draft-ietf-rats-eat-00.txt		draft-ietf-rats-eat-01.txt
	RATS Working Group G. Mandyam		RATS Working Group G. Mandyam
	Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade		Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade
	Expires: December 24, 2019 Security Theory LLC		Expires: January 5, 2020 Security Theory LLC
	M. Ballesteros		M. Ballesteros
	J. O'Donoghue		J. O'Donoghue
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	June 22, 2019		July 04, 2019
	The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)		The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
	draft-ietf-rats-eat-00		draft-ietf-rats-eat-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	An attestation format based on concise binary object representation		An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of
	(CBOR) is proposed that is suitable for inclusion in a CBOR Web Token		claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,
	(CWT), know as the Entity Attestation Token (EAT). The associated		typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are
	data can be used by a relying party to assess the security state of a		used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the
	remote device or module.		entity.
			An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.
			To a large degree, all this document does is extend CWT and JWT.
	Contributing		Contributing
	TBD		TBD
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 24, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.1. CDDL, CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.2. Use of CBOR and COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.2. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.3. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.3. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	1.4. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.4. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1.4.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.4.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1.4.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		1.4.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. The Claims Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.1. Universal Entity ID (UEID) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1. Nonce Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. Origination (origination) Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.3. OEM identification by IEEE OUI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.3. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.4. Security Level (seclevel) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.4. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.5. Nonce (nonce) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.4.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims . . . . . . . . 13		3.5. OEM identification by IEEE OUI (oemid) . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6.1. Secure Boot Enabled (secbootenabled) Claim . . . . . 13		3.5.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6.2. Debug Disabled (debugdisabled) Claim . . . . . . . . 13		3.6. The Security Level Claim (security_level) . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot (debugdisabledsincebboot)		3.6.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.7. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) . 13
	3.6.4. Debug Permanent Disable (debugpermanentdisable) Claim 13		3.7.1. Secure Boot Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	3.6.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable		3.7.2. Debug Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	(debugfullpermanentdisable) Claim . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.7.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7. Location (loc) Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.7.4. Debug Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.1. lat (latitude) claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.7.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.2. long (longitude) claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.7.6. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.3. alt (altitude) claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.4. acc (accuracy) claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.7.5. altacc (altitude accuracy) claim . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.9. The Age Claim (age) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.7.6. heading claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.10. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.7.7. speed claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.10.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.8. ts (timestamp) claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.11. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.9. age claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.11.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.10. uptime claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.12. The Submods Claim (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.11. The submods Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.12.1. The submod_name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.11.1. The submod_name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.12.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.11.2. Nested EATs, the eat Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		4. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
			4.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	4. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		4.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	4.1. Integer Encoding (major type 0 and 1) . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	4.2. String Encoding (major type 2 and 3) . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	4.3. Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5) . . . . . . . 17		4.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	4.4. Date and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	4.5. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.4.1. Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	4.6. Floating Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	4.7. Other types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 18		5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 21
	5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . 18		5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . 22
	5.2. EAT CBOR Tag Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	5.2.1. Tag Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 18		6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 26
	A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		Appendix B. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 22		B.1. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Remote device attestation is fundamental service that allows a remote		Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a
	device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) device, or		remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)
	other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a server or a		device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a
	service. This allows the relying party to know some characteristics		server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some
	about the device and decide whether it trusts the device.		characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the
			device.
	Remote attestation is a fundamental service that can underlie other		Remote attestation is a fundamental service that can underlie other
	protocols and services that need to know about the trustworthiness of		protocols and services that need to know about the trustworthiness of
	the device before proceeding. One good example is biometric		the device before proceeding. One good example is biometric
	authentication where the biometric matching is done on the device.		authentication where the biometric matching is done on the device.
	The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known		The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known
	to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content		to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content
	protection where the relying party wants to know the device will		protection where the relying party wants to know the device will
	protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that		protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that
	might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing		might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing
	skipping to change at page 4, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 11 ¶
	to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content		to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content
	protection where the relying party wants to know the device will		protection where the relying party wants to know the device will
	protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that		protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that
	might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing		might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing
	corporate data to be accessed by it.		corporate data to be accessed by it.
	The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not		The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not
	limited to the following:		limited to the following:
	o Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)		o Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)
	o Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly		o Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly
	for security oriented chips		for security-oriented chips
	o Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device		o Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device
	o Configuration and state of the device		o Configuration and state of the device
	o Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS		o Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS
	location		location
	The required data format should be general purpose and extensible so		1.1. CDDL, CWT and JWT
	that it can work across many use cases. This is why CBOR (see
	[RFC7049]) was chosen as the format -- it already supports a rich set
	of data types, and is both expressive and extensible. It translates
	well to JSON for good interoperation with web technology. It is
	compact and can work on very small IoT device. The format proposed
	here is small enough that a limited version can be implemented in
	pure hardware gates with no software at all. Moreover, the
	attestation data is defined in the form of claims that is the same as
	CBOR Web Token (CWT, see [RFC8392]). This is the motivation for
	defining the Entity Attestation Token, i.e. EAT.
	1.1. Entity Overview		An EAT token is either a CWT as defined in [RFC8392] or a JWT as
			defined in [RFC7519]. This specification defines additional claims
			for entity attestation.
			This specification uses CDDL, [RFC8610], as the primary formalism to
			define each claim. The implementor then interprets the CDDL to come
			to either the CBOR [RFC7049] or JSON [ECMAScript] representation. In
			the case of JSON, Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed. Additional
			rules are given in Section 4.3.2 of this document where Appendix E is
			insufficient. (Note that this is not to define a general means to
			translate between CBOR and JSON, but only to define enough such that
			the claims defined in this document can be rendered unambiguously in
			JSON).
			1.2. Entity Overview
	An "entity" can be any device or device subassembly ("submodule")		An "entity" can be any device or device subassembly ("submodule")
	that can generate its own attestation in the form of an EAT. The		that can generate its own attestation in the form of an EAT. The
	attestation should be cryptographically verifiable by the EAT		attestation should be cryptographically verifiable by the EAT
	consumer. An EAT at the device-level can be composed of several		consumer. An EAT at the device-level can be composed of several
	submodule EAT's. It is assumed that any entity that can create an		submodule EAT's. It is assumed that any entity that can create an
	EAT does so by means of a dedicated root-of-trust (RoT).		EAT does so by means of a dedicated root-of-trust (RoT).
	Modern devices such as a mobile phone have many different execution		Modern devices such as a mobile phone have many different execution
	environments operating with different security levels. For example		environments operating with different security levels. For example,
	it is common for a mobile phone to have an "apps" environment that		it is common for a mobile phone to have an "apps" environment that
	runs an operating system (OS) that hosts a plethora of downloadable		runs an operating system (OS) that hosts a plethora of downloadable
	apps. It may also have a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that is		apps. It may also have a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that is
	distinct, isolated, and hosts security-oriented functionality like		distinct, isolated, and hosts security-oriented functionality like
	biometric authentication. Additionally it may have an eSE (embedded		biometric authentication. Additionally, it may have an eSE (embedded
	Secure Element) - a high security chip with defenses against HW		Secure Element) - a high security chip with defenses against HW
	attacks that can serve as a RoT. This device attestation format		attacks that can serve as a RoT. This device attestation format
	allows the attested data to be tagged at a security level from which		allows the attested data to be tagged at a security level from which
	it originates. In general, any discrete execution environment that		it originates. In general, any discrete execution environment that
	has an identifiable security level can be considered an entity.		has an identifiable security level can be considered an entity.
	1.2. Use of CBOR and COSE
	Fundamentally this attestation format is a verifiable data format.
	It is a collection of data items that can be signed by an attestation
	key, hashed, and/or encrypted. As per Section 7 of [RFC8392], the
	verification method is in the CWT using the CBOR Object Signing and
	Encryption (COSE) methodology (see [RFC8152]).
	In addition, the reported attestation data could be determined within
	the secure operating environment or written to it from an external
	and presumably less trusted entity on the device. In either case,
	the source of the reported data must be identifiable by the relying
	party.
	This attestation format is a single relatively simple signed message.
	It is designed to be incorporated into many other protocols and many
	other transports. It is also designed such that other SW and apps
	can add their own data to the message such that it is also attested.
	1.3. EAT Operating Models		1.3. EAT Operating Models
	At least the following three participants exist in all EAT operating		At least the following three participants exist in all EAT operating
	models. Some operating models have additional participants.		models. Some operating models have additional participants.
	The Entity. This is the phone, the IoT device, the sensor, the sub-		The Entity. This is the phone, the IoT device, the sensor, the sub-
	assembly or such that the attestation provides information about.		assembly or such that the attestation provides information about.
	The Manufacturer. The company that made the entity. This may be a		The Manufacturer. The company that made the entity. This may be a
	chip vendor, a circuit board module vendor or a vendor of finished		chip vendor, a circuit board module vendor or a vendor of finished
	skipping to change at page 6, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 11 ¶
	o The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party		o The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party
	transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the		transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the
	manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims.		manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims.
	o The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps		o The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps
	operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It		operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It
	verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the		verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the
	relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-		relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-
	sign the EAT (with a different signing key).		sign the EAT (with a different signing key).
	This standard supports all these operating models and does not prefer		All these operating models are supported and there is no preference
	one over the other. It is important to support this variety of		of one over the other. It is important to support this variety of
	operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for		operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for
	some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation		some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation
	service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In		service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In
	another, a privacy proxy service processes the EAT before it is		another, a privacy proxy service processes the EAT before it is
	transmitted to the relying party. In yet another, symmetric key		transmitted to the relying party. In yet another, symmetric key
	material is used for signing. In this case the manufacturer should		material is used for signing. In this case the manufacturer should
	perform the verification, because any release of the key material		perform the verification, because any release of the key material
	would enable a participant other than the entity to create valid		would enable a participant other than the entity to create valid
	signed EATs.		signed EATs.
	1.4. What is Not Standardized		1.4. What is Not Standardized
			The following is not standardized for EAT, just the same they are not
			standardized for CWT or JWT.
	1.4.1. Transmission Protocol		1.4.1. Transmission Protocol
	EATs may be transmitted by any protocol. For example, they might be		EATs may be transmitted by any protocol the same as CWTs and JWTs.
	added in extension fields of other protocols, bundled into an HTTP		For example, they might be added in extension fields of other
	header, or just transmitted as files. This flexibility is		protocols, bundled into an HTTP header, or just transmitted as files.
	intentional to allow broader adoption. This flexibility is possible		This flexibility is intentional to allow broader adoption. This
	because EAT's are self-secured with signing (and possibly		flexibility is possible because EAT's are self-secured with signing
	additionally with encryption and anti-replay). The transmission		(and possibly additionally with encryption and anti-replay). The
	protocol is not required to fulfill any additional security		transmission protocol is not required to fulfill any additional
	requirements.		security requirements.
	For certain devices, a direct connection may not exist between the		For certain devices, a direct connection may not exist between the
	EAT-producing device and the Relying Party. In such cases, the EAT		EAT-producing device and the Relying Party. In such cases, the EAT
	should be protected against malicious access. The use of COSE allows		should be protected against malicious access. The use of COSE and
	for signing and encryption of the EAT. Therefore even if the EAT is		JOSE allows for signing and encryption of the EAT. Therefore, even
	conveyed through intermediaries between the device and Relying Party,		if the EAT is conveyed through intermediaries between the device and
	such intermediaries cannot easily modify the EAT payload or alter the		Relying Party, such intermediaries cannot easily modify the EAT
	signature.		payload or alter the signature.
	1.4.2. Signing Scheme		1.4.2. Signing Scheme
	The term "signing scheme" is used to refer to the system that		The term "signing scheme" is used to refer to the system that
	includes end-end process of establishing signing attestation key		includes end-end process of establishing signing attestation key
	material in the entity, signing the EAT, and verifying it. This		material in the entity, signing the EAT, and verifying it. This
	might involve key IDs and X.509 certificate chains or something		might involve key IDs and X.509 certificate chains or something
	similar but different. The term "signing algorithm" refers just to		similar but different. The term "signing algorithm" refers just to
	the algorithm ID in the COSE signing structure. No particular		the algorithm ID in the COSE signing structure. No particular
	signing algorithm or signing scheme is required by this standard.		signing algorithm or signing scheme is required by this standard.
	skipping to change at page 7, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 18 ¶
	There are three main implementation issues driving this. First,		There are three main implementation issues driving this. First,
	secure non-volatile storage space in the entity for the attestation		secure non-volatile storage space in the entity for the attestation
	key material may be highly limited, perhaps to only a few hundred		key material may be highly limited, perhaps to only a few hundred
	bits, on some small IoT chips. Second, the factory cost of		bits, on some small IoT chips. Second, the factory cost of
	provisioning key material in each chip or device may be high, with		provisioning key material in each chip or device may be high, with
	even millisecond delays adding to the cost of a chip. Third,		even millisecond delays adding to the cost of a chip. Third,
	privacy-preserving signing schemes like ECDAA (Elliptic Curve Direct		privacy-preserving signing schemes like ECDAA (Elliptic Curve Direct
	Anonymous Attestation) are complex and not suitable for all use		Anonymous Attestation) are complex and not suitable for all use
	cases.		cases.
	Eventually some form of standardization of the signing scheme may be		Over time to faciliate interoperability, some signing schemes may be
	required. This might come in the form of another standard that adds		defined in EAT profiles or other documents either in the IETF or
	to this document, or when there is clear convergence on a small		outside.
	number of signing schemes this standard can be updated.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519], COSE [RFC8152],		This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519], COSE [RFC8152],
	and CWT [RFC8392].		and CWT [RFC8392].
	StringOrURI. The "StringOrURI" term in this specification has the
	same meaning and processing rules as the JWT "StringOrURI" term
	defined in Section 2 of [RFC7519], except that it is represented
	as a CBOR text string instead of a JSON text string.
	NumericDate. The "NumericDate" term in this specification has the
	same meaning and processing rules as the JWT "NumericDate" term
	defined in Section 2 of [RFC7519], except that it is represented
	as a CBOR numeric date (from Section 2.4.1 of [RFC7049]) instead
	of a JSON number. The encoding is modified so that the leading
	tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
	Claim Name. The human-readable name used to identify a claim.		Claim Name. The human-readable name used to identify a claim.
	Claim Key. The CBOR map key used to identify a claim.		Claim Key. The CBOR map key or JSON name used to identify a claim.
	Claim Value. The CBOR map value representing the value of the claim.
	CWT Claims Set. The CBOR map that contains the claims conveyed by		Claim Value. The CBOR map or JSON object value representing the
	the CWT.		value of the claim.
	FloatOrNumber. The "FloatOrNumber" term in this specification is the		CWT Claims Set. The CBOR map or JSON object that contains the claims
	type of a claim that is either a CBOR positive integer, negative		conveyed by the CWT or JWT.
	integer or floating point number.
	Attestation Key Material (AKM). The key material used to sign the		Attestation Key Material (AKM). The key material used to sign the
	EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a		EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a
	simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE		simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE
	DevID [IDevID], then this is the private part of the EC key pair.		DevID [IDevID], then this is the private part of the EC key pair.
	If ECDAA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e.		If ECDAA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e.
	EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA.		EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA.
	3. The Claims		3. The Claims Information Model
	3.1. Universal Entity ID (UEID) Claim		This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also
			mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT are particularly
			important for EAT.
			Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT
			including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA
			[IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries. * All claims are optional * No
			claims are mandatory * All claims that are not understood by
			implementations MUST be ignored
			CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define the information
			model. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the group is a general
			aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL). In the data model,
			described in the Section 4, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map
			entries and JSON name/value pairs.
			3.1. Nonce Claim (cti and jti)
			All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is
			generated by the relying party, sent to the entity by any protocol,
			and included in the token. Note that intrinsically by the nature of
			a nonce no security is needed for its transport.
			CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These
			carry the nonce in an EAT.
			TODO: what about the JWT claim "nonce"?
			3.2. Timestamp claim (iat)
			The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date-
			of-creation of the token.
			3.3. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)
	UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a		UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a
	mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked		mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked
	security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or		security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or
	subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices.		subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices.
	It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be		It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be
	sequential.		sequential.
	It is identified by Claim Key X (X is TBD).
	UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers		UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers
	and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and		and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and
	systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different		systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different
	protocols and systems. No two products anywhere, even in completely		protocols and systems. No two products anywhere, even in completely
	different industries made by two different manufacturers in two		different industries made by two different manufacturers in two
	different countries. should have the same UEID (if they are not		different countries should have the same UEID (if they are not global
	global and universal in this way then relying parties receiving them		and universal in this way, then relying parties receiving them will
	will have to track other characteristics of the device to keep		have to track other characteristics of the device to keep devices
	devices distinct between manufacturers).		distinct between manufacturers).
			There are privacy considerations for UEID's. See Section 6.1.
	The UEID should be permanent. It should never change for a given		The UEID should be permanent. It should never change for a given
	device / entity. In addition, it should not be reprogrammable.		device / entity. In addition, it should not be reprogrammable.
			UEID's are variable length. The recommended maximum is 33 bytes (1
	UEID's are binary byte-strings (resulting in a smaller size than text		type byte and 256 bits). The recommended minimum is 17 bytes (1 type
	strings). When handled in text-based protocols, they should be		and 128 bits) because fewer bytes endanger the universal uniqueness.
	base-64 encoded.
	UEID's are variable length with a maximum size of 33 bytes (1 type
	byte and 256 bits). A receivers of a token with UEIDs may reject the
	token if a UEID is larger than 33 bytes.
	UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
	the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.
	A UEID is a byte string. From the consumer's view (the rely party)
	it is opaque with no bytes having any special meaning.
	When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the		When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the
	following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to		following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to
	accommodate different industries and different manufacturing		accommodate different industries and different manufacturing
	processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types		processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types
	of manufacturer registrations.		of manufacturer registrations.
			Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126].
	+------+--------+---------------------------------------------------+		+------+--------+---------------------------------------------------+
	| Type | Type | Specification |		| Type | Type | Specification |
	| Byte | Name | |		| Byte | Name | |
	+------+--------+---------------------------------------------------+		+------+--------+---------------------------------------------------+
	| 0x01 | GUID | This is a 128 to 256 bit random number generated |		| 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128- to 256-bit random number generated |
	| | | once and stored in the device. The GUID may be |		| | | once and stored in the device. This may be |
	| | | constructed from various identifiers on the |		| | | constructed by concatenating enough identifiers |
	| | | device using a hash function or it may be just |		| | | to be universally unique and then feeding the |
	| | | the raw random number. |		| | | concatenation through a cryptographic hash |
			| | | function. It may also be a cryptographic quality |
			| | | random number generate once at the beginning of |
			| | | the life of the device and stored. |
	| 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification |		| 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification |
	| | EUI | registry. An EUI is made up of an OUI and OUI-36 |		| | EUI | registry. An EUI is made up of an OUI and OUI-36 |
	| | | or a CID, different registered company |		| | | or a CID, different registered company |
	| | | identifiers, and some unique per-device |		| | | identifiers, and some unique per-device |
	| | | identifier. EUIs are often the same as or similar |		| | | identifier. EUIs are often the same as or similar |
	| | | to MAC addresses. (Note that while devices with |		| | | to MAC addresses. (Note that while devices with |
	| | | multiple network interfaces may have multiple MAC |		| | | multiple network interfaces may have multiple MAC |
	| | | addresses, there is only one UEID for a device) |		| | | addresses, there is only one UEID for a device) |
	| | | TODO: normative references to IEEE. |		| | | TODO: normative references to IEEE. |
	| 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an 8 |		| 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an |
	| | | digit Type Allocation Code and a six digit serial |		| | | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial |
	| | | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL |		| | | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL |
	| | | be encoded as a binary integer over 48 bits. The |		| | | be encoded as a binary integer over 48 bits. The |
	| | | IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include Luhn |		| | | IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include Luhn |
	| | | checksum or SVN information. |		| | | checksum or SVN information. |
	| 0x04 | EUI-48 | This is a 48-bit identifier formed by |		| 0x04 | EUI-48 | This is a 48-bit identifier formed by |
	| | | concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 24-bit |		| | | concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 24-bit |
	| | | identifier assigned by the organisation that |		| | | identifier assigned by the organisation that |
	| | | purchased the OUI. |		| | | purchased the OUI. |
	| 0x05 | EUI-60 | This is a 60-bit identifier formed by |		| 0x05 | EUI-60 | This is a 60-bit identifier formed by |
	| | | concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 36-bit |		| | | concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 36-bit |
	| | | identifier assigned by the organisation that |		| | | identifier assigned by the organisation that |
	| | | purchased the OUI. |		| | | purchased the OUI. |
	| 0x06 | EUI-64 | This is a 64-bit identifier formed by |		| 0x06 | EUI-64 | This is a 64-bit identifier formed by |
	| | | concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 40-bit |		| | | concatenating the 24-bit OUI with a 40-bit |
	| | | identifier assigned by the organisation that |		| | | identifier assigned by the organisation that |
	| | | purchased the OUI. |		| | | purchased the OUI. |
	+------+--------+---------------------------------------------------+		+------+--------+---------------------------------------------------+
	Table 1: UEID Composition Types		Table 1: UEID Composition Types
	The consumer (the Relying Party) of a UEID should treat a UEID as a		UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
			the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.
			The consumer (the relying party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a
	completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its		completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its
	internal structure. For example they should not use the OUI part of		internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of
	a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead		a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead
	they should use the OUI claim that is defined elsewhere. The reasons		they should use the OUI claim that is defined elsewhere. The reasons
	for this are:		for this are:
	o UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.		o UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.
	o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example a type 0x04 UEID		o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID
	may be created based on some other manufacturer registration		may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
	scheme.		scheme.
	o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID		o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID
	to another anytime they want. For example they may find they can		to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can
	optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type		optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type
	0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is		0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is
	that UEIDs be universally unique.		that UEIDs be universally unique.
	3.2. Origination (origination) Claims		### CDDL
			ueid_claim = (
			ueid: bstr )
			3.4. Origination Claim (origination)
	This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are		This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are
	creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip		creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip
	manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:		manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Name | Description |		| Name | Description |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored |		| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored |
	| | and configured by "Acme" |		| | and configured by "Acme" |
	| Acme-TPM | The EATs are generated in a TPM manufactured |		| Acme-TPM | The EATs are generated in a TPM manufactured |
	| | by "Acme" |		| | by "Acme" |
	| Acme-Linux-Kernel | The EATs are generated in a Linux kernel |		| Acme-Linux-Kernel | The EATs are generated in a Linux kernel |
	| | configured and shipped by "Acme" |		| | configured and shipped by "Acme" |
	| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |		| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |
	| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |		| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	The claim is represented by Claim Key X+1. It is type StringOrURI.
	TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI		TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI
	and other are in separate fields.		and other are in separate fields.
	TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim		TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim
	in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.		in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.
	3.3. OEM identification by IEEE OUI		3.4.1. CDDL
			origination_claim = (
			origination: string_or_uri )
			3.5. OEM identification by IEEE OUI (oemid)
	This claim identifies a device OEM by the IEEE OUI. Reference TBD.		This claim identifies a device OEM by the IEEE OUI. Reference TBD.
	It is a byte string representing the OUI in binary form in network		It is a byte string representing the OUI in binary form in network
	byte order (TODO: confirm details).		byte order (TODO: confirm details).
	Companies that have more than one IEEE OUI registered with IEEE		Companies that have more than one IEEE OUI registered with IEEE
	should pick one and prefer that for all their devices.		should pick one and prefer that for all their devices.
	Note that the OUI is in common use as a part of MAC Address. This		Note that the OUI is in common use as a part of MAC Address. This
	claim is only the first bits of the MAC address that identify the		claim is only the first bits of the MAC address that identify the
	manufacturer. The IEEE maintains a registry for these in which many		manufacturer. The IEEE maintains a registry for these in which many
	companies participate. This claim is represented by Claim Key TBD.		companies participate.
	3.4. Security Level (seclevel) Claim		3.5.1. CDDL
			oemid_claim = (
			oemid: bstr )
			3.6. The Security Level Claim (security_level)
	EATs have a claim that roughly characterizes the device / entities		EATs have a claim that roughly characterizes the device / entities
	ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key,		ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key,
	forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by roughly defining		forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by roughly defining
	four security levels as described below. This is similar to the		four security levels as described below. This is similar to the
	security levels defined in the Metadata Service definied by the Fast		security levels defined in the Metadata Service defined by the Fast
	Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance (TODO: reference).		Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance (TODO: reference).
	These claims describe security environment and countermeasures		These claims describe security environment and countermeasures
	available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key		available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key
	reside and the claims originate.		reside and the claims originate.
	This claim is identified by Claim Key X+2. The value is an integer
	between 1 and 4 as defined below.
	1 - Unrestricted There is some expectation that implementor will		1 - Unrestricted There is some expectation that implementor will
	protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the		protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the
	EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.		EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.
	2- Restricted Entities at this level should not be general-purpose		2- Restricted Entities at this level should not be general-purpose
	operating environments that host features such as app download		operating environments that host features such as app download
	systems, web browsers and complex productivity applications. It		systems, web browsers and complex productivity applications. It
	is akin to the Secure Restricted level (see below) without the		is akin to the Secure Restricted level (see below) without the
	security orientation. Examples include a WiFi subsystem, an IoT		security orientation. Examples include a Wi-Fi subsystem, an IoT
	camera, or sensor device.		camera, or sensor device.
	3 - Secure Restricted Entities at this level must meet the critera		3 - Secure Restricted Entities at this level must meet the criteria
	defined by FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating Environments (TODO:		defined by FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating Environments (TODO:
	reference). Examples include TEE's and schemes using		reference). Examples include TEE's and schemes using
	virtualization-based security. Like the FIDO security goal,		virtualization-based security. Like the FIDO security goal,
	security at this level is aimed at defending well against large-		security at this level is aimed at defending well against large-
	scale network / remote attacks against the device.		scale network / remote attacks against the device.
	4 - Hardware Entities at this level must include substantial defense		4 - Hardware Entities at this level must include substantial defense
	against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself.		against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself.
	It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and		It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and
	can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements.		can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements.
	This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device		This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device
	security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS (TODO:		security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS (TODO:
	reference) or those based on Common Criteria (TODO: reference). The		reference) or those based on Common Criteria (TODO: reference). The
	claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.		claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.
	3.5. Nonce (nonce) Claim		3.6.1. CDDL
	The "nonce" (Nonce) claim represents a random value that can be used		security_level_type = (
	to avoid replay attacks. This would be ideally generated by the CWT		unrestricted: 1,
	consumer. This value is intended to be a CWT companion claim to the		restricted: 2,
	existing JWT claim **_IANAJWT_ (TODO: fix this reference). The nonce		secure_restricted: 3,
	claim is identified by Claim Key X+3.		hardware: 4
			)
	3.6. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims		security_level_claim = (
			security_level: security_level_type )
	3.6.1. Secure Boot Enabled (secbootenabled) Claim		3.7. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state)
	The "secbootenabled" (Secure Boot Enabled) claim represents a boolean		This claim is an array of five Boolean values indicating the boot and
	value that indicates whether secure boot is enabled either for an		debug state of the entity.
	entire device or an individual submodule. If it appears at the
	device level, then this means that secure boot is enabled for all		3.7.1. Secure Boot Enabled
			This indicates whether secure boot is enabled either for an entire
			device or an individual submodule. If it appears at the device
			level, then this means that secure boot is enabled for all
	submodules. Secure boot enablement allows a secure boot loader to		submodules. Secure boot enablement allows a secure boot loader to
	authenticate software running either in a device or a submodule prior		authenticate software running either in a device or a submodule prior
	allowing execution. This claim is identified by Claim Key X+4.		allowing execution.
	3.6.2. Debug Disabled (debugdisabled) Claim		3.7.2. Debug Disabled
	The "debugdisabled" (Debug Disabled) claim represents a boolean value		This indicates whether debug capabilities are disabled for an entity
	that indicates whether debug capabilities are disabled for an entity
	(i.e. value of 'true'). Debug disablement is considered a		(i.e. value of 'true'). Debug disablement is considered a
	prerequisite before an entity is considered operational. This claim		prerequisite before an entity is considered operational.
	is identified by Claim Key X+5.
	3.6.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot (debugdisabledsincebboot) Claim
	The "debugdisabledsinceboot" (Debug Disabled Since Boot) claim		3.7.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot
	represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities
	for the entity were not disabled in any way since boot (i.e. value of
	'true'). This claim is identified by Claim Key X+6.
	3.6.4. Debug Permanent Disable (debugpermanentdisable) Claim		This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity were
			not disabled in any way since boot (i.e. value of 'true').
	The "debugpermanentdisable" (Debug Permanent Disable) claim		3.7.4. Debug Permanent Disable
	represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities
	for the entity are permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This
	value can be set to 'true' also if only the manufacturer is allowed
	to enabled debug, but the end user is not. This claim is identified
	by Claim Key X+7.
	3.6.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable (debugfullpermanentdisable) Claim		This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are
			permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can be set
			to 'true' also if only the manufacturer is allowed to enabled debug,
			but the end user is not.
	The "debugfullpermanentdisable" (Debug Full Permanent Disable) claim		3.7.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable
	represents a boolean value that indicates whether debug capabilities
	for the entity are permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This
	value can only be set to 'true' if no party can enable debug
	capabilities for the entity. Often this is implemented by blowing a
	fuse on a chip as fuses cannot be restored once blown. This claim is
	identified by Claim Key X+8.
	3.7. Location (loc) Claim		This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are
			permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can only be
			set to 'true' if no party can enable debug capabilities for the
			entity. Often this is implemented by blowing a fuse on a chip as
			fuses cannot be restored once blown.
	The "loc" (location) claim is a CBOR-formatted object that describes		3.7.6. CDDL
	the location of the device entity from which the attestation
	originates. It is identified by Claim Key X+10. It is comprised of
	an array of additional subclaims that represent the actual location
	coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude). The location
	coordinate claims are consistent with the WGS84 coordinate system
	[WGS84]. In addition, a subclaim providing the estimated accuracy of
	the location measurement is defined.
	3.7.1. lat (latitude) claim		boot_state_type = [
			secure_boot_enabled=> bool,
			debug_disabled=> bool,
			debug_disabled_since_boot=> bool,
			debug_permanent_disable=> bool,
			debug_full_permanent_disable=> bool
			]
	The "lat" (latitude) claim contains the value of the device location		boot_state_claim = (
	corresponding to its latitude coordinate. It is of data type		boot_state: boot_state_type
	FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+11.		)
	3.7.2. long (longitude) claim		3.8. The Location Claim (location)
	The "long" (longitude) claim contains the value of the device		The location claim is a CBOR-formatted object that describes the
	location corresponding to its longitude coordinate. It is of data		location of the device entity from which the attestation originates.
	type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+12.		It is comprised of a map of additional sub claims that represent the
			actual location coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude). The
			location coordinate claims are consistent with the WGS84 coordinate
			system [WGS84]. In addition, a sub claim providing the estimated
			accuracy of the location measurement is defined.
	3.7.3. alt (altitude) claim		3.8.1. CDDL
	The "alt" (altitude) claim contains the value of the device location		location_type = {
	corresponding to its altitude coordinate (if available). It is of		latitude => number,
	data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+13.		longitude => number,
			altitude => number,
			accuracy => number,
			altitude_accuracy => number,
			heading_claim => number,
			speed_claim => number
			}
	3.7.4. acc (accuracy) claim		location_claim = (
			location: location_type )
	The "acc" (accuracy) claim contains a value that describes the		3.9. The Age Claim (age)
	location accuracy. It is non-negative and expressed in meters. It
	is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+14.
	3.7.5. altacc (altitude accuracy) claim		The "age" claim contains a value that represents the number of
			seconds that have elapsed since the token was created, measurement
			was made, or location was obtained. Typical attestable values are
			sent as soon as they are obtained. However, in the case that such a
			value is buffered and sent at a later time and a sufficiently
			accurate time reference is unavailable for creation of a timestamp,
			then the age claim is provided.
	The "altacc" (altitude accuracy) claim contains a value that		age_claim = (
	describes the altitude accuracy. It is non-negative and expressed in		age: uint)
	meters. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key
	X+15.
	3.7.6. heading claim		3.10. The Uptime Claim (uptime)
	The "heading" claim contains a value that describes direction of		The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of
	motion for the entity. Its value is specified in degrees, between 0		seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.
	and 360. It is of data type FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim
	Key X+16.
	3.7.7. speed claim		3.10.1. CDDL
	The "speed" claim contains a value that describes the velocity of the		uptime_claim = (
	entity in the horizontal direction. Its value is specified in		uptime: uint )
	meters/second and must be non-negative. It is of data type
	FloatOrNumber and identified by Claim Key X+17.
	3.8. ts (timestamp) claim		3.11. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat)
	The "ts" (timestamp) claim contains a timestamp derived using the		It is allowed for one EAT to be embedded in another. This is for
	same time reference as is used to generate an "iat" claim (see		complex devices that have more than one subsystem capable of
	Section 3.1.6 of [RFC8392]). It is of the same type as "iat"		generating an EAT. Typically, one will be the device-wide EAT that
	(integer or floating-point), and is identified by Claim Key X+18. It		is low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or
	is meant to designate the time at which a measurement was taken, when		similar that is high security.
	a location was obtained, or when a token was actually transmitted.
	The timestamp would be included as a subclaim under the "submod" or
	"loc" claims (in addition to the existing respective subclaims), or
	at the device level.
	3.9. age claim		The contents of the "eat" claim must be a fully signed, optionally
			encrypted, EAT token.
	The "age" claim contains a value that represents the number of		3.11.1. CDDL
	seconds that have elapsed since the token was created, measurement
	was made, or location was obtained. Typical attestable values are
	sent as soon as they are obtained. However in the case that such a
	value is buffered and sent at a later time and a sufficiently
	accurate time reference is unavailable for creation of a timestamp,
	then the age claim is provided. It is identified by Claim Key X+19.
	3.10. uptime claim		nested_eat_claim = (
			nested_eat: nested_eat_type)
	The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of		A nested_eat_type is defined in words rather than CDDL. It is either
	seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.		a full CWT or JWT including the COSE or JOSE signing.
	It is identified by Claim Key X+20.
	3.11. The submods Claim		3.12. The Submods Claim (submods)
	Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A		Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A
	mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity		mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity
	submodules for communications (e.g., WiFi and cellular). It may have		submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may
	sub systems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have one		have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have
	or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure Element.		one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure
			Element.
	The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.		The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.
	Specifically, the "submods" claim is an array. Each item in the		Specifically, the "submods" claim is an array. Each item in the
	array is a CBOR map containing all the claims for a particular		array is a CBOR map containing all the claims for a particular
	submodule. It is identified by Claim Key X+22.		submodule.
	The security level of the submod is assumed to be at the same level		The security level of the submod is assumed to be at the same level
	as the main entity unless there is a security level claim in that		as the main entity unless there is a security level claim in that
	submodule indicating otherwise. The security level of a submodule		submodule indicating otherwise. The security level of a submodule
	can never be higher (more secure) than the security level of the EAT		can never be higher (more secure) than the security level of the EAT
	it is a part of.		it is a part of.
	3.11.1. The submod_name Claim		3.12.1. The submod_name Claim
	Each submodule should have a submod_name claim that is descriptive		Each submodule should have a submod_name claim that is descriptive
	name. This name should be the CBOR txt type.		name. This name should be the CBOR txt type.
	3.11.2. Nested EATs, the eat Claim		3.12.2. CDDL
	It is allowed for one EAT to be embedded in another. This is for		In the following a generic_claim_type is any CBOR map entry or JSON
	complex devices that have more than one subsystem capable of		name/value pair.
	generating an EAT. Typically one will be the device-wide EAT that is
	low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or similar
	that is high security.
	The contents of the "eat" claim must be a fully signed, optionally		submod_name_type = (
	encrypted, EAT token. It is identified by Claim Key X+23.		submod_name: tstr )
	4. CBOR Interoperability		submods_type = [ * submod_claims ]
	EAT is a one-way protocol. It only defines a single message that		submod_claims = {
	goes from the entity to the server. The entity implementation will		submod_name_type,
	often be in a contained environment with little RAM and the server		* generic_claim_type
	will usually not be. The following requirements for interoperability		}
	take that into account. The entity can generally use whatever
	encoding it wants. The server is required to support just about
	every encoding.
	Canonical CBOR encoding is explicitly NOT required as it would place		submods_claim = (
	an unnecessary burden on the entity implementation.		submods: submod_type )
	4.1. Integer Encoding (major type 0 and 1)		4. Data Model
	The entity may use any integer encoding allowed by CBOR. The server		This makes use of the types defined in CDDL Appendix D, Standard
	MUST accept all integer encodings allowed by CBOR.		Prelude.
	4.2. String Encoding (major type 2 and 3)		4.1. Common CDDL Types
	The entity can use any string encoding allowed by CBOR including		string_or_uri = #6.32(tstr) / tstr; See JSON section below for JSON encoding of string_or_uri
	indefinite lengths. It may also encode the lengths of strings in any
	way allowed by CBOR. The server must accept all string encodings.
	Major type 2, bstr, SHOULD be have tag 21, 22 or 23 to indicate		4.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims
	conversion to base64 or such when converting to JSON.
	4.3. Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5)		This section provides CDDL for the claims defined in CWT. It is non-
			normative as [RFC8392] is the authoritative definition of these
			claims.
	The entity can use any array or map encoding allowed by CBOR		cwt_claim = (
	including indefinite lengths. Sorting of map keys is not required.		issuer_claim //
	Duplicate map keys are not allowed. The server must accept all array		subject_claim //
	and map encodings. The server may reject maps with duplicate map		audience_claim //
	keys.		expiration_claim //
			not_before_claim //
			issued_at_calim //
			cwt_id_claim
			)
	4.4. Date and Time		issuer_claim = (
			issuer: string_or_uri )
	The entity should send dates as tag 1 encoded as 64-bit or 32-bit		subject_claim = (
	integers. The entity may not send floating point dates. The server		subject: string_or_uri )
	must support tag 1 epoch based dates encoded as 64-bit or 32-bit
	integers.
	The entity may send tag 0 dates, however tag 1 is preferred. The		audience_claim = (
	server must support tag 0 UTC dates.		audience: string_or_uri )
	4.5. URIs		expiration_claim = (
			expiration: time )
	URIs should be encoded as text strings and marked with tag 32.		not_before_claim = (
			not_before: time )
	4.6. Floating Point		issued_at_calim = (
			issued_at: time )
	Encoding data in floating point is to be used only if necessary.		cwt_id_claim = (
	Location coordinates are always in floating point. The server must		cwt_id: bstr )
	support decoding of all types of floating point.
	4.7. Other types		issuer = 1
			subject = 2
			audience = 3
			expiration = 4
			not_before = 5
			issued_at = 6
			cwt_id = 7
	Use of Other types like bignums, regular expressions and so SHOULD		4.3. JSON
	NOT be used. The server MAY support them, but is not required to.
	Use of these tags is		4.3.1. JSON Labels
			ueid = "ueid"
			origination = "origination"
			oemid = "oemid"
			security_level = "security_level"
			boot_state = "boot_state"
			location = "location"
			age = "age"
			uptime = "uptime"
			nested_eat = "nested_eat"
			submods = "submods"
			4.3.2. JSON Interoperability
			JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the
			following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:
			o bstr - must be base64url encoded
			o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
			[RFC7519].
			o string_or_uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
			section 2 of [RFC7519].
			4.4. CBOR
			4.4.1. Labels
			ueid = 8
			origination = 9
			oemid = 10
			security_level = 11
			boot_state = 12
			location = 13
			age = 14
			uptime = 15
			nested_eat = 16
			submods = 17
			submod_name = 18
			latitude 1
			longitude 2
			altitude 3
			accuracy 4
			altitude_accuracy 5
			heading_claim 6
			speed_claim 7
			4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability
			Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and
			decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify
			how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats
			MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability.
			The assumption is that the entity is likely to be a constrained
			device and relying party is likely to be a very capable server. The
			approach taken is that the entity generating the token can use
			whatever encoding it wants, specifically encodings that are easier to
			implement such as indefinite lengths. The relying party receiving
			the token must support decoding all encodings.
			These rules cover all types used in the claims in this document.
			They also are recommendations for additional claims.
			Canonical CBOR encoding, Preferred Serialization and
			Deterministically Encoded CBOR are explicitly NOT required as they
			would place an unnecessary burden on the entity implementation,
			particularly if the entity implementation is implemented in hardware.
			o Integer Encoding (major type 0, 1) - The entity may use any
			integer encoding allowed by CBOR. The server MUST accept all
			integer encodings allowed by CBOR.
			o String Encoding (major type 2 and 3) - The entity can use any
			string encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite lengths. It
			may also encode the lengths of strings in any way allowed by CBOR.
			The server must accept all string encodings.
			o Major type 2, bstr, SHOULD be have tag 21 to indicate conversion
			to base64url in case that conversion is performed.
			o Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5) - The entity can use
			any array or map encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite
			lengths. Sorting of map keys is not required. Duplicate map keys
			are not allowed. The server must accept all array and map
			encodings. The server may reject maps with duplicate map keys.
			o Date and Time - The entity should send dates as tag 1 encoded as
			64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may not send floating-point
			dates. The server must support tag 1 epoch-based dates encoded as
			64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may send tag 0 dates,
			however tag 1 is preferred. The server must support tag 0 UTC
			dates.
			o URIs - URIs should be encoded as text strings and marked with tag
			32.
			o Floating Point - The entity may use any floating-point encoding.
			The relying party must support decoding of all types of floating-
			point.
			o Other types - Use of Other types like bignums, regular expressions
			and such, SHOULD NOT be used. The server MAY support them but is
			not required to so interoperability is not guaranteed.
			4.5. Collected CDDL
			A generic_claim is any CBOR map entry or JSON name/value pair.
			eat_claims = { ; the top-level payload that is signed using COSE or JOSE
			* claim
			}
			claim = (
			ueid_claim //
			origination_claim //
			oemid_claim //
			security_level_claim //
			boot_state_claim //
			location_claim //
			age_claim //
			uptime_claim //
			nested_eat_claim //
			cwt_claim //
			generic_claim_type //
			)
			TODO: copy the rest of the CDDL here (wait until the CDDL is more
			settled so as to avoid copying multiple times)
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry		5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry
	Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT		Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT
	Claims Registry is re used. New new IANA registry is created. All		Claims Registry is re used. No new IANA registry is created. All
	EAT claims should be registered in the CWT Claims Registry.		EAT claims should be registered in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries.
	5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document		5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document
	o Claim Name: UEID		o Claim Name: UEID
	o Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID		o Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID
	o JWT Claim Name: N/A		o JWT Claim Name: N/A
	o Claim Key: X		o Claim Key: 8
	o Claim Value Type(s): byte string		o Claim Value Type(s): byte string
	o Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	o Specification Document(s): *this document*		o Specification Document(s): *this document*
	TODO: add the rest of the claims in here		TODO: add the rest of the claims in here
	5.2. EAT CBOR Tag Registration
	How an EAT consumer determines whether received CBOR-formatted data
	actually represents a valid EAT is application-dependent, much like a
	CWT. For instance, a specific MIME type associated with the EAT such
	as "application/eat" could be sufficient for identification of the
	EAT. Note however that EAT's can include other EAT's (e.g. a device
	EAT comprised of several submodule EAT's). In this case, a CBOR tag
	dedicated to the EAT will be required at least for the submodule
	EAT's and the tag must be a valid CBOR tag. In other words - the EAT
	CBOR tag can optionally prefix a device-level EAT, but a EAT CBOR tag
	must always prefix a submodule EAT. The proposed EAT CBOR tag is 71.
	5.2.1. Tag Registered by This Document
	o CBOR Tag: 71
	o Data Item: Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
	o Semantics: Entity Attestation Token (CWT), as defined in
	*this_doc*
	o Reference: *this_doc*
	o Point of Contact: Giridhar Mandyam, mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com
	6. Privacy Considerations		6. Privacy Considerations
	Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and		Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and
	therefore implementations should consider providing privacy-		therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-
	preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.		preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.
	Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's		Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's
	provided to unauthenticated consumers.		provided to unauthenticated consumers.
	6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations		6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations
	A UEID is usually not privacy preserving. Any set of relying parties		A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties
	that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be		that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be
	able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to		able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to
	track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates		track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates
	governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will		governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will
	not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy		not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy
	for the end user. it will often be the case that tokens will not		for the end user. it will often be the case that tokens will not
	have a UEID for these reasons.		have a UEID for these reasons.
	There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put		There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put
	UEID's in tokens:		UEID's in tokens:
	skipping to change at page 20, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 28 ¶
	7. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	TODO: Perhaps this can be the same as CWT / COSE, but not sure yet		TODO: Perhaps this can be the same as CWT / COSE, but not sure yet
	because it involves so much entity / device security that those do		because it involves so much entity / device security that those do
	not.		not.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
			[IANA.CWT.Claims]
			IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", n.d.,
			<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
			[IANA.JWT.Claims]
			IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims", n.d.,
			<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
			[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
			Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
			RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
	[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",		[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
	RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,		RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,		[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
	"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,		"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
	May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.		May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
			[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
			Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
			Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
			JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
			June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
	[TIME_T] The Open Group Base Specifications, "Vol. 1: Base		[TIME_T] The Open Group Base Specifications, "Vol. 1: Base
	Definitions, Issue 7", Section 4.15 'Seconds Since the		Definitions, Issue 7", Section 4.15 'Seconds Since the
	Epoch', IEEE Std 1003.1, 2013 Edition, 2013,		Epoch', IEEE Std 1003.1, 2013 Edition, 2013,
	<http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/		<http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
	V1_chap04.html#tag_04_15>.		V1_chap04.html#tag_04_15>.
	[WGS84] National Imagery and Mapping Agency, "National Imagery and		[WGS84] National Imagery and Mapping Agency, "National Imagery and
	Mapping Agency Technical Report 8350.2, Third Edition",		Mapping Agency Technical Report 8350.2, Third Edition",
	2000, <http://earth-		2000, <http://earth-
	info.nga.mil/GandG/publications/tr8350.2/wgs84fin.pdf>.		info.nga.mil/GandG/publications/tr8350.2/wgs84fin.pdf>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[ASN.1] International Telecommunication Union, "Information		[ASN.1] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
	Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic		Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
	Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and		Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
	Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation		Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
	X.690, 1994.		X.690, 1994.
			[ECMAScript]
			"Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
			5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,
			<http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/
			ECMA-262.pdf>.
	[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",		[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",
	December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/		December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
	standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.		standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
	[Webauthn]		[Webauthn]
	Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API		Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API
	for accessing scoped credentials", 2016.		for accessing scoped credentials", 2016.
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	A.1. Very Simple EAT		A.1. Very Simple EAT
	This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by		This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by
	COSE is shown.		COSE is shown.
	{		{
	/ nonce / 11:h'948f8860d13a463e8e',		/ nonce (cti) / 7:h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
	/ UEID / 8:h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2f',		/ UEID / 8:h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2f',
	/ secbootenabled / 13:true,		/ boot_state / 12:{true, true, true, true, false}
	/ debugpermanentdisable / 15:true,		/ time stamp (iat) / 6:1526542894,
	/ ts / 21:1526542894,
	}		}
	A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels		A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels
	{		{
	/ nonce / 11:h'948f8860d13a463e8e',		/ nonce / 7:h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
	/ UEID / 8:h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2f',		/ UEID / 8:h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2f',
	/ secbootenabled / 13:true,		/ boot_state / 12:{true, true, true, true, false}
	/ debugpermanentdisable / 15:true,		/ time stamp (iat) / 6:1526542894,
	/ ts / 21:1526542894,		/ seclevel / 11:3, / secure restricted OS /
	/ seclevel / 10:3, / secure restriced OS /
	/ submods / 30:		/ submods / 17:
	[		[
	/ 1st submod, an Android Application / {		/ 1st submod, an Android Application / {
	/ submod_name / 30:'Android App "Foo"',		/ submod_name / 18:'Android App "Foo"',
	/ seclevel / 10:1, / unrestricted /		/ seclevel / 11:1, / unrestricted /
	/ app data / -70000:'text string'		/ app data / -70000:'text string'
	},		},
	/ 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element / {		/ 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element / {
	/ submod_name / 30:'Secure Element EAT',		/ submod_name / 18:'Secure Element EAT',
	/ eat / 31:71( 18(		/ eat / 16:61( 18(
	/ an embedded EAT / [ /...COSE_Sign1 bytes with payload.../ ]		/ an embedded EAT / [ /...COSE_Sign1 bytes with payload.../ ]
	))		))
	}		}
	/ 3rd submod, information about Linux Android / {		/ 3rd submod, information about Linux Android / {
	/ submod_name/ 30:'Linux Android',		/ submod_name/ 18:'Linux Android',
	/ seclevel / 10:1, / unrestricted /		/ seclevel / 11:1, / unrestricted /
	/ custom - release / -80000:'8.0.0',		/ custom - release / -80000:'8.0.0',
	/ custom - version / -80001:'4.9.51+'		/ custom - version / -80001:'4.9.51+'
	}		}
	]		]
	}		}
			Appendix B. Changes from Previous Drafts
			The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.
			This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see
			the significant differences.
			B.1. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00
			This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
			not new claims have been added.
			o Separate information and data model using CDDL.
			o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT
			o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Giridhar Mandyam		Giridhar Mandyam
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	5775 Morehouse Drive		5775 Morehouse Drive
	San Diego, California		San Diego, California
	USA		USA
	Phone: +1 858 651 7200		Phone: +1 858 651 7200
	EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com		EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com
End of changes. 126 change blocks.
	391 lines changed or deleted		552 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/