draft-ietf-rats-eat-06.txt		draft-ietf-rats-eat-07.txt
	RATS Working Group G. Mandyam		RATS Working Group G. Mandyam
	Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Internet-Draft Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade		Intended status: Standards Track L. Lundblade
	Expires: 4 June 2021 Security Theory LLC		Expires: August 7, 2021 Security Theory LLC
	M. Ballesteros		M. Ballesteros
	J. O'Donoghue		J. O'Donoghue
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	1 December 2020		February 03, 2021
	The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)		The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
	draft-ietf-rats-eat-06		draft-ietf-rats-eat-07
	Abstract		Abstract
	An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of		An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of
	claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,		claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,
	typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are		typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are
	used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the		used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the
	entity.		entity.
	An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.		An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 45 ¶
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	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	1.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.2. CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	1.3. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		1.3. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1.4. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		1.4. EAT Operating Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1.5. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		1.5. What is Not Standardized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	1.5.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		1.5.1. Transmission Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	1.5.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		1.5.2. Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.3.1. nonce CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.3.1. nonce CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.4.1. ueid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.4.1. ueid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	3.5. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.5. Origination Claim (origination) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	3.5.1. origination CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.5.1. origination CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.6. OEM Identification by IEEE (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.6.1. oemid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.6.1. oemid CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	3.7. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . . 15		3.7. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . . 14
	3.8. Software Description and Version . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		3.8. Software Description and Version . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . . 17		3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . . 16
	3.9.1. security-level CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		3.9.1. security-level CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	3.10. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		3.10. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	3.10.1. secure-boot CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		3.10.1. secure-boot CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	3.11. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		3.11. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	3.11.1. Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		3.11.1. Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.11.2. Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		3.11.2. Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.11.3. Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.11.3. Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.11.4. Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.11.4. Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.11.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.11.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.11.6. debug-status CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.11.6. debug-status CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	3.12. Including Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		3.12. Including Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	3.13. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		3.13. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	3.13.1. location CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		3.13.1. location CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	3.14. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		3.14. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	3.14.1. uptime CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		3.14.1. uptime CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
			3.14.2. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed) . . . . . . . . . . 22
	3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . . 23		3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . . 23
	3.15.1. intended-use CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		3.15.1. intended-use CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
	3.16. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods) . . . . . . . . 24		3.16. The Profile Claim (profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	3.16.1. Two Types of Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		3.17. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods) . . . . . . . . 24
	3.16.1.1. Non-token Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		3.17.1. Two Types of Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	3.16.1.2. Nested EATs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		3.17.1.1. Non-token Submodules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	3.16.1.3. Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules . . 26		3.17.1.2. Nested EATs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	3.16.2. No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		3.17.1.3. Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules . . 26
	3.16.3. Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		3.17.2. No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	3.16.4. Submodule Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		3.17.3. Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	3.16.5. submods CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		3.17.4. Submodule Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
			3.17.5. submods CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	4. Endorsements and Verification Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		4. Endorsements and Verification Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	5. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		5. Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	5.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.1. List of Profile Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	5.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.1.1. Use of JSON, CBOR or both . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	5.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.1.2. CBOR Map and Array Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	5.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29		5.1.3. CBOR String Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	5.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		5.1.4. COSE/JOSE Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	5.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		5.1.5. COSE/JOSE Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	5.4.1. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		5.1.6. Verification Key Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	5.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		5.1.7. Endorsement Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		5.1.8. Required Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	6.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 38		5.1.9. Prohibited Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	6.2. Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38		5.1.10. Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	6.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . . 38		5.1.11. Refined Claim Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	6.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . . 39		5.1.12. CBOR Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	6.2.3. Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		6. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	6.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 39		6.1. Common CDDL Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	6.2.5. Proprietary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		6.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	6.3. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 40		6.3. JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40		6.3.1. JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	7.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		6.3.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	7.2. Location Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41		6.4. CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		6.4.1. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	8.1. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		6.4.1.1. EAT Constrained Device Serialization . . . . . . 33
	8.1.1. Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		6.5. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	8.2. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	8.3. Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . . . . . . 40
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.2. Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43		7.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . . 40
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45		7.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . . 41
	Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		7.2.3. Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
	A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47		7.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
	A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 47		7.2.5. Proprietary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		7.3. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	B.1. Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
	B.2. No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		8.1. UEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
	Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		8.2. Location Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
	C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		9.1. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		9.1.1. Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		9.2. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
	C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		9.3. Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
	C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
	C.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
			Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
			A.1. Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
			A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels . . 49
			Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
			B.1. Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
			B.2. No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
			Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
			C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
			C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
			C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
			C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
			C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
			C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
			C.7. From draft-ietf-rats-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
			C.8. From draft-ietf-rats-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a		Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a
	remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)		remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)
	device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a		device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a
	server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some		server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some
	characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the		characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the
	device.		device.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 13 ¶
	The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known		The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known
	to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content		to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content
	protection where the relying party wants to know the device will		protection where the relying party wants to know the device will
	protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that		protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that
	might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing		might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing
	corporate data to be accessed by it.		corporate data to be accessed by it.
	The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not		The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not
	limited to the following:		limited to the following:
	* Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)		o Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)
	* Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly		o Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly
	for security-oriented chips		for security-oriented chips
	* Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device		o Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device
	* Configuration and state of the device		o Configuration and state of the device
	* Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS
			o Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS
	location		location
	TODO: mention use for Attestation Evidence and Results.		TODO: mention use for Attestation Evidence and Results.
	1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS		1.1. CWT, JWT and UCCS
	For flexibility and ease of imlpementation in a wide variety of		For flexibility and ease of imlpementation in a wide variety of
	environments, EATs can be either CBOR [RFC7049] or JSON [ECMAScript]		environments, EATs can be either CBOR [RFC8949] or JSON [ECMAScript]
	format. This specification simultaneously describes both formats.		format. This specification simultaneously describes both formats.
	An EAT is either a CWT as defined in [RFC8392], a UCCS as defined in		An EAT is either a CWT as defined in [RFC8392], a UCCS as defined in
	[UCCS.Draft], or a JWT as defined in [RFC7519]. This specification		[UCCS.Draft], or a JWT as defined in [RFC7519]. This specification
	extends those specifications with additional claims for attestation.		extends those specifications with additional claims for attestation.
	The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or		The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or
	JSON format, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT and		JSON format, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT and
	UCCS. Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT. In		UCCS. Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT. In
	some cases it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type). In other		some cases it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type). In other
	cases it may be through use of CBOR tags. There is no fixed		cases it may be through use of CBOR tags. There is no fixed
	mechanism across all use cases.		mechanism across all use cases.
	1.2. CDDL		1.2. CDDL
	This specification uses CDDL, [RFC8610], as the primary formalism to		This specification uses CDDL, [RFC8610], as the primary formalism to
	define each claim. The implementor then interprets the CDDL to come		define each claim. The implementor then interprets the CDDL to come
	to either the CBOR [RFC7049] or JSON [ECMAScript] representation. In		to either the CBOR [RFC8949] or JSON [ECMAScript] representation. In
	the case of JSON, Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed. Additional		the case of JSON, Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed. Additional
	rules are given in Section 5.3.2 of this document where Appendix E is		rules are given in Section 6.3.2 of this document where Appendix E is
	insufficient. (Note that this is not to define a general means to		insufficient. (Note that this is not to define a general means to
	translate between CBOR and JSON, but only to define enough such that		translate between CBOR and JSON, but only to define enough such that
	the claims defined in this document can be rendered unambiguously in		the claims defined in this document can be rendered unambiguously in
	JSON).		JSON).
	The CWT specification was authored before CDDL was available and did		The CWT specification was authored before CDDL was available and did
	not use it. This specification includes a CDDL definition of most of		not use it. This specification includes a CDDL definition of most of
	what is described in [RFC8392].		what is described in [RFC8392].
	1.3. Entity Overview		1.3. Entity Overview
	skipping to change at page 7, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 22 ¶
	In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity		In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity
	create an EAT of the format described in this document. The EAT is		create an EAT of the format described in this document. The EAT is
	always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the		always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the
	manufacturer.		manufacturer.
	In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing that		In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing that
	the signature on the EAT is valid and consistent with data from		the signature on the EAT is valid and consistent with data from
	claims in the EAT. This can happen in many different ways. Here are		claims in the EAT. This can happen in many different ways. Here are
	some examples.		some examples.
	* The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party		o The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party
	gets corresponding key material (e.g. a root certificate) from the		gets corresponding key material (e.g. a root certificate) from the
	manufacturer. The relying party performs the verification.		manufacturer. The relying party performs the verification.
	* The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party		o The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party
	transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the		transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the
	manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims.		manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims.
	* The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps		o The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps
	operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It		operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It
	verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the		verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the
	relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-		relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-
	sign the EAT (with a different signing key).		sign the EAT (with a different signing key).
	All these operating models are supported and there is no preference		All these operating models are supported and there is no preference
	of one over the other. It is important to support this variety of		of one over the other. It is important to support this variety of
	operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for		operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for
	some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation		some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation
	service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In		service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In
	skipping to change at page 9, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 37 ¶
	3. The Claims		3. The Claims
	This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also		This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also
	mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly		mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly
	important for EAT.		important for EAT.
	Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT		Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT
	including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA		including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA
	[IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries.		[IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries.
	* All claims are optional		o All claims are optional
	* No claims are mandatory		o No claims are mandatory
	* All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be		o All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be
	ignored		ignored
	There are no default values or meanings assigned to absent claims		There are no default values or meanings assigned to absent claims
	other than they are not reported. The reason for a claim's absence		other than they are not reported. The reason for a claim's absence
	may be the implementation not supporting the claim, an inability to		may be the implementation not supporting the claim, an inability to
	determine its value, or a preference to report in a different way		determine its value, or a preference to report in a different way
	such as a proprietary claim.		such as a proprietary claim.
	CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim		CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim
	indepdent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the		indepdent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the
	group is a general aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL).		group is a general aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL).
	In the encoding section Section 5, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map		In the encoding section Section 6, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map
	entries and JSON name/value pairs.		entries and JSON name/value pairs.
	TODO: add paragraph here about use for Attestation Evidence and for		TODO: add paragraph here about use for Attestation Evidence and for
	Results.		Results.
	3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti)		3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti)
	CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These are		CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These are
	equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier		equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier
	as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use		as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use
	skipping to change at page 11, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 41 ¶
	UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers		UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers
	and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and		and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and
	systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different		systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different
	protocols and systems. No two products anywhere, even in completely		protocols and systems. No two products anywhere, even in completely
	different industries made by two different manufacturers in two		different industries made by two different manufacturers in two
	different countries should have the same UEID (if they are not global		different countries should have the same UEID (if they are not global
	and universal in this way, then relying parties receiving them will		and universal in this way, then relying parties receiving them will
	have to track other characteristics of the device to keep devices		have to track other characteristics of the device to keep devices
	distinct between manufacturers).		distinct between manufacturers).
	There are privacy considerations for UEID's. See Section 7.1.		There are privacy considerations for UEID's. See Section 8.1.
	The UEID should be permanent. It should never change for a given		The UEID should be permanent. It should never change for a given
	device / entity. In addition, it should not be reprogrammable.		device / entity. In addition, it should not be reprogrammable.
	UEID's are variable length. All implementations MUST be able to		UEID's are variable length. All implementations MUST be able to
	receive UEID's that are 33 bytes long (1 type byte and 256 bits).		receive UEID's that are 33 bytes long (1 type byte and 256 bits).
	The recommended maximum sent is also 33 bytes.		The recommended maximum sent is also 33 bytes.
	When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the		When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the
	following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to		following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to
	accommodate different industries and different manufacturing		accommodate different industries and different manufacturing
	processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types		processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types
	of manufacturer registrations.		of manufacturer registrations.
	Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126].		Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126].
	+======+======+===================================================+		+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
	| Type | Type | Specification |		| Type | Type | Specification |
	| Byte | Name | |		| Byte | Name | |
	+======+======+===================================================+		+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
	| 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128, 192 or 256 bit random number |		| 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128, 192 or 256 bit random number |
	| | | generated once and stored in the device. This |		| | | generated once and stored in the device. This may |
	| | | may be constructed by concatenating enough |		| | | be constructed by concatenating enough identifiers |
	| | | identifiers to make up an equivalent number of |		| | | to make up an equivalent number of random bits and |
	| | | random bits and then feeding the concatenation |		| | | then feeding the concatenation through a |
	| | | through a cryptographic hash function. It may |		| | | cryptographic hash function. It may also be a |
	| | | also be a cryptographic quality random number |		| | | cryptographic quality random number generated once |
	| | | generated once at the beginning of the life of |		| | | at the beginning of the life of the device and |
	| | | the device and stored. It may not be smaller |		| | | stored. It may not be smaller than 128 bits. |
	| | | than 128 bits. |		| 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification |
	+------+------+---------------------------------------------------+		| | EUI | registry. An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or |
	| 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification |		| | | EUI-64 and made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID, |
	| | EUI | registry. An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or |		| | | different registered company identifiers, and some |
	| | | EUI-64 and made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID, |		| | | unique per-device identifier. EUIs are often the |
	| | | different registered company identifiers, and |		| | | same as or similar to MAC addresses. This type |
	| | | some unique per-device identifier. EUIs are |		| | | includes MAC-48, an obsolete name for EUI-48. (Note |
	| | | often the same as or similar to MAC addresses. |		| | | that while devices with multiple network interfaces |
	| | | This type includes MAC-48, an obsolete name for |		| | | may have multiple MAC addresses, there is only one |
	| | | EUI-48. (Note that while devices with multiple |		| | | UEID for a device) [IEEE.802-2001], [OUI.Guide] |
	| | | network interfaces may have multiple MAC |		| 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an |
	| | | addresses, there is only one UEID for a device) |		| | | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial |
	| | | [IEEE.802-2001], [OUI.Guide] |		| | | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL |
	+------+------+---------------------------------------------------+		| | | be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each |
	| 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an |		| | | byte as the digit's value (not the ASCII encoding |
	| | | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial |		| | | of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not |
	| | | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL |		| | | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include |
	| | | be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each |		| | | Luhn checksum or SVN information. [ThreeGPP.IMEI] |
	| | | byte as the digit's value (not the ASCII encoding |		+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
	| | | of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not |
	| | | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include |
	| | | Luhn checksum or SVN information. |
	| | | [ThreeGPP.IMEI] |
	+------+------+---------------------------------------------------+
	Table 1: UEID Composition Types		Table 1: UEID Composition Types
	UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on		UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
	the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.		the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.
	The consumer (the relying party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a		The consumer (the relying party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a
	completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its		completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its
	internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of		internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of
	a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead		a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead
	they should use the oemid claim that is defined elsewhere. The		they should use the oemid claim that is defined elsewhere. The
	reasons for this are:		reasons for this are:
	* UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.		o UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.
	* New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID		o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID
	may be created based on some other manufacturer registration		may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
	scheme.		scheme.
	* Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID		o Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID
	to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can		to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can
	optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type		optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type
	0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is		0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is
	that UEIDs be universally unique.		that UEIDs be universally unique.
	3.4.1. ueid CDDL		3.4.1. ueid CDDL
	ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)		ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)
	ueid-claim = (		ueid-claim = (
	skipping to change at page 14, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 36 ¶
	3.5. Origination Claim (origination)		3.5. Origination Claim (origination)
	TODO: this claim is likely to be dropped in favor of Endorsement		TODO: this claim is likely to be dropped in favor of Endorsement
	identifier and locators.		identifier and locators.
	This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are		This claim describes the parts of the device or entity that are
	creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip		creating the EAT. Often it will be tied back to the device or chip
	manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:		manufacturer. The following table gives some examples:
	+===================+=========================================+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Name | Description |		| Name | Description |
	+===================+=========================================+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE |		| Acme-TEE | The EATs are generated in the TEE authored |
	| | authored and configured by "Acme" |		| | and configured by "Acme" |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------+		| Acme-TPM | The EATs are generated in a TPM manufactured |
	| Acme-TPM | The EATs are generated in a TPM |		| | by "Acme" |
	| | manufactured by "Acme" |		| Acme-Linux-Kernel | The EATs are generated in a Linux kernel |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------+		| | configured and shipped by "Acme" |
	| Acme-Linux-Kernel | The EATs are generated in a Linux |		| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |
	| | kernel configured and shipped by "Acme" |		| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------+		+-------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
	| Acme-TA | The EATs are generated in a Trusted |
	| | Application (TA) authored by "Acme" |
	+-------------------+-----------------------------------------+
	Table 2
	TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI		TODO: consider a more structure approach where the name and the URI
	and other are in separate fields.		and other are in separate fields.
	TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim		TODO: This needs refinement. It is somewhat parallel to issuer claim
	in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.		in CWT in that it describes the authority that created the token.
	3.5.1. origination CDDL		3.5.1. origination CDDL
	origination-claim = (		origination-claim = (
	skipping to change at page 17, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 30 ¶
	3.8. Software Description and Version		3.8. Software Description and Version
	TODO: Add claims that reference CoSWID.		TODO: Add claims that reference CoSWID.
	3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level)		3.9. The Security Level Claim (security-level)
	This claim characterizes the device/entity ability to defend against		This claim characterizes the device/entity ability to defend against
	attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at		attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at
	forging EATs. This is done by defining four security levels as		forging EATs. This is done by defining four security levels as
	described below. This is similar to the key protection types defined		described below. This is similar to the key protection types defined
	by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance [FIDO.Registry]).		by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance [FIDO.Registry].
	These claims describe security environment and countermeasures		These claims describe security environment and countermeasures
	available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key		available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key
	reside and the claims originate.		reside and the claims originate.
	1 - Unrestricted There is some expectation that implementor will		1 - Unrestricted There is some expectation that implementor will
	protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the		protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the
	EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.		EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.
	2- Restricted Entities at this level should not be general-purpose		2- Restricted Entities at this level should not be general-purpose
	skipping to change at page 22, line 11 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 35 ¶
	since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or		since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or
	age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The		age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The
	timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time.		timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time.
	The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time		The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time
	it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set. The		it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set. The
	entity must still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.		entity must still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.
	The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and		The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and
	token creation.		token creation.
	See Section 7.2 below.		See location-related privacy considerations in Section 8.2 below.
	3.13.1. location CDDL		3.13.1. location CDDL
	location-type = {		location-type = {
	latitude => number,		latitude => number,
	longitude => number,		longitude => number,
	? altitude => number,		? altitude => number,
	? accuracy => number,		? accuracy => number,
	? altitude-accuracy => number,		? altitude-accuracy => number,
	? heading => number,		? heading => number,
	? speed => number,		? speed => number,
	? timestamp => ~time-int,		? timestamp => ~time-int,
	? age => uint		? age => uint
	skipping to change at page 23, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 22, line 41 ¶
	The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of		The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of
	seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.		seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.
	3.14.1. uptime CDDL		3.14.1. uptime CDDL
	uptime-claim = (		uptime-claim = (
	uptime => uint		uptime => uint
	)		)
			3.14.2. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed)
			The Boot Seed claim is a random value created at system boot time
			that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot
			sessions. This value is usually public and not protected. It is not
			the same as a seed for a random number generator which must be kept
			secret.
			boot-seed-claim = (
			boot-seed => bytes
			)
	3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use)		3.15. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use)
	EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications.		EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications.
	The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer		The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer
	about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a		about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a
	way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between		way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between
	different ways it uses EAT.		different ways it uses EAT.
	1 - Generic Generic attestation describes an application where the		1 - Generic Generic attestation describes an application where the
	EAT consumer requres the most up-to-date security assessment of		EAT consumer requres the most up-to-date security assessment of
	skipping to change at page 24, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 24, line 9 ¶
	posession of a key. This kind of attestation may be neceesary to		posession of a key. This kind of attestation may be neceesary to
	verify the security state of the entity storing the private key		verify the security state of the entity storing the private key
	used in a PoP application.		used in a PoP application.
	3.15.1. intended-use CDDL		3.15.1. intended-use CDDL
	intended-use-type = &(		intended-use-type = &(
	generic: 1,		generic: 1,
	registration: 2,		registration: 2,
	provisioning: 3,		provisioning: 3,
	csr: 4,		csr: 4,
	pop: 5		pop: 5
	)		)
	intended-use-claim = (		intended-use-claim = (
	intended-use => intended-use-type		intended-use => intended-use-type
			)
			3.16. The Profile Claim (profile)
			The profile claim is a text string that simply gives the name of the
			profile to which the token purports to adhere to. It may name an
			IETF document, some other document or no particular document. There
			is no requirement that the named document be publicly accessible.
			See Section 5 for a detailed description of a profile.
			Note that this named "eat-profile" for JWT and is distinct from the
			already registered "profile" claim in the JWT claims registry.
			profile-claim = (
			profile => tstr
	)		)
	3.16. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods)		3.17. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods)
	Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A		Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A
	mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity		mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity
	submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may		submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may
	have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have		have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have
	one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure		one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure
	Element.		Element.
	The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.		The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule.
	The submods part of a token are in a single map/object with many		The submods part of a token are in a single map/object with many
	entries, one per submodule. There is only one submods map in a		entries, one per submodule. There is only one submods map in a
	token. It is identified by its specific label. It is a peer to		token. It is identified by its specific label. It is a peer to
	other claims, but it is not called a claim because it is a container		other claims, but it is not called a claim because it is a container
	for a claim set rather than an individual claim. This submods part		for a claim set rather than an individual claim. This submods part
	of a token allows what might be called recursion. It allows claim		of a token allows what might be called recursion. It allows claim
	sets inside of claim sets inside of claims sets...		sets inside of claim sets inside of claims sets...
	3.16.1. Two Types of Submodules		3.17.1. Two Types of Submodules
	Each entry in the submod map is one of two types:		Each entry in the submod map is one of two types:
	* A non-token submodule that is a map or object directly containing		o A non-token submodule that is a map or object directly containing
	claims for the submodule.		claims for the submodule.
	* A nested EAT that is a fully formed, independently signed EAT		o A nested EAT that is a fully formed, independently signed EAT
	token		token
	3.16.1.1. Non-token Submodules		3.17.1.1. Non-token Submodules
	This is simply a map or object containing claims about the submodule.		This is simply a map or object containing claims about the submodule.
	It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or		It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or
	superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may		superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may
	have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further		have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further
	subordinate submodule may also have a UEID.		subordinate submodule may also have a UEID.
	It is signed/encrypted along with the rest of the token and thus the		It is signed/encrypted along with the rest of the token and thus the
	claims are secured by the same Attester with the same signing key as		claims are secured by the same Attester with the same signing key as
	the rest of the token.		the rest of the token.
	If a token is in CBOR format (a CWT or a UCCS), all non-token		If a token is in CBOR format (a CWT or a UCCS), all non-token
	submodules must be CBOR format. If a token in in JSON format (a		submodules must be CBOR format. If a token in in JSON format (a
	JWT), all non-token submodules must be in JSON format.		JWT), all non-token submodules must be in JSON format.
	When decoding, this type of submodule is recognized from the other		When decoding, this type of submodule is recognized from the other
	type by being a data item of type map for CBOR or type object for		type by being a data item of type map for CBOR or type object for
	JSON.		JSON.
	3.16.1.2. Nested EATs		3.17.1.2. Nested EATs
	This type of submodule is a fully formed secured EAT as defined in		This type of submodule is a fully formed secured EAT as defined in
	this document except that it MUST NOT be a UCCS or an unsecured JWT.		this document except that it MUST NOT be a UCCS or an unsecured JWT.
	A nested token that is one that is always secured using COSE or JOSE,		A nested token that is one that is always secured using COSE or JOSE,
	usually by an independent Attester. When the surrounding EAT is a		usually by an independent Attester. When the surrounding EAT is a
	CWT or secured JWT, the nested token becomes securely bound with the		CWT or secured JWT, the nested token becomes securely bound with the
	other claims in the surrounding token.		other claims in the surrounding token.
	It is allowed to have a CWT as a submodule in a JWT and vice versa,		It is allowed to have a CWT as a submodule in a JWT and vice versa,
	but this SHOULD be avoided unless necessary.		but this SHOULD be avoided unless necessary.
	3.16.1.2.1. Surrounding EAT is CBOR format		3.17.1.2.1. Surrounding EAT is CBOR format
	They type of an EAT nested in a CWT is determined by whether the CBOR		They type of an EAT nested in a CWT is determined by whether the CBOR
	type is a text string or a byte string. If a text string, then it is		type is a text string or a byte string. If a text string, then it is
	a JWT. If a byte string, then it is a CWT.		a JWT. If a byte string, then it is a CWT.
	A CWT nested in a CBOR-format token is always wrapped by a byte		A CWT nested in a CBOR-format token is always wrapped by a byte
	string for easier handling with standard CBOR decoders and token		string for easier handling with standard CBOR decoders and token
	processing APIs that will typically take a byte buffer as input.		processing APIs that will typically take a byte buffer as input.
	Nested CWTs may be either a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message.		Nested CWTs may be either a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message.
	COSE layers in nested CWT EATs MUST be a COSE_Tagged_Message, never a		COSE layers in nested CWT EATs MUST be a COSE_Tagged_Message, never a
	COSE_Untagged_Message. If a nested EAT has more than one level of		COSE_Untagged_Message. If a nested EAT has more than one level of
	COSE, for example one that is both encrypted and signed, a		COSE, for example one that is both encrypted and signed, a
	COSE_Tagged_message must be used at every level.		COSE_Tagged_message must be used at every level.
	3.16.1.2.2. Surrounding EAT is JSON format		3.17.1.2.2. Surrounding EAT is JSON format
	When a CWT is nested in a JWT, it must be as a 55799 tag in order to		When a CWT is nested in a JWT, it must be as a 55799 tag in order to
	distinguish it from a nested JWT.		distinguish it from a nested JWT.
	When a nested EAT in a JWT is decoded, first remove the base64url		When a nested EAT in a JWT is decoded, first remove the base64url
	encoding. Next, check to see if it starts with the bytes 0xd9d9f7.		encoding. Next, check to see if it starts with the bytes 0xd9d9f7.
	If so, then it is a CWT as a JWT will never start with these four		If so, then it is a CWT as a JWT will never start with these four
	bytes. If not if it is a JWT.		bytes. If not if it is a JWT.
	Other than the 55799 tag requirement, tag usage for CWT's nested in a		Other than the 55799 tag requirement, tag usage for CWT's nested in a
	JSON format token follow the same rules as for CWTs nested in CBOR-		JSON format token follow the same rules as for CWTs nested in CBOR-
	format tokens. It may be a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message		format tokens. It may be a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message
	and COSE_Tagged_Message MUST be used at all COSE layers.		and COSE_Tagged_Message MUST be used at all COSE layers.
	3.16.1.3. Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules		3.17.1.3. Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules
	To incorporate a UCCS token as a submodule, it MUST be as a non-token		To incorporate a UCCS token as a submodule, it MUST be as a non-token
	submodule. This can be accomplished inserting the content of the		submodule. This can be accomplished inserting the content of the
	UCCS Tag into the submodule map. The content of a UCCS tag is		UCCS Tag into the submodule map. The content of a UCCS tag is
	exactly a map of claims as required for a non-token submodule. If		exactly a map of claims as required for a non-token submodule. If
	the UCCS is not a UCCS tag, then it can just be inserted into the		the UCCS is not a UCCS tag, then it can just be inserted into the
	submodule map directly.		submodule map directly.
	The definition of a nested EAT type of submodule is that it is one		The definition of a nested EAT type of submodule is that it is one
	that is secured (signed) by an Attester. Since UCCS tokens are		that is secured (signed) by an Attester. Since UCCS tokens are
	skipping to change at page 26, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 27, line 5 ¶
	To incorporate an Unsecured JWT as a submodule, the null-security		To incorporate an Unsecured JWT as a submodule, the null-security
	JOSE wrapping should be removed. The resulting claims set should be		JOSE wrapping should be removed. The resulting claims set should be
	inserted as a non-token submodule.		inserted as a non-token submodule.
	To incorporate a UCCS token in a surrounding JSON token, the UCCS		To incorporate a UCCS token in a surrounding JSON token, the UCCS
	token claims should be translated from CBOR to JSON. To incorporate		token claims should be translated from CBOR to JSON. To incorporate
	an Unsecured JWT into a surrounding CBOR-format token, the null-		an Unsecured JWT into a surrounding CBOR-format token, the null-
	security JOSE should be removed and the claims translated from JSON		security JOSE should be removed and the claims translated from JSON
	to CBOR.		to CBOR.
	3.16.2. No Inheritance		3.17.2. No Inheritance
	The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the containing		The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the containing
	token. The subordinate modules must explicitly include all of their		token. The subordinate modules must explicitly include all of their
	claims. This is the case even for claims like the nonce and age.		claims. This is the case even for claims like the nonce and age.
	This rule is in place for simplicity. It avoids complex inheritance		This rule is in place for simplicity. It avoids complex inheritance
	rules that might vary from one type of claim to another.		rules that might vary from one type of claim to another.
	3.16.3. Security Levels		3.17.3. Security Levels
	The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always		The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always
	be less than or equal to that of the containing modules in the case		be less than or equal to that of the containing modules in the case
	of non-token submodules. It makes no sense for a module of lesser		of non-token submodules. It makes no sense for a module of lesser
	security to be signing claims of a module of higher security. An		security to be signing claims of a module of higher security. An
	example of this is a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts		example of this is a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts
	(e.g. the high-level OS) of the device.		(e.g. the high-level OS) of the device.
	The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have		The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have
	their own more secure key material. An example of this is an		their own more secure key material. An example of this is an
	embedded secure element.		embedded secure element.
	3.16.4. Submodule Names		3.17.4. Submodule Names
	The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text		The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text
	string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name.		string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name.
	3.16.5. submods CDDL		3.17.5. submods CDDL
	; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer		; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer
	; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to		; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to
	; hold all the submodules.		; hold all the submodules.
	submods-part = (		submods-part = (
	submods => submods-type		submods => submods-type
	)		)
	submods-type = { + submod-type }		submods-type = { + submod-type }
	skipping to change at page 28, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 39 ¶
	submod-name = tstr		submod-name = tstr
	4. Endorsements and Verification Keys		4. Endorsements and Verification Keys
	TODO: fill this section in. It will discuss key IDs, endorsement ID		TODO: fill this section in. It will discuss key IDs, endorsement ID
	and such that are needed as input needed to by the Verifier to verify		and such that are needed as input needed to by the Verifier to verify
	the signature. This will NOT discuss the contents of an Endorsement,		the signature. This will NOT discuss the contents of an Endorsement,
	just and ID/locator.		just and ID/locator.
	5. Encoding		5. Profiles
			This EAT specification does not gaurantee that implementations of it
			will interoperate. The variability in this specification is
			necessary to accommodate the widely varying use cases. An EAT
			profile narrows the specification for a specific use case. An ideal
			EAT profile will gauarantee interoperability.
			The profile can be named in the token using the profile claim
			described in Section 3.16.
			5.1. List of Profile Issues
			The following is a list of EAT, CWT, UCCS, JWS, COSE, JOSE and CBOR
			options that a profile should address.
			5.1.1. Use of JSON, CBOR or both
			The profile should indicate whether the token format should be CBOR,
			JSON, both or even some other encoding. If some other encoding, a
			specification for how the CDDL described here is serialized in that
			encoding is necessary.
			This should be addressed for the top-level token and for any nested
			tokens. For example, a profile might require all nested tokens to be
			of the same encoding of the top level token.
			5.1.2. CBOR Map and Array Encoding
			The profile should indicate whether definite-length arrays/maps,
			indefinite-length arrays/maps or both are allowed. A good default is
			to allow only definite-length arrays/maps.
			An alternate is to allow both definite and indefinite-length arrays/
			maps. The decoder should accept either. Encoders that need to fit
			on very small hardware or be actually implement in hardware can use
			indefinite-length encoding.
			This applies to individual EAT claims, CWT and COSE parts of the
			implementation.
			5.1.3. CBOR String Encoding
			The profile should indicate whether definite-length strings,
			indefinite-length strings or both are allowed. A good default is to
			allow only definite-length strings. As with map and array encoding,
			allowing indefinite-length strings can be beneficial for some smaller
			implementations.
			5.1.4. COSE/JOSE Protection
			COSE and JOSE have several options for signed, MACed and encrypted
			messages. EAT/CWT has the option to have no protection using UCCS
			and JOSE has a NULL protection option. It is possible to implement
			no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then encrypt and so on. All
			combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, CWT and UCCS are allowed by
			EAT.
			The profile should list the protections that must be supported by all
			decoders implementing the profile. The encoders them must implement
			a subset of what is listed for the decoders, perhaps only one.
			Implementations may choose to sign or MAC before encryption so that
			the implementation layer doing the signing or MACing can be the
			smallest. It is often easier to make smaller implementations more
			secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware. The key
			material for a signature or MAC is a private key, while for
			encryption it is likely to be a public key. The key for encryption
			requires less protection.
			5.1.5. COSE/JOSE Algorithms
			The profile document should list the COSE algorithms that a Verifier
			must implement. The Attester will select one of them. Since there
			is no negotiation, the Verifier should implement all algorithms
			listed in the profile.
			5.1.6. Verification Key Identification
			Section Section 4 describes a number of methods for identifying a
			verification key. The profile document should specify one of these
			or one that is not described. The ones described in this document
			are only roughly described. The profile document should go into the
			full detail.
			5.1.7. Endorsement Identification
			Similar to, or perhaps the same as Verification Key Identification,
			the profile may wish to specify how Endorsements are to be
			identified. However note that Endorsement Identification is
			optional, where as key identification is not.
			5.1.8. Required Claims
			The profile can list claims whose absence results in Verification
			failure.
			5.1.9. Prohibited Claims
			The profile can list claims whose presence results in Verification
			failure.
			5.1.10. Additional Claims
			The profile may describe entirely new claims. These claims can be
			required or optional.
			5.1.11. Refined Claim Definition
			The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims. For
			example, it may require altitude in the location claim, or it may
			require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13.
			5.1.12. CBOR Tags
			The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or
			not. Similarly, the profile should specify whether the token should
			be a UCCS tag or not.
			When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE
			tags are used or not. Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used
			in a CWT tag.
			Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying
			protocol identifies the object as an EAT.
			6. Encoding
	This makes use of the types defined in CDDL Appendix D, Standard		This makes use of the types defined in CDDL Appendix D, Standard
	Prelude.		Prelude.
	Some of the CDDL included here is for claims that are defined in CWT		Some of the CDDL included here is for claims that are defined in CWT
	[RFC8392] or JWT [RFC7519] or are in the IANA CWT or JWT registries.		[RFC8392] or JWT [RFC7519] or are in the IANA CWT or JWT registries.
	CDDL was not in use when these claims where defined.		CDDL was not in use when these claims where defined.
	5.1. Common CDDL Types		6.1. Common CDDL Types
	time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows		time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows
	floating-point representation.		floating-point representation.
	string-or-uri = tstr		string-or-uri = tstr
	time-int = #6.1(int)		time-int = #6.1(int)
	5.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims		6.2. CDDL for CWT-defined Claims
	This section provides CDDL for the claims defined in CWT. It is non-		This section provides CDDL for the claims defined in CWT. It is non-
	normative as [RFC8392] is the authoritative definition of these		normative as [RFC8392] is the authoritative definition of these
	claims.		claims.
	$$eat-extension //= (		$$eat-extension //= (
	? issuer => text,		? issuer => text,
	? subject => text,		? subject => text,
	? audience => text,		? audience => text,
	? expiration => time,		? expiration => time,
	skipping to change at page 29, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 32, line 23 ¶
	)		)
	issuer = 1		issuer = 1
	subject = 2		subject = 2
	audience = 3		audience = 3
	expiration = 4		expiration = 4
	not-before = 5		not-before = 5
	issued-at = 6		issued-at = 6
	cwt-id = 7		cwt-id = 7
	5.3. JSON		6.3. JSON
			6.3.1. JSON Labels
	5.3.1. JSON Labels
	ueid /= "ueid"		ueid /= "ueid"
	nonce /= "nonce"		nonce /= "nonce"
	origination /= "origination"		origination /= "origination"
	oemid /= "oemid"		oemid /= "oemid"
	security-level /= "security-level"		security-level /= "security-level"
	secure-boot /= "secure-boot"		secure-boot /= "secure-boot"
	debug-status /= "debug-status"		debug-status /= "debug-status"
	location /= "location"		location /= "location"
	age /= "age"		age /= "age"
	uptime /= "uptime"		uptime /= "uptime"
			profile /= "eat-profile"
			boot-seed /= "bootseed"
	submods /= "submods"		submods /= "submods"
	timestamp /= "timestamp"		timestamp /= "timestamp"
	latitude /= "lat"		latitude /= "lat"
	longitude /= "long"		longitude /= "long"
	altitude /= "alt"		altitude /= "alt"
	accuracy /= "accry"		accuracy /= "accry"
	altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"		altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
	heading /= "heading"		heading /= "heading"
	speed /= "speed"		speed /= "speed"
	5.3.2. JSON Interoperability		6.3.2. JSON Interoperability
	JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the		JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the
	following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:		following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:
	* bstr - must be base64url encoded		o bstr - must be base64url encoded
	* time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of		o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
	[RFC7519].		[RFC7519].
	* string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described		o string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
	section 2 of [RFC7519].		section 2 of [RFC7519].
	5.4. CBOR		6.4. CBOR
	5.4.1. CBOR Interoperability
	Variations in the CBOR serializations supported in CBOR encoding and
	decoding are allowed and suggests that CBOR-based protocols specify
	how this variation is handled. This section specifies what formats
	MUST be supported in order to achieve interoperability.
	The assumption is that the entity is likely to be a constrained
	device and relying party is likely to be a very capable server. The
	approach taken is that the entity generating the token can use
	whatever encoding it wants, specifically encodings that are easier to
	implement such as indefinite lengths. The relying party receiving
	the token must support decoding all encodings.
	These rules cover all types used in the claims in this document.
	They also are recommendations for additional claims.
	Canonical CBOR encoding, Preferred Serialization and
	Deterministically Encoded CBOR are explicitly NOT required as they
	would place an unnecessary burden on the entity implementation,
	particularly if the entity implementation is implemented in hardware.
	* Integer Encoding (major type 0, 1) - The entity may use any
	integer encoding allowed by CBOR. The server MUST accept all
	integer encodings allowed by CBOR.
	* String Encoding (major type 2 and 3) - The entity can use any
	string encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite lengths. It
	may also encode the lengths of strings in any way allowed by CBOR.
	The server must accept all string encodings.
	* Major type 2, bstr, SHOULD have tag 21 to indicate conversion to
	base64url in case that conversion is performed.
	* Map and Array Encoding (major type 4 and 5) - The entity can use
	any array or map encoding allowed by CBOR including indefinite
	lengths. Sorting of map keys is not required. Duplicate map keys
	are not allowed. The server must accept all array and map
	encodings. The server may reject maps with duplicate map keys.
	* Date and Time - The entity should send dates as tag 1 encoded as		6.4.1. CBOR Interoperability
	64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may not send floating-point
	dates. The server must support tag 1 epoch-based dates encoded as
	64-bit or 32-bit integers. The entity may send tag 0 dates,
	however tag 1 is preferred. The server must support tag 0 UTC
	dates.
	* URIs - URIs should be encoded as text strings and marked with tag		CBOR allows data items to be serialized in more than one form. If
	32.		the sender uses a form that the receiver can't decode, there will not
			be interoperability.
	* Floating Point - The entity may use any floating-point encoding.		This specification gives no blanket requirements to narrow CBOR
	The relying party must support decoding of all types of floating-		serialization for all uses of EAT. This allows individual uses to
	point.		tailor serialization to the environment. It also may result in EAT
			implementations that don't interoperate.
	* Other types - Other types like bignums, regular expressions and		One way to guarantee interoperability is to clearly specify CBOR
	such, SHOULD NOT be used. The server MAY support them but is not		serialization in a profile document. See Section 5 for a list of
	required to so interoperability is not guaranteed.		serialization issues that should be addressed.
	5.5. Collected CDDL		EAT will be commonly used where the device generating the attestation
			is constrained and the receiver/verifier of the attestation is a
			capacious server. Following is a set of serialization requirements
			that work well for that use case and are guaranteed to interoperate.
			Use of this serialization is recommended where possible, but not
			required. An EAT profile may just reference the following section
			rather than spell out serialization details.
	; This is the top-level definition of the claims in EAT tokens. To		6.4.1.1. EAT Constrained Device Serialization
	; form an actual EAT Token, this claim set is enclosed in a COSE, JOSE
	; or UCCS message.
	; TO-DO: Add intended-use claim
	eat-claim-set = {		o Preferred serialization described in section 4.1 of [RFC8949] is
	? ueid-claim,		not required. The EAT decoder must accept all forms of number
	? nonce-claim,		serialization. The EAT encoder may use any form it wishes.
	? origination-claim,
	? oemid-claim,
	? hardware-version-claims,
	? security-level-claim,
	? secure-boot-claim,
	? debug-status-claim,
	? location-claim,
	? uptime-claim,
	? submods-part,
	* $$eat-extension,
	}
	; This is the top-level definition of an EAT Token. It is a CWT, JWT		o The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length arrays and maps as
	; or UCSS where the payload is an eat-claim-set. A JWT_Message is what		described in section 3.2.2 of [RFC8949]. The EAT encoder may use
	; is defined by JWT in RFC 7519. (RFC 7519 doesn't use CDDL so a there		indefinite length arrays and maps if it wishes.
	; is no actual CDDL definition of JWT_Message).
	eat-token = EAT_Tagged_Message / EAT_Untagged_Message / JWT_Message		o The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length strings as described
			in section 3.2.3 of [RFC8949]. The EAT encoder may use indefinite
			length strings if it wishes.
	; This is CBOR-format EAT token in the CWT or UCCS format that is a		o Sorting of maps by key is not required. The EAT decoder must not
	; tag. COSE_Tagged_message is defined in RFC 8152. Tag 601 is		rely on sorting.
	; proposed by the UCCS draft, but not yet assigned.
	EAT_Tagged_Message = #6.61(COSE_Tagged_Message) / #6.601(eat-claim-set)		o Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8949] is
			not required.
	; This is a CBOR-format EAT token that is a CWT or UCSS that is not a		o Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must be
	; tag COSE_Tagged_message and COSE_Untagged_Message are defined in RFC		followed. The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels
	; 8152.		or invalid UTF-8 strings.
	EAT_Untagged_Message = COSE_Tagged_Message / COSE_Untagged_Message / UCCS_Untagged_Message		6.5. Collected CDDL
	; This is an "unwrapped" UCCS tag. Unwrapping a tag means to use the
	; definition of its content without the preceding type 6 tag
	; integer. Since a UCCS is nothing but a tag for an unsecured CWT
	; claim set, unwrapping reduces to a bare eat-claim-set.
	UCCS_Untagged_Message = eat-claim-set		; This is the top-level definition of the claims in EAT tokens. To
			; form an actual EAT Token, this claim set is enclosed in a COSE, JOSE
			; or UCCS message.
	; The following Claim Keys (labels) are temporary. They are not		eat-claim-set = {
	; assigned by IANA		? ueid-claim,
			? nonce-claim,
			? origination-claim,
			? oemid-claim,
			? hardware-version-claims,
			? security-level-claim,
			? secure-boot-claim,
			? debug-status-claim,
			? location-claim,
			? profile-claim,
			? uptime-claim,
			? boot-seed-claim,
			? submods-part,
			* $$eat-extension,
			}
	nonce = 10		; This is the top-level definition of an EAT Token. It is a CWT, JWT
	ueid = 11		; or UCSS where the payload is an eat-claim-set. A JWT_Message is what
	origination = 12		; is defined by JWT in RFC 7519. (RFC 7519 doesn't use CDDL so a there
	oemid = 13		; is no actual CDDL definition of JWT_Message).
	security-level = 14
	secure-boot = 15
	debug-status = 16
	location = 17
	uptime = 19
	submods = 20
	chip-version = 21		eat-token = EAT_Tagged_Message / EAT_Untagged_Message / JWT_Message
	board-version = 22
	device-version = 23
	chip-version-scheme = 24
	board-version-scheme = 25
	device-version-scheme = 26
	ean-chip-version = 27
	ean-board-version = 28
	ean-device-version = 29
	string-or-uri = tstr		; This is CBOR-format EAT token in the CWT or UCCS format that is a
			; tag. COSE_Tagged_message is defined in RFC 8152. Tag 601 is
			; proposed by the UCCS draft, but not yet assigned.
	time-int = #6.1(int)		EAT_Tagged_Message = #6.61(COSE_Tagged_Message) / #6.601(eat-claim-set)
	$$eat-extension //= (		; This is a CBOR-format EAT token that is a CWT or UCSS that is not a
	? issuer => text,		; tag COSE_Tagged_message and COSE_Untagged_Message are defined in RFC
	? subject => text,		; 8152.
	? audience => text,
	? expiration => time,
	? not-before => time,
	? issued-at => time,
	? cwt-id => bytes,
	)
	issuer = 1		EAT_Untagged_Message = COSE_Tagged_Message /
	subject = 2		COSE_Untagged_Message /
	audience = 3		UCCS_Untagged_Message
	expiration = 4
	not-before = 5
	issued-at = 6
	cwt-id = 7
	debug-status-type = &(		; This is an "unwrapped" UCCS tag. Unwrapping a tag means to use the
	enabled: 0,		; definition of its content without the preceding type 6 tag
	disabled: 1,		; integer. Since a UCCS is nothing but a tag for an unsecured CWT
	disabled-since-boot: 2,		; claim set, unwrapping reduces to a bare eat-claim-set.
	disabled-permanently: 3,
	disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
	)
	debug-status-claim = (		UCCS_Untagged_Message = eat-claim-set
	debug-status => debug-status-type
	)
	location-type = {		; The following Claim Keys (labels) are temporary. They are not
	latitude => number,		; assigned by IANA
	longitude => number,
	? altitude => number,
	? accuracy => number,
	? altitude-accuracy => number,
	? heading => number,
	? speed => number,
	? timestamp => ~time-int,
	? age => uint
	}
	latitude = 1		nonce = 10
	longitude = 2		ueid = 11
	altitude = 3		origination = 12
	accuracy = 4		oemid = 13
	altitude-accuracy = 5		security-level = 14
	heading = 6		secure-boot = 15
	speed = 7		debug-status = 16
	timestamp = 8		location = 17
	age = 9		profile = 18
			uptime = 19
			submods = 20
			boot-seed = 21
	location-claim = (		chip-version = 21
	location => location-type		board-version = 22
	)		device-version = 23
			chip-version-scheme = 24
			board-version-scheme = 25
			device-version-scheme = 26
			ean-chip-version = 27
			ean-board-version = 28
			ean-device-version = 29
			string-or-uri = tstr
			time-int = #6.1(int)
			$$eat-extension //= (
			? issuer => text,
			? subject => text,
			? audience => text,
			? expiration => time,
			? not-before => time,
			? issued-at => time,
			? cwt-id => bytes,
			)
	nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)		issuer = 1
			subject = 2
			audience = 3
			expiration = 4
			not-before = 5
			issued-at = 6
			cwt-id = 7
	nonce-claim = (		debug-status-type = &(
	nonce => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ]		enabled: 0,
	)		disabled: 1,
			disabled-since-boot: 2,
			disabled-permanently: 3,
			disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
			)
	oemid-claim = (		debug-status-claim = (
	oemid => bstr		debug-status => debug-status-type
	)		)
			location-type = {
			latitude => number,
			longitude => number,
			? altitude => number,
			? accuracy => number,
			? altitude-accuracy => number,
			? heading => number,
			? speed => number,
			? timestamp => ~time-int,
			? age => uint
			}
	; copied from CoSWID		latitude = 1
	; TODO: how to properly make reference to CoSWID and have tool validate		longitude = 2
			altitude = 3
			accuracy = 4
			altitude-accuracy = 5
			heading = 6
			speed = 7
			timestamp = 8
			age = 9
	$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric		location-claim = (
	$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix		location => location-type
	$version-scheme /= alphanumeric		)
	$version-scheme /= decimal		nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)
	$version-scheme /= semver
	$version-scheme /= uint / text
	multipartnumeric = 1
	multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
	alphanumeric = 3
	decimal = 4
	semver = 16384
	chip-version-claim = (		nonce-claim = (
	chip-version => tstr		nonce => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ]
	)		)
			oemid-claim = (
			oemid => bstr
			)
			; copied from CoSWID
			; TODO: how to properly make reference to CoSWID and have tool validate
	chip-version-scheme-claim = (		$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric
	chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme		$version-scheme /= multipartnumeric-suffix
	)		$version-scheme /= alphanumeric
			$version-scheme /= decimal
			$version-scheme /= semver
			$version-scheme /= uint / text
			multipartnumeric = 1
			multipartnumeric-suffix = 2
			alphanumeric = 3
			decimal = 4
			semver = 16384
	board-version-claim = (		chip-version-claim = (
	board-version => tstr		chip-version => tstr
	)		)
	board-version-scheme-claim = (		chip-version-scheme-claim = (
	board-version-scheme => $version-scheme		chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme
	)		)
	device-version-claim = (		board-version-claim = (
	device-version => tstr		board-version => tstr
	)		)
	device-version-scheme-claim = (		board-version-scheme-claim = (
	device-version-scheme => $version-scheme		board-version-scheme => $version-scheme
	)		)
	ean-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
	ean-chip-version-claim = (		device-version-claim = (
	ean-chip-version => ean-type		device-version => tstr
	)
	ean-board-version-claim = (		)
	ean-board-version => ean-type
	)
	ean-device-version-claim = (		device-version-scheme-claim = (
	ean-device-version => ean-type		device-version-scheme => $version-scheme
	)		)
	hardware-version-claims = (		ean-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
	? chip-version-claim,
	? board-version-claim,
	? device-version-claim,
	? chip-version-scheme-claim,
	? board-version-scheme-claim,
	? device-version-scheme-claim,
	? ean-chip-version-claim,
	? ean-board-version-claim,
	? ean-device-version-claim,
	)
	origination-claim = (		ean-chip-version-claim = (
	origination => string-or-uri		ean-chip-version => ean-type
	)		)
	secure-boot-claim = (		ean-board-version-claim = (
	secure-boot => bool		ean-board-version => ean-type
	)		)
	security-level-type = &(		ean-device-version-claim = (
	unrestricted: 1,		ean-device-version => ean-type
	restricted: 2,		)
	secure-restricted: 3,
	hardware: 4
	)
	security-level-claim = (		hardware-version-claims = (
	security-level => security-level-type		? chip-version-claim,
	)		? board-version-claim,
			? device-version-claim,
			? chip-version-scheme-claim,
			? board-version-scheme-claim,
			? device-version-scheme-claim,
			? ean-chip-version-claim,
			? ean-board-version-claim,
			? ean-device-version-claim,
			)
	; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer		origination-claim = (
	; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to		origination => string-or-uri
	; hold all the submodules.		)
			secure-boot-claim = (
			secure-boot => bool
			)
			security-level-type = &(
			unrestricted: 1,
			restricted: 2,
			secure-restricted: 3,
			hardware: 4
			)
	submods-part = (		security-level-claim = (
	submods => submods-type		security-level => security-level-type
	)
	submods-type = { + submod-type }		)
			; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer
			; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to
			; hold all the submodules.
	; The type of a submodule which can either be a nested claim set or a		submods-part = (
	; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in a bstr		submods => submods-type
	; or a tstr.		)
	submod-type = (		submods-type = { + submod-type }
	submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token
	)
	; When this is a bstr, the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS		; The type of a submodule which can either be a nested claim set or a
	; format. When this is a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT		; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in a bstr
	; format.		; or a tstr.
	nested-token = bstr / tstr;		submod-type = (
			submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token
			)
	; Each submodule has a unique text string name.		; When this is a bstr, the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS
			; format. When this is a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT
			; format.
	submod-name = tstr		nested-token = bstr / tstr;
	ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)		; Each submodule has a unique text string name.
	ueid-claim = (		submod-name = tstr
	ueid => ueid-type
	)
	uptime-claim = (		ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)
	uptime => uint
	)
	ueid /= "ueid"		ueid-claim = (
	nonce /= "nonce"		ueid => ueid-type
	origination /= "origination"		)
	oemid /= "oemid"		uptime-claim = (
	security-level /= "security-level"		uptime => uint
	secure-boot /= "secure-boot"		)
	debug-status /= "debug-status"		profile-claim = (
	location /= "location"		profile => tstr
	age /= "age"		)
	uptime /= "uptime"		boot-seed-claim = (
	submods /= "submods"		boot-seed => bytes
	timestamp /= "timestamp"		)
			ueid /= "ueid"
			nonce /= "nonce"
			origination /= "origination"
			oemid /= "oemid"
			security-level /= "security-level"
			secure-boot /= "secure-boot"
			debug-status /= "debug-status"
			location /= "location"
			age /= "age"
			uptime /= "uptime"
			profile /= "eat-profile"
			boot-seed /= "bootseed"
			submods /= "submods"
			timestamp /= "timestamp"
	latitude /= "lat"		latitude /= "lat"
	longitude /= "long"		longitude /= "long"
	altitude /= "alt"		altitude /= "alt"
	accuracy /= "accry"		accuracy /= "accry"
	altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"		altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
	heading /= "heading"		heading /= "heading"
	speed /= "speed"		speed /= "speed"
	6. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	6.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry		7.1. Reuse of CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry
	Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT		Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT
	Claims Registry is re used. No new IANA registry is created. All		Claims Registry is re used. No new IANA registry is created. All
	EAT claims should be registered in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries.		EAT claims should be registered in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries.
	6.2. Claim Characteristics		7.2. Claim Characteristics
	The following is design guidance for creating new EAT claims,		The following is design guidance for creating new EAT claims,
	particularly those to be registered with IANA.		particularly those to be registered with IANA.
	Much of this guidance is generic and could also be considered when		Much of this guidance is generic and could also be considered when
	designing new CWT or JWT claims.		designing new CWT or JWT claims.
	6.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation		7.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation
	It is a broad goal that EATs can be processed by relying parties in a		It is a broad goal that EATs can be processed by relying parties in a
	general way regardless of the type, manufacturer or technology of the		general way regardless of the type, manufacturer or technology of the
	device from which they originate. It is a goal that there be		device from which they originate. It is a goal that there be
	general-purpose verification implementations that can verify tokens		general-purpose verification implementations that can verify tokens
	for large numbers of use cases with special cases and configurations		for large numbers of use cases with special cases and configurations
	for different device types. This is a goal of interoperability of		for different device types. This is a goal of interoperability of
	the semantics of claims themselves, not just of the signing, encoding		the semantics of claims themselves, not just of the signing, encoding
	and serialization formats.		and serialization formats.
	This is a lofty goal and difficult to achieve broadly requiring		This is a lofty goal and difficult to achieve broadly requiring
	careful definition of claims in a technology neutral way. Sometimes		careful definition of claims in a technology neutral way. Sometimes
	it will be difficult to design a claim that can represent the		it will be difficult to design a claim that can represent the
	semantics of data from very different device types. However, the		semantics of data from very different device types. However, the
	goal remains even when difficult.		goal remains even when difficult.
	6.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral		7.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral
	Claims should be defined such that they are not specific to an		Claims should be defined such that they are not specific to an
	operating system. They should be applicable to multiple large high-		operating system. They should be applicable to multiple large high-
	level operating systems from different vendors. They should also be		level operating systems from different vendors. They should also be
	applicable to multiple small embedded operating systems from multiple		applicable to multiple small embedded operating systems from multiple
	vendors and everything in between.		vendors and everything in between.
	Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a SW		Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a SW
	environment or programming language.		environment or programming language.
	Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a chip or		Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a chip or
	particular hardware. For example, they should not just be the		particular hardware. For example, they should not just be the
	contents of some HW status register as it is unlikely that the same		contents of some HW status register as it is unlikely that the same
	HW status register with the same bits exists on a chip of a different		HW status register with the same bits exists on a chip of a different
	manufacturer.		manufacturer.
	The boot and debug state claims in this document are an example of a		The boot and debug state claims in this document are an example of a
	claim that has been defined in this neutral way.		claim that has been defined in this neutral way.
	6.2.3. Security Level Neutral		7.2.3. Security Level Neutral
	Many use cases will have EATs generated by some of the most secure		Many use cases will have EATs generated by some of the most secure
	hardware and software that exists. Secure Elements and smart cards		hardware and software that exists. Secure Elements and smart cards
	are examples of this. However, EAT is intended for use in low-		are examples of this. However, EAT is intended for use in low-
	security use cases the same as high-security use case. For example,		security use cases the same as high-security use case. For example,
	an app on a mobile device may generate EATs on its own.		an app on a mobile device may generate EATs on its own.
	Claims should be defined and registered on the basis of whether they		Claims should be defined and registered on the basis of whether they
	are useful and interoperable, not based on security level. In		are useful and interoperable, not based on security level. In
	particular, there should be no exclusion of claims because they are		particular, there should be no exclusion of claims because they are
	just used only in low-security environments.		just used only in low-security environments.
	6.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats		7.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats
	Where possible, claims should use already standardized data items,		Where possible, claims should use already standardized data items,
	identifiers and formats. This takes advantage of the expertise put		identifiers and formats. This takes advantage of the expertise put
	into creating those formats and improves interoperability.		into creating those formats and improves interoperability.
	Often extant claims will not be defined in an encoding or		Often extant claims will not be defined in an encoding or
	serialization format used by EAT. It is preferred to define a CBOR		serialization format used by EAT. It is preferred to define a CBOR
	and JSON format for them so that EAT implementations do not require a		and JSON format for them so that EAT implementations do not require a
	plethora of encoders and decoders for serialization formats.		plethora of encoders and decoders for serialization formats.
	In some cases, it may be better to use the encoding and serialization		In some cases, it may be better to use the encoding and serialization
	as is. For example, signed X.509 certificates and CRLs can be		as is. For example, signed X.509 certificates and CRLs can be
	carried as-is in a byte string. This retains interoperability with		carried as-is in a byte string. This retains interoperability with
	the extensive infrastructure for creating and processing X.509		the extensive infrastructure for creating and processing X.509
	certificates and CRLs.		certificates and CRLs.
	6.2.5. Proprietary Claims		7.2.5. Proprietary Claims
	EAT allows the definition and use of proprietary claims.		EAT allows the definition and use of proprietary claims.
	For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with		For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with
	proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service		proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service
	offered by that device manufacturer. This is a supported use case.		offered by that device manufacturer. This is a supported use case.
	In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious		In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious
	way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general		way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general
	standardized claims is preferred.		standardized claims is preferred.
	6.3. Claims Registered by This Document		7.3. Claims Registered by This Document
	* Claim Name: UEID		o Claim Name: UEID
	* Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID		o Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID
	* JWT Claim Name: N/A		o JWT Claim Name: N/A
	* Claim Key: 8		o Claim Key: 8
	* Claim Value Type(s): byte string		o Claim Value Type(s): byte string
	* Change Controller: IESG		o Change Controller: IESG
	* Specification Document(s): *this document*		o Specification Document(s): *this document*
	TODO: add the rest of the claims in here		TODO: add the rest of the claims in here
	7. Privacy Considerations		8. Privacy Considerations
	Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and		Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and
	therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-		therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-
	preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.		preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.
	Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's		Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's
	provided to unauthenticated consumers.		provided to unauthenticated consumers.
	7.1. UEID Privacy Considerations		8.1. UEID Privacy Considerations
	A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties		A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties
	that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be		that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be
	able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to		able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to
	track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates		track the device. Thus, in many usage situations ueid violates
	governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will		governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations UEID will
	not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy		not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy
	for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not		for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not
	have a UEID for these reasons.		have a UEID for these reasons.
	There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put		There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put
	UEID's in tokens:		UEID's in tokens:
	* The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device		o The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device
	to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be		to use the UEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be
	through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some		through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some
	online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a		online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a
	UEID.		UEID.
	* The UEID is used only in a particular context or particular use		o The UEID is used only in a particular context or particular use
	case. It is used only by one relying party.		case. It is used only by one relying party.
	* The device authenticates the relying party and generates a derived		o The device authenticates the relying party and generates a derived
	UEID just for that particular relying party. For example, the		UEID just for that particular relying party. For example, the
	relying party could prove their identity cryptographically to the		relying party could prove their identity cryptographically to the
	device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying		device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying
	party by hashing a proofed relying party ID with the main device		party by hashing a proofed relying party ID with the main device
	UEID.		UEID.
	Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in		Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in
	multiple UEIDs per device. Each UEID is used in a different context,		multiple UEIDs per device. Each UEID is used in a different context,
	use case or system on the device. However, from the view of the		use case or system on the device. However, from the view of the
	relying party, there is just one UEID and it is still globally		relying party, there is just one UEID and it is still globally
	universal across manufacturers.		universal across manufacturers.
	7.2. Location Privacy Considerations		8.2. Location Privacy Considerations
	Geographic location is most always considered personally identifiable		Geographic location is most always considered personally identifiable
	information. Implementers should consider laws and regulations		information. Implementers should consider laws and regulations
	governing the transmission of location data from end user devices to		governing the transmission of location data from end user devices to
	servers and services. Implementers should consider using location		servers and services. Implementers should consider using location
	management facilities offered by the operating system on the device		management facilities offered by the operating system on the device
	generating the attestation. For example, many mobile phones prompt		generating the attestation. For example, many mobile phones prompt
	the user for permission when before sending location data.		the user for permission when before sending location data.
	8. Security Considerations		9. Security Considerations
	The security considerations provided in Section 8 of [RFC8392] and		The security considerations provided in Section 8 of [RFC8392] and
	Section 11 of [RFC7519] apply to EAT in its CWT and JWT form,		Section 11 of [RFC7519] apply to EAT in its CWT and JWT form,
	respectively. In addition, implementors should consider the		respectively. In addition, implementors should consider the
	following.		following.
	8.1. Key Provisioning		9.1. Key Provisioning
	Private key material can be used to sign and/or encrypt the EAT, or		Private key material can be used to sign and/or encrypt the EAT, or
	can be used to derive the keys used for signing and/or encryption.		can be used to derive the keys used for signing and/or encryption.
	In some instances, the manufacturer of the entity may create the key		In some instances, the manufacturer of the entity may create the key
	material separately and provision the key material in the entity		material separately and provision the key material in the entity
	itself. The manfuacturer of any entity that is capable of producing		itself. The manfuacturer of any entity that is capable of producing
	an EAT should take care to ensure that any private key material be		an EAT should take care to ensure that any private key material be
	suitably protected prior to provisioning the key material in the		suitably protected prior to provisioning the key material in the
	entity itself. This can require creation of key material in an		entity itself. This can require creation of key material in an
	enclave (see [RFC4949] for definition of "enclave"), secure		enclave (see [RFC4949] for definition of "enclave"), secure
	transmission of the key material from the enclave to the entity using		transmission of the key material from the enclave to the entity using
	an appropriate protocol, and persistence of the private key material		an appropriate protocol, and persistence of the private key material
	in some form of secure storage to which (preferably) only the entity		in some form of secure storage to which (preferably) only the entity
	has access.		has access.
	8.1.1. Transmission of Key Material		9.1.1. Transmission of Key Material
	Regarding transmission of key material from the enclave to the		Regarding transmission of key material from the enclave to the
	entity, the key material may pass through one or more intermediaries.		entity, the key material may pass through one or more intermediaries.
	Therefore some form of protection ("key wrapping") may be necessary.		Therefore some form of protection ("key wrapping") may be necessary.
	The transmission itself may be performed electronically, but can also		The transmission itself may be performed electronically, but can also
	be done by human courier. In the latter case, there should be		be done by human courier. In the latter case, there should be
	minimal to no exposure of the key material to the human (e.g.		minimal to no exposure of the key material to the human (e.g.
	encrypted portable memory). Moreover, the human should transport the		encrypted portable memory). Moreover, the human should transport the
	key material directly from the secure enclave where it was created to		key material directly from the secure enclave where it was created to
	a destination secure enclave where it can be provisioned.		a destination secure enclave where it can be provisioned.
	8.2. Transport Security		9.2. Transport Security
	As stated in Section 8 of [RFC8392], "The security of the CWT relies		As stated in Section 8 of [RFC8392], "The security of the CWT relies
	upon on the protections offered by COSE". Similar considerations		upon on the protections offered by COSE". Similar considerations
	apply to EAT when sent as a CWT. However, EAT introduces the concept		apply to EAT when sent as a CWT. However, EAT introduces the concept
	of a nonce to protect against replay. Since an EAT may be created by		of a nonce to protect against replay. Since an EAT may be created by
	an entity that may not support the same type of transport security as		an entity that may not support the same type of transport security as
	the consumer of the EAT, intermediaries may be required to bridge		the consumer of the EAT, intermediaries may be required to bridge
	communications between the entity and consumer. As a result, it is		communications between the entity and consumer. As a result, it is
	RECOMMENDED that both the consumer create a nonce, and the entity		RECOMMENDED that both the consumer create a nonce, and the entity
	leverage the nonce along with COSE mechanisms for encryption and/or		leverage the nonce along with COSE mechanisms for encryption and/or
	signing to create the EAT.		signing to create the EAT.
	Similar considerations apply to the use of EAT as a JWT. Although		Similar considerations apply to the use of EAT as a JWT. Although
	the security of a JWT leverages the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and		the security of a JWT leverages the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and
	JSON Web Signature (JWS) specifications, it is still recommended to		JSON Web Signature (JWS) specifications, it is still recommended to
	make use of the EAT nonce.		make use of the EAT nonce.
	8.3. Multiple EAT Consumers		9.3. Multiple EAT Consumers
	In many cases, more than one EAT consumer may be required to fully		In many cases, more than one EAT consumer may be required to fully
	verify the entity attestation. Examples include individual consumers		verify the entity attestation. Examples include individual consumers
	for nested EATs, or consumers for individual claims with an EAT.		for nested EATs, or consumers for individual claims with an EAT.
	When multiple consumers are required for verification of an EAT, it		When multiple consumers are required for verification of an EAT, it
	is important to minimize information exposure to each consumer. In		is important to minimize information exposure to each consumer. In
	addition, the communication between multiple consumers should be		addition, the communication between multiple consumers should be
	secure.		secure.
	For instance, consider the example of an encrypted and signed EAT		For instance, consider the example of an encrypted and signed EAT
	skipping to change at page 43, line 36 ¶		skipping to change at page 45, line 36 ¶
	subsets to any downstream consumer should leverage a secure protocol		subsets to any downstream consumer should leverage a secure protocol
	(e.g.one that uses transport-layer security, i.e. TLS),		(e.g.one that uses transport-layer security, i.e. TLS),
	However, assume the EAT of the previous example is hierarchical and		However, assume the EAT of the previous example is hierarchical and
	each claim subset for a downstream consumer is created in the form of		each claim subset for a downstream consumer is created in the form of
	a nested EAT. Then transport security between the receiving and		a nested EAT. Then transport security between the receiving and
	downstream consumers is not strictly required. Nevertheless,		downstream consumers is not strictly required. Nevertheless,
	downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to		downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to
	the EAT they are consuming.		the EAT they are consuming.
	9. References		10. References
	9.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[CoSWID] "Concise Software Identification Tags", November 2020,		[CoSWID] "Concise Software Identification Tags", November 2020,
	<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-16>.		<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-16>.
	[EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",		[EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",
	2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.		2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.
	[FIDO.AROE]		[FIDO.AROE]
	The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted		The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted
	Operating Environments List", November 2019,		Operating Environments List", November 2019,
	skipping to change at page 44, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 46, line 18 ¶
	[IANA.JWT.Claims]		[IANA.JWT.Claims]
	IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims",		IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims",
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.		<https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
	Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
	October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
	[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,		[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
	[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,		(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
	[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-		[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
	Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",		Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
	skipping to change at page 45, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 47, line 10 ¶
	Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to		Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
	Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and		Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
	JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,		JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
	June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.		June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
	[RFC8747] Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.		[RFC8747] Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
	Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR		Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
	Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March		Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March
	2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.		2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.
			[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
			Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
	[ThreeGPP.IMEI]		[ThreeGPP.IMEI]
	3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical		3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
	Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering,		Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering,
	addressing and identification", 2019,		addressing and identification", 2019,
	<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/		<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
	SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.		SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.
	[TIME_T] The Open Group Base Specifications, "Vol. 1: Base
	Definitions, Issue 7", Section 4.15 'Seconds Since the
	Epoch', IEEE Std 1003.1, 2013 Edition, 2013,
	<http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
	V1_chap04.html#tag_04_15>.
	[UCCS.Draft]		[UCCS.Draft]
	Birkholz, H., "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims		Birkholz, H., "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims
	Sets", 2020,		Sets", 2020,
	<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-uccs-01>.		<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-uccs-01>.
	[WGS84] National Imagery and Mapping Agency, "National Imagery and		[WGS84] National Imagery and Mapping Agency, "National Imagery and
	Mapping Agency Technical Report 8350.2, Third Edition",		Mapping Agency Technical Report 8350.2, Third Edition",
	2000, <http://earth-		2000, <http://earth-
	info.nga.mil/GandG/publications/tr8350.2/wgs84fin.pdf>.		info.nga.mil/GandG/publications/tr8350.2/wgs84fin.pdf>.
	9.2. Informative References		10.2. Informative References
	[ASN.1] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
	Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
	Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
	Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
	X.690, 1994.
	[BirthdayAttack]		[BirthdayAttack]
	"Birthday attack",		"Birthday attack",
	<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>.		<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>.
	[Common.Criteria]		[Common.Criteria]
	"Common Criteria for Information Technology Security		"Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
	Evaluation", April 2017,		Evaluation", April 2017,
	<https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>.		<https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>.
	skipping to change at page 46, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 48, line 5 ¶
	"Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,		"Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
	5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,		5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,
	<http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-		<http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-
	262.pdf>.		262.pdf>.
	[FIDO.Registry]		[FIDO.Registry]
	The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Registry of Predefined Values",		The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Registry of Predefined Values",
	December 2019, <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-		December 2019, <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-
	specs/fido-registry-v2.1-ps-20191217.html>.		specs/fido-registry-v2.1-ps-20191217.html>.
	[FIPS-140] National Institue of Standards, "Security Requirements for		[FIPS-140]
			National Institue of Standards, "Security Requirements for
	Cryptographic Modules", May 2001,		Cryptographic Modules", May 2001,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/		<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/
	final>.		final>.
	[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",		[IDevID] "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",
	December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/		December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
	standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.		standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
	[IEEE.802-2001]		[IEEE.802-2001]
	"IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks		"IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks
	skipping to change at page 47, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 5 ¶
	[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",		[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
	FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,		FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
	[W3C.GeoLoc]		[W3C.GeoLoc]
	Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification		Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
	2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/		2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
	geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.		geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.
	[Webauthn] Worldwide Web Consortium, "Web Authentication: A Web API
	for accessing scoped credentials", 2016.
	Appendix A. Examples		Appendix A. Examples
	A.1. Very Simple EAT		A.1. Very Simple EAT
	This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by		This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by
	COSE is shown.		COSE is shown.
	{		{
	/ issuer / 1: "joe",		/ issuer / 1: "joe",
	/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',		/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
	/ UEID / 11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2fa',		/ UEID / 11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
	/ secure-boot / 15: true,		/ secure-boot / 15: true,
	/ debug-disable / 16: 3, / permanent-disable /		/ debug-disable / 16: 3, / permanent-disable /
	/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894),		/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894),
	/ chip-version / 21: "1.4a",		/ chip-version / 21: "1.4a",
	/ chip-version-scheme / 24: 2 / multipartnumeric+suffix /		/ chip-version-scheme / 24: 2 / multipartnumeric+suffix /
	}		}
	A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels		A.2. Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels
	{
	/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
	/ UEID / 11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea4fe2fa',
	/ secure-boot / 15: true,
	/ debug-disable / 16: 3, / permanent-disable /
	/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894),
	/ security-level / 14: 3, / secure restricted OS /
	/ submods / 20: {
	/ first submod, an Android Application /
	"Android App Foo" : {
	/ security-level / 14: 1 / unrestricted /
	},
	/ 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element /		{
	"Secure Element Eat" :		/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
	/ an embedded EAT, bytes of which are not shown /		/ UEID / 11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea'
	h'420123',		/ secure-boot / 15: true,
			/ debug-disable / 16: 3, / permanent-disable /
			/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1(1526542894),
			/ security-level / 14: 3, / secure restricted OS /
			/ submods / 20: {
			/ first submod, an Android Application /
			"Android App Foo" : {
			/ security-level / 14: 1 / unrestricted /
			},
	/ 3rd submod, information about Linux Android /		/ 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element /
	"Linux Android": {		"Secure Element Eat" :
	/ security-level / 14: 1 / unrestricted /		/ an embedded EAT, bytes of which are not shown /
	}		h'420123',
	}
	}		/ 3rd submod, information about Linux Android /
			"Linux Android": {
			/ security-level / 14: 1 / unrestricted /
			}
			}
			}
	Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale		Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale
	B.1. Collision Probability		B.1. Collision Probability
	This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of		This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of
	UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of		UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of
	entities in a particular entity management database.		entities in a particular entity management database.
	Three different sized databases are considered. The number of		Three different sized databases are considered. The number of
	skipping to change at page 49, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 50, line 34 ¶
	the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated.		the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated.
	The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving		The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving
	nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird.		nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird.
	It is included to round out the analysis.		It is included to round out the analysis.
	Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and		Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and
	are not individually connected to the network. They may be connected		are not individually connected to the network. They may be connected
	to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on. This is		to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on. This is
	not the same problem as sizing IP addresses.		not the same problem as sizing IP addresses.
	+=========+===========+============+==========+=================+		+---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
	| People | Devices / | Subsystems | Database | Database Size |		| People | Devices / | Subsystems / | Database | Database Size |
	| | Person | / Device | Portion | |		| | Person | Device | Portion | |
	+=========+===========+============+==========+=================+		+---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
	| 10 | 100 | 10 | 10% | trillion |		| 10 | 100 | 10 | 10% | trillion |
	| billion | | | | (10^12) |		| billion | | | | (10^12) |
	+---------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------------+		| 10 | 100,000 | 10 | 10% | quadrillion |
	| 10 | 100,000 | 10 | 10% | quadrillion |		| billion | | | | (10^15) |
	| billion | | | | (10^15) |		| 100 | 1,000,000 | 10 | 10% | 100 |
	+---------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------------+		| billion | | | | quadrillion |
	| 100 | 1,000,000 | 10 | 10% | 100 quadrillion |		| | | | | (10^17) |
	| billion | | | | (10^17) |		+---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
	+---------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------------+
	Table 3
	This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the		This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the
	number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of		number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of
	people. It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where		people. It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where
	collisions of the output of hash functions are considered.		collisions of the output of hash functions are considered.
	The proper formula for the collision calculation is		The proper formula for the collision calculation is
	p = 1 - e^{-k^2/(2n)}		p = 1 - e^{-k^2/(2n)}
	p Collision Probability		p Collision Probability
	n Total possible population		n Total possible population
	k Actual population		k Actual population
	However, for the very large values involved here, this formula		However, for the very large values involved here, this formula
	requires floating point precision higher than commonly available in		requires floating point precision higher than commonly available in
	calculators and SW so this simple approximation is used. See		calculators and SW so this simple approximation is used. See
	[BirthdayAttack].		[BirthdayAttack].
	skipping to change at page 50, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 51, line 23 ¶
	[BirthdayAttack].		[BirthdayAttack].
	p = k^2 / 2n		p = k^2 / 2n
	For this calculation:		For this calculation:
	p Collision Probability		p Collision Probability
	n Total population based on number of bits in UEID		n Total population based on number of bits in UEID
	k Population in a database		k Population in a database
	+=====================+==============+==============+==============+		+----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
	| Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |		| Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
	+=====================+==============+==============+==============+		+----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
	| trillion (10^12) | 2 * 10^-15 | 8 * 10^-35 | 5 * 10^-55 |		| trillion (10^12) | 2 * 10^-15 | 8 * 10^-35 | 5 * 10^-55 |
	+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+		| quadrillion (10^15) | 2 * 10^-09 | 8 * 10^-29 | 5 * 10^-49 |
	| quadrillion (10^15) | 2 * 10^-09 | 8 * 10^-29 | 5 * 10^-49 |		| 100 quadrillion | 2 * 10^-05 | 8 * 10^-25 | 5 * 10^-45 |
	+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+		| (10^17) | | | |
	| 100 quadrillion | 2 * 10^-05 | 8 * 10^-25 | 5 * 10^-45 |		+----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
	| (10^17) | | | |
	+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
	Table 4
	Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one		Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one
	year's operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size		year's operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size
	is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year.		is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year.
	For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states		For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states
	per year. Each of those states has the above calculated probability		per year. Each of those states has the above calculated probability
	of a collision.		of a collision.
	This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of		This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of
	the database is completely independent from the previous state. In		the database is completely independent from the previous state. In
	skipping to change at page 50, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 52, line 11 ¶
	The following tables gives the time interval until there is a		The following tables gives the time interval until there is a
	probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number		probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number
	of states per year as the number of records in the database.		of states per year as the number of records in the database.
	t = 1 / ((k / 10) * p)		t = 1 / ((k / 10) * p)
	t Time until a collision		t Time until a collision
	p Collision probability for UEID size		p Collision probability for UEID size
	k Database size		k Database size
	+=====================+==============+==============+==============+		+---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
	| Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |		| Database Size | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
	+=====================+==============+==============+==============+		+---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
	| trillion (10^12) | 60,000 years | 10^24 years | 10^44 years |		| trillion (10^12) | 60,000 years | 10^24 years | 10^44 years |
	+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+		| quadrillion (10^15) | 8 seconds | 10^14 years | 10^34 years |
	| quadrillion (10^15) | 8 seconds | 10^14 years | 10^34 years |		| 100 quadrillion | 8 | 10^11 years | 10^31 years |
	+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+		| (10^17) | microseconds | | |
	| 100 quadrillion | 8 | 10^11 years | 10^31 years |		+---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
	| (10^17) | microseconds | | |
	+---------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
	Table 5
	Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement		Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement
	that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits.		that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits.
	There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record		There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record
	databases are not expected in the near future and because this time-		databases are not expected in the near future and because this time-
	to-collision calculation is a very worst case. A future update of		to-collision calculation is a very worst case. A future update of
	the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a		the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a
	requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs.		requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs.
	skipping to change at page 51, line 51 ¶		skipping to change at page 53, line 17 ¶
	as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware.		as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware.
	Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts		Appendix C. Changes from Previous Drafts
	The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.		The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.
	This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see		This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see
	the significant differences.		the significant differences.
	C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01		C.1. From draft-rats-eat-01
	* Added UEID design rationale appendix		o Added UEID design rationale appendix
	C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00		C.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00
	This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but		This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
	no new claims have been added.		no new claims have been added.
	* Separate information and data model using CDDL.		o Separate information and data model using CDDL.
	* Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT		o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT
	* Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims		o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims
	C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01		C.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01
	* Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim		o Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim
	* Minor spelling and other fixes		o Minor spelling and other fixes
	* Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim		o Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim
	C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02		C.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02
	* Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type		o Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type
	* UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256.		o UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256.
	* Added appendix justifying UEID design and size.		o Added appendix justifying UEID design and size.
	* Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named		o Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named
	and there can be more tha one of them		and there can be more tha one of them
	* Lots of fixes to the CDDL		o Lots of fixes to the CDDL
	* Added security considerations		o Added security considerations
	C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03		C.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03
	* Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims		o Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims
	* Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans		o Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans
	C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04		C.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04
	* Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string		o Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string
	* CDDL cleaned up some more		o CDDL cleaned up some more
	* CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs		o CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs
	* CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped
	* Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa		o CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped
	* Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens		o Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa
	* Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens		o Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens
	* Add section on key inclusion		o Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens
	* Add hardware version claims		o Add section on key inclusion
	* Collected CDDL is now filled in. Other CDDL corrections.		o Add hardware version claims
	* Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not		o Collected CDDL is now filled in. Other CDDL corrections.
			o Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not
	extensible		extensible
	* Security level claim is not extensible		o Security level claim is not extensible
	* Improve specification of location claim and added a location		o Improve specification of location claim and added a location
	privacy section		privacy section
	* Add intended use claim		o Add intended use claim
	C.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05		C.7. From draft-ietf-rats-05
	* CDDL format issues resolved		o CDDL format issues resolved
	* Corrected reference to Location Privacy section		o Corrected reference to Location Privacy section
			C.8. From draft-ietf-rats-06
			o Added boot-seed claim
			o Rework CBOR interoperability section
			o Added profiles claim and section
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Giridhar Mandyam		Giridhar Mandyam
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	5775 Morehouse Drive		5775 Morehouse Drive
	San Diego, California		San Diego, California
	United States of America		USA
	Phone: +1 858 651 7200		Phone: +1 858 651 7200
	Email: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com		EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com
	Laurence Lundblade		Laurence Lundblade
	Security Theory LLC		Security Theory LLC
	Email: lgl@island-resort.com		EMail: lgl@island-resort.com
	Miguel Ballesteros		Miguel Ballesteros
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	5775 Morehouse Drive		5775 Morehouse Drive
	San Diego, California		San Diego, California
	United States of America		USA
	Phone: +1 858 651 4299		Phone: +1 858 651 4299
	Email: mballest@qti.qualcomm.com		EMail: mballest@qti.qualcomm.com
	Jeremy O'Donoghue		Jeremy O'Donoghue
	Qualcomm Technologies Inc.		Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
	279 Farnborough Road		279 Farnborough Road
	Farnborough		Farnborough GU14 7LS
	GU14 7LS
	United Kingdom		United Kingdom
	Phone: +44 1252 363189		Phone: +44 1252 363189
	Email: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com		EMail: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com
End of changes. 205 change blocks.
	622 lines changed or deleted		767 lines changed or added
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