--- 1/draft-ietf-rats-eat-01.txt 2020-01-09 02:14:51.759313227 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-rats-eat-02.txt 2020-01-09 02:14:51.819314753 -0800 @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ RATS Working Group G. Mandyam Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade -Expires: January 5, 2020 Security Theory LLC +Expires: July 12, 2020 Security Theory LLC M. Ballesteros J. O'Donoghue Qualcomm Technologies Inc. - July 04, 2019 + January 09, 2020 The Entity Attestation Token (EAT) - draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 + draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 Abstract An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity, typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the entity. An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims. @@ -34,99 +34,103 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2020. + This Internet-Draft will expire on July 12, 2020. Copyright Notice - Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. CDDL, CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 1.4.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 1.4.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. The Claims Information Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 3.1. Nonce Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 3.3. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - 3.4. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 3.4.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 3.5. OEM identification by IEEE OUI (oemid) . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 3.3.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.4.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + 3.5. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.5.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 3.6. The Security Level Claim (security_level) . . . . . . . . 12 - 3.6.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 3.7. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) . 13 - 3.7.1. Secure Boot Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 3.7.2. Debug Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 - 3.7.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 3.7.4. Debug Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 3.7.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 3.7.6. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 3.8. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 3.8.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 3.9. The Age Claim (age) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 3.10. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 3.10.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 - 3.11. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) . . . . . . . . . 15 - 3.11.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 3.12. The Submods Claim (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 3.12.1. The submod_name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 - 3.12.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.6.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.7. The Security Level Claim (security_level) . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.7.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + 3.8. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) . 13 + 3.8.1. Secure Boot Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.8.2. Debug Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.8.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.8.4. Debug Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.8.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.8.6. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 + 3.9. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.9.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.10. The Age Claim (age) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.11. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.11.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.12. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) . . . . . . . . . 16 + 3.12.1. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 3.13. The Submods Claim (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 3.13.1. The submod_name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 + 3.13.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4. Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4.1. Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 - 5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 21 + 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 + 5.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 22 5.1.1. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . 22 - 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 - 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 - Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 - A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 26 - Appendix B. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - B.1. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 + Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 + A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 27 + Appendix B. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + B.1. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + B.2. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1. Introduction Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the device. @@ -324,53 +328,77 @@ Attestation Key Material (AKM). The key material used to sign the EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE DevID [IDevID], then this is the private part of the EC key pair. If ECDAA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e. EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA. 3. The Claims Information Model This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also - mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT are particularly + mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly important for EAT. Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA - [IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries. * All claims are optional * No - claims are mandatory * All claims that are not understood by - implementations MUST be ignored + [IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries. + + o All claims are optional + + o No claims are mandatory + + o All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be + ignored CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define the information model. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the group is a general aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL). In the data model, described in the Section 4, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map entries and JSON name/value pairs. -3.1. Nonce Claim (cti and jti) - - All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is - generated by the relying party, sent to the entity by any protocol, - and included in the token. Note that intrinsically by the nature of - a nonce no security is needed for its transport. - - CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These - carry the nonce in an EAT. +3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) - TODO: what about the JWT claim "nonce"? + CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These are + equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier + as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use + of the token but are distinct from the nonce that is used by the + relying party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay. 3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date- of-creation of the token. -3.3. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) +3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) + + All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is + generated by the relying party, the end consumer of the token. It is + conveyed to the entity over whatever transport is in use before the + token is generated and then included in the token as the nonce claim. + + This documents the nonce claim for registration in the IANA CWT + claims registry. This is equivalent to the JWT nonce claim that is + already registered. + + The nonce must be at least 8 bytes (64 bits) as fewer are unlikely to + be secure. A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the memory a + constrained implementation uses. This size range is not set for the + already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size + recommendation when used in an EAT. + +3.3.1. CDDL + + nonce_claim = ( + nonce => bstr .size (8..64) + ) + +3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices. It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be sequential. UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and @@ -456,26 +484,26 @@ o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID may be created based on some other manufacturer registration scheme. o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type 0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is that UEIDs be universally unique. - ### CDDL +3.4.1. CDDL ueid_claim = ( ueid: bstr ) -3.4. Origination Claim (origination) +3.5. Origination Claim (origination) This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip manufacturer. The following table gives some examples: +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | Name | Description | +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored | | | and configured by "Acme" | @@ -486,45 +514,55 @@ | Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted | | | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" | +-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI and other are in separate fields. TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token. -3.4.1. CDDL +3.5.1. CDDL origination_claim = ( origination: string_or_uri ) -3.5. OEM identification by IEEE OUI (oemid) +3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) - This claim identifies a device OEM by the IEEE OUI. Reference TBD. - It is a byte string representing the OUI in binary form in network - byte order (TODO: confirm details). + The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company + IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents + of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID + [IEEE.RA]. An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used + as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value + uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as + OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of + these. A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L, + but not for use as a MAC address. IEEE has published Guidelines for + Use of EUI, OUI, and CID [OUI.Guide] and provides a lookup services + [OUI.Lookup] - Companies that have more than one IEEE OUI registered with IEEE + Companies that have more than one of these IDs or MAC address blocks should pick one and prefer that for all their devices. - Note that the OUI is in common use as a part of MAC Address. This - claim is only the first bits of the MAC address that identify the - manufacturer. The IEEE maintains a registry for these in which many - companies participate. + Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation + [IEEE.802-2001] also called the Canonical format. When this claim is + encoded order of bytes in the bstr are the same as the order in the + Hexadecimal Representation. For example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48" + would be encoded in 3 bytes with values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48. For JSON + encoded tokens, this is further base64url encoded. -3.5.1. CDDL +3.6.1. CDDL oemid_claim = ( oemid: bstr ) -3.6. The Security Level Claim (security_level) +3.7. The Security Level Claim (security_level) EATs have a claim that roughly characterizes the device / entities ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by roughly defining four security levels as described below. This is similar to the security levels defined in the Metadata Service defined by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance (TODO: reference). These claims describe security environment and countermeasures available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key @@ -551,180 +589,180 @@ 4 - Hardware Entities at this level must include substantial defense against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself. It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements. This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS (TODO: reference) or those based on Common Criteria (TODO: reference). The claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator. -3.6.1. CDDL +3.7.1. CDDL security_level_type = ( unrestricted: 1, restricted: 2, secure_restricted: 3, hardware: 4 ) security_level_claim = ( security_level: security_level_type ) -3.7. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) +3.8. Secure Boot and Debug Enable State Claims (boot_state) This claim is an array of five Boolean values indicating the boot and debug state of the entity. -3.7.1. Secure Boot Enabled +3.8.1. Secure Boot Enabled This indicates whether secure boot is enabled either for an entire device or an individual submodule. If it appears at the device level, then this means that secure boot is enabled for all submodules. Secure boot enablement allows a secure boot loader to authenticate software running either in a device or a submodule prior allowing execution. -3.7.2. Debug Disabled +3.8.2. Debug Disabled This indicates whether debug capabilities are disabled for an entity (i.e. value of 'true'). Debug disablement is considered a prerequisite before an entity is considered operational. -3.7.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot +3.8.3. Debug Disabled Since Boot This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity were not disabled in any way since boot (i.e. value of 'true'). -3.7.4. Debug Permanent Disable +3.8.4. Debug Permanent Disable This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can be set to 'true' also if only the manufacturer is allowed to enabled debug, but the end user is not. -3.7.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable +3.8.5. Debug Full Permanent Disable This claim indicates whether debug capabilities for the entity are permanently disabled (i.e. value of 'true'). This value can only be set to 'true' if no party can enable debug capabilities for the entity. Often this is implemented by blowing a fuse on a chip as fuses cannot be restored once blown. -3.7.6. CDDL +3.8.6. CDDL boot_state_type = [ secure_boot_enabled=> bool, debug_disabled=> bool, debug_disabled_since_boot=> bool, debug_permanent_disable=> bool, debug_full_permanent_disable=> bool ] boot_state_claim = ( boot_state: boot_state_type ) -3.8. The Location Claim (location) +3.9. The Location Claim (location) The location claim is a CBOR-formatted object that describes the location of the device entity from which the attestation originates. It is comprised of a map of additional sub claims that represent the actual location coordinates (latitude, longitude and altitude). The location coordinate claims are consistent with the WGS84 coordinate system [WGS84]. In addition, a sub claim providing the estimated accuracy of the location measurement is defined. -3.8.1. CDDL +3.9.1. CDDL location_type = { latitude => number, longitude => number, altitude => number, accuracy => number, altitude_accuracy => number, - heading_claim => number, - speed_claim => number + heading => number, + speed => number } location_claim = ( location: location_type ) -3.9. The Age Claim (age) +3.10. The Age Claim (age) The "age" claim contains a value that represents the number of seconds that have elapsed since the token was created, measurement was made, or location was obtained. Typical attestable values are sent as soon as they are obtained. However, in the case that such a value is buffered and sent at a later time and a sufficiently accurate time reference is unavailable for creation of a timestamp, then the age claim is provided. age_claim = ( age: uint) -3.10. The Uptime Claim (uptime) +3.11. The Uptime Claim (uptime) The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted. -3.10.1. CDDL +3.11.1. CDDL uptime_claim = ( uptime: uint ) -3.11. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) +3.12. Nested EATs, the EAT Claim (nested_eat) It is allowed for one EAT to be embedded in another. This is for complex devices that have more than one subsystem capable of - generating an EAT. Typically, one will be the device-wide EAT that - is low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or + generating an EAT. For example, one might be the device-wide EAT + that is low to medium security and another from a Secure Element or similar that is high security. - The contents of the "eat" claim must be a fully signed, optionally - encrypted, EAT token. + The contents of the "nested_eat" claim must be a fully signed, + optionally encrypted, EAT token. -3.11.1. CDDL +3.12.1. CDDL nested_eat_claim = ( nested_eat: nested_eat_type) A nested_eat_type is defined in words rather than CDDL. It is either a full CWT or JWT including the COSE or JOSE signing. -3.12. The Submods Claim (submods) +3.13. The Submods Claim (submods) Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure Element. The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule. Specifically, the "submods" claim is an array. Each item in the array is a CBOR map containing all the claims for a particular submodule. The security level of the submod is assumed to be at the same level as the main entity unless there is a security level claim in that submodule indicating otherwise. The security level of a submodule can never be higher (more secure) than the security level of the EAT it is a part of. -3.12.1. The submod_name Claim +3.13.1. The submod_name Claim Each submodule should have a submod_name claim that is descriptive name. This name should be the CBOR txt type. -3.12.2. CDDL +3.13.2. CDDL In the following a generic_claim_type is any CBOR map entry or JSON name/value pair. submod_name_type = ( submod_name: tstr ) submods_type = [ * submod_claims ] submod_claims = { @@ -796,20 +834,28 @@ origination = "origination" oemid = "oemid" security_level = "security_level" boot_state = "boot_state" location = "location" age = "age" uptime = "uptime" nested_eat = "nested_eat" submods = "submods" + latitude = "lat"" + longitude = "long"" + altitude = "alt" + accuracy = "accry" + altitude_accuracy = "alt_accry" + heading = "heading" + speed = "speed" + 4.3.2. JSON Interoperability JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows: o bstr - must be base64url encoded o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of [RFC7519]. @@ -824,28 +869,29 @@ origination = 9 oemid = 10 security_level = 11 boot_state = 12 location = 13 age = 14 uptime = 15 nested_eat = 16 submods = 17 submod_name = 18 + nonce = 19 - latitude 1 - longitude 2 - altitude 3 - accuracy 4 - altitude_accuracy 5 - heading_claim 6 - speed_claim 7 + latitude = 1 + longitude = 2 + altitude = 3 + accuracy = 4 + altitude_accuracy = 5 + heading = 6 + speed = 7 4.4.2. CBOR Interoperability Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability. The assumption is that the entity is likely to be a constrained device and relying party is likely to be a very capable server. The @@ -958,21 +1004,21 @@ provided to unauthenticated consumers. 6.1. UEID Privacy Considerations A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy - for the end user. it will often be the case that tokens will not + for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not have a UEID for these reasons. There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put UEID's in tokens: o The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a UEID. @@ -997,25 +1043,25 @@ TODO: Perhaps this can be the same as CWT / COSE, but not sure yet because it involves so much entity / device security that those do not. 8. References 8.1. Normative References [IANA.CWT.Claims] - IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", n.d., + IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims", . [IANA.JWT.Claims] - IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims", n.d., + IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims", . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, October 2013, . @@ -1062,27 +1108,49 @@ [ASN.1] International Telecommunication Union, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 1994. [ECMAScript] "Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification, 5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011, - . + . [IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"", December 2009, . + [IEEE.802-2001] + "IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks + Overview And Architecture", 2007, + . + + [IEEE.RA] "IEEE Registration Authority", + . + + [OUI.Guide] + "Guidelines for Use of Extended Unique Identifier (EUI), + Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), and Company ID + (CID)", August 2017, + . + + [OUI.Lookup] + "IEEE Registration Authority Assignments", + . + [Webauthn] Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API for accessing scoped credentials", 2016. Appendix A. Examples A.1. Very Simple EAT This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by COSE is shown. @@ -1134,20 +1202,28 @@ This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but not new claims have been added. o Separate information and data model using CDDL. o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims +B.2. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 + + o Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim + + o Minor spelling and other fixes + + o Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim + Authors' Addresses Giridhar Mandyam Qualcomm Technologies Inc. 5775 Morehouse Drive San Diego, California USA Phone: +1 858 651 7200 EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com