draft-ietf-pana-requirements-04.txt   draft-ietf-pana-requirements-05.txt 
PANA Working Group Reinaldo Penno, Editor
INTERNET-DRAFT Alper E. Yegin
Date: October 2002 Yoshihiro Ohba
Expires: April 2003 George Tsirtsis
Cliff Wang
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA)
Requirements and Terminology
<draft-ietf-pana-requirements-04.txt>
Status of this Memo
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Abstract
It is expected that future IP devices will have a variety of access
technologies to gain network connectivity. Currently there are
access-specific mechanisms for providing client information to the
network for authentication and authorization purposes. In addition
to being limited to specific access media (e.g., 802.1x for IEEE 802
links), some of these protocols are limited to specific network
topologies (e.g., PPP for point-to-point links). The goal of the
PANA is to provide a layer two agnostic and IPv4/IPv6 compatible
client-server protocol that allows a host to be authenticated for
network access. The protocol will run between a client's device
and an agent device in the network where the agent might be a client
of the AAA infrastructure. This document defines the common
terminology and identifies the requirements for PANA.
Table of Contents
Status of this Memo...............................................1
Abstract..........................................................1
Table of Contents.................................................2
1. Introduction...................................................2
2. Key Words......................................................3
3. Terminology....................................................4
4. Requirements...................................................4
4.1. Authentication...............................................4
4.1.1. Authentication of Client...................................4
4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting and Access Control...............5
4.1.3. Authentication Backend.....................................5
4.1.4. Identifiers................................................5
4.2. Network......................................................6
4.2.1. Multi-access...............................................6
4.2.2. Disconnect Indication......................................6
4.2.3. Location of PAA............................................7
4.2.4. Secure Channel.............................................7
4.3. Interaction with Other Protocols.............................7
4.4. Performance..................................................8
4.5. Reliability and Congestion Control...........................8
4.6. Miscellaneous................................................8
4.6.1. IP Version Independence....................................8
4.6.2. Denial of Service Attacks..................................8
4.6.3. Location Privacy...........................................8
4.7 Change Log....................................................9
Acknowledgements..................................................9
References........................................................9
Authors' Addresses...............................................10
Appendix (PANA Model)............................................11
Full Copyright Statement.........................................13
1. Introduction
Network access technologies for wired and wireless media are
evolving rapidly. With the rapid growth in the number and type of
devices and terminals that support IP stacks and can access the
Internet, users can potentially use a single device having the
capability of attaching via different multiple access media and
technologies to interface to the network.
If a client can have more than one type of interface, using
access-specific authentication mechanisms leads to running a
collection of protocols on the client for the same purpose.
For example, the authentication mechanisms in PPP are being used
for many wired access scenarios as well as some wireless access,
which requires using PPP encapsulation for the data packets. Using
PPP just for client authentication is viewed as a sub-optimal
solution as it causes extra round-trips, overhead of encapsulation
and processing,
and forces the network topology into a point-to-point
model. A point in case is PPPoE which is used over multi-access
networks primarily for the purpose of exploiting the authentication
scheme provided by PPP. Also, IEEE 802 relies on 802.1X which
provides EAP authentication that is limited to IEEE 802 link layers.
It is clearly advantageous to use a general protocol to authenticate
the client for network access on any type of technology. There is
currently no general protocol to be used by a client for gaining
network access, and the PANA Working Group will attempt to
fill that hole.
The protocol design will be limited to defining a client-server
messaging protocol (i.e., a carrier) that will allow authentication
payload to be carried between the host/client (PaC) and an
agent/server (PAA) in the access network for authentication and
authorization purposes regardless of the AAA infrastructure that
may (or may not) reside on the network. As a network-layer
protocol, it will be independent of the underlying access
technologies. It will also be applicable to any network topology.
The Working Group will not invent new security protocols and
mechanisms but instead will use the existing mechanisms. In
particular, the Working Group will not define authentication
protocols, key distribution or key agreement protocols, or key
derivation. The desired protocol can be viewed as the front-end
of the AAA protocol or any other protocol/mechanisms the network
is running at the background to authenticate its clients. It will
act as a carrier for an already defined security protocol or
mechanism.
As an example, Mobile IP Working Group has already defined such a
carrier for Mobile IPv4 [MIPV4]. Mobile IPv4 registration request
message is used as the carrier for authentication extensions (MN-FA
[MIPV4], or MN-AAA [MNAAA]) to receive forwarding service from the
foreign agents. In that sense, designing the equivalent of Mobile
IPv4 registration request messages for general network access is the
goal of this work, but not defining the equivalent of MN-FA or MN-
AAA extensions.
This document defines the common terminology and identifies the
requirements of a protocol for PANA. These terminology and
requirements will be used to define and limit the scope of the work
to be done in this group.
2. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].
3. Terminology
Device Identifier (DI)
The identifier used by the network as a handle to control and
police the network access of a client. Depending on the access
technology, identifier might contain any of IP address, link-
layer address, switch port number, etc. of a device. PANA
authentication agent keeps a table for binding device
identifiers to the PANA clients. At most one PANA client
should be associated with a DI on a PANA authentication agent.
PANA Client (PaC)
The entity wishing to obtain network access from a PANA
authentication agent within a network. A PANA client is
associated with a network device and a set of credentials to
prove its identity within the scope of PANA.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA)
The entity whose responsibility is to authenticate the
credentials provided by a PANA client and grant network
access service to the device associated with the client
and identified by a DI.
4. Requirements
4.1. Authentication
4.1.1. Authentication of Client
PANA MUST authenticate a PaC for network access. A PaC can be
identified by the credentials (identifier, authenticator) supplied
by one of the users of the device or the device itself. PANA MUST
only grant network access service to the device identified by the
DI, rather than granting separate access to multiple simultaneous
users of the device. Once the network access is granted to the
device, the methods used by the device on arbitrating which one of
its users can access the network is outside the scope of PANA.
PANA MUST NOT define new security protocols or mechanisms. Instead
it must be defined as a "carrier" for such protocols. PANA MUST
identify which specific security protocol(s) or mechanism(s) it can
carry (the "payload"). The current thinking is that a sufficient
solution would be for PANA to carry EAP. If PANA WG decides that
extensions to EAP are needed, it will define requirements for an
EAP WG instead of defining these extensions.
Authentication and encryption of data traffic except between
the Pac and PAA is outside the scope of PANA. Providing a complete
secure network access solution by also securing router discovery
[RDISC], neighbor discovery [NDISC], and address resolution
protocols [ARP] is outside the scope as well.
Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to authenticate each other for
network access. Providing capability of only PAA authenticating the
PaC is not sufficient.
PANA MUST be capable of carrying out both periodic and on-demand re-
authentication. Both the PaC and the PAA MUST be able to initiate
both the initial authentication and the re-authentication process.
When the DI is carried explicitly as part of the PANA payload, the
authentication computation MUST also include this field to provide
integrity protection for the DI. When the DI is carried implicitly
as the source of the PANA message, the protocol has to make sure
that the DI's integrity is protected by some other means (e.g.,
physical verification of incoming port number of the PANA message in
the case of switch port number as a DI and PAA co-located with the
link-layer access device). Protecting PaCs against DI theft is
outside the scope of PANA.
4.1.2. Authorization, Accounting and Access Control
In addition to carrying authentication information, PANA MUST also
provides only a binary authorization to indicate whether the PaC
is allowed to access full IP services on the network. Providing
finer granularity authorization, such as negotiating QoS parameters,
authorizing individual services (http vs. ssh), individual users
sharing the same device, etc. is outside the scope of PANA.
Providing access control functionality in the network is outside the
scope of PANA. Client access authentication should be followed by
access control to make sure only authenticated and authorized
clients can send and receive IP packets via access network. Access
control can involve setting access control lists on the enforcement
points. Identification of clients which are authorized to access
the network is done by the PANA protocol exchange.
Carrying accounting data is outside the scope of PANA.
4.1.3. Authentication Backend
PANA protocol MUST NOT make any assumptions on the backend
authentication protocol or mechanisms. PAA may interact with
backend AAA infrastructures such as RADIUS or Diameter, but it is
not a requirement. When the access network doesn't rely on a
IETF-defined AAA protocol (e.g., RADIUS, Diameter), then it can
still use a proprietary backend system, or rely on the information
locally stored on the authentication agents.
The interaction between the PAA and the backend authentication
entities is outside the scope of PANA.
4.1.4. Identifiers
PANA SHOULD allow various types of identifiers to be used for the
PaC (e.g., NAI, IP address, FQDN, etc.)
PANA SHOULD allow various types of identifiers to be used as the DI
(IP address, link-layer address, port number of a switch, etc.)
PAA MUST be able to create a binding between the PaC and the
associated DI upon successful PANA exchange. The DI MUST be carried
either explicitly as part of the PANA payload, or implicitly as the
source of the PANA message, or both. This binding is used for access
control and accounting in the network as described in section 4.1.2.
4.1.5. IP Address Assignment
PANA does not perform any address assignment functions but MUST
only be invoked after the client has a usable IP address
(e.g., a link-local address in IPv6 or a DHCP-learned address
in IPv4)
4.2. Network
4.2.1. Multi-access
Protocol MUST support PaCs with multiple interfaces, and networks
with multiple routers on multi-access links.
4.2.2. Disconnect Indication
PANA MUST NOT assume connection-oriented links. Links may or may not
provide disconnect indication. Such notification is desirable in
order for the PAA to cleanup resources when a client moves away
from the network (e.g., inform the enforcement points that the
client is no longer connected). PANA SHOULD have a mechanism to
provide disconnect indication.
This mechanism must allow PAAs to detect the departure of a PaC from
the network. This mechanism SHOULD also allow a PaC to detect the
discontinuation of the network access service. Access
discontinuation can happen due to various reasons such as network
systems going down, or a change in access policy.
Several mechanisms can be used to provide disconnect indication,
e.g., frequent re-authentication; but the use of a heartbeat
function is not recommended.
4.2.3. Location of PAA
The PAA must be on an IP capable network element on the same
IP link as the PaC. Hence it can be on the NAS or WLAN AP or first
hop router (most likely scenario). The use of PANA when the PAA is
not on the same link as the PaC is outside the scope of PANA.
Since a PaC may not be pre-configured with the IP address of PAA,
but may have to dynamically discover instead. Therefore PANA
protocol must define a dynamic discovery method. Given that
the PAA is on the same link as the PaC, there are number
of discovery techniques that could be used (e.g., multicast or
anycast) by the PaC to find out the address of the PAA.
PANA does not assumes the PAA is co-located with the enforcement
point. Network access enforcement can be provided by one or more
nodes on the same IP subnet as the client (e.g., multiple routers),
or on another subnet in the access domain (e.g., gateway to the
Internet, depending on the network architecture). When the PAA and
the enforcement point(s) are separated, there needs to be another
transport for client provisioning. This transport is needed to
create access control lists to allow authenticated and authorized
clients on the enforcement points. This WG will identify a
(preferably existing) protocol solution that allows the PAA
to deliver the authorization information to one or more EPs
when the PAA is separated from EPs.
4.2.4. Secure Channel
PANA MUST not assume a secure channel between the PaC and the PAA.
PANA MUST be able to provide authentication especially in networks
which are not protected against eavesdropping and spoofing. PANA
MUST provide protection against replay attacks on both PaCs and
PAAs.
Alternatively a combination of PANA with its chosen payload (EAP)
can be used to meet the requirements stated above.
4.3. Interaction with Other Protocols
Mobility management is outside the scope of PANA. Though, PANA MUST
be able to co-exist and not interfere with various mobility
management protocols, such as Mobile IPv4 [MIPV4], Mobile IPv6
[MIPV6], fast handover protocols [FMIPV4, FMIPV6], and other
standard protocols like IPv6 stateless address auto-configuration
[ADDRCONF] (including privacy extensions [PRIVACY]), and DHCP
[DHCP]. It MUST NOT make any assumptions on the protocols or
mechanisms used for IP address configuration of the PaC.
4.4. Performance
PANA design SHOULD give consideration to efficient handling of
authentication process. This is important for gaining network access
with minimum latency. As an example, a method like minimizing the
protocol signaling by creating local security associations can be
used for this purpose.
4.5. Reliability and Congestion Control
PANA MUST provide reliability and congestion control. It can do so
by using techniques like re-transmissions, cyclic redundancy check,
delayed initialization and exponential back-off.
In order to satisfy the these requirements, the PANA MAY specify
that high layer protocols, such as EAP, provide these
services
4.6. Miscellaneous
4.6.1. IP Version Independence
PANA MUST work for both IPv4 and IPv6.
4.6.2. Denial of Service Attacks
PANA MUST be robust against a class of DoS attacks such as blind
masquerade attacks through IP spoofing that swamp the PAA in
spending much resources and prevent legitimate clientsœ attempts of
network access.
4.6.3. Location Privacy
Location privacy is outside the scope of PANA.
4.7. Change Log
Version 04
* Minor Editorial corrections
* Inserted the PANA model appendix
Version 03
* In section 4.2.2 the requirement for a heartbeat mechanism to
provide disconnect indication was removed. Rewording of the
section was done
* In section 4.2.3 and 4.1.2 rewording was done to account for
the separation of PAA and EP and the protocol between them.
* In section 4.2.4 new text was added to account for the possibility
to rely on the high layer protocol (EAP) to meet the requirements
stated
* In section 4.5 new text was added to allow reliability and
congestion control to be provided by the payload protocol, e.g.,
EAP.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Basavaraj Patil, Subir Das, and the PANA
Working Group members for their valuable contributions to the
discussions and preparation of this document.
References
[KEYWORDS] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[8021X] "IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
Port Based Network Access Control", IEEE Draft 802.1X/D11, March
2001.
[PPP] W. Simpson (editor), "The Point-To-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD
51, RFC 1661, July 1994.
[MIPV4] C. Perkins (editor), "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002,
October 1996.
[MIPV6] D. Johnson and C. Perkins, "Mobility Support in IPv6",
draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-15.txt, July 2001. Work in progress.
[MNAAA] C. Perkins, P. Calhoun, "Mobile IPv4 Challenge/Response
Extensions", RFC3012, November 2000.
[NDISC] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
for IP Version 6 (IPv6)",RFC 2461, December 1998.
[ARP] D. Plummer, "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol", STD 37,
RFC 826, November 1982.
[FMIPV4] K. ElMalki (editor), et. al., "Low latency Handoffs in
Mobile IPv4", November 2001. Work in progress.
[FMIPV6] G. Dommety (editor), et. al., "Fast Handovers for Mobile
IPv6", July 2001. Work in progress.
[DHCP] R. Droms (editor), et. al., "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol for IPv6", December 2001. Work in progress.
[PRIVACY] T. Narten, R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.
Authors' Addresses
Alper E. Yegin
DoCoMo USA Labs
181 Metro Drive, Suite 300
San Jose, CA, 95110
USA
Phone: +1 408 451 4743
Email: alper@docomolabs-usa.com
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
P.O. Box 136
Convent Station, NJ, 07961-0136
USA
Phone: +1 973 829 5174
Email: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Reinaldo Penno
Nortel Networks
600 Technology Park
Billerica, MA, 01821
USA
Phone: +1 978 288 8011
Email: rpenno@nortelnetworks.com
George Tsirtsis
Flarion Technologies
Bedminster One
135 Route 202/206 South
Bedminster, NJ, 07921
USA
Phone : +44 20 88260073
E-mail: G.Tsirtsis@Flarion.com, gtsirt@hotmail.com
Cliff Wang
Smart Pipes
565 Metro Place South
Dublin, OH, 43017
USA
Phone: +1 614 923 6241
Email: cwang@smartpipes.com
Appendix
A. PANA Model
Following sub-sections capture the PANA usage model in different
network architectures with reference to its placement of logical
elements such as, PANA Client (PaC) and PANA Authentication Agent
(PAA) w.r.t Enforcement Point (EP) and Access Router (AR). Four
different scenarios are described in following sub-sections. Note
that PAA may or may not use AAA infrastructure to verify the
credentials of PaC and grants or deny the device (belongs to that
particular PaC) to access the network resources.
A.1. PAA Co-located with EP but separated from AR
In this scenario (Figure 1), PAA is co-located with the enforcement
point on which access control is performed. PaCs communicate with
the PAA for network access on behalf of a device (D1, D2,... etc.).
PANA in this case provides a means to transport the authentication
parameters from the PaC to PAA securely. PAA understands how to
verify the credentials. After verification, PAA sends back the
success or failure to PaC. However, PANA does not play any explicit
role in performing access control except that it provides a hook to
access control mechanisms.
PaC -----EP/PAA-+
[D1] |
+- ----- AR ----- (AAA)
|
PaC -----EP/PAA-+
[D2]
Figure 1: An example of PANA Model
[PAA co-located with EP but separated from AR]
A.2. PAA Co-located with AR but separated from EP
Figure 2 describes this model. In this scenario, PAA is not co-
located with EPs but resides in the edge subnet. Although we have
shown only one AR here there could be multiple ARs with PAAs co-
located. PaC exchanges the same messages with PAA as discussed
earlier. The difference here is when initial authentication for the
PaC is successful, access control parameters are to be distributed to
respective enforcement points residing in the edge subnet so that the
corresponding device on which PaC is authenticated must get the
access to the network. Similar to earlier case, PANA does not play
any explicit role in performing access control except that it
provides a hook to access control mechanisms. However, a separate
protocol is needed between PAA and EP to carry access control
parameters.
PaC -------- EP --+
[D1] |
+--- router/PAA --- (AAA)
|
PaC -------- EP --+
[D2]
Figure 2: An example of PANA Model
[PAA co-located with AR but separated from EP]
A.3. PAA colocated with EP and router
In this scenario (Figure 3), PAA is co-located with the EP and AR on
which access control and routing are performed. PaC exchanges the
same messages with PAA and PAA performs similar functionalities as
above. PANA in this case also does not play any explicit role in
performing access control except that it provides a hook to access
control mechanisms.
PaC ---------- EP/PAA/router+
[D1] |
+ -------(AAA)
|
PaC ---------- EP/PAA/router+
[D2]
Figure 3: An example of PANA Model
[PAA co-located with EP and AR]
A.4. PAA Separated from EP and AR
Figure 4 represents this model. In this scenario, PAA is neither co-
located with EPs nor ARs but resides on the edge subnet. Although we
have shown only one PAA here there could be multiple PAAs in the edge
subnet. PaC does similar exchanges with PAA as discussed earlier.
Similar to model 5.2, after successful authentication, access control
parameters will be distributed to respective enforcement points via a
separate protocol and PANA does not play any explicit role to this.
PaC ----- EP -----+- router -----+
| |
PaC ----- EP --- -+ |
| |
PaC ----- EP -----+- router ---- + ----(AAA)
|
+- PAA
Figure 4: An example of PANA Model
[PAA separated from EP and AR]
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