--- 1/draft-ietf-opsawg-sbom-access-01.txt 2021-07-09 08:13:37.541833969 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-opsawg-sbom-access-02.txt 2021-07-09 08:13:37.577834869 -0700 @@ -1,136 +1,175 @@ Network Working Group E. Lear Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Intended status: Standards Track S. Rose -Expires: 19 November 2021 NIST - 18 May 2021 +Expires: 10 January 2022 NIST + 9 July 2021 - Discovering And Accessing Software Bills of Materials - draft-ietf-opsawg-sbom-access-01 + Discovering and Retrieving Software Transparency and Vulnerability + Information + draft-ietf-opsawg-sbom-access-02 Abstract - Software bills of materials (SBOMs) are formal descriptions of what - pieces of software are included in a product. This memo specifies a - different means for SBOMs to be retrieved. + To improve cybersecurity posture, automation is necessary to locate + what software is running on a device, whether that software has known + vulnerabilities, and what, if any recommendations suppliers may have. + This memo specifies a model to provide access this information. It + may optionally be discovered through manufacturer usage descriptions. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 November 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 January 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 1.1. Cases Not Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1.2. How This Information Is Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 1.3. SBOM formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 1.4. Discussion points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 2. The .well-known/sbom endpoint set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 3. The mud-sbom extension model extension . . . . . . . . . . . 5 - 4. The mud-sbom augmentation to the MUD YANG model . . . . . . . 5 - 5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 5.1. Without ACLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 5.2. Located on the Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5.3. SBOM Obtained from Contact Information . . . . . . . . . 9 - 5.4. With ACLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 7.1. MUD Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 7.2. Well-Known Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 1.1. Cases Not Addressed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.2. How This Information Is Retrieved . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 1.3. Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 1.4. Discussion points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2. The .well-known/transparency endpoint set . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 3. The mud-transparency extension model extension . . . . . . . 6 + 4. The mud-sbom augmentation to the MUD YANG model . . . . . . . 7 + 5. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.1. Without ACLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 5.2. SBOM Located on the Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 5.3. Further contact required. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 5.4. With ACLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 + 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.1. MUD Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 7.2. Well-Known Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1. Introduction + A number of activities have been working to improve visibility to + what software is running on a system, and what vulnerabilities that + software may have. + + Put simply, we seek to answer two classes of questions *at scale*: + + * Is this system vulnerable to a particular vulnerability? + + * Which devices in a particular environment contain vulnerabilities + that require some action? + Software bills of material (SBOMs) are descriptions of what software, including versioning and dependencies, a device contains. There are different SBOM formats such as Software Package Data Exchange [SPDX] or CycloneDX[CycloneDX12]. - This memo specifies means by which SBOMs can be advertised and - retrieved. + System vulnerabilities may similarly be described using several data + formats, including the aforementioned CycloneDX, Common Vulnerability + Reporting Framework [CVRF], the Common Security Advisory Format + [CSAF]. This information is typically used to report to customers + the state of a system. + + These two classes of information can be used in concert. For + instance, a network management tool may discover that a system makes + use of a particular software component that has a known + vulnerability, and a vulnerability report may be used to indicate + what if any versions of software correct that vulnerability, or + whether the system exercises the vulnerable code at all. + + Both classes of information elements are optional under the model + specified in this memo. One can provide only an SBOM, only + vulnerability information, or both an SBOM and vulnerability + information. + + Note that SBOMs may also carry other information, the most common + being any licensing terms. Because this specification is neutral + regarding content, it is left for format developers such as the Linux + Foundation, OASIS, and ISO to decide what attributes they will + support. + + This memo specifies means by which both SBOMs and vulnerability + information can be advertised and retrieved through the use of a YANG + augmentation of the Manufacturer User Description (MUD) model + [RFC8520]. Note that the schema creates a grouping that can also be + used independently of MUD. The mechanisms specified in this document are meant to satisfy several use cases: - * A network-layer management system retrieving an SBOM from an IoT - device as part of its ongoing lifecycle. Such devices may or may - not have interfaces available to query SBOM information. + * A network-layer management system retrieving information from an + IoT device as part of its ongoing lifecycle. Such devices may or + may not have query interfaces available. - * An application-layer management system retrieving an SBOM in order - to evaluate the posture of an application server of some form. - These application servers may themselves be containers or - hypervisors. Discovery of the topology of a server is beyond the - scope of this memo. + * An application-layer management system retrieving vulnerability or + SBOM information in order to evaluate the posture of an + application server of some form. These application servers may + themselves be containers or hypervisors. Discovery of the + topology of a server is beyond the scope of this memo. - To satisfy these two key use cases, SBOMs may be found in one of + To satisfy these two key use cases, objects may be found in one of three ways: * on devices themselves * on a web site (e.g., via URI) * through some form of out-of-band contact with the supplier. In the first case, devices will have interfaces that permit direct - SBOM retrieval. Examples of these interfaces might be an HTTP, COAP - or [OpenC2] endpoint for retrieval. There may also be private + retrieval. Examples of these interfaces might be an HTTP, COAP or + [OpenC2] endpoint for retrieval. There may also be private interfaces as well. In the second case, when a device does not have an appropriate - interface to retrieve an SBOM, but one is directly available from the + retrieval interface, but one is directly available from the manufacturer, a URI to that information must be discovered. - In the third case, a supplier may wish to make an SBOM available - under certain circumstances, and may need to individually evaluate - requests. The result of that evaluation might be the SBOM itself or - a restricted URL or no access. + In the third case, a supplier may wish to make an SBOM or + vulnerability information available under certain circumstances, and + may need to individually evaluate requests. The result of that + evaluation might be the SBOM or vulnerability itself or a restricted + URL or no access. To enable application-layer discovery, this memo defines a well-known URI [RFC8615]. Management or orchestration tools can query this - well-known URI to retrieve a system's SBOM. Further queries may be - necessary based on the content and structure of a particular SBOM. - - To enable network-layer discovery, particularly for IOT-based - devices, an extension to Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUD) may be - used[RFC8520]. + well-known URI to retrieve a system's SBOM or vulnerability + information. Further queries may be necessary based on the content + and structure of the response. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 1.1. Cases Not Addressed [ This section to be removed prior to publication ] @@ -142,103 +181,119 @@ involve multiple backend systems, depending on many factors. One example might be a large cloud-based service that offers spreadsheets, email, and document authoring and management. Depending on what service is being used, a different set of back end services may in turn be invoking different software that should be listed. The reason why this use case isn't addressed here is that it may be better addressed inline within HTML. Further discussion is required. -1.2. How This Information Is Used +1.2. How This Information Is Retrieved - SBOMs are used for numerous purposes, including vulnerability - assessment, license management, and inventory management. This memo - provides means for either automated or semi-automated collection of - that information. For devices that can output a MUD URL or establish - a well-known URI, the mechanism may be highly automated. For devices - that have a MUD URL in either their documentation or within a QR code - on a box, the mechanism is semi-automated (someone has to scan the QR - code or enter the URL). + For devices that can emit a URL or can establish a well-known URI, + the mechanism may be highly automated. For devices that have a URL + in either their documentation or within a QR code on a box, the + mechanism is semi-automated (someone has to scan the QR code or enter + the URL). - Note that SBOMs may change more frequently than access control - requirements. A change to software does not necessarily mean a - change to control channels that are used. Therefore, it is important - to retrieve the MUD file as suggested by the manufacturer in the - cache-validity period. In many cases, only the SBOM list will have - been updated. + Note that vulnerability and SBOM information is likely to change at + different rates. The MUD semantics provide a way for manufacturers + to control how often tooling should check for those changes through + the cache-validity node. -1.3. SBOM formats +1.3. Formats - There are multiple ways to express an SBOM. When these are retrieved - either directly from the device or directly from a web server, tools - will need to observe the content-type header to determine precisely - which format is being transmitted. Because IoT devices in particular - have limited capabilities, use of a specific Accept: header in HTTP - or the Accept Option in CoAP is NOT RECOMMENDED. Instead, backend - tooling MUST silently discard SBOM information sent with a media type - that is not understood. + There are multiple ways to express both SBOMs and vulnerability + information. When these are retrieved either directly from the + device or directly from a web server, tools will need to observe the + content-type header to determine precisely which format is being + transmitted. Because IoT devices in particular have limited + capabilities, use of a specific Accept: header in HTTP or the Accept + Option in CoAP is NOT RECOMMENDED. Instead, backend tooling is + encouraged to support all known formats, and SHOULD silently discard + SBOM information sent with a media type that is not understood. + + Some formats may support both vulnerability and software inventory + information. When both vulnerability and software inventory + information is available from the same location, both sbom and vuln + nodes MUST indicate that. Network management systems retrieving this + information MUST take note that the identical resource is being + retrieved rather than retrieving it twice. 1.4. Discussion points The following is discussion to be removed at time of RFC publication. * Is the model structured correctly? - * Are there other retrieval mechanisms that need to be specified? * Do we need to be more specific in how to authenticate and retrieve SBOMs? * What are the implications if the MUD URL is an extension in a certificate (e.g. an IDevID cert)? -2. The .well-known/sbom endpoint set +2. The .well-known/transparency endpoint set - If a host offers this service, it will offer the RESTful endpoint - beginning with "{ORIGIN}/.well-known/sbom/base". + Three well known endpoints are defined: -3. The mud-sbom extension model extension + * "/.well-known/sbom" retrieves an SBOM. + + * "/.well-known/vuln" retrieves vulnerability information. + + * "/.well-known/openc2" is the HTTPS binding to OpenC2. + + As discussed previously, the precise format of a response is based on + the Content-type provided. + +3. The mud-transparency extension model extension We now formally define this extension. This is done in two parts. - First, the extension name "sbom" is listed in the "extensions" array - of the MUD file. N.B., this schema extension is intended to be used - wherever it might be appropriate (e.g., not just MUD). + First, the extension name "transparency" is listed in the + "extensions" array of the MUD file. N.B., this schema extension is + intended to be used wherever it might be appropriate (e.g., not just + MUD). Second, the "mud" container is augmented with a list of SBOM sources. This is done as follows: - module: ietf-mud-sbom + module: ietf-mud-transparency augment /mud:mud: - +--rw sbom - +--rw (sbom-type)? + +--rw transparency + +--rw (sbom-retrieval-method)? + | +--:(cloud) + | | +--rw sboms* [version-info] + | | +--rw version-info string + | | +--rw sbom-url? inet:uri + | +--:(local-well-known) + | | +--rw sbom-local-well-known? enumeration + | +--:(sbom-contact-info) + | +--rw sbom-contact-uri inet:uri + +--rw (vuln-retrieval-method)? +--:(cloud) - | +--rw sboms* [version-info] - | +--rw version-info string - | +--rw sbom-url? inet:uri - +--:(local-well-known) - | +--rw local-well-known? empty - +--:(contact-info) - | +--rw contact-uri inet:uri - +--:(openc2) - +--rw openc2-uri inet:uri + | +--rw vuln-url? inet:uri + +--:(vuln-local-well-known) + | +--rw vuln-local-well-known? enumeration + +--:(vuln-contact-info) + +--rw contact-uri inet:uri 4. The mud-sbom augmentation to the MUD YANG model - file "ietf-mud-sbom@2021-04-29.yang" - module ietf-mud-sbom { + file "ietf-mud-transparency@2021-07-06.yang" + module ietf-mud-transparency { yang-version 1.1; - namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-sbom"; - prefix mud-sbom; + namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-transparency"; + prefix mud-transparency; import ietf-inet-types { prefix inet; } import ietf-mud { prefix mud; } organization "IETF OPSAWG (Ops Area) Working Group"; @@ -256,318 +311,397 @@ authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX - (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself - for full legal notices. + (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); + see the RFC itself for full legal notices. The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. "; - revision 2021-04-29 { + revision 2021-07-06 { description "Initial proposed standard."; reference - "RFC XXXX: Extension for MUD SBOM"; + "RFC XXXX: Extension for software transparency"; } - grouping mud-sbom-extension { + grouping transparency-extension { description - "SBOM extension grouping"; - container sbom { + "Transparency extension grouping"; + container transparency { description "container of methods to get an SBOM."; - - choice sbom-type { + choice sbom-retrieval-method { description - "SBOM type"; + "How to find SBOM information"; case cloud { list sboms { key "version-info"; description "A list of SBOMs tied to different s/w or h/w versions."; leaf version-info { type string; description "The version to which this SBOM refers."; } leaf sbom-url { type inet:uri; description "A statically located URI."; } } } case local-well-known { - leaf local-well-known { - type empty; + leaf sbom-local-well-known { + type enumeration { + enum http { description - "SBOM information is to be retrieved via - https from the host on port 443, at - https://{hostname}/.well-known/sbom, where - hostname is replaced with the host to which - this MUD extension refers."; + "Use http (insecure) to retrieve + SBOM information."; } + enum https { + description + "Use https (secure) to retrieve SBOM information."; } - case contact-info { - leaf contact-uri { + enum coap { + description + "Use COAP (insecure) to retrieve SBOM"; + } + enum coaps { + description + "Use COAPS (secure) to retrieve SBOM"; + } + enum openc2 { + description + "Use OpenC2 endpoint. + This is https://{host}/.well-known/openc2"; + } + } + description + "Which communication protocol to choose."; + } + } + case sbom-contact-info { + leaf sbom-contact-uri { type inet:uri; mandatory true; description "This MUST be either a tel, http, https, or mailto uri schema that customers can use to contact someone for SBOM information."; } } - case openc2 { - leaf openc2-uri { + } + choice vuln-retrieval-method { + description + "How to find vulnerability information"; + case cloud { + leaf vuln-url { + type inet:uri; + description + "A statically located URL."; + } + } + case vuln-local-well-known { + leaf vuln-local-well-known { + type enumeration { + enum http { + description + "Use http (insecure) to retrieve vulnerability + information."; + } + enum https { + description + "Use https to retrieve vulnerability information."; + } + enum coap { + description + "Use COAP (insecure) to retrieve vulnerability + information"; + } + enum coaps { + description + "Use COAPS to retrieve vulnerability information"; + } + enum openc2 { + description + "Use OpenC2 endpoint. + This is https://{host}/.well-known/openc2"; + } + } + description + "What communication protocol to use."; + } + } + case vuln-contact-info { + leaf contact-uri { type inet:uri; mandatory true; description - "A link to the OpenC2 https RESTful - \t mapping. The OpenC2 protocol is then - used to retrieve the SBOM"; + "This MUST be either a tel, http, https, or + mailto uri schema that customers can use to + contact someone for vulnerability information."; + } } } } } augment "/mud:mud" { description - "Add extension for SBOMs."; - uses mud-sbom-extension; + "Add extension for software transparency."; + uses transparency-extension; } } 5. Examples - In this example MUD file that uses a cloud service, the Frobinator + In this example MUD file that uses a cloud service, the modelX presents a location of the SBOM in a URL. Note, the ACLs in a MUD file are NOT required, although they are a very good idea for IP- - based devices. The first MUD file demonstrates how to get the SBOM - without ACLs, and the second has ACLs. + based devices. 5.1. Without ACLS + + This first MUD file demonstrates how to get SBOM and vulnerability + information without ACLs. + { "ietf-mud:mud": { "mud-version": 1, - "mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/dnsname", - "last-update": "2019-01-15T10:22:47+00:00", + "extensions": [ + "transparency" + ], + "transparency": { + "sboms": [ + { + "version-info": "ExOS1.1", + "sbom-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/sbom.json" + } + ], + "vuln-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json" + }, + "mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json", + "mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s", + "last-update": "2021-07-09T05:57:58+00:00", "cache-validity": 48, "is-supported": true, - "systeminfo": "device that wants to talk to a cloud service", + "systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service", "mfg-name": "Example, Inc.", - "documentation": "https://frob.example.com/doc/frob2000", - "model-name": "Frobinator 2000", + "documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX", + "model-name": "modelX" + } + } + + The second example demonstrates that just SBOM information is + included. + + { + "ietf-mud:mud": { + "mud-version": 1, "extensions" : [ - "sbom" + "transparency" ], - "sboms" : { "sbom" : [ + "transparency": { + "sboms": [ { - "version-info" : "FrobOS Release 1.1", - "sbom-url" : "https://frob.example.com/sboms/f20001.1", + "version-info": "ExOS1.1", + "sbom-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/sbom.json" } ] - } + }, + "mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json", + "mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s", + "last-update": "2021-07-09T06:03:21+00:00", + "cache-validity": 48, + "is-supported": true, + "systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service", + "mfg-name": "Example, Inc.", + "documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX", + "model-name": "modelX" } } -5.2. Located on the Device +5.2. SBOM Located on the Device + + In this example, the SBOM is retrieved from the device, while + vulnerability information is available from the cloud. This is + likely a common case, because vendors may learn of vulnerability + information more frequently than they update software. { "ietf-mud:mud": { "mud-version": 1, - "mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/dnsname", - "last-update": "2019-01-15T10:22:47+00:00", + "extensions": [ + "ol", + "transparency" + ], + "ol": { + "owners": [ + "Copyright (c) Example, Inc. 2021. All Rights Reserved" + ], + "spdx-tag": "0BSD" + }, + "transparency": { + "sbom-local-well-known": "https", + "vuln-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json" + }, + "mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.json", + "mud-signature": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.p7s", + "last-update": "2021-07-09T06:06:13+00:00", "cache-validity": 48, "is-supported": true, - "systeminfo": "device that wants to talk to a cloud service", + "systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service", "mfg-name": "Example, Inc.", - "documentation": "https://frob.example.com/doc/frob2000", - "model-name": "Frobinator 2000", - "extensions" : [ - "sbom" - ], - "sboms" : "sbom" : { - "sbom-local" : "coaps:///.well-known/sbom", - } + "documentation": "https://iot-device.example.com/doc/modelX", + "model-name": "modelX" } } -5.3. SBOM Obtained from Contact Information +5.3. Further contact required. + + In this example, the network manager must take further steps to + retrieve SBOM information. Vulnerability information is still + available. + { "ietf-mud:mud": { "mud-version": 1, - "mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/dnsname", - "last-update": "2019-01-15T10:22:47+00:00", + "extensions": [ + "transparency" + ], + "transparency": { + "contact-info": "https://iot-device.example.com/contact-info.html", + "vuln-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json" + }, + "mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.json", + "mud-signature": "https://iot-device.example.com/modelX.p7s", + "last-update": "2021-07-09T06:16:42+00:00", "cache-validity": 48, "is-supported": true, - "systeminfo": "device that wants to talk to a cloud service", + "systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service", "mfg-name": "Example, Inc.", - "documentation": "https://frob.example.com/doc/frob2000", - "model-name": "Frobinator 2000", - "extensions" : [ - "sbom" - ], - "sboms" : { "sbom" : { - "contact-uri" : "mailto:sbom-requst@example.com", - } - } + "documentation": "https://iot-device.example.com/doc/modelX", + "model-name": "modelX" } } 5.4. With ACLS + Finally, here is a complete example where the device provides SBOM + and vulnerability information, as well as access-control information. + { "ietf-mud:mud": { "mud-version": 1, - "mud-url": "https://iot-device.example.com/dnsname", - "last-update": "2019-01-15T10:22:47+00:00", - "cache-validity": 48, - "is-supported": true, - "systeminfo": "device that wants to talk to a cloud service", - "mfg-name": "Example, Inc.", - "documentation": "https://frob.example.com/doc/frob2000", - "model-name": "Frobinator 2000", "extensions" : [ - "sbom" + "transparency" ], - "sboms" : "sbom" : [ + "transparency": { + "sboms": [ { - "version-info" : "FrobOS Release 1.1", - "sbom-url" : "https://frob.example.com/sboms/f20001.1", - }, + "version-info": "ExOS1.1", + "sbom-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/sbom.json" + } ], + "vuln-url": "https://iot.example.com/info/modelX/csaf.json" }, + "mud-url": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.json", + "mud-signature": "https://iot.example.com/modelX.p7s", + "last-update": "2021-07-09T06:19:39+00:00", + "cache-validity": 48, + "is-supported": true, + "systeminfo": "retrieving vuln and SBOM info via a cloud service", + "mfg-name": "Example, Inc.", + "documentation": "https://iot.example.com/doc/modelX", + "model-name": "modelX", "from-device-policy": { "access-lists": { "access-list": [ { - "name": "mud-96898-v4fr" - }, - { - "name": "mud-96898-v6fr" + "name": "mud-15060-v4fr" } ] } }, "to-device-policy": { "access-lists": { "access-list": [ { - "name": "mud-96898-v4to" - }, - { - "name": "mud-96898-v6to" + "name": "mud-15060-v4to" } ] } } }, "ietf-access-control-list:acls": { "acl": [ { - "name": "mud-96898-v4to", + "name": "mud-15060-v4to", "type": "ipv4-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "cl0-todev", "matches": { "ipv4": { "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "cloud.example.com" } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } ] } }, { - "name": "mud-96898-v4fr", + "name": "mud-15060-v4fr", "type": "ipv4-acl-type", "aces": { "ace": [ { "name": "cl0-frdev", "matches": { "ipv4": { "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "cloud.example.com" } }, "actions": { "forwarding": "accept" } } ] } - }, - { - "name": "mud-96898-v6to", - "type": "ipv6-acl-type", - "aces": { - "ace": [ - { - "name": "cl0-todev", - "matches": { - "ipv6": { - "ietf-acldns:src-dnsname": "cloud.example.com" - } - }, - "actions": { - "forwarding": "accept" - } - } - ] - } - }, - { - "name": "mud-96898-v6fr", - "type": "ipv6-acl-type", - "aces": { - "ace": [ - { - "name": "cl0-frdev", - "matches": { - "ipv6": { - "ietf-acldns:dst-dnsname": "cloud.example.com" - } - }, - "actions": { - "forwarding": "accept" - } - } - - ] - } } ] } } At this point, the management system can attempt to retrieve the SBOM, and determine which format is in use through the content-type - header on the response to a GET request. + header on the response to a GET request, independently repeat the + process for vulnerability information, and apply ACLs, as + appropriate. 6. Security Considerations SBOMs provide an inventory of software. If firmware is available to an attacker, the attacker may well already be able to derive this very same software inventory. Manufacturers MAY restrict access to SBOM information using appropriate authorization semantics within HTTP. In particular, if a system attempts to retrieve an SBOM via HTTP and the client is not authorized, the server MUST produce an appropriate error, with instructions on how to register a particular @@ -579,40 +713,57 @@ Another risk is a skew in the SBOM listing and the actual software inventory of a device/container. For example, a manufacturer may update the SBOM on its server, but an individual device has not be upgraded yet. This may result in an incorrect policy being applied to a device. A unique mapping of a device's firmware version and its SBOM can minimize this risk. To further mitigate attacks against a device, manufacturers SHOULD recommend access controls through the normal MUD mechanism. + Vulnerability information is generally made available to such + databases as NIST's National Vulnerability Database. It is possible + that vendor may wish to release information early to some customers. + We do not discuss here whether that is a good idea, but if it is + employed, then appropriate access controls and authoration would be + applied to the vulnerability resource. + 7. IANA Considerations 7.1. MUD Extension - The IANA is requested to add "controller-candidate" to the MUD - extensions registry as follows: + The IANA is requested to add "transparency" to the MUD extensions + registry as follows: - Extension Name: sbom + Extension Name: transparency Standard reference: This document 7.2. Well-Known Prefix - The following well known URI is requested in accordance with + The following well known URIs are requested in accordance with [RFC8615]: URI suffix: "sbom" Change controller: "IETF" Specification document: This memo Related information: See ISO/IEC 19970-2 and SPDX.org + URI suffix: "openc2" + Change controller: "IETF" + Specification document: This memo + Related information: OpenC2 Project + + URI suffix: "vuln" + Change controller: "IETF" + Specification document: This memo + Related information: OASIS.ORG's CSAF project + 8. References 8.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC @@ -623,38 +774,52 @@ Description Specification", RFC 8520, DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019, . [RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019, . 8.2. Informative References + [CSAF] OASIS, "Common Security Advisory Format", July 2021, + . + + [CVRF] Santos, O., Ed., "Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework + (CVRF) Version 1.2", September 2017, . + [CycloneDX12] cylonedx.org, "CycloneDX XML Reference v1.2", May 2020. [OpenC2] Lemire, D., Ed., "Specification for Transfer of OpenC2 Messages via HTTPS Version 1.0", July 2019, . [SPDX] The Linux Foundation, "SPDX Specification 2.1", 2016. Appendix A. Changes from Earlier Versions + Draft -02: + + * include vulnerability information + + Draft -01: + + * some modest changes + Draft -00: * Initial revision Authors' Addresses - Eliot Lear Cisco Systems Richtistrasse 7 CH-8304 Wallisellen Switzerland Phone: +41 44 878 9200 Email: lear@cisco.com Scott Rose