| PoP | Encrypted | |		| PoP | Encrypted | |
	| Key | PoP Key | |		| Key | PoP Key | |
	v | | |		v | | |
	+--------------+ | |		+--------------+ | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| |<-(2) Key Exchange for ->| |		| |<-(0) Key Exchange for ->| |
	| Issuer | Key Encryption Key | |		| Issuer | Key Encryption Key | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| | +--------------+		| | +--------------+
	+--------------+		+--------------+
	Figure 1: Proof-of-Possession with a Symmetric Key		Figure 1: Proof-of-Possession with a Symmetric Key
	In the case illustrated in Figure 1, the presenter generates a		In the case illustrated in Figure 1, either the presenter generates a
	symmetric key and (1) privately sends it to the issuer. The issuer		symmetric key and privately sends it to the issuer (1) or the issuer
	generates a JWT with an encrypted copy of this symmetric key in the		generates a symmetric key and privately sends it to the presenter
	newly introduced confirmation claim. This symmetric key is encrypted		(1). The issuer generates a JWT with an encrypted copy of this
	with a key known only to the issuer and the recipient, which is		symmetric key in the confirmation claim. This symmetric key is
	established in step (2), if it doesn't already exist. The entire JWT		encrypted with a key known only to the issuer and the recipient,
	is integrity protected by the issuer. The JWT is then (3) sent to		which was previously established in step (0). The entire JWT is
	the presenter. Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric		integrity protected by the issuer. The JWT is then (2) sent to the
	key as well as the JWT (which includes the confirmation claim). When		presenter. Now, the presenter is in possession of the symmetric key
	the presenter (4) presents the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to		as well as the JWT (which includes the confirmation claim). When the
			presenter (3) presents the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to
	demonstrate possession of the symmetric key; the presenter, for		demonstrate possession of the symmetric key; the presenter, for
	example, (5) uses the symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol		example, (4) uses the symmetric key in a challenge/response protocol
	with the recipient. The recipient is then able to verify that it is		with the recipient. The recipient is then able to verify that it is
	interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the key in the		interacting with the genuine presenter by decrypting the key in the
	confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this, the recipient obtains		confirmation claim of the JWT. By doing this, the recipient obtains
	the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify cryptographically		the symmetric key, which it then uses to verify cryptographically
	protected messages exchanged with the presenter (5). This symmetric		protected messages exchanged with the presenter (4). This symmetric
	key mechanism described above is conceptually similar to the use of		key mechanism described above is conceptually similar to the use of
	Kerberos tickets.		Kerberos tickets.
	+--------------+		+--------------+
	| | +--------------+		| | +--------------+
	| |--(3) Presentation of -->| |		| |--(3) Presentation of -->| |
	| | JWT w/ Public | |		| | JWT w/ Public | |
	| Presenter | PoP Key | |		| Presenter | PoP Key | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| |<-(4) Communication ---->| |		| |<-(4) Communication ---->| |
	skipping to change at page 4, line 49		skipping to change at page 4, line 50
	| | | |		| | | |
	| | | |		| | | |
	| | +--------------+		| | +--------------+
	+--------------+		+--------------+
	Figure 2: Proof-of-Possession with an Asymmetric Key		Figure 2: Proof-of-Possession with an Asymmetric Key
	In the case illustrated in Figure 2, the presenter generates a		In the case illustrated in Figure 2, the presenter generates a
	public/private key pair and (1) sends the public key to the issuer,		public/private key pair and (1) sends the public key to the issuer,
	which creates a JWT that contains the public key (or an identifier		which creates a JWT that contains the public key (or an identifier
	for it) in the newly introduced confirmation claim. The entire JWT		for it) in the confirmation claim. The entire JWT is integrity
	is integrity protected using a digital signature to protect it		protected using a digital signature to protect it against
	against modifications. The JWT is then (2) sent to the presenter.		modifications. The JWT is then (2) sent to the presenter. When the
			presenter (3) presents the JWT to the recipient, it also needs to
	When the presenter (3) presents the JWT to the recipient, it also		demonstrate possession of the private key. The presenter, for
	needs to demonstrate possession of the private key. The presenter,		example, (4) uses the private key in a TLS exchange with the
	for example, (4) uses the private key in a TLS exchange with the
	recipient or (4) signs a nonce with the private key. The recipient		recipient or (4) signs a nonce with the private key. The recipient
	is able to verify that it is interacting with the genuine presenter		is able to verify that it is interacting with the genuine presenter
	by extracting the public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT		by extracting the public key from the confirmation claim of the JWT
	(after verifying the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it		(after verifying the digital signature of the JWT) and utilizing it
	with the private key in the TLS exchange or by checking the nonce		with the private key in the TLS exchange or by checking the nonce
	signature.		signature.
	In both cases, the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by		In both cases, the JWT may contain other claims that are needed by
	the application.		the application.
	skipping to change at page 6, line 40		skipping to change at page 6, line 40
	3.1. Confirmation Claim		3.1. Confirmation Claim
	The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain members		The "cnf" (confirmation) claim is used in the JWT to contain members
	used to identify the proof-of-possession key. Other members of the		used to identify the proof-of-possession key. Other members of the
	"cnf" object may be defined because a proof-of-possession key may not		"cnf" object may be defined because a proof-of-possession key may not
	be the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This		be the only means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This
	is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject		SubjectConfirmation element, in which a number of different subject
	confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession		confirmation methods can be included, including proof-of-possession
	key information. When a recipient receives a "cnf" claim with a		key information.
	member that it does not understand, it MUST ignore that member.
			The set of confirmation members that a JWT must contain to be
			considered valid is context dependent and is outside the scope of
			this specification. Specific applications of JWTs will require
			implementations to understand and process some confirmation members
			in particular ways. However, in the absence of such requirements,
			all confirmation members that are not understood by implementations
			MUST be ignored.
	This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"		This specification establishes the IANA "JWT Confirmation Methods"
	registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members		registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members
	defined by this specification. Other specifications can register		defined by this specification. Other specifications can register
	other members used for confirmation, including other members for		other members used for confirmation, including other members for
	conveying proof-of-possession keys, possibly using different key		conveying proof-of-possession keys, possibly using different key
	representations.		representations.
	Note that if an application needs to represent multiple proof-of-		The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of-
	possession keys in the same JWT, one way for it to achieve this is to		possession key; thus, at most one of the "jwk", "jwe", and "jku"
	use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the additional		confirmation values defined below may be present. Note that if an
	proof-of-possession key information. These claims could use the same		application needs to represent multiple proof-of-possession keys in
	syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims would be		the same JWT, one way for it to achieve this is to use other claim
	defined by applications or other specifications and could be		names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the additional proof-of-
	registered in the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry		possession key information. These claims could use the same syntax
	[IANA.JWT.Claims].		and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims would be defined by
			applications or other specifications and could be registered in the
			IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims].
	3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key		3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
	When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the		When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the
	"jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing the		"jwk" member is a JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] representing the
	corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example		corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example
	demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:		demonstrates such a declaration in the JWT Claims Set of a JWT:
	{		{
	"iss": "https://server.example.com",		"iss": "https://server.example.com",
	skipping to change at page 10, line 21		skipping to change at page 10, line 38
	Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a		Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a
	symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of		symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of
	obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol-specific.		obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol-specific.
	For examples using the mechanisms defined in this specification, see		For examples using the mechanisms defined in this specification, see
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].		[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
	4. Security Considerations		4. Security Considerations
	All of the normal security issues, especially in relationship to		All of the security considerations that are discussed in JWT [JWT]
	comparing URIs and dealing with unrecognized values, that are		also apply here. In addition, proof-of-possession introduces its own
	discussed in JWT [JWT] also apply here.		unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is
			kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that
	In addition, proof-of-possession introduces its own unique security		unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values.
	issues. Possessing the key is only valuable if it is kept secret.
	Appropriate means must be used to ensure that unintended parties do
	not learn the private key or symmetric key value.
	Proof-of-possession via encrypted symmetric secrets is subject to		Proof-of-possession via encrypted symmetric secrets is subject to
	replay attacks. This attack can be avoided when a signed nonce or		replay attacks. This attack can be avoided when a signed nonce or
	challenge is used, since the recipient can use a distinct nonce or		challenge is used, since the recipient can use a distinct nonce or
	challenged for each interaction.		challenged for each interaction.
	Similarly to other information included in a JWT, it is necessary to		Similarly to other information included in a JWT, it is necessary to
	apply data origin authentication and integrity protection (via a		apply data origin authentication and integrity protection (via a
	keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data origin		keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data origin
	authentication ensures that the recipient of the JWT learns about the		authentication ensures that the recipient of the JWT learns about the
	entity that created the JWT, since this will be important for any		entity that created the JWT, since this will be important for any
	policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary from		policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary from
	changing any elements conveyed within the JWT payload. Special care		changing any elements conveyed within the JWT payload. Special care
	has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the JWT, since		has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the JWT, since
	those not only require integrity protection, but also confidentiality		those not only require integrity protection, but also confidentiality
	protection.		protection.
	A recipient may not understand the newly introduced "cnf" claim and		A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim, in which case it
	may consequently treat it as a bearer token. While this is a		will typically be ignored. Unless this is acceptable behavior,
	legitimate concern, it is outside the scope of this specification,		applications that need the proof-of-possession keys communicated with
	since demonstration the possession of the key associated with the		it to be understood and processed must require that the parts of this
	"cnf" claim is not covered by this specification. For more details,		specification that they use be implemented.
	please consult [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].
	5. Privacy Considerations		5. Privacy Considerations
	A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the		A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
	same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons,		same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons,
	it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used		it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used
	when interacting with different parties.		when interacting with different parties.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	skipping to change at page 13, line 43		skipping to change at page 14, line 6
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
	[IANA.JWT.Claims]		[IANA.JWT.Claims]
	IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",		IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
	[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",		[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
	RFC 7516, May 2015,		RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7156, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
	[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015,		[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/
			RFC7157, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
	[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
	RFC2119, March 1997,		RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO		[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
	10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629,		10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629,
	November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.		November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
	skipping to change at page 14, line 41		skipping to change at page 15, line 4
	within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509		within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
	(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer		(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,		Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
	March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.		March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture]
	Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.		Hunt, P., Richer, J., Mills, W., Mishra, P., and H.
	Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security		Tschofenig, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security
	Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-03 (work		Architecture", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-05 (work
	in progress), September 2015.		in progress), October 2015.
	[JWK.Thumbprint]		[JWK.Thumbprint]
	Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)		Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
	Thumbprint", draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint (work in		Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638,
	progress), July 2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/		September 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
	draft-ietf-jose-jwk-thumbprint-08>.
	[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]		[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
	Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,		Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
	"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion		"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
	Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-		Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
	2.0-os, March 2005.		2.0-os, March 2005.
	[OpenID.Core]		[OpenID.Core]
	Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and		Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
	C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,		C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
	<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.		<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgements		Appendix A. Acknowledgements
	The authors wish to thank Brian Campbell, Kepeng Li, James Manger,		The authors wish to thank Brian Campbell, Kepeng Li, James Manger,
	Justin Richer, and Nat Sakimura for their reviews of the		Kathleen Moriarty, Justin Richer, and Nat Sakimura for their reviews
	specification.		of the specification.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
			-07
			o Addressed review comments by Hannes Tschofenig, Kathleen Moriarty,
			and Justin Richer. Changes were:
			o Clarified that symmetric proof-of-possession keys can be generated
			by either the presenter or the issuer.
			o Clarified that confirmation members that are not understood must
			be ignored unless otherwise specified by the application.
	-06		-06
	o Added diagrams to the introduction.		o Added diagrams to the introduction.
	-05		-05
	o Addressed review comments by Kepeng Li.		o Addressed review comments by Kepeng Li.
	-04		-04
	o Allowed the use of "jwk" for symmetric keys when the JWT is		o Allowed the use of "jwk" for symmetric keys when the JWT is
	encrypted.		encrypted.
	o Added the "jku" (JWK Set URL) member.		o Added the "jku" (JWK Set URL) member.
	o Added privacy considerations.		o Added privacy considerations.
End of changes. 29 change blocks.
	67 lines changed or deleted		82 lines changed or added
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