draft-ietf-rats-eat-01.txt		draft-ietf-rats-eat-02.txt
	RATS Working Group G. Mandyam		RATS Working Group G. Mandyam
	Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade		Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade
	Expires: January 5, 2020 Security Theory LLC		Expires: July 12, 2020 Security Theory LLC
	M. Ballesteros		M. Ballesteros
	J. O'Donoghue		J. O'Donoghue
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	July 04, 2019		January 09, 2020
	The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)		The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
	draft-ietf-rats-eat-01		draft-ietf-rats-eat-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of		An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of
	claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,		claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,
	typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are		typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are
	used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the		used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the
	entity.		entity.
	An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.		An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on July 12, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. CDDL, CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.1. CDDL, CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.2. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.2. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.3. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.3. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	1.4. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.4. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1.4.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.4.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1.4.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.4.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3. The Claims Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. The Claims Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.1. Nonce Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.3. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.4. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.3.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.4.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.5. OEM identification by IEEE OUI (oemid) . . . . . . . . . 12		3.4.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
			3.5. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.5.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.5.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6. The Security Level Claim (security_level) . . . . . . . . 12		3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.6.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.7. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) . 13		3.7. The Security Level Claim (security_level) . . . . . . . . 12
	3.7.1. Secure Boot Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.7.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	3.7.2. Debug Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.8. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) . 13
	3.7.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8.1. Secure Boot Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.4. Debug Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8.2. Debug Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7.6. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8.4. Debug Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.8. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.8.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.8.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.8.6. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.9. The Age Claim (age) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.9. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.10. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.9.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.10.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.10. The Age Claim (age) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.11. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) . . . . . . . . . 15		3.11. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.11.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.11.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.12. The Submods Claim (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.12. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.12.1. The submod_name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.12.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.12.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.13. The Submods Claim (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
			3.13.1. The submod_name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
			3.13.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	4. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	4.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	4.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		4.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	4.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		4.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	4.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		4.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	4.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		4.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	4.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		4.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	4.4.1. Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		4.4.1. Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	4.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		4.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 21		5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 22
	5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . 22		5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . 22
	6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 26		A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 27
	Appendix B. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		Appendix B. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	B.1. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		B.1. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		B.2. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a		Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a
	remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)		remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)
	device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a		device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a
	server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some		server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some
	characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the		characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the
	device.		device.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 11 ¶
	Attestation Key Material (AKM). The key material used to sign the		Attestation Key Material (AKM). The key material used to sign the
	EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a		EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a
	simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE		simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE
	DevID [IDevID], then this is the private part of the EC key pair.		DevID [IDevID], then this is the private part of the EC key pair.
	If ECDAA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e.		If ECDAA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e.
	EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA.		EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA.
	3. The Claims Information Model		3. The Claims Information Model
	This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also		This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also
	mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT are particularly		mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly
	important for EAT.		important for EAT.
	Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT		Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT
	including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA		including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA
	[IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries. * All claims are optional * No		[IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries.
	claims are mandatory * All claims that are not understood by
	implementations MUST be ignored		o All claims are optional
			o No claims are mandatory
			o All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be
			ignored
	CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define the information		CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define the information
	model. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the group is a general		model. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the group is a general
	aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL). In the data model,		aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL). In the data model,
	described in the Section 4, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map		described in the Section 4, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map
	entries and JSON name/value pairs.		entries and JSON name/value pairs.
	3.1. Nonce Claim (cti and jti)		3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti)
	All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is
	generated by the relying party, sent to the entity by any protocol,
	and included in the token. Note that intrinsically by the nature of
	a nonce no security is needed for its transport.
	CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These
	carry the nonce in an EAT.
	TODO: what about the JWT claim "nonce"?		CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These are
			equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier
			as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use
			of the token but are distinct from the nonce that is used by the
			relying party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay.
	3.2. Timestamp claim (iat)		3.2. Timestamp claim (iat)
	The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date-		The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date-
	of-creation of the token.		of-creation of the token.
	3.3. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)		3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce)
			All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is
			generated by the relying party, the end consumer of the token. It is
			conveyed to the entity over whatever transport is in use before the
			token is generated and then included in the token as the nonce claim.
			This documents the nonce claim for registration in the IANA CWT
			claims registry. This is equivalent to the JWT nonce claim that is
			already registered.
			The nonce must be at least 8 bytes (64 bits) as fewer are unlikely to
			be secure. A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the memory a
			constrained implementation uses. This size range is not set for the
			already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size
			recommendation when used in an EAT.
			3.3.1. CDDL
			nonce_claim = (
			nonce => bstr .size (8..64)
			)
			3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)
	UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a		UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a
	mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked		mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked
	security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or		security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or
	subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices.		subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices.
	It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be		It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be
	sequential.		sequential.
	UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers		UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers
	and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and		and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and
	skipping to change at page 11, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 24 ¶
	o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID		o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID
	may be created based on some other manufacturer registration		may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
	scheme.		scheme.
	o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID		o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID
	to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can		to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can
	optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type		optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type
	0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is		0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is
	that UEIDs be universally unique.		that UEIDs be universally unique.
	### CDDL		3.4.1. CDDL
	ueid_claim = (		ueid_claim = (
	ueid: bstr )		ueid: bstr )
	3.4. Origination Claim (origination)		3.5. Origination Claim (origination)
	This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are		This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are
	creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip		creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip
	manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:		manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Name | Description |		| Name | Description |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored |		| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored |
	| | and configured by "Acme" |		| | and configured by "Acme" |
	skipping to change at page 12, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 12, line 5 ¶
	| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |		| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |
	| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |		| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI		TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI
	and other are in separate fields.		and other are in separate fields.
	TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim		TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim
	in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.		in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.
	3.4.1. CDDL		3.5.1. CDDL
	origination_claim = (		origination_claim = (
	origination: string_or_uri )		origination: string_or_uri )
	3.5. OEM identification by IEEE OUI (oemid)		3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid)
	This claim identifies a device OEM by the IEEE OUI. Reference TBD.		The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company
	It is a byte string representing the OUI in binary form in network		IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents
	byte order (TODO: confirm details).		of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID
			[IEEE.RA]. An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used
			as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value
			uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as
			OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of
			these. A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L,
			but not for use as a MAC address. IEEE has published Guidelines for
			Use of EUI, OUI, and CID [OUI.Guide] and provides a lookup services
			[OUI.Lookup]
	Companies that have more than one IEEE OUI registered with IEEE		Companies that have more than one of these IDs or MAC address blocks
	should pick one and prefer that for all their devices.		should pick one and prefer that for all their devices.
	Note that the OUI is in common use as a part of MAC Address. This		Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation
	claim is only the first bits of the MAC address that identify the		[IEEE.802-2001] also called the Canonical format. When this claim is
	manufacturer. The IEEE maintains a registry for these in which many		encoded order of bytes in the bstr are the same as the order in the
	companies participate.		Hexadecimal Representation. For example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48"
			would be encoded in 3 bytes with values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48. For JSON
			encoded tokens, this is further base64url encoded.
	3.5.1. CDDL		3.6.1. CDDL
	oemid_claim = (		oemid_claim = (
	oemid: bstr )		oemid: bstr )
	3.6. The Security Level Claim (security_level)		3.7. The Security Level Claim (security_level)
	EATs have a claim that roughly characterizes the device / entities		EATs have a claim that roughly characterizes the device / entities
	ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key,		ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key,
	forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by roughly defining		forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by roughly defining
	four security levels as described below. This is similar to the		four security levels as described below. This is similar to the
	security levels defined in the Metadata Service defined by the Fast		security levels defined in the Metadata Service defined by the Fast
	Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance (TODO: reference).		Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance (TODO: reference).
	These claims describe security environment and countermeasures		These claims describe security environment and countermeasures
	available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key		available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key
	skipping to change at page 13, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 33 ¶
	4 - Hardware Entities at this level must include substantial defense		4 - Hardware Entities at this level must include substantial defense
	against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself.		against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself.
	It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and		It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and
	can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements.		can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements.
	This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device		This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device
	security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS (TODO:		security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS (TODO:
	reference) or those based on Common Criteria (TODO: reference). The		reference) or those based on Common Criteria (TODO: reference). The
	claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.		claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.
	3.6.1. CDDL		3.7.1. CDDL
	security_level_type = (		security_level_type = (
	unrestricted: 1,		unrestricted: 1,
	restricted: 2,		restricted: 2,
	secure_restricted: 3,		secure_restricted: 3,
	hardware: 4		hardware: 4
	)		)
	security_level_claim = (		security_level_claim = (
	security_level: security_level_type )		security_level: security_level_type )
	3.7. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state)		3.8. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state)
	This claim is an array of five Boolean values indicating the boot and		This claim is an array of five Boolean values indicating the boot and
	debug state of the entity.		debug state of the entity.
	3.7.1. Secure Boot Enabled		3.8.1. Secure Boot Enabled
	This indicates whether secure boot is enabled either for an entire		This indicates whether secure boot is enabled either for an entire
	device or an individual submodule. If it appears at the device		device or an individual submodule. If it appears at the device
	level, then this means that secure boot is enabled for all		level, then this means that secure boot is enabled for all
	submodules. Secure boot enablement allows a secure boot loader to		submodules. Secure boot enablement allows a secure boot loader to
	authenticate software running either in a device or a submodule prior		authenticate software running either in a device or a submodule prior
	allowing execution.		allowing execution.
	3.7.2. Debug Disabled		3.8.2. Debug Disabled
	This indicates whether debug capabilities are disabled for an entity		This indicates whether debug capabilities are disabled for an entity
	(i.e. value of 'true'). Debug disablement is considered a		(i.e. value of 'true'). Debug disablement is considered a
	prerequisite before an entity is considered operational.		prerequisite before an entity is considered operational.
	3.7.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot		3.8.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot
	This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity were		This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity were
	not disabled in any way since boot (i.e. value of 'true').		not disabled in any way since boot (i.e. value of 'true').
	3.7.4. Debug Permanent Disable		3.8.4. Debug Permanent Disable
	This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are		This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are
	permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can be set		permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can be set
	to 'true' also if only the manufacturer is allowed to enabled debug,		to 'true' also if only the manufacturer is allowed to enabled debug,
	but the end user is not.		but the end user is not.
	3.7.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable		3.8.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable
	This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are		This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are
	permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can only be		permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can only be
	set to 'true' if no party can enable debug capabilities for the		set to 'true' if no party can enable debug capabilities for the
	entity. Often this is implemented by blowing a fuse on a chip as		entity. Often this is implemented by blowing a fuse on a chip as
	fuses cannot be restored once blown.		fuses cannot be restored once blown.
	3.7.6. CDDL		3.8.6. CDDL
	boot_state_type = [		boot_state_type = [
	secure_boot_enabled=> bool,		secure_boot_enabled=> bool,
	debug_disabled=> bool,		debug_disabled=> bool,
	debug_disabled_since_boot=> bool,		debug_disabled_since_boot=> bool,
	debug_permanent_disable=> bool,		debug_permanent_disable=> bool,
	debug_full_permanent_disable=> bool		debug_full_permanent_disable=> bool
	]		]
	boot_state_claim = (		boot_state_claim = (
	boot_state: boot_state_type		boot_state: boot_state_type
	)		)
	3.8. The Location Claim (location)		3.9. The Location Claim (location)
	The location claim is a CBOR-formatted object that describes the		The location claim is a CBOR-formatted object that describes the
	location of the device entity from which the attestation originates.		location of the device entity from which the attestation originates.
	It is comprised of a map of additional sub claims that represent the		It is comprised of a map of additional sub claims that represent the
	actual location coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude). The		actual location coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude). The
	location coordinate claims are consistent with the WGS84 coordinate		location coordinate claims are consistent with the WGS84 coordinate
	system [WGS84]. In addition, a sub claim providing the estimated		system [WGS84]. In addition, a sub claim providing the estimated
	accuracy of the location measurement is defined.		accuracy of the location measurement is defined.
	3.8.1. CDDL		3.9.1. CDDL
	location_type = {		location_type = {
	latitude => number,		latitude => number,
	longitude => number,		longitude => number,
	altitude => number,		altitude => number,
	accuracy => number,		accuracy => number,
	altitude_accuracy => number,		altitude_accuracy => number,
	heading_claim => number,		heading => number,
	speed_claim => number		speed => number
	}		}
	location_claim = (		location_claim = (
	location: location_type )		location: location_type )
	3.9. The Age Claim (age)		3.10. The Age Claim (age)
	The "age" claim contains a value that represents the number of		The "age" claim contains a value that represents the number of
	seconds that have elapsed since the token was created, measurement		seconds that have elapsed since the token was created, measurement
	was made, or location was obtained. Typical attestable values are		was made, or location was obtained. Typical attestable values are
	sent as soon as they are obtained. However, in the case that such a		sent as soon as they are obtained. However, in the case that such a
	value is buffered and sent at a later time and a sufficiently		value is buffered and sent at a later time and a sufficiently
	accurate time reference is unavailable for creation of a timestamp,		accurate time reference is unavailable for creation of a timestamp,
	then the age claim is provided.		then the age claim is provided.
	age_claim = (		age_claim = (
	age: uint)		age: uint)
	3.10. The Uptime Claim (uptime)		3.11. The Uptime Claim (uptime)
	The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of		The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of
	seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.		seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.
	3.10.1. CDDL		3.11.1. CDDL
	uptime_claim = (		uptime_claim = (
	uptime: uint )		uptime: uint )
	3.11. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat)		3.12. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat)
	It is allowed for one EAT to be embedded in another. This is for		It is allowed for one EAT to be embedded in another. This is for
	complex devices that have more than one subsystem capable of		complex devices that have more than one subsystem capable of
	generating an EAT. Typically, one will be the device-wide EAT that		generating an EAT. For example, one might be the device-wide EAT
	is low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or		that is low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or
	similar that is high security.		similar that is high security.
	The contents of the "eat" claim must be a fully signed, optionally		The contents of the "nested_eat" claim must be a fully signed,
	encrypted, EAT token.		optionally encrypted, EAT token.
	3.11.1. CDDL		3.12.1. CDDL
	nested_eat_claim = (		nested_eat_claim = (
	nested_eat: nested_eat_type)		nested_eat: nested_eat_type)
	A nested_eat_type is defined in words rather than CDDL. It is either		A nested_eat_type is defined in words rather than CDDL. It is either
	a full CWT or JWT including the COSE or JOSE signing.		a full CWT or JWT including the COSE or JOSE signing.
	3.12. The Submods Claim (submods)		3.13. The Submods Claim (submods)
	Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A		Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A
	mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity		mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity
	submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may		submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may
	have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have		have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have
	one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure		one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure
	Element.		Element.
	The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.		The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.
	Specifically, the "submods" claim is an array. Each item in the		Specifically, the "submods" claim is an array. Each item in the
	array is a CBOR map containing all the claims for a particular		array is a CBOR map containing all the claims for a particular
	submodule.		submodule.
	The security level of the submod is assumed to be at the same level		The security level of the submod is assumed to be at the same level
	as the main entity unless there is a security level claim in that		as the main entity unless there is a security level claim in that
	submodule indicating otherwise. The security level of a submodule		submodule indicating otherwise. The security level of a submodule
	can never be higher (more secure) than the security level of the EAT		can never be higher (more secure) than the security level of the EAT
	it is a part of.		it is a part of.
	3.12.1. The submod_name Claim		3.13.1. The submod_name Claim
	Each submodule should have a submod_name claim that is descriptive		Each submodule should have a submod_name claim that is descriptive
	name. This name should be the CBOR txt type.		name. This name should be the CBOR txt type.
	3.12.2. CDDL		3.13.2. CDDL
	In the following a generic_claim_type is any CBOR map entry or JSON		In the following a generic_claim_type is any CBOR map entry or JSON
	name/value pair.		name/value pair.
	submod_name_type = (		submod_name_type = (
	submod_name: tstr )		submod_name: tstr )
	submods_type = [ * submod_claims ]		submods_type = [ * submod_claims ]
	submod_claims = {		submod_claims = {
	skipping to change at page 19, line 15 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 15 ¶
	origination = "origination"		origination = "origination"
	oemid = "oemid"		oemid = "oemid"
	security_level = "security_level"		security_level = "security_level"
	boot_state = "boot_state"		boot_state = "boot_state"
	location = "location"		location = "location"
	age = "age"		age = "age"
	uptime = "uptime"		uptime = "uptime"
	nested_eat = "nested_eat"		nested_eat = "nested_eat"
	submods = "submods"		submods = "submods"
			latitude = "lat""
			longitude = "long""
			altitude = "alt"
			accuracy = "accry"
			altitude_accuracy = "alt_accry"
			heading = "heading"
			speed = "speed"
	4.3.2. JSON Interoperability		4.3.2. JSON Interoperability
	JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the		JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the
	following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:		following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:
	o bstr - must be base64url encoded		o bstr - must be base64url encoded
	o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of		o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
	[RFC7519].		[RFC7519].
	skipping to change at page 19, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 15 ¶
	origination = 9		origination = 9
	oemid = 10		oemid = 10
	security_level = 11		security_level = 11
	boot_state = 12		boot_state = 12
	location = 13		location = 13
	age = 14		age = 14
	uptime = 15		uptime = 15
	nested_eat = 16		nested_eat = 16
	submods = 17		submods = 17
	submod_name = 18		submod_name = 18
			nonce = 19
	latitude 1		latitude = 1
	longitude 2		longitude = 2
	altitude 3		altitude = 3
	accuracy 4		accuracy = 4
	altitude_accuracy 5		altitude_accuracy = 5
	heading_claim 6		heading = 6
	speed_claim 7		speed = 7
	4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability		4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability
	Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and		Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and
	decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify		decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify
	how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats		how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats
	MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability.		MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability.
	The assumption is that the entity is likely to be a constrained		The assumption is that the entity is likely to be a constrained
	device and relying party is likely to be a very capable server. The		device and relying party is likely to be a very capable server. The
	skipping to change at page 22, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 21 ¶
	provided to unauthenticated consumers.		provided to unauthenticated consumers.
	6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations		6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations
	A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties		A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties
	that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be		that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be
	able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to		able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to
	track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates		track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates
	governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will		governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will
	not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy		not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy
	for the end user. it will often be the case that tokens will not		for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not
	have a UEID for these reasons.		have a UEID for these reasons.
	There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put		There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put
	UEID's in tokens:		UEID's in tokens:
	o The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device		o The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device
	to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be		to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be
	through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some		through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some
	online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a		online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a
	UEID.		UEID.
	skipping to change at page 23, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 24, line 16 ¶
	TODO: Perhaps this can be the same as CWT / COSE, but not sure yet		TODO: Perhaps this can be the same as CWT / COSE, but not sure yet
	because it involves so much entity / device security that those do		because it involves so much entity / device security that those do
	not.		not.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[IANA.CWT.Claims]		[IANA.CWT.Claims]
	IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", n.d.,		IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
	<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.		<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
	[IANA.JWT.Claims]		[IANA.JWT.Claims]
	IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims", n.d.,		IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims",
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object		[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,		Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.		October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	skipping to change at page 24, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 25, line 33 ¶
	[ASN.1] International Telecommunication Union, "Information		[ASN.1] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
	Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic		Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
	Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and		Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
	Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation		Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
	X.690, 1994.		X.690, 1994.
	[ECMAScript]		[ECMAScript]
	"Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,		"Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
	5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,		5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,
	<http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/		<http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-
	ECMA-262.pdf>.		262.pdf>.
	[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",		[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",
	December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/		December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
	standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.		standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
			[IEEE.802-2001]
			"IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks
			Overview And Architecture", 2007,
			<https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ieee/
			ieee8022001r2007>.
			[IEEE.RA] "IEEE Registration Authority",
			<https://standards.ieee.org/products-services/regauth/
			index.html>.
			[OUI.Guide]
			"Guidelines for Use of Extended Unique Identifier (EUI),
			Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), and Company ID
			(CID)", August 2017,
			<https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
			standards/standards/web/documents/tutorials/eui.pdf>.
			[OUI.Lookup]
			"IEEE Registration Authority Assignments",
			<https://regauth.standards.ieee.org/standards-ra-web/pub/
			view.html#registries>.
	[Webauthn]		[Webauthn]
	Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API		Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API
	for accessing scoped credentials", 2016.		for accessing scoped credentials", 2016.
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	A.1. Very Simple EAT		A.1. Very Simple EAT
	This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by		This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by
	COSE is shown.		COSE is shown.
	skipping to change at page 27, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 21 ¶
	This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but		This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
	not new claims have been added.		not new claims have been added.
	o Separate information and data model using CDDL.		o Separate information and data model using CDDL.
	o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT		o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT
	o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims		o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims
			B.2. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01
			o Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim
			o Minor spelling and other fixes
			o Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Giridhar Mandyam		Giridhar Mandyam
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	5775 Morehouse Drive		5775 Morehouse Drive
	San Diego, California		San Diego, California
	USA		USA
	Phone: +1 858 651 7200		Phone: +1 858 651 7200
	EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com		EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com
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