draft-ietf-rats-eat-05.txt   draft-ietf-rats-eat-06.txt 
RATS Working Group G. Mandyam RATS Working Group G. Mandyam
Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade
Expires: June 4, 2021 Security Theory LLC Expires: 4 June 2021 Security Theory LLC
M. Ballesteros M. Ballesteros
J. O'Donoghue J. O'Donoghue
Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
December 01, 2020 1 December 2020
The Entity Attestation Token (EAT) The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 draft-ietf-rats-eat-06
Abstract Abstract
An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of
claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity, claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,
typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are
used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the
entity. entity.
An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims. An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.
skipping to change at page 1, line 45 skipping to change at page 1, line 45
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 4, 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 June 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.5. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.5.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.5.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.1. nonce CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3.1. nonce CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.1. ueid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.4.1. ueid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.5. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5.1. origination CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3.5.1. origination CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.6.1. oemid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.6.1. oemid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.7. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . . 14 3.7. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . . 15
3.8. Software Description and Version . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.8. Software Description and Version . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . . 15 3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . . 17
3.9.1. security-level CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.9.1. security-level CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.10. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.10. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.10.1. secure-boot CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.10.1. secure-boot CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.11. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.11. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.11.1. Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.11.1. Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.11.2. Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.11.2. Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.11.3. Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11.3. Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.11.4. Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11.4. Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.11.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.11.6. debug-status CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11.6. debug-status CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.12. Including Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.12. Including Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.13. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.13. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.13.1. location CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.13.1. location CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.14. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.14. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.14.1. uptime CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.14.1. uptime CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.15.1. intended-use CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.15.1. intended-use CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.16. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods) . . . . . . . . 21 3.16. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods) . . . . . . . . 24
3.16.1. Two Types of Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.16.1. Two Types of Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.16.1.1. Non-token Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.16.1.1. Non-token Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.16.1.2. Nested EATs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.16.1.2. Nested EATs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.16.1.3. Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules . . 23 3.16.1.3. Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules . . 26
3.16.2. No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.16.2. No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.16.3. Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.16.3. Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.16.4. Submodule Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.16.4. Submodule Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.16.5. submods CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.16.5. submods CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4. Endorsements and Verification Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4. Endorsements and Verification Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.4.1. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.4.1. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 26 6.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 38
6.2. Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.2. Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . . 27 6.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . . 38
6.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . . 27 6.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . . 39
6.2.3. Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2.3. Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2.5. Proprietary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2.5. Proprietary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.3. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.3. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2. Location Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.2. Location Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.1. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.1. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.1.1. Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.1.1. Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.2. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.2. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.3. Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.3. Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 47
A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 36 Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 B.1. Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B.1. Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 B.2. No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
B.2. No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 C.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a
remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)
device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a
server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some
characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the
device. device.
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The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known
to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content
protection where the relying party wants to know the device will protection where the relying party wants to know the device will
protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that
might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing
corporate data to be accessed by it. corporate data to be accessed by it.
The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not
limited to the following: limited to the following:
o Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW) * Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)
o Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly * Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly
for security-oriented chips for security-oriented chips
o Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device * Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device
o Configuration and state of the device * Configuration and state of the device
o Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS * Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS
location location
TODO: mention use for Attestation Evidence and Results. TODO: mention use for Attestation Evidence and Results.
1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS 1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS
For flexibility and ease of imlpementation in a wide variety of For flexibility and ease of imlpementation in a wide variety of
environments, EATs can be either CBOR [RFC7049] or JSON [ECMAScript] environments, EATs can be either CBOR [RFC7049] or JSON [ECMAScript]
format. This specification simultaneously describes both formats. format. This specification simultaneously describes both formats.
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In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity
create an EAT of the format described in this document. The EAT is create an EAT of the format described in this document. The EAT is
always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the
manufacturer. manufacturer.
In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing that In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing that
the signature on the EAT is valid and consistent with data from the signature on the EAT is valid and consistent with data from
claims in the EAT. This can happen in many different ways. Here are claims in the EAT. This can happen in many different ways. Here are
some examples. some examples.
o The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party * The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party
gets corresponding key material (e.g. a root certificate) from the gets corresponding key material (e.g. a root certificate) from the
manufacturer. The relying party performs the verification. manufacturer. The relying party performs the verification.
o The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party * The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party
transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the
manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims. manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims.
o The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps * The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps
operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It
verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the
relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re- relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-
sign the EAT (with a different signing key). sign the EAT (with a different signing key).
All these operating models are supported and there is no preference All these operating models are supported and there is no preference
of one over the other. It is important to support this variety of of one over the other. It is important to support this variety of
operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for
some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation
service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In
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3. The Claims 3. The Claims
This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also
mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly
important for EAT. important for EAT.
Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT
including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA
[IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries. [IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries.
o All claims are optional * All claims are optional
o No claims are mandatory * No claims are mandatory
o All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be * All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be
ignored ignored
There are no default values or meanings assigned to absent claims There are no default values or meanings assigned to absent claims
other than they are not reported. The reason for a claim's absence other than they are not reported. The reason for a claim's absence
may be the implementation not supporting the claim, an inability to may be the implementation not supporting the claim, an inability to
determine its value, or a preference to report in a different way determine its value, or a preference to report in a different way
such as a proprietary claim. such as a proprietary claim.
CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim
indepdent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the indepdent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the
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be secure. A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the memory a be secure. A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the memory a
constrained implementation uses. This size range is not set for the constrained implementation uses. This size range is not set for the
already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size
recommendation when used in an EAT. recommendation when used in an EAT.
Multiple nonces are allowed to accommodate multistage verification Multiple nonces are allowed to accommodate multistage verification
and consumption. and consumption.
3.3.1. nonce CDDL 3.3.1. nonce CDDL
{::include cddl/nonce.cddl} nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)
nonce-claim = (
nonce => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ]
)
3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) 3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)
UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a
mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked
security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or
subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices. subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices.
It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be
sequential. sequential.
skipping to change at page 12, line 5 skipping to change at page 12, line 5
The recommended maximum sent is also 33 bytes. The recommended maximum sent is also 33 bytes.
When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the
following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to
accommodate different industries and different manufacturing accommodate different industries and different manufacturing
processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types
of manufacturer registrations. of manufacturer registrations.
Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126]. Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126].
+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+ +======+======+===================================================+
| Type | Type | Specification | | Type | Type | Specification |
| Byte | Name | | | Byte | Name | |
+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+ +======+======+===================================================+
| 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128, 192 or 256 bit random number | | 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128, 192 or 256 bit random number |
| | | generated once and stored in the device. This may | | | | generated once and stored in the device. This |
| | | be constructed by concatenating enough identifiers | | | | may be constructed by concatenating enough |
| | | to make up an equivalent number of random bits and | | | | identifiers to make up an equivalent number of |
| | | then feeding the concatenation through a | | | | random bits and then feeding the concatenation |
| | | cryptographic hash function. It may also be a | | | | through a cryptographic hash function. It may |
| | | cryptographic quality random number generated once | | | | also be a cryptographic quality random number |
| | | at the beginning of the life of the device and | | | | generated once at the beginning of the life of |
| | | stored. It may not be smaller than 128 bits. | | | | the device and stored. It may not be smaller |
| 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification | | | | than 128 bits. |
| | EUI | registry. An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or | +------+------+---------------------------------------------------+
| | | EUI-64 and made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID, | | 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification |
| | | different registered company identifiers, and some | | | EUI | registry. An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or |
| | | unique per-device identifier. EUIs are often the | | | | EUI-64 and made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID, |
| | | same as or similar to MAC addresses. This type | | | | different registered company identifiers, and |
| | | includes MAC-48, an obsolete name for EUI-48. (Note | | | | some unique per-device identifier. EUIs are |
| | | that while devices with multiple network interfaces | | | | often the same as or similar to MAC addresses. |
| | | may have multiple MAC addresses, there is only one | | | | This type includes MAC-48, an obsolete name for |
| | | UEID for a device) [IEEE.802-2001], [OUI.Guide] | | | | EUI-48. (Note that while devices with multiple |
| 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an | | | | network interfaces may have multiple MAC |
| | | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial | | | | addresses, there is only one UEID for a device) |
| | | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL | | | | [IEEE.802-2001], [OUI.Guide] |
| | | be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each | +------+------+---------------------------------------------------+
| | | byte as the digit's value (not the ASCII encoding | | 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an |
| | | of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not | | | | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial |
| | | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include | | | | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL |
| | | Luhn checksum or SVN information. [ThreeGPP.IMEI] | | | | be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each |
+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+ | | | byte as the digit's value (not the ASCII encoding |
| | | of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not |
| | | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include |
| | | Luhn checksum or SVN information. |
| | | [ThreeGPP.IMEI] |
+------+------+---------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: UEID Composition Types Table 1: UEID Composition Types
UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined. the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.
The consumer (the relying party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a The consumer (the relying party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a
completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its
internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of
a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead
they should use the oemid claim that is defined elsewhere. The they should use the oemid claim that is defined elsewhere. The
reasons for this are: reasons for this are:
o UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next. * UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.
o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID * New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID
may be created based on some other manufacturer registration may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
scheme. scheme.
o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID * Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID
to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can
optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type
0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is 0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is
that UEIDs be universally unique. that UEIDs be universally unique.
3.4.1. ueid CDDL 3.4.1. ueid CDDL
{::include cddl/ueid.cddl} ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)
ueid-claim = (
ueid => ueid-type
)
3.5. Origination Claim (origination) 3.5. Origination Claim (origination)
TODO: this claim is likely to be dropped in favor of Endorsement TODO: this claim is likely to be dropped in favor of Endorsement
identifier and locators. identifier and locators.
This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are
creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip
manufacturer. The following table gives some examples: manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:
+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ +===================+=========================================+
| Name | Description | | Name | Description |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ +===================+=========================================+
| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored | | Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE |
| | and configured by "Acme" | | | authored and configured by "Acme" |
| Acme-TPM | The EATs are generated in a TPM manufactured | +-------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| | by "Acme" | | Acme-TPM | The EATs are generated in a TPM |
| Acme-Linux-Kernel | The EATs are generated in a Linux kernel | | | manufactured by "Acme" |
| | configured and shipped by "Acme" | +-------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted | | Acme-Linux-Kernel | The EATs are generated in a Linux |
| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" | | | kernel configured and shipped by "Acme" |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+ +-------------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |
| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |
+-------------------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 2
TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI
and other are in separate fields. and other are in separate fields.
TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim
in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token. in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.
3.5.1. origination CDDL 3.5.1. origination CDDL
{::include cddl/origination.cddl} origination-claim = (
origination => string-or-uri
)
3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) 3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid)
The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company
IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents
of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID
[IEEE.RA]. An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used [IEEE.RA]. An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used
as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value
uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as
OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of
skipping to change at page 14, line 31 skipping to change at page 15, line 14
Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation
[IEEE.802-2001] also called the Canonical format. When this claim is [IEEE.802-2001] also called the Canonical format. When this claim is
encoded the order of bytes in the bstr are the same as the order in encoded the order of bytes in the bstr are the same as the order in
the Hexadecimal Representation. For example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48" the Hexadecimal Representation. For example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48"
would be encoded in 3 bytes with values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48. For JSON would be encoded in 3 bytes with values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48. For JSON
encoded tokens, this is further base64url encoded. encoded tokens, this is further base64url encoded.
3.6.1. oemid CDDL 3.6.1. oemid CDDL
{::include cddl/oemid.cddl} oemid-claim = (
oemid => bstr
)
3.7. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) 3.7. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims)
The hardware version can be claimed at three different levels, the The hardware version can be claimed at three different levels, the
chip, the circuit board and the final device assembly. An EAT can chip, the circuit board and the final device assembly. An EAT can
include any combination these claims. include any combination these claims.
The hardware version is a simple text string the format of which is The hardware version is a simple text string the format of which is
set by each manufacturer. The structure and sorting order of this set by each manufacturer. The structure and sorting order of this
text string can be specified using the version-scheme item from text string can be specified using the version-scheme item from
skipping to change at page 15, line 8 skipping to change at page 15, line 40
Number [EAN-13]. An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article Number [EAN-13]. An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article
Number or most commonly as a bar code. This claim is the ASCII text Number or most commonly as a bar code. This claim is the ASCII text
representation of actual digits often printed with a bar code. Use representation of actual digits often printed with a bar code. Use
of this claim must comply with the EAN allocation and assignment of this claim must comply with the EAN allocation and assignment
rules. For example, this requires the manufacturer to obtain a rules. For example, this requires the manufacturer to obtain a
manufacture code from GS1. manufacture code from GS1.
Both the simple version string and EAN-13 versions may be included Both the simple version string and EAN-13 versions may be included
for the same hardware. for the same hardware.
{::include cddl/hardware-version.cddl} chip-version-claim = (
chip-version => tstr
)
chip-version-scheme-claim = (
chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)
board-version-claim = (
board-version => tstr
)
board-version-scheme-claim = (
board-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)
device-version-claim = (
device-version => tstr
)
device-version-scheme-claim = (
device-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)
ean-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
ean-chip-version-claim = (
ean-chip-version => ean-type
)
ean-board-version-claim = (
ean-board-version => ean-type
)
ean-device-version-claim = (
ean-device-version => ean-type
)
hardware-version-claims = (
? chip-version-claim,
? board-version-claim,
? device-version-claim,
? chip-version-scheme-claim,
? board-version-scheme-claim,
? device-version-scheme-claim,
? ean-chip-version-claim,
? ean-board-version-claim,
? ean-device-version-claim,
)
3.8. Software Description and Version 3.8. Software Description and Version
TODO: Add claims that reference CoSWID. TODO: Add claims that reference CoSWID.
3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level) 3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level)
This claim characterizes the device/entity ability to defend against This claim characterizes the device/entity ability to defend against
attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at
forging EATs. This is done by forging EATs. This is done by defining four security levels as
defining four security levels as described below. This is similar to described below. This is similar to the key protection types defined
the key protection types defined by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance [FIDO.Registry]).
Alliance [FIDO.Registry]).
These claims describe security environment and countermeasures These claims describe security environment and countermeasures
available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key
reside and the claims originate. reside and the claims originate.
1 - Unrestricted There is some expectation that implementor will 1 - Unrestricted There is some expectation that implementor will
protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the
EAT provides no meaningful security assurances. EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.
2- Restricted Entities at this level should not be general-purpose 2- Restricted Entities at this level should not be general-purpose
skipping to change at page 16, line 16 skipping to change at page 18, line 7
this claim as a coarse indication of security and its own proprietary this claim as a coarse indication of security and its own proprietary
claim as a refined indication. claim as a refined indication.
This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device
security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS 140 security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS 140
[FIPS-140] or those based on Common Criteria [Common.Criteria]. The [FIPS-140] or those based on Common Criteria [Common.Criteria]. The
claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator. claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.
3.9.1. security-level CDDL 3.9.1. security-level CDDL
{::include cddl/security-level.cddl} security-level-type = &(
unrestricted: 1,
restricted: 2,
secure-restricted: 3,
hardware: 4
)
security-level-claim = (
security-level => security-level-type
)
3.10. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) 3.10. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot)
The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled. Secure boot is The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled. Secure boot is
considered enabled when base software, the firmware and operating considered enabled when base software, the firmware and operating
system, are under control of the entity manufacturer identified in system, are under control of the entity manufacturer identified in
the oemid claimd described in Section 3.6. This may because the the oemid claimd described in Section 3.6. This may because the
software is in ROM or because it is cryptographically authenticated software is in ROM or because it is cryptographically authenticated
or some combination of the two or other. or some combination of the two or other.
3.10.1. secure-boot CDDL 3.10.1. secure-boot CDDL
{::include cddl/secure-boot.cddl} secure-boot-claim = (
secure-boot => bool
)
3.11. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) 3.11. Debug Status Claim (debug-status)
This applies to system-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the This applies to system-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the
target device / submodule like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built target device / submodule like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built
into chips. It applies to any software debug facilities related to into chips. It applies to any software debug facilities related to
root, operating system or privileged software that allow system-wide root, operating system or privileged software that allow system-wide
memory inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software memory inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software
like user mode applications. like user mode applications.
skipping to change at page 18, line 25 skipping to change at page 20, line 25
also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and
have been so since boot/start. have been so since boot/start.
3.11.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently 3.11.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently
This level indicates that all debug capabilities for the target This level indicates that all debug capabilities for the target
device/sub-module are permanently disabled. device/sub-module are permanently disabled.
3.11.6. debug-status CDDL 3.11.6. debug-status CDDL
{::include cddl/debug-status.cddl} debug-status-type = &(
enabled: 0,
disabled: 1,
disabled-since-boot: 2,
disabled-permanently: 3,
disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
)
debug-status-claim = (
debug-status => debug-status-type
)
3.12. Including Keys 3.12. Including Keys
An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key. The An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key. The
signing of the EAT binds the key to all the other claims in the signing of the EAT binds the key to all the other claims in the
token. token.
The purpose for inclusion of the key may vary by use case. For The purpose for inclusion of the key may vary by use case. For
example, the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding example, the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding
protocol. When the FIDO protocol includes a pubic key in its protocol. When the FIDO protocol includes a pubic key in its
skipping to change at page 19, line 43 skipping to change at page 22, line 11
since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or
age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The
timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time. timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time.
The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time
it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set. The it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set. The
entity must still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval. entity must still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.
The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and
token creation. token creation.
See {#locationprivacyconsiderations} below. See Section 7.2 below.
3.13.1. location CDDL 3.13.1. location CDDL
{::include cddl/location.cddl} location-type = {
latitude => number,
longitude => number,
? altitude => number,
? accuracy => number,
? altitude-accuracy => number,
? heading => number,
? speed => number,
? timestamp => ~time-int,
? age => uint
}
latitude = 1
longitude = 2
altitude = 3
accuracy = 4
altitude-accuracy = 5
heading = 6
speed = 7
timestamp = 8
age = 9
location-claim = (
location => location-type
)
3.14. The Uptime Claim (uptime) 3.14. The Uptime Claim (uptime)
The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of
seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted. seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.
3.14.1. uptime CDDL 3.14.1. uptime CDDL
{::include cddl/uptime.cddl} uptime-claim = (
uptime => uint
)
3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) 3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use)
EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications. EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications.
The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer
about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a
way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between
different ways it uses EAT. different ways it uses EAT.
1 - Generic Generic attestation describes an application where the 1 - Generic Generic attestation describes an application where the
skipping to change at page 21, line 6 skipping to change at page 24, line 4
5 - Proof-of-Possession An EAT consumer may require an attestation 5 - Proof-of-Possession An EAT consumer may require an attestation
as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) appication. as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) appication.
More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the
recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the sender has recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the sender has
posession of a key. This kind of attestation may be neceesary to posession of a key. This kind of attestation may be neceesary to
verify the security state of the entity storing the private key verify the security state of the entity storing the private key
used in a PoP application. used in a PoP application.
3.15.1. intended-use CDDL 3.15.1. intended-use CDDL
intended-use-type = &(
intended-use = &(
generic: 1, generic: 1,
registration: 2, registration: 2,
provisioning: 3, provisioning: 3,
csr: 4, csr: 4,
pop: 5 pop: 5
)
intended-use-claim = (
intended-use => intended-use-type
) )
3.16. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods) 3.16. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods)
Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A
mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity
submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may
have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have
one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure
Element. Element.
skipping to change at page 21, line 38 skipping to change at page 24, line 39
token. It is identified by its specific label. It is a peer to token. It is identified by its specific label. It is a peer to
other claims, but it is not called a claim because it is a container other claims, but it is not called a claim because it is a container
for a claim set rather than an individual claim. This submods part for a claim set rather than an individual claim. This submods part
of a token allows what might be called recursion. It allows claim of a token allows what might be called recursion. It allows claim
sets inside of claim sets inside of claims sets... sets inside of claim sets inside of claims sets...
3.16.1. Two Types of Submodules 3.16.1. Two Types of Submodules
Each entry in the submod map is one of two types: Each entry in the submod map is one of two types:
o A non-token submodule that is a map or object directly containing * A non-token submodule that is a map or object directly containing
claims for the submodule. claims for the submodule.
o A nested EAT that is a fully formed, independently signed EAT * A nested EAT that is a fully formed, independently signed EAT
token token
3.16.1.1. Non-token Submodules 3.16.1.1. Non-token Submodules
This is simply a map or object containing claims about the submodule. This is simply a map or object containing claims about the submodule.
It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or
superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may
have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further
subordinate submodule may also have a UEID. subordinate submodule may also have a UEID.
skipping to change at page 24, line 17 skipping to change at page 28, line 4
The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have
their own more secure key material. An example of this is an their own more secure key material. An example of this is an
embedded secure element. embedded secure element.
3.16.4. Submodule Names 3.16.4. Submodule Names
The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text
string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name. string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name.
3.16.5. submods CDDL 3.16.5. submods CDDL
; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer
; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to
; hold all the submodules.
{::include cddl/submods.cddl} submods-part = (
submods => submods-type
)
submods-type = { + submod-type }
; The type of a submodule which can either be a nested claim set or a
; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in a bstr
; or a tstr.
submod-type = (
submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token
)
; When this is a bstr, the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS
; format. When this is a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT
; format.
nested-token = bstr / tstr;
; Each submodule has a unique text string name.
submod-name = tstr
4. Endorsements and Verification Keys 4. Endorsements and Verification Keys
TODO: fill this section in. It will discuss key IDs, endorsement ID TODO: fill this section in. It will discuss key IDs, endorsement ID
and such that are needed as input needed to by the Verifier to verify and such that are needed as input needed to by the Verifier to verify
the signature. This will NOT discuss the contents of an Endorsement, the signature. This will NOT discuss the contents of an Endorsement,
just and ID/locator. just and ID/locator.
5. Encoding 5. Encoding
skipping to change at page 24, line 41 skipping to change at page 29, line 10
Some of the CDDL included here is for claims that are defined in CWT Some of the CDDL included here is for claims that are defined in CWT
[RFC8392] or JWT [RFC7519] or are in the IANA CWT or JWT registries. [RFC8392] or JWT [RFC7519] or are in the IANA CWT or JWT registries.
CDDL was not in use when these claims where defined. CDDL was not in use when these claims where defined.
5.1. Common CDDL Types 5.1. Common CDDL Types
time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows
floating-point representation. floating-point representation.
{::include cddl/common-types.cddl} string-or-uri = tstr
time-int = #6.1(int)
5.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims 5.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims
This section provides CDDL for the claims defined in CWT. It is non- This section provides CDDL for the claims defined in CWT. It is non-
normative as [RFC8392] is the authoritative definition of these normative as [RFC8392] is the authoritative definition of these
claims. claims.
{::include cddl/cwt.cddl} $$eat-extension //= (
? issuer => text,
? subject => text,
? audience => text,
? expiration => time,
? not-before => time,
? issued-at => time,
? cwt-id => bytes,
)
issuer = 1
subject = 2
audience = 3
expiration = 4
not-before = 5
issued-at = 6
cwt-id = 7
5.3. JSON 5.3. JSON
5.3.1. JSON Labels 5.3.1. JSON Labels
ueid /= "ueid"
nonce /= "nonce"
origination /= "origination"
oemid /= "oemid"
security-level /= "security-level"
secure-boot /= "secure-boot"
debug-status /= "debug-status"
location /= "location"
age /= "age"
uptime /= "uptime"
submods /= "submods"
timestamp /= "timestamp"
{::include cddl/json.cddl} latitude /= "lat"
longitude /= "long"
altitude /= "alt"
accuracy /= "accry"
altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
heading /= "heading"
speed /= "speed"
5.3.2. JSON Interoperability 5.3.2. JSON Interoperability
JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the
following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows: following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:
o bstr - must be base64url encoded * bstr - must be base64url encoded
o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of * time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
[RFC7519]. [RFC7519].
o string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described * string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
section 2 of [RFC7519]. section 2 of [RFC7519].
5.4. CBOR 5.4. CBOR
5.4.1. CBOR Interoperability 5.4.1. CBOR Interoperability
Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and
decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify
how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats
MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability. MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability.
skipping to change at page 25, line 48 skipping to change at page 31, line 20
the token must support decoding all encodings. the token must support decoding all encodings.
These rules cover all types used in the claims in this document. These rules cover all types used in the claims in this document.
They also are recommendations for additional claims. They also are recommendations for additional claims.
Canonical CBOR encoding, Preferred Serialization and Canonical CBOR encoding, Preferred Serialization and
Deterministically Encoded CBOR are explicitly NOT required as they Deterministically Encoded CBOR are explicitly NOT required as they
would place an unnecessary burden on the entity implementation, would place an unnecessary burden on the entity implementation,
particularly if the entity implementation is implemented in hardware. particularly if the entity implementation is implemented in hardware.
o Integer Encoding (major type 0, 1) - The entity may use any * Integer Encoding (major type 0, 1) - The entity may use any
integer encoding allowed by CBOR. The server MUST accept all integer encoding allowed by CBOR. The server MUST accept all
integer encodings allowed by CBOR. integer encodings allowed by CBOR.
o String Encoding (major type 2 and 3) - The entity can use any * String Encoding (major type 2 and 3) - The entity can use any
string encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite lengths. It string encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite lengths. It
may also encode the lengths of strings in any way allowed by CBOR. may also encode the lengths of strings in any way allowed by CBOR.
The server must accept all string encodings. The server must accept all string encodings.
o Major type 2, bstr, SHOULD have tag 21 to indicate conversion to * Major type 2, bstr, SHOULD have tag 21 to indicate conversion to
base64url in case that conversion is performed. base64url in case that conversion is performed.
o Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5) - The entity can use * Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5) - The entity can use
any array or map encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite any array or map encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite
lengths. Sorting of map keys is not required. Duplicate map keys lengths. Sorting of map keys is not required. Duplicate map keys
are not allowed. The server must accept all array and map are not allowed. The server must accept all array and map
encodings. The server may reject maps with duplicate map keys. encodings. The server may reject maps with duplicate map keys.
o Date and Time - The entity should send dates as tag 1 encoded as * Date and Time - The entity should send dates as tag 1 encoded as
64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may not send floating-point 64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may not send floating-point
dates. The server must support tag 1 epoch-based dates encoded as dates. The server must support tag 1 epoch-based dates encoded as
64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may send tag 0 dates, 64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may send tag 0 dates,
however tag 1 is preferred. The server must support tag 0 UTC however tag 1 is preferred. The server must support tag 0 UTC
dates. dates.
o URIs - URIs should be encoded as text strings and marked with tag * URIs - URIs should be encoded as text strings and marked with tag
32. 32.
o Floating Point - The entity may use any floating-point encoding. * Floating Point - The entity may use any floating-point encoding.
The relying party must support decoding of all types of floating- The relying party must support decoding of all types of floating-
point. point.
o Other types - Other types like bignums, regular expressions and * Other types - Other types like bignums, regular expressions and
such, SHOULD NOT be used. The server MAY support them but is not such, SHOULD NOT be used. The server MAY support them but is not
required to so interoperability is not guaranteed. required to so interoperability is not guaranteed.
5.5. Collected CDDL 5.5. Collected CDDL
{::include cddl/eat-token.cddl} ; This is the top-level definition of the claims in EAT tokens. To
; form an actual EAT Token, this claim set is enclosed in a COSE, JOSE
; or UCCS message.
; TO-DO: Add intended-use claim
eat-claim-set = {
? ueid-claim,
? nonce-claim,
? origination-claim,
? oemid-claim,
? hardware-version-claims,
? security-level-claim,
? secure-boot-claim,
? debug-status-claim,
? location-claim,
? uptime-claim,
? submods-part,
* $$eat-extension,
}
; This is the top-level definition of an EAT Token. It is a CWT, JWT
; or UCSS where the payload is an eat-claim-set. A JWT_Message is what
; is defined by JWT in RFC 7519. (RFC 7519 doesn't use CDDL so a there
; is no actual CDDL definition of JWT_Message).
eat-token = EAT_Tagged_Message / EAT_Untagged_Message / JWT_Message
; This is CBOR-format EAT token in the CWT or UCCS format that is a
; tag. COSE_Tagged_message is defined in RFC 8152. Tag 601 is
; proposed by the UCCS draft, but not yet assigned.
EAT_Tagged_Message = #6.61(COSE_Tagged_Message) / #6.601(eat-claim-set)
; This is a CBOR-format EAT token that is a CWT or UCSS that is not a
; tag COSE_Tagged_message and COSE_Untagged_Message are defined in RFC
; 8152.
EAT_Untagged_Message = COSE_Tagged_Message / COSE_Untagged_Message / UCCS_Untagged_Message
; This is an "unwrapped" UCCS tag. Unwrapping a tag means to use the
; definition of its content without the preceding type 6 tag
; integer. Since a UCCS is nothing but a tag for an unsecured CWT
; claim set, unwrapping reduces to a bare eat-claim-set.
UCCS_Untagged_Message = eat-claim-set
; The following Claim Keys (labels) are temporary. They are not
; assigned by IANA
nonce = 10
ueid = 11
origination = 12
oemid = 13
security-level = 14
secure-boot = 15
debug-status = 16
location = 17
uptime = 19
submods = 20
chip-version = 21
board-version = 22
device-version = 23
chip-version-scheme = 24
board-version-scheme = 25
device-version-scheme = 26
ean-chip-version = 27
ean-board-version = 28
ean-device-version = 29
string-or-uri = tstr
time-int = #6.1(int)
$$eat-extension //= (
? issuer => text,
? subject => text,
? audience => text,
? expiration => time,
? not-before => time,
? issued-at => time,
? cwt-id => bytes,
)
issuer = 1
subject = 2
audience = 3
expiration = 4
not-before = 5
issued-at = 6
cwt-id = 7
debug-status-type = &(
enabled: 0,
disabled: 1,
disabled-since-boot: 2,
disabled-permanently: 3,
disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
)
debug-status-claim = (
debug-status => debug-status-type
)
location-type = {
latitude => number,
longitude => number,
? altitude => number,
? accuracy => number,
? altitude-accuracy => number,
? heading => number,
? speed => number,
? timestamp => ~time-int,
? age => uint
}
latitude = 1
longitude = 2
altitude = 3
accuracy = 4
altitude-accuracy = 5
heading = 6
speed = 7
timestamp = 8
age = 9
location-claim = (
location => location-type
)
nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)
nonce-claim = (
nonce => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ]
)
oemid-claim = (
oemid => bstr
)
; copied from CoSWID
; TODO: how to properly make reference to CoSWID and have tool validate
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric
$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix
$version-scheme /= alphanumeric
$version-scheme /= decimal
$version-scheme /= semver
$version-scheme /= uint / text
multipartnumeric = 1
multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
alphanumeric = 3
decimal = 4
semver = 16384
chip-version-claim = (
chip-version => tstr
)
chip-version-scheme-claim = (
chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)
board-version-claim = (
board-version => tstr
)
board-version-scheme-claim = (
board-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)
device-version-claim = (
device-version => tstr
)
device-version-scheme-claim = (
device-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)
ean-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
ean-chip-version-claim = (
ean-chip-version => ean-type
)
ean-board-version-claim = (
ean-board-version => ean-type
)
ean-device-version-claim = (
ean-device-version => ean-type
)
hardware-version-claims = (
? chip-version-claim,
? board-version-claim,
? device-version-claim,
? chip-version-scheme-claim,
? board-version-scheme-claim,
? device-version-scheme-claim,
? ean-chip-version-claim,
? ean-board-version-claim,
? ean-device-version-claim,
)
origination-claim = (
origination => string-or-uri
)
secure-boot-claim = (
secure-boot => bool
)
security-level-type = &(
unrestricted: 1,
restricted: 2,
secure-restricted: 3,
hardware: 4
)
security-level-claim = (
security-level => security-level-type
)
; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer
; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to
; hold all the submodules.
submods-part = (
submods => submods-type
)
submods-type = { + submod-type }
; The type of a submodule which can either be a nested claim set or a
; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in a bstr
; or a tstr.
submod-type = (
submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token
)
; When this is a bstr, the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS
; format. When this is a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT
; format.
nested-token = bstr / tstr;
; Each submodule has a unique text string name.
submod-name = tstr
ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)
ueid-claim = (
ueid => ueid-type
)
uptime-claim = (
uptime => uint
)
ueid /= "ueid"
nonce /= "nonce"
origination /= "origination"
oemid /= "oemid"
security-level /= "security-level"
secure-boot /= "secure-boot"
debug-status /= "debug-status"
location /= "location"
age /= "age"
uptime /= "uptime"
submods /= "submods"
timestamp /= "timestamp"
latitude /= "lat"
longitude /= "long"
altitude /= "alt"
accuracy /= "accry"
altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
heading /= "heading"
speed /= "speed"
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry 6.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry
Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT
Claims Registry is re used. No new IANA registry is created. All Claims Registry is re used. No new IANA registry is created. All
EAT claims should be registered in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries. EAT claims should be registered in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries.
6.2. Claim Characteristics 6.2. Claim Characteristics
skipping to change at page 28, line 49 skipping to change at page 40, line 25
For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with
proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service
offered by that device manufacturer. This is a supported use case. offered by that device manufacturer. This is a supported use case.
In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious
way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general
standardized claims is preferred. standardized claims is preferred.
6.3. Claims Registered by This Document 6.3. Claims Registered by This Document
o Claim Name: UEID * Claim Name: UEID
o Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID * Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID
o JWT Claim Name: N/A
o Claim Key: 8 * JWT Claim Name: N/A
o Claim Value Type(s): byte string * Claim Key: 8
o Change Controller: IESG * Claim Value Type(s): byte string
o Specification Document(s): *this document* * Change Controller: IESG
* Specification Document(s): *this document*
TODO: add the rest of the claims in here TODO: add the rest of the claims in here
7. Privacy Considerations 7. Privacy Considerations
Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and
therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy- therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-
preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT. preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.
Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's
provided to unauthenticated consumers. provided to unauthenticated consumers.
skipping to change at page 29, line 38 skipping to change at page 41, line 19
able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to
track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates
governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will
not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy
for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not
have a UEID for these reasons. have a UEID for these reasons.
There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put
UEID's in tokens: UEID's in tokens:
o The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device * The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device
to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be
through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some
online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a
UEID. UEID.
o The UEID is used only in a particular context or particular use * The UEID is used only in a particular context or particular use
case. It is used only by one relying party. case. It is used only by one relying party.
o The device authenticates the relying party and generates a derived * The device authenticates the relying party and generates a derived
UEID just for that particular relying party. For example, the UEID just for that particular relying party. For example, the
relying party could prove their identity cryptographically to the relying party could prove their identity cryptographically to the
device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying
party by hashing a proofed relying party ID with the main device party by hashing a proofed relying party ID with the main device
UEID. UEID.
Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in
multiple UEIDs per device. Each UEID is used in a different context, multiple UEIDs per device. Each UEID is used in a different context,
use case or system on the device. However, from the view of the use case or system on the device. However, from the view of the
relying party, there is just one UEID and it is still globally relying party, there is just one UEID and it is still globally
skipping to change at page 34, line 38 skipping to change at page 46, line 21
"Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification, "Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011, 5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,
<http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA- <http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-
262.pdf>. 262.pdf>.
[FIDO.Registry] [FIDO.Registry]
The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Registry of Predefined Values", The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Registry of Predefined Values",
December 2019, <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common- December 2019, <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-
specs/fido-registry-v2.1-ps-20191217.html>. specs/fido-registry-v2.1-ps-20191217.html>.
[FIPS-140] [FIPS-140] National Institue of Standards, "Security Requirements for
National Institue of Standards, "Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules", May 2001, Cryptographic Modules", May 2001,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/
final>. final>.
[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"", [IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",
December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/ December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>. standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
[IEEE.802-2001] [IEEE.802-2001]
"IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks "IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks
skipping to change at page 35, line 35 skipping to change at page 47, line 19
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[W3C.GeoLoc] [W3C.GeoLoc]
Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/ 2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>. geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.
[Webauthn] [Webauthn] Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API
Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API
for accessing scoped credentials", 2016. for accessing scoped credentials", 2016.
Appendix A. Examples Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Very Simple EAT A.1. Very Simple EAT
This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by
COSE is shown. COSE is shown.
{::include cddl/examples/simple.diag} {
/ issuer / 1: "joe",
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ UEID / 11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2fa',
/ secure-boot / 15: true,
/ debug-disable / 16: 3, / permanent-disable /
/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894),
/ chip-version / 21: "1.4a",
/ chip-version-scheme / 24: 2 / multipartnumeric+suffix /
}
A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels
{
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ UEID / 11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2fa',
/ secure-boot / 15: true,
/ debug-disable / 16: 3, / permanent-disable /
/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894),
/ security-level / 14: 3, / secure restricted OS /
/ submods / 20: {
/ first submod, an Android Application /
"Android App Foo" : {
/ security-level / 14: 1 / unrestricted /
},
{::include cddl/examples/submods.diag} / 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element /
"Secure Element Eat" :
/ an embedded EAT, bytes of which are not shown /
h'420123',
/ 3rd submod, information about Linux Android /
"Linux Android": {
/ security-level / 14: 1 / unrestricted /
}
}
}
Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale
B.1. Collision Probability B.1. Collision Probability
This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of
UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of
entities in a particular entity management database. entities in a particular entity management database.
Three different sized databases are considered. The number of Three different sized databases are considered. The number of
skipping to change at page 37, line 5 skipping to change at page 49, line 10
the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated. the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated.
The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving
nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird. nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird.
It is included to round out the analysis. It is included to round out the analysis.
Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and
are not individually connected to the network. They may be connected are not individually connected to the network. They may be connected
to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on. This is to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on. This is
not the same problem as sizing IP addresses. not the same problem as sizing IP addresses.
+---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+ +=========+===========+============+==========+=================+
| People | Devices / | Subsystems / | Database | Database Size | | People | Devices / | Subsystems | Database | Database Size |
| | Person | Device | Portion | | | | Person | / Device | Portion | |
+---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+ +=========+===========+============+==========+=================+
| 10 | 100 | 10 | 10% | trillion | | 10 | 100 | 10 | 10% | trillion |
| billion | | | | (10^12) | | billion | | | | (10^12) |
| 10 | 100,000 | 10 | 10% | quadrillion | +---------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------------+
| billion | | | | (10^15) | | 10 | 100,000 | 10 | 10% | quadrillion |
| 100 | 1,000,000 | 10 | 10% | 100 | | billion | | | | (10^15) |
| billion | | | | quadrillion | +---------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------------+
| | | | | (10^17) | | 100 | 1,000,000 | 10 | 10% | 100 quadrillion |
+---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+ | billion | | | | (10^17) |
+---------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------------+
Table 3
This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the
number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of
people. It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where people. It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where
collisions of the output of hash functions are considered. collisions of the output of hash functions are considered.
The proper formula for the collision calculation is The proper formula for the collision calculation is
p = 1 - e^{-k^2/(2n)} p = 1 - e^{-k^2/(2n)}
skipping to change at page 37, line 44 skipping to change at page 50, line 5
[BirthdayAttack]. [BirthdayAttack].
p = k^2 / 2n p = k^2 / 2n
For this calculation: For this calculation:
p Collision Probability p Collision Probability
n Total population based on number of bits in UEID n Total population based on number of bits in UEID
k Population in a database k Population in a database
+----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+ +=====================+==============+==============+==============+
| Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID | | Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
+----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+ +=====================+==============+==============+==============+
| trillion (10^12) | 2 * 10^-15 | 8 * 10^-35 | 5 * 10^-55 | | trillion (10^12) | 2 * 10^-15 | 8 * 10^-35 | 5 * 10^-55 |
| quadrillion (10^15) | 2 * 10^-09 | 8 * 10^-29 | 5 * 10^-49 | +---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
| 100 quadrillion | 2 * 10^-05 | 8 * 10^-25 | 5 * 10^-45 | | quadrillion (10^15) | 2 * 10^-09 | 8 * 10^-29 | 5 * 10^-49 |
| (10^17) | | | | +---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
+----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+ | 100 quadrillion | 2 * 10^-05 | 8 * 10^-25 | 5 * 10^-45 |
| (10^17) | | | |
+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
Table 4
Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one
year's operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size year's operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size
is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year. is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year.
For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states
per year. Each of those states has the above calculated probability per year. Each of those states has the above calculated probability
of a collision. of a collision.
This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of
the database is completely independent from the previous state. In the database is completely independent from the previous state. In
reality this is unlikely as state changes will be the addition or reality this is unlikely as state changes will be the addition or
skipping to change at page 38, line 26 skipping to change at page 50, line 40
The following tables gives the time interval until there is a The following tables gives the time interval until there is a
probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number
of states per year as the number of records in the database. of states per year as the number of records in the database.
t = 1 / ((k / 10) * p) t = 1 / ((k / 10) * p)
t Time until a collision t Time until a collision
p Collision probability for UEID size p Collision probability for UEID size
k Database size k Database size
+---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+ +=====================+==============+==============+==============+
| Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID | | Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
+---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+ +=====================+==============+==============+==============+
| trillion (10^12) | 60,000 years | 10^24 years | 10^44 years | | trillion (10^12) | 60,000 years | 10^24 years | 10^44 years |
| quadrillion (10^15) | 8 seconds | 10^14 years | 10^34 years | +---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
| 100 quadrillion | 8 | 10^11 years | 10^31 years | | quadrillion (10^15) | 8 seconds | 10^14 years | 10^34 years |
| (10^17) | microseconds | | | +---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
+---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+ | 100 quadrillion | 8 | 10^11 years | 10^31 years |
| (10^17) | microseconds | | |
+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
Table 5
Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement
that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits. that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits.
There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record
databases are not expected in the near future and because this time- databases are not expected in the near future and because this time-
to-collision calculation is a very worst case. A future update of to-collision calculation is a very worst case. A future update of
the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a
requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs. requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs.
skipping to change at page 39, line 34 skipping to change at page 51, line 51
as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware. as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware.
Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts
The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts. The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.
This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see
the significant differences. the significant differences.
C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01
o Added UEID design rationale appendix * Added UEID design rationale appendix
C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00
This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
no new claims have been added. no new claims have been added.
o Separate information and data model using CDDL. * Separate information and data model using CDDL.
o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT * Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT
o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims * Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims
C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01
o Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim * Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim
o Minor spelling and other fixes * Minor spelling and other fixes
o Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim
* Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim
C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02
o Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type * Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type
o UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256. * UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256.
o Added appendix justifying UEID design and size. * Added appendix justifying UEID design and size.
o Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named * Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named
and there can be more tha one of them and there can be more tha one of them
o Lots of fixes to the CDDL * Lots of fixes to the CDDL
o Added security considerations * Added security considerations
C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03
o Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims * Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims
o Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans * Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans
C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04
o Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string * Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string
o CDDL cleaned up some more
o CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs * CDDL cleaned up some more
o CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped * CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs
* CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped
o Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa * Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa
o Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens * Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens
o Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens * Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens
o Add section on key inclusion * Add section on key inclusion
o Add hardware version claims * Add hardware version claims
o Collected CDDL is now filled in. Other CDDL corrections. * Collected CDDL is now filled in. Other CDDL corrections.
o Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not * Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not
extensible extensible
o Security level claim is not extensible * Security level claim is not extensible
o Improve specification of location claim and added a location * Improve specification of location claim and added a location
privacy section privacy section
o Add intended use claim * Add intended use claim
C.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05
* CDDL format issues resolved
* Corrected reference to Location Privacy section
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Giridhar Mandyam Giridhar Mandyam
Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse Drive 5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, California San Diego, California
USA United States of America
Phone: +1 858 651 7200 Phone: +1 858 651 7200
EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com Email: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com
Laurence Lundblade Laurence Lundblade
Security Theory LLC Security Theory LLC
EMail: lgl@island-resort.com Email: lgl@island-resort.com
Miguel Ballesteros Miguel Ballesteros
Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse Drive 5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, California San Diego, California
USA United States of America
Phone: +1 858 651 4299 Phone: +1 858 651 4299
EMail: mballest@qti.qualcomm.com Email: mballest@qti.qualcomm.com
Jeremy O'Donoghue Jeremy O'Donoghue
Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
279 Farnborough Road 279 Farnborough Road
Farnborough GU14 7LS Farnborough
GU14 7LS
United Kingdom United Kingdom
Phone: +44 1252 363189 Phone: +44 1252 363189
EMail: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com Email: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com
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