RATS Working Group                                            G. Mandyam                                          L. Lundblade
Internet-Draft                                Qualcomm Technologies Inc.                                       Security Theory LLC
Intended status: Standards Track                            L. Lundblade                              G. Mandyam
Expires: December 9, 2021                            Security Theory LLC
                                                          M. Ballesteros April 26, 2022                                    J. O'Donoghue
                                              Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
                                                           June 07,
                                                        October 23, 2021

                   The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
                         draft-ietf-rats-eat-10
                         draft-ietf-rats-eat-11

Abstract

   An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of
   claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity,
   typically a device like a phone or an IoT device.  These claims are
   used by a relying party Relying Party to determine how much it wishes to trust the
   entity.

   An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims.
   To a large degree, all this document does is extend CWT and JWT.

Contributing

   TBD

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  CWT, JWT JWT, UCCS, UJCS and UCCS . . . . . . DEB  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6   5
     1.2.  CDDL  . . . . . . .  CDDL, CBOR and JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . .  Operating Model and RATS Architecture . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.   7
       1.3.1.  Use as Evidence and Attestation Results . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.5.  EAT Operating Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.6.  What is Not Standardized  . . . . Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       1.6.1.  Transmission Protocol .   8
       1.3.2.  Use as Attestation Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.4.  Entity Overview . .   9
       1.6.2.  Signing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10   9
   3.  The Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Token ID Claim (cti and jti)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.3.1.  nonce CDDL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  11
     3.4.  Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.4.1.  ueid CDDL
     3.5.  Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.6.  Hardware OEM Identification (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.5.  Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs)
       3.6.1.  Random Number Based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.6.  OEM Identification by
       3.6.2.  IEEE (oemid) Based  . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.6.1.  oemid CDDL . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.6.3.  IANA Private Enterprise Number  . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.7.  Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . .  16
     3.8.  Software Description and Version  . Name Claim . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.9.  The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . .  17
       3.9.1.  security-level CDDL
     3.9.  Software Version Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  17
     3.10. Secure Boot The Security Level Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . (security-level) . . .  19
       3.10.1.  secure-boot CDDL . . . . .  17
     3.11. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.11.
     3.12. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.11.1.
       3.12.1.  Enabled  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       3.11.2.
       3.12.2.  Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.11.3.  20
       3.12.3.  Disabled Since Boot  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.11.4.
       3.12.4.  Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.11.5.
       3.12.5.  Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.11.6.  debug-status CDDL  .
     3.13. Including Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     3.12. Including Keys  . . . . . . .  21
     3.14. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.13.
     3.15. The Location Uptime Claim (location) . . . . (uptime) . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.13.1.  location CDDL . . . . . .  23
     3.16. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     3.14.
     3.17. The Uptime Intended Use Claim (uptime) (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.18. The Profile Claim (profile) . . . . . .  24
       3.14.1.  uptime CDDL . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.19. The DLOA (Digital Letter or Approval) Claim (dloas) . . .  26
     3.20. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests)  . . . . . . . .  24
     3.15.  27
     3.21. The Boot Seed Software Evidence Claim (boot-seed) . (swevidence)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.16.  28
     3.22. The Intended Use SW Measurement Results Claim (intended-use) (swresults)  . . . . . .  29
       3.22.1.  Scheme . . . .  24
       3.16.1.  intended-use CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.17. The Profile Claim (profile) . .  29
       3.22.2.  Objective  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.18. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests) . . . . . . . .  26
     3.19. The Software Evidence Claim {swevidence}  30
       3.22.3.  Results  . . . . . . . .  27
     3.20. The Submodules Part of a Token (submods) . . . . . . . .  28
       3.20.1.  Two Types of Submodules . . . . . .  30
       3.22.4.  Objective Name . . . . . . . .  28
         3.20.1.1.  Non-token Submodules . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     3.23. Submodules (submods)  . . .  29
         3.20.1.2.  Nested EATs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       3.23.1.  Submodule Types  . . .  29
         3.20.1.3.  Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens as Submodules . .  30
       3.20.2.  No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
         3.23.1.1.  Submodule Claims-Set . . . . . .  30
       3.20.3.  Security Levels . . . . . . . .  33
         3.23.1.2.  Nested Token . . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.20.4.  Submodule Names . . . . . . . .  34
         3.23.1.3.  Detached Submodule Digest  . . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.20.5.  submods CDDL .  36
       3.23.2.  No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   4.  Endorsements and Verification Keys  37
       3.23.3.  Security Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     4.1.  Identification Methods . . . . .  37
       3.23.4.  Submodule Names  . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       4.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID . . . . . .  37
       3.23.5.  CDDL for submods . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       4.1.2.  JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters . . . . .  38
   4.  Unprotected JWT Claims-Sets . . .  34
       4.1.3.  CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters . . . . . . .  34
       4.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification . . . . . . .  38
   5.  Detached EAT Bundles  . . . .  34
     4.2.  Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   6.  Endorsements and Verification Keys  . .  34
   5.  Profiles . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     6.1.  Identification Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     5.1.  Format of a Profile Document . .  41
       6.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     5.2.  List of Profile Issues . . . . . . .  41
       6.1.2.  JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters  . . . . . . . .  41
       6.1.3.  CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters . .  35
       5.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or both . . . . .  42
       6.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification  . . . . . . . . .  35
       5.2.2.  CBOR Map and Array Encoding . .  42
     6.2.  Other Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . .  35
       5.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding . . . . . . .  42
   7.  Profiles  . . . . . . . . .  36
       5.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       5.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection . . . . .  42
     7.1.  Format of a Profile Document  . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       5.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms . . .  43
     7.2.  List of Profile Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       5.2.7.  Verification Key Identification . . . .  43
       7.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or both . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.8.  Endorsement Identification . . . . . . .  43
       7.2.2.  CBOR Map and Array Encoding . . . . . .  37
       5.2.9.  Freshness . . . . . . .  43
       7.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.10. Required Claims .  44
       7.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization  . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection  . . . . . .  37
       5.2.11. Prohibited Claims . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms  . . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.12. Additional Claims . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.7.  DEB Support . . . . . . . . . .  37
       5.2.13. Refined Claim Definition . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.8.  Verification Key Identification . . .  37
       5.2.14. CBOR Tags . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.9.  Endorsement Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.10. Freshness .  38
       5.2.15. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims . . . . . . .  38
   6.  Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.11. Required Claims . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     6.1.  Common CDDL Types . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.12. Prohibited Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
     6.2.  CDDL for CWT-defined Claims . . . . .  45
       7.2.13. Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . .  38
     6.3.  JSON . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.14. Refined Claim Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.15. CBOR Tags . . . .  39
       6.3.1.  JSON Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       7.2.16. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims  . . .  39
       6.3.2.  JSON Interoperability . . . .  46
   8.  Encoding and Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     6.4.  CBOR . . . . .  46
     8.1.  Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     8.2.  Encoding Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       6.4.1.  CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . .  47
       8.2.1.  Common Data Types . . . . . . . . .  41
         6.4.1.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization . . . . . .  41
     6.5.  Collected CDDL . . .  47
       8.2.2.  JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       8.2.3.  Labels  . .  42
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     7.1.  Reuse of
     8.3.  CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry . Interoperability . . . . .  47
     7.2.  Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       8.3.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization  . . . . .  48
       7.2.1.  Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . .  48
       7.2.2.  Operating System and Technology Neutral .

     8.4.  Collected Common CDDL . . . . . .  48
       7.2.3.  Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     8.5.  Collected CDDL for CBOR . . .  49
       7.2.4.  Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
       7.2.5.  Proprietary Claims . .  55
     8.6.  Collected CDDL for JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     7.3.  Claims Registered by This Document . .  57
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . .  49
       7.3.1.  Claims for Early Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       7.3.2.  To be Assigned  59
     9.1.  Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims
           Registries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
       7.3.3.  Version Schemes Registered by this Document . . . . .  53
   8.  Privacy Considerations . . .  59
     9.2.  Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     8.1.  UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations . .  59
       9.2.1.  Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation  . . .  59
       9.2.2.  Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . .  53
     8.2.  Location Privacy Considerations . .  59
       9.2.3.  Security Level Neutral  . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   9.  Security Considerations . . . .  60
       9.2.4.  Reuse of Extant Data Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
       9.2.5.  Proprietary Claims  . . .  54
     9.1.  Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     9.3.  Claims Registered by This Document  . . . . . .  55
       9.1.1.  Transmission of Key Material . . . . .  61
       9.3.1.  Claims for Early Assignment . . . . . . .  55
     9.2.  Transport Security . . . . . .  61
       9.3.2.  To be Assigned Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     9.3.  Multiple EAT Consumers . . .  64
       9.3.3.  Version Schemes Registered by this Document . . . . .  64
       9.3.4.  UEID URN Registered by this Document  . . . . . . . .  64
       9.3.5.  Tag for Detached EAT Bundle .  56
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . .  65
     10.1.  UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . .  65
     10.2.  Location Privacy Considerations  . . .  56
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . .  66
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . .  59
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     11.1.  Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.1.  Very Simple EAT . . . . . . . . .  66
       11.1.1.  Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.2.  Example with Submodules, Nesting and  67
     11.2.  Transport Security Levels . .  61
   Appendix B.  UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     B.1.  Collision Probability . .  67
     11.3.  Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     B.2.  No Use of UUID .  67
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
   Appendix C.  EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity
                (DevID) . . . . .  68
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     C.1.  DevID Used With EAT .  68
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
   Appendix A.  Examples .  65
     C.2.  How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity . .  66
     C.3.  An X.509 Format EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     C.4.  Device Identifier Permanence  73
     A.1.  Simple TEE Attestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
   Appendix D.  Changes from Previous Drafts . . .  73
     A.2.  EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block  . . . . . . .  74
     A.3.  Detached EAT Bundle . .  67
     D.1.  From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
     D.2.  From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00  75
     A.4.  Key / Key Store Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
     D.3.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . .  76
     A.5.  SW Measurements of an IoT Device  . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
     A.6.  Attestation Results in JSON format  . . .  67
     D.4.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . .  81
   Appendix B.  UEID Design Rationale  . . . . . . .  68
     D.5.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . .  82
     B.1.  Collision Probability . . . . . . .  68
     D.6.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     B.2.  No Use of UUID  . . . .  68
     D.7.  From draft-ietf-rats-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     D.8.  84
   Appendix C.  EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity
                (DevID)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     C.1.  DevID Used With EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
     C.2.  How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity . .  86
     C.3.  An X.509 Format EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  86
     C.4.  Device Identifier Permanence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
   Appendix D.  Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     D.1.  From draft-ietf-rats-06 draft-rats-eat-01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
     D.9.  87
     D.2.  From draft-ietf-rats-07 draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     D.3.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . .  69
     D.10. . . . . . . . . .  87
     D.4.  From draft-ietf-rats-08 draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
     D.5.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . .  69
     D.11. . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
     D.6.  From draft-ietf-rats-09 draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  88
     D.7.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 . .  69
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.8.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06 . . . . . . . . . .  70

1.  Introduction

   Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a
   remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)
   device, or other endpoint to . . . . .  89
     D.9.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.10. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.11. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     D.12. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91

1.  Introduction

   Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a
   remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT)
   device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, Relying Party, a
   server or a service.  This allows the relying party Relying Party to know some
   characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the
   device.

   Remote attestation is a fundamental service that can underlie other
   protocols and services that need to know about the trustworthiness of
   the device before proceeding.  One good example is biometric
   authentication where the biometric matching is done on the device.
   The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known
   to do biometric matching correctly.  Another example is content
   protection where the relying party wants to know the device will
   protect the data.  This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that
   might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing
   corporate data to be accessed by it.

   The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not
   limited to the following:

   o  Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW)

   o  Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly
      for security-oriented chips

   o  Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device

   o  Configuration and state of the device

   o  Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS
      location

1.1.  CWT, JWT and UCCS

   For flexibility

   This document uses the terminology and ease of imlpementation main operational model defined
   in [RATS.Architecture].  In particular it is a wide variety of
   environments, EATs format that can be either CBOR [RFC8949]
   used for Attestation Evidence or JSON [ECMAScript]
   format.  This specification simultaneously describes both formats.

   An EAT is either a CWT as defined in [RFC8392], a UCCS Attestation Results as defined in
   [UCCS.Draft], or
   the RATS architecture.

1.1.  CWT, JWT, UCCS, UJCS and DEB

   An EAT is a JWT as defined in [RFC7519]. set of claims about an entity/device based on one of the
   following:

   o  CBOR Web Token (CWT), [RFC8392]
   o  Unprotected CWT Claims Sets (UCCS), [UCCS.Draft]

   o  JSON Web Token (JWT), [RFC7519]

   All definitions, requirements, creation and validation procedures,
   security considerations, IANA registrations and so on from these
   carry over to EAT.

   This specification extends those specifications with by defining
   additional claims for attestation.  This specification also describes
   the notion of a "profile" that can narrow the definition of an EAT,
   ensure interoperability and fill in details for specific usage
   scenarios.  This specification also adds some considerations for
   registration of future EAT-related claims.

   The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or
   JSON format, encoded, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT and
   UCCS.  Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT.  In
   some cases it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type).  In other
   cases it may be through use of CBOR tags.  There is no fixed
   mechanism across all use cases.

1.2.  CDDL

   This specification uses CDDL, [RFC8610], as the primary formalism adds two more top-level messages:

   o  Unprotected JWT Claims Set (UJCS), Section 4

   o  Detached EAT Bundle (DEB), Section 5

   A DEB is simple structure to
   define each claim.  The implementor then interprets hold a collection of detached claims-
   sets and the CDDL to come
   to EAT that separately provides integrity and authenticity
   protection for them.  It can be either the CBOR [RFC8949] or JSON [ECMAScript] representation.  In
   the case of JSON, Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed.  Additional
   rules are given in Section 6.3.2 of this document where Appendix E is
   insufficient.  (Note that this is not to define a general means to
   translate between encoded.

1.2.  CDDL, CBOR and JSON, but only to define enough such that
   the claims defined in this document JSON

   An EAT can be rendered unambiguously encoded in
   JSON). either CBOR or JSON.  The CWT specification was authored before CDDL was available and did
   not use it.  This specification includes a CDDL definition of most of
   what each
   claim is described in [RFC8392].

1.3.  Entity Overview

   An "entity" such that it can be any device encoded either.  Each token is either
   entirely CBOR or device subassembly ("submodule")
   that can generate its own JSON, with only an exception for nested tokens.

   To implement composite attestation as described in the form of an EAT.  The
   attestation should RATS
   architecture document, one token has to be cryptographically verifiable by the EAT
   consumer.  An EAT at the device-level can nested inside another.  It
   is also possible to construct composite Attestation Results (see
   below) which may be composed of several
   submodule EAT's.

   Modern devices such expressed as one token nested inside another.  So
   as a mobile phone have many different execution
   environments operating with different security levels.  For example,
   it is common for a mobile phone to have an "apps" environment that
   runs an operating not force each end-end attestation system (OS) that hosts a plethora to be all JSON or all
   CBOR, nesting of downloadable
   apps.  It may also have a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that is
   distinct, isolated, JSON-encoded tokens in CBOR-encoded tokens and hosts security-oriented functionality like
   biometric authentication.  Additionally, it may have an eSE (embedded
   Secure Element) - a high security chip with defenses against HW
   attacks that vice
   versa is used to produce attestations. accommodated by this specification.  This device
   attestation format allows is the attested data to be tagged at a
   security level from which it originates.  In general, any discrete
   execution environment only place
   that has an identifiable security level CBOR and JSON can be
   considered an entity.

1.4.  Use as Evidence and Attestation Results

   Here, normative reference is made mixed.

   This specification formally uses CDDL, [RFC8610], to [RATS-Architecture],
   particularly the definition of Evidence, define each
   claim.  The implementor interprets the Verifier, Attestation
   Results CDDL to come to either the
   CBOR [RFC8949] or JSON [ECMAScript] representation.  In the case of
   JSON, Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed.  Additional rules are
   given in Section 8.2.2 where Appendix E is insufficient.

   The CWT and JWT specifications were authored before CDDL was
   available and did not use CDDL.  This specification includes a CDDL
   definition of most of what is defined in [RFC8392].  Similarly, this
   specification includes CDDL for most of what is defined in [RFC7519].

   The UCCS specification does not include CDDL.  This specification
   provides CDDL for it.

   (TODO: The authors are open to modifications to this specification
   and the Relying Party.  Per UCCS specification to include CDDL for UCCS and UJCS there
   instead of here.)

1.3.  Operating Model and RATS Architecture

   While it is not required that EAT be used with the RATS operational
   model described in Figure 1 in [RATS-Architecture],
   Evidence [RATS.Architecture], or even that it
   be used for attestation, this document is a protocol message authored with an
   orientation around that goes from the model.

   To summarize, an Attester to on an entity/device generates Attestation
   Evidence.  Attestation Evidence is a Claims Set describing various
   characteristics of the
   Verifier and entity/device.  Attestation Results Evidence also is
   usually signed by a message key that goes from proves the
   Verifier to entity/device and the Relying Party.  EAT is defined such that
   evidence it can be
   used to represent either Evidence, Attestation Results or both.  No
   claims defined here produces are considered exclusive to authentic.  The Claims Set includes a nonce
   or are prohibited in
   either use.  It is useful some other means to create provide freshness.  EAT profiles as described in
   Section 5 for either use.

   It is useful to characterize the relationship of claims in Evidence designed to those in carry
   Attestation Evidence.  The Attestation Evidence goes to a Verifier
   where the signature is validated.  Some of the Claims may also be
   validated against Reference Values.  The Verifier then produces
   Attestation Results which is also usually a Claims Set.  EAT is also
   designed to carry Attestation Results.  The Attestation Results go to
   the Relying Party which is the ultimate consumer of the "Remote
   Attestaton Procedures", RATS.  The Relying Party uses the Attestation
   Results as needed for the use case, perhaps allowing a device on the
   network, allowing a financial transaction or such.

   Note that sometimes the Verifier and Relying Party are not separate
   and thus there is no need for a protocol to carry Attestation
   Results.

1.3.1.  Use as Attestation Evidence

   Any claim defined in this document or in the IANA CWT or JWT registry
   may be used in Attestation Evidence.

   Attestation Evidence nearly always has to be signed or otherwise have
   authenticity and integrity protection because the Attester is remote
   relative to the Verifier.  Usually, this is by using COSE/JOSE
   signing where the signing key is an attestation key provisioned into
   the entity/device by its manufacturer.  The details of how this is
   achieved are beyond this specification, but see Section 6.  If there
   is already a suitable secure channel between the Attester and
   Verifier, UCCS may be used.

1.3.2.  Use as Attestation Results

   Any claim defined in this document or in the IANA CWT or JWT registry
   may be used in Attestation Results.

   It is useful to characterize the relationship of claims in Evidence
   to those in Attestation Results.

   Many claims in Attestation Results.

   Many claims in Evidence simply will pass through the
   Verifier to the Relying Party without modification.  They will be
   verified as authentic from the device by the Verifier just through
   normal verification of the Attester's signature.  They will be protected
   from modification when they  The UEID,
   Section 3.4, and Location, Section 3.14, are conveyed to the Relying Party by
   whatever means is used to protect Attestation Results.  (The details examples of claims that protection are out of scope of this document.)
   may be passed through.

   Some claims in Attestation Evidence will be verified by the Verifier
   by comparison to Reference Values.  In this case the  These claims in Evidence will not likely be
   conveyed to the Relying Party.  Instead, some claim indicating they
   were checked may be added to the Attestation Results or it may be
   tacitly known that the Verifier always does this check.  For example,
   the Verifier receives the Software Evidence claim, Section 3.21,
   compares it to Reference Values and conveys the results to the
   Relying Party in a Software Measurement Results Claim, Section 3.22.

   In some cases the Verifier may provide privacy-preserving
   functionality by stripping or modifying claims that do not posses
   sufficient privacy-preserving characteristics.

1.5.  EAT Operating Models

   TODO: Rewrite (or eliminate) this section in light of the RATS
   architecture draft.

   At least  For example, the following three participants exist data
   in all EAT operating
   models.  Some operating models have additional participants.

   The Entity.  This is the phone, the IoT device, the sensor, the sub-
      assembly or such that the attestation provides information about.

   The Manufacturer.  The company that made the entity.  This Location claim, Section 3.14, may be modified to have a
      chip vendor,
   precision of a circuit board module vendor or few kilometers rather than a vendor of finished
      consumer products.

   The few meters.

   When the Verifier is remote from the Relying Party.  The server, service Party, the Attestation
   Results must be protected for integrity, authenticity and possibly
   confidentiality.  Often this will simply be HTTPS as per a normal web
   service, but COSE or company that makes use JOSE may also be used.  The details of this
   protection are beyond the information scope of this document.

1.4.  Entity Overview

   An "entity" can be any device or device subassembly ("submodule")
   that can generate its own attestation in the EAT about the entity.

   In all operating models, the manufacturer provisions some secret form of an EAT.  The
   attestation key material (AKM) into the entity during manufacturing.
   This might should be during cryptographically verifiable by the manufacturer of a chip EAT
   consumer.  An EAT at a fabrication
   facility (fab) or during final assembly the device-level can be composed of several
   submodule EAT's.

   Modern devices such as a consumer product or any
   time in between.  This attestation key material mobile phone have many different execution
   environments operating with different security levels.  For example,
   it is used common for signing
   EATs.

   In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity
   create a mobile phone to have an "apps" environment that
   runs an EAT of the format described in this document.  The EAT is
   always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the
   manufacturer.

   In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing system (OS) that hosts a plethora of downloadable
   apps.  It may also have a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that
   the signature on the EAT is valid
   distinct, isolated, and consistent with data from
   claims in the EAT.  This can happen in many different ways.  Here are
   some examples.

   o  The EAT is transmitted to the relying party.  The relying party
      gets corresponding key material (e.g. hosts security-oriented functionality like
   biometric authentication.  Additionally, it may have an eSE (embedded
   Secure Element) - a root certificate) from the
      manufacturer.  The relying party performs the verification.

   o  The EAT high security chip with defenses against HW
   attacks that is transmitted used to produce attestations.  This device
   attestation format allows the relying party.  The relying party
      transmits the EAT attested data to be tagged at a verification service offered by the
      manufacturer.  The server returns the validated claims.

   o
   security level from which it originates.  In general, any discrete
   execution environment that has an identifiable security level can be
   considered an entity.

2.  Terminology

   The EAT is transmitted directly key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to a verification service, perhaps
      operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party.  It
      verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the
      relying party.  It may even modify the claims be interpreted as described in some way BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and re-
      sign the EAT (with a different signing key).

   All these operating models are supported only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519] and there is no preference
   of one over the other.  It is important to support this variety CWT
   [RFC8392].

   Claim:  A piece of
   operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for
   some special scenarios.  One special scenario has information asserted about a validation
   service that subject.  A claim is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer.  In
   another,
      represented as pair with a privacy proxy service processes the EAT before it is
   transmitted value and either a name or key to
      identify it.

   Claim Name:  A unique text string that identifies the relying party.  In yet another, symmetric key
   material claim.  It is
      used for signing.  In this case the manufacturer should
   perform the verification, because any release of as the claim name for JSON encoding.

   Claim Key:  The CBOR map key material
   would enable used to identify a participant other than claim.

   Claim Value:  The value portion of the entity to create valid
   signed EATs.

1.6.  What is Not Standardized claim.  A claim value can be
      any CBOR data item or JSON value.

   CWT/JWT Claims Set:  The following is not standardized for EAT, just CBOR map or JSON object that contains the
      claims conveyed by the same they are not
   standardized for CWT or JWT.

1.6.1.  Transmission Protocol

   EATs may be transmitted

   This document reuses terminology from RATS Architecure
   [RATS.Architecture]

   Attester:  A role performed by any protocol an entity (typically a device) whose
      Evidence must be appraised in order to infer the same as CWTs and JWTs.
   For example, they might be added in extension fields of other
   protocols, bundled into an HTTP header, or just transmitted as files.
   This flexibility is intentional extent to allow broader adoption.  This
   flexibility which
      the Attester is possible because EAT's are self-secured with signing
   (and possibly additionally with encryption and anti-replay).  The
   transmission protocol considered trustworthy, such as when deciding
      whether it is not required authorized to fulfill any additional
   security requirements.

   For certain devices, a direct connection may not exist between perform some operation.

   Verifier:  A role that appraises the
   EAT-producing device validity of Attestation Evidence
      about an Attester and the produces Attestation Results to be used by a
      Relying Party.  In such cases,

   Relying Party:  A role that depends on the EAT
   should be protected against malicious access.  The use validity of COSE and
   JOSE allows information
      about an Attester, for signing and encryption purposes of reliably applying application
      specific actions.  Compare /relying party/ in [RFC4949].

   Attestation Evidence:  A Claims Set generated by an Attester to be
      appraised by a Verifier.  Attestation Evidence may include
      configuration data, measurements, telemetry, or inferences.

   Attestation Results:  The output generated by a Verifier, typically
      including information about an Attester, where the EAT.  Therefore, even
   if Verifier
      vouches for the EAT is conveyed through intermediaries between validity of the device results

   Reference Values:  A set of values against which values of Claims can
      be compared as part of applying an Appraisal Policy for
      Attestation Evidence.  Reference Values are sometimes referred to
      in other documents as known-good values, golden measurements, or
      nominal values, although those terms typically assume comparison
      for equality, whereas here Reference Values might be more general
      and
   Relying Party, such intermediaries cannot easily modify the EAT
   payload or alter the signature.

1.6.2.  Signing Scheme

   The term "signing scheme" is be used to refer to the system that
   includes end-end process in any sort of establishing signing comparison.

3.  The Claims

   This section describes new claims defined for attestation key
   material in the entity, signing that are to
   be added to the EAT, CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and verifying it. JWT [IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA
   registries.

   This
   might involve key IDs and X.509 certificate chains or something
   similar but different.  The term "signing algorithm" refers just to
   the algorithm ID section also describes how several extant CWT and JWT claims
   apply in the COSE signing structure.  No particular
   signing algorithm or signing scheme EAT.

   CDDL, along with a text description, is required by this standard.

   There are three main implementation issues driving this.  First,
   secure non-volatile storage space in the entity for the attestation
   key material may be highly limited, perhaps used to only define each claim
   independent of encoding.  Each claim is defined as a few hundred
   bits, CDDL group.  In
   Section 8 on some small IoT chips.  Second, the factory cost of
   provisioning key material in each chip or device may be high, with
   even millisecond delays adding to encoding, the cost of CDDL groups turn into CBOR map entries and
   JSON name/value pairs.

   Each claim described has a chip.  Third,
   privacy-preserving signing schemes like ECDAA (Elliptic Curve Direct
   Anonymous Attestation) are complex unique text string and not suitable integer that
   identifies it.  CBOR encoded tokens MUST use only the integer for all
   Claim Keys.  JSON encoded tokens MUST use
   cases.

   Over time to faciliate interoperability, some signing schemes may be
   defined in EAT profiles or other documents either in only the IETF or
   outside.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", text string for
   Claim Names.

3.1.  Token ID Claim (cti and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document jti)

   CWT defines the "cti" claim.  JWT defines the "jti" claim.  These are
   equivalent to be interpreted as described each other in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, EAT and only when, carry a unique token identifier
   as they appear do in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519], COSE [RFC8152], and CWT [RFC8392].

   Claim Name.  The human-readable name used to identify a claim.

   Claim Key.  The CBOR map key or JSON name used to identify a claim.

   Claim Value.  The value portion of the claim.  A claim value can CWT.  They may be
      any CBOR data item or JSON value.

   CWT Claims Set.  The CBOR map or JSON object that contains the claims
      conveyed by the CWT or JWT.

   Attestation Key Material (AKM).  The key material used to sign the
      EAT token.  If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a
      simple symmetric key.  If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE
      DevID [IEEE.802.1AR], then this is the private part defend against re use
   of the EC key
      pair.  If ECDAA token but are distinct from the nonce that is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID,
      i.e. EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA.

3.  The Claims

   This section describes new claims defined for attestation.  It also
   mentions several claims defined by CWT
   Relying Party to guarantee freshness and JWT that are particularly
   important for EAT.

   Note also: * Any defend against replay.

3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat)

   The "iat" claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT
   including those in the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT IANA
   [IANA.JWT.Claims] claims registries.

   o  All claims are optional
   o  No claims are mandatory

   o  All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be
      ignored

   There are no default values or meanings assigned is used to absent indicate the date-
   of-creation of the token, the time at which the claims
   other than they are not reported. collected
   and the token is composed and signed.

   The reason data for a claim's absence some claims may be the implementation not supporting the claim, an inability to
   determine its value, or a preference to report in a different way
   such as a proprietary claim.

   CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim
   indepdent of encoding.  Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the
   group is a general aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL).
   In the encoding section Section 6, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map
   entries and JSON name/value pairs.

   Map labels are assigned both an integer and string value.  CBOR
   encoded tokens MUST use only integer labels.  JSON encoded tokens
   MUST use only string labels.

   TODO: add paragraph here about use for Attestation Evidence and for
   Results.

3.1.  Token ID Claim (cti and jti)

   CWT defines the "cti" claim.  JWT defines the "jti" claim.  These are
   equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier
   as they do in JWT and CWT.  They may be used to defend against re use
   of the token but are distinct from the nonce that is used by the
   relying party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay.

3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat)

   The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date-
   of-creation of the token, the time at which the claims are collected
   and the token is composed and signed.

   The data for some claims may be held held or cached for some period of
   time before the token is created.  This period may be long, even
   days.  Examples are measurements taken at boot or a geographic
   position fix taken the last time a satellite signal was received.
   There are individual timestamps associated with these claims to
   indicate their age is older than the "iat" timestamp.

   CWT allows the use floating-point for this claim.  EAT disallows the
   use of floating-point.  No token may contain an iat claim in float-
   point format.  Any recipient of a token with a floating-point format
   iat claim may consider it an error.  A 64-bit integer representation
   of epoch time can represent a range of +/- 500 billion years, so the
   only point of a floating-point timestamp is to have precession
   greater than one second.  This is not needed for EAT.

3.3.  Nonce Claim (nonce)

   All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks.  The nonce is
   generated by the relying party, Relying Party, the end consumer of the token.  It is
   conveyed to the entity over whatever transport is in use before the
   token is generated and then included in the token as the nonce claim.

   This documents the nonce claim for registration in the IANA CWT
   claims registry.  This is equivalent to the JWT nonce claim that is
   already registered.

   The nonce must be at least 8 bytes (64 bits) as fewer are unlikely to
   be secure.  A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the memory a
   constrained implementation uses.  This size range is not set for the
   already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size
   recommendation when used in an EAT.

   Multiple nonces are allowed to accommodate multistage verification
   and consumption.

3.3.1.  nonce CDDL

   nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)

   nonce-claim = (
       nonce

   $$claims-set-claims //=
       (nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ]
   ) ])

   nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)

3.4.  Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)

   UEID's identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a
   mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked
   security camera.  It may identify the entire device or a submodule or
   subsystem.  It does not identify types, models or classes of devices.
   It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be
   sequential.

   UEID's must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers
   and countries.  UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and
   systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different
   protocols and systems.  No two products anywhere, even in completely
   different industries made by two different manufacturers in two
   different countries should have the same UEID (if they are not global
   and universal in this way, then relying parties Relying Parties receiving them will
   have to track other characteristics of the device to keep devices
   distinct between manufacturers).

   There are privacy considerations for UEID's.  See Section 8.1. 10.1.

   The UEID is permanent.  It never change for a given device / entity.

   UEIDs are variable length.  All implementations MUST be able to
   receive UEIDs that are 33 bytes long (1 type byte and 256 bits).  The
   recommended maximum sent is also 33 bytes.

   When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the
   following bytes the ID for that type.  Several types are allowed to
   accommodate different industries and different manufacturing
   processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types
   of manufacturer registrations.

   Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126].

   +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
   | Type | Type | Specification                                       |
   | Byte | Name |                                                     |
   +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
   | 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128, 192 or 256 bit random number         |
   |      |      | generated once and stored in the device. This may   |
   |      |      | be constructed by concatenating enough identifiers  |
   |      |      | to make up an equivalent number of random bits and  |
   |      |      | then feeding the concatenation through a            |
   |      |      | cryptographic hash function. It may also be a       |
   |      |      | cryptographic quality random number generated once  |
   |      |      | at the beginning of the life of the device and      |
   |      |      | stored. It may not be smaller than 128 bits.        |
   | 0x02 | IEEE | This makes use of the IEEE company identification   |
   |      | EUI  | registry. An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or     |
   |      |      | EUI-64 and made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID,      |
   |      |      | different registered company identifiers, and some  |
   |      |      | unique per-device identifier. EUIs are often the    |
   |      |      | same as or similar to MAC addresses. This type      |
   |      |      | includes MAC-48, an obsolete name for EUI-48. (Note |
   |      |      | that while devices with multiple network interfaces |
   |      |      | may have multiple MAC addresses, there is only one  |
   |      |      | UEID for a device) [IEEE.802-2001], [OUI.Guide]     |
   | 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an      |
   |      |      | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial   |
   |      |      | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL   |
   |      |      | be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each    |
   |      |      | byte as the digit's value (not the ASCII encoding   |
   |      |      | of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not      |
   |      |      | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include     |
   |      |      | Luhn checksum or SVN information. [ThreeGPP.IMEI]   |
   +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+

                      Table 1: UEID Composition Types

   UEID's are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
   the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.

   The consumer (the relying party) Relying Party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a
   completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its
   internal structure.  For example, they should not use the OUI part of
   a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device.  Instead
   they should use the oemid claim that is defined elsewhere.  The
   reasons for this are:

   o  UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.

   o  New types of UEIDs may be created.  For example, a type 0x07 UEID
      may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
      scheme.

   o  Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID
      to another anytime they want.  For example, they may find they can
      optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type
      0x02 or vice versa.  The main requirement on the manufacturer is
      that UEIDs be universally unique.

3.4.1.  ueid CDDL

   A Device Indentifier URN is registered for UEIDs.  See Section 9.3.4.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)

   ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)

   ueid-claim = (
        ueid => ueid-type
   )

3.5.  Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs)

   An SEUID is of the same format as a UEID, but it may change to a
   different value on device life-cycle events.  Examples of these
   events are change of ownership, factory reset and on-boarding into an
   IoT device management system.  A device may have both a UEID and
   SUEIDs, neither, one or the other.

   There may be multiple SUEIDs.  Each one has a text string label the
   purpose of which is to distinguish it from others in the token.  The
   label may name the purpose, application or type of the SUEID.
   Typically, there will be few SUEDs so there is no need for a formal
   labeling mechanism like a registry.  The EAT profile may describe how
   SUEIDs should be labeled.  If there is only one SUEID, the claim
   remains a map and there still must be a label.  For example, the
   label for the SUEID used by FIDO Onboarding Protocol could simply be
   "FDO".

   There are privacy considerations for SUEID's.  See Section 8.1.

   sueids-type = 10.1.

   A Device Indentifier URN is registered for SUEIDs.  See
   Section 9.3.4.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)

   sueids-type = {
       + tstr => ueid-type
   }

   sueids-claim = (
        sueids => sueids-type
   )

3.6.  Hardware OEM Identification (oemid)

   This claim identifies the OEM of the hardware.  Any of the three
   forms may be used at the convenience of the attester implementation.
   The receiver of this claim MUST be able to handle all three forms.

3.6.1.  Random Number Based

   This format is always 16 bytes in size (128 bits).

   The OEM may create their own ID by using a cryptographic-quality
   random number generator.  They would perform this only once in the
   life of the company to generate the single ID for said company.  They
   would use that same ID in every device they make.  This uniquely
   identifies the OEM on a statistical basis and is large enough should
   there be ten billion companies.

   The OEM may also use a hash like SHA-256 and truncate the output to
   128 bits.  The input to the hash should be somethings that have at
   least 96 bits of entropy, but preferably 128 bits of entropy.  The
   input to the hash may be something whose uniqueness is managed by a
   central registry like a domain name.

   This is to be base64url encoded in JSON.

3.6.2.  IEEE (oemid) Based

   The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company
   IDs.  This claim uses that database to identify OEMs.  The contents
   of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID
   [IEEE.RA].  An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used
   as the first half of a MAC address.  MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value
   uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as
   OUI-36, a 36-bit value.  Many companies already have purchased one of
   these.  A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L,
   but not for use as a MAC address.  IEEE has published Guidelines for
   Use of EUI, OUI, and CID [OUI.Guide] and provides a lookup services
   [OUI.Lookup]
   [OUI.Lookup].

   Companies that have more than one of these IDs or MAC address blocks
   should pick one and prefer that for all their devices.

   Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation
   [IEEE.802-2001] also called the Canonical format.  When this claim is
   encoded the order of bytes in the bstr are the same as the order in
   the Hexadecimal Representation.  For example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48"
   would be encoded in 3 bytes with values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48.  For JSON
   encoded tokens, this is further base64url encoded.

3.6.1.  oemid CDDL

   oemid-claim = (
       oemid => bstr
   )

3.7.  Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims)

   The hardware version can be claimed at three different levels, the
   chip, the circuit board and the final device assembly.  An EAT can
   include any combination these claims.

   The hardware version

   This format is always 3 bytes in size in CBOR.

3.6.3.  IANA Private Enterprise Number

   IANA maintains a simple text string integer-based company registry called the format of which is
   set by each manufacturer.  The structure and sorting
   Private Enterprise Number (PEN) [PEN].

   PENs are often used to create an OID.  That is not the case here.
   They are used only as a simple integer.

   In CBOR this is encoded as a major type 0 integer in CBOR and is
   typically 3 bytes.  It is encoded as a number in JSON.

   oemid-pen = int

   oemid-ieee = bstr .size 3

   oemid-random = bstr .size 16

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       oemid-label =>
           oemid-random / oemid-ieee / oemid-pen
   )

3.7.  Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims)

   The hardware version can be claimed at three different levels, the
   chip, the circuit board and the final device assembly.  An EAT can
   include any combination these claims.

   The hardware version is a simple text string the format of which is
   set by each manufacturer.  The structure and sorting order of this
   text string can be specified using the version-scheme item from
   CoSWID [CoSWID].

   The hardware version can also be given by a 13-digit [EAN-13].  A new
   CoSWID version scheme is registered with IANA by this document in
   Section 7.3.3. 9.3.3.  An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article
   Number or most commonly as a bar code.

   chip-version-claim =

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       chip-version
       chip-version-label => tstr hw-version-type
   )

   chip-version-scheme-claim =

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       chip-version-scheme
       board-version-label => $version-scheme hw-version-type
   )

   board-version-claim =

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       board-version
       device-version-label => tstr hw-version-type
   )

   board-version-scheme-claim

   hw-version-type = (
       board-version-scheme => [
       version:  tstr,
       scheme:  $version-scheme
   )

   device-version-claim =
   ]

3.8.  Software Name Claim

   This is a simple free-form text claim for the name of the software.
   A CoSWID manifest or other type of manifest can be used instead if
   this is too simple.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       device-version sw-name-label => tstr )

   device-version-scheme-claim = (
       device-version-scheme => $version-scheme
   )

   hardware-version-claims = (
       ? chip-version-claim,
       ? board-version-claim,
       ? device-version-claim,
       ? chip-version-scheme-claim,
       ? board-version-scheme-claim,
       ? device-version-scheme-claim,
   )

3.8.

3.9.  Software Description and Version

   TODO: Add claims that reference CoSWID.

3.9. Claim

   This makes use of the CoSWID version scheme data type to give a
   simple version for the software.  A full CoSWID manifest or other
   type of manifest can be instead if this is too simple.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type)

   sw-version-type = [
       version:  tstr,
       scheme:  $version-scheme / As defined by CoSWID /
   ]

3.10.  The Security Level Claim (security-level)

   This claim characterizes the device/entity ability to defend against
   attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at
   forging EATs.  This is done by defining four security levels as described
   below.  This is similar to the key protection types defined
   by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance [FIDO.Registry].

   These claims describe security environment and countermeasures
   available on the end-entity / client end-entity/client device where the attestation key
   reside
   resides and the claims originate.

   1 - Unrestricted Unrestricted:  There is some expectation that implementor will
      protect the attestation signing keys at this level.  Otherwise  Otherwise,
      the EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.

   2- Restricted

   2 - Restricted:  Entities at this level should are not be general-purpose
      operating environments that host features such as app download
      systems, web browsers and complex productivity applications.  It
      is akin to the Secure Restricted secure-restricted level (see below) without the
      security orientation.  Examples include a Wi-Fi subsystem, an IoT
      camera, or sensor device.  Often these can be considered more
      secure than unrestricted just because they are much simpler and a
      smaller attack surface, but this won't always be the case.  Some
      unrestricted devices may be implemented in a way that provides
      poor protection of signing keys.

   3 - Secure Restricted Secure-Restricted:  Entities at this level must meet the criteria
      defined by in section 4 of FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating
      Environments [FIDO.AROE].  Examples include TEE's and schemes
      using virtualization-based security.  Like the FIDO security goal,
      security at this level is aimed at defending well against large-
      scale network / remote network/remote attacks against the device.

   4 - Hardware Hardware:  Entities at this level must include substantial
      defense against physical or electrical attacks against the device
      itself.  It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the
      device and can disassemble it.  Example  Examples include TPMs and Secure
      Elements.

   The entity should claim the highest security level it achieves and no
   higher.  This set is not extensible so as to provide a common
   interoperable description of security level to the relying party. Relying Party.  If
   a particular implementation considers this claim to be inadequate, it
   can define its own proprietary claim.  It may consider including both
   this claim as a coarse indication of security and its own proprietary
   claim as a refined indication.

   This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device
   security certification schemes scheme such as those based on FIPS 140
   [FIPS-140] or those based on Common Criteria [Common.Criteria].  The
   claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.

3.9.1.  security-level CDDL Attester.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       security-level-label =>
           security-level-cbor-type /
           security-level-json-type
   )

   security-level-cbor-type = &(
       unrestricted: 1,
       restricted: 2,
       secure-restricted: 3,
       hardware: 4
   )

   security-level-json-type =
       "unrestricted" /
       "restricted" /
       "secure-restricted" /
       "hardware"

security-level-claim = (
    security-level => security-level-cbor-type / security-level-json-type
)

3.10.

3.11.  Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot)

   The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled.  Secure boot is
   considered enabled when base software, the firmware and operating
   system, are under control of the entity manufacturer identified in
   the oemid claimd OEMID claim described in Section 3.6.  This may because the
   software is in ROM or because it is cryptographically authenticated
   or some combination of the two or other.

3.10.1.  secure-boot CDDL

   secure-boot-claim = (
       secure-boot

   $$claims-set-claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool
   )

3.11. bool)

3.12.  Debug Status Claim (debug-status)

   This applies to system-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the
   target device / submodule like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built
   into chips.  It applies to any software debug facilities related to
   root, operating system or privileged software that allow system-wide
   memory inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software
   like user mode applications.

   This characterization assumes that debug facilities can be enabled
   and disabled in a dynamic way or be disabled in some permanent way
   such that no enabling is possible.  An example of dynamic enabling is
   one where some authentication is required to enable debugging.  An
   example of permanent disabling is blowing a hardware fuse in a chip.
   The specific type of the mechanism is not taken into account.  For
   example, it does not matter if authentication is by a global password
   or by per-device public keys.

   As with all claims, the absence of the debug level claim means it is
   not reported.  A conservative interpretation might assume the Not
   Disabled state.  It could however be that it is reported in a
   proprietary claim.

   This claim is not extensible so as to provide a common interoperable
   description of debug status to the relying party. Relying Party.  If a particular
   implementation considers this claim to be inadequate, it can define
   its own proprietary claim.  It may consider including both this claim
   as a coarse indication of debug status and its own proprietary claim
   as a refined indication.

   The higher levels of debug disabling requires that all debug
   disabling of the levels below it be in effect.  Since the lowest
   level requires that all of the target's debug be currently disabled,
   all other levels require that too.

   There is no inheritance of claims from a submodule to a superior
   module or vice versa.  There is no assumption, requirement or
   guarantee that the target of a superior module encompasses the
   targets of submodules.  Thus, every submodule must explicitly
   describe its own debug state.  The verifier Verifier or relying party Relying Party
   receiving an EAT cannot assume that debug is turned off in a
   submodule because there is a claim indicating it is turned off in a
   superior module.

   An individual target device / submodule may have multiple debug
   facilities.  The use of plural in the description of the states
   refers to that, not to any aggregation or inheritance.

   The architecture of some chips or devices may be such that a debug
   facility operates for the whole chip or device.  If the EAT for such
   a chip includes submodules, then each submodule should independently
   report the status of the whole-chip or whole-device debug facility.
   This is the only way the relying party Relying Party can know the debug status of
   the submodules since there is no inheritance.

3.11.1.

3.12.1.  Enabled

   If any debug facility, even manufacturer hardware diagnostics, is
   currently enabled, then this level must be indicated.

3.11.2.

3.12.2.  Disabled

   This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled.  It
   may be possible to enable them in the future, and it may also be
   possible that they were enabled in the past after the target device/
   sub-system booted/started, but they are currently disabled.

3.11.3.

3.12.3.  Disabled Since Boot

   This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled and
   have been so since the target device/sub-system booted/started.

3.11.4.

3.12.4.  Disabled Permanently

   This level indicates all non-manufacturer facilities are permanently
   disabled such that no end user or developer cannot enable them.  Only
   the manufacturer indicated in the OEMID claim can enable them.  This
   also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and
   have been so since boot/start.

3.11.5.

3.12.5.  Disabled Fully and Permanently

   This level indicates that all debug capabilities for the target
   device/sub-module are permanently disabled.

3.11.6.  debug-status CDDL

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       debug-status-label =>
           debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
   )

   debug-status-cbor-type = &(
       enabled: 0,
       disabled: 1,
       disabled-since-boot: 2,
       disabled-permanently: 3,
       disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
   )

   debug-status-json-type =
       "enabled" /
       "disabled" /
       "disabled-since-boot" /
       "disabled-permanently" /
       "disabled-fully-and-permanently"

   debug-status-claim = (
       debug-status => debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
   )

3.12.

3.13.  Including Keys

   An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key.  The
   signing of the EAT binds the key to all the other claims in the
   token.

   The purpose for inclusion of the key may vary by use case.  For
   example, the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding
   protocol.  When the FIDO protocol includes a pubic key in its
   attestation message, the key represents the binding of a user, device
   and relying party. Relying Party.  This document describes how claims containing
   keys should be defined for the various use cases.  It does not define
   specific claims for specific use cases.

   Keys in CBOR format tokens SHOULD be the COSE_Key format [RFC8152]
   and keys in JSON format tokens SHOULD be the JSON Web Key format
   [RFC7517].  These two formats support many common key types.  Their
   use avoids the need to decode other serialization formats.  These two
   formats can be extended to support further key types through their
   IANA registries.

   The general confirmation claim format [RFC8747], [RFC7800] may also
   be used.  It provides key encryption.  It also allows for inclusion
   by reference through a key ID.  The confirmation claim format may
   employed in the definition of some new claim for a a particular use
   case.

   When the actual confirmation claim is included in an EAT, this
   document associates no use case semantics other than proof of
   posession.  Different EAT use cases may choose to associate further
   semantics.  The key in the confirmation claim MUST be protected the
   same as the key used to sign the EAT.  That is, the same, equivalent
   or better hardware defenses, access controls, key generation and such
   must be used.

3.13.

3.14.  The Location Claim (location)

   The location claim gives the location of the device entity from which
   the attestation originates.  It is derived from the W3C Geolocation
   API [W3C.GeoLoc].  The latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy
   must conform to [WGS84].  The altitude is in meters above the [WGS84]
   ellipsoid.  The two accuracy values are positive numbers in meters.
   The heading is in degrees relative to true north.  If the device is
   stationary, the heading is NaN (floating-point not-a-number).  The
   speed is the horizontal component of the device velocity in meters
   per second.

   When encoding floating-point numbers half-precision should not be
   used.  It usually does not provide enough precision for a geographic
   location.  It is not a requirement that the receiver of an EAT
   implement half-precision, so the receiver may not be able to decode
   the location.

   The location may have been cached for a period of time before token
   creation.  For example, it might have been minutes or hours or more
   since the last contact with a GPS satellite.  Either the timestamp or
   age data item can be used to quantify the cached period.  The
   timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time.

   The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time
   it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set.  The
   entity must still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.
   The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and
   token creation.

   See location-related privacy considerations in Section 8.2 10.2 below.

3.13.1.  location CDDL

   $$claims-set-claims //= (location-label => location-type)

   location-type = {
       latitude => number,
       longitude => number,
       ? altitude => number,
       ? accuracy => number,
       ? altitude-accuracy => number,
       ? heading => number,
       ? speed => number,
       ? timestamp => ~time-int,
       ? age => uint
   }

   latitude = 1 / "latitude"
   longitude = 2 / "longitude"
   altitude = 3 / "altitude"
   accuracy = 4 / "accuracy"
   altitude-accuracy = 5 / "altitude-accuracy"
   heading = 6 / "heading"
   speed = 7 / "speed"
   timestamp = 8 / "timestamp"
   age = 9 / "age"

   location-claim = (
       location-label => location-type
   )

3.14.

3.15.  The Uptime Claim (uptime)

   The "uptime" claim contains a value that represents the number of
   seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.

3.14.1.  uptime CDDL

   uptime-claim = (
       uptime

   $$claims-set-claims //= (uptime-label => uint
   )

3.15. uint)

3.16.  The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed)

   The Boot Seed claim is a random value created at system boot time
   that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot
   sessions.  This value is usually public and not protected.  It is not
   the same as a seed for a random number generator which must be kept
   secret.

   boot-seed-claim = (
       boot-seed

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (boot-seed-label => bytes
   )

3.16. bytes)

3.17.  The Intended Use Claim (intended-use)

   EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications.
   The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer
   about the intended usage of the token.  This claim can be used as a
   way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between
   different ways it uses EAT.

   1 - Generic  Generic attestation describes an application where the
      EAT consumer requres the most up-to-date security assessment of
      the attesting entity.  It is expected that this is the most
      commonly-used application of EAT.

   2- Registration  Entities that are registering for a new service may
      be expected to provide an attestation as part of the registration
      process.  This intended-use setting indicates that the attestation
      is not intended for any use but registration.

   3 - Provisioning  Entities may be provisioned with different values
      or settings by an EAT consumer.  Examples include key material or
      device management trees.  The consumer may require an EAT to
      assess device security state of the entity prior to provisioning.

   4 - Certificate Issuance (Certificate Signing Request)  Certifying
      authorities (CA's) may require attestations prior to the issuance
      of certificates related to keypairs hosted at the entity.  An EAT
      may be used as part of the certificate signing request (CSR).

   5 - Proof-of-Possession  An EAT consumer may require an attestation
      as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) appication.
      More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the
      recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the sender has
      posession of a key.  This kind of attestation may be neceesary to
      verify the security state of the entity storing the private key
      used in a PoP application.

3.16.1.  intended-use CDDL

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       intended-use-label =>
           intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
   )

   intended-use-cbor-type = &(
       generic: 1,
       registration: 2,
       provisioning: 3,
       csr: 4,
       pop: 5
   )

   intended-use-json-type =
       "generic" /
       "registration" /
       "provisioning" /
       "csr" /
       "pop"

   intended-use-claim = (
       intended-use => intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
   )

3.17.

3.18.  The Profile Claim (profile)

   See Section 5 7 for the detailed description of a profile.

   A profile is identified by either a URL or an OID.  Typically, the
   URI will reference a document describing the profile.  An OID is just
   a unique identifier for the profile.  It may exist anywhere in the
   OID tree.  There is no requirement that the named document be
   publicly accessible.  The primary purpose of the profile claim is to
   uniquely identify the profile even if it is a private profile.

   The OID is encoded in CBOR according to [CBOR-OID] [CBOR.OID] and the URI
   according to [RFC8949].  Both are unwrapped and thus not tags.  The
   OID is always absolute and never relative.  If the claims CBOR type
   is a text string it is a URI and if a byte string it is an OID.

   Note that this named "eat_profile" for JWT and is distinct from the
   already registered "profile" claim in the JWT claims registry.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (profile-label => ~uri / ~oid)

   oid = #6.4000(bstr) ; TODO: fill this in Replace with correct CDDL from OID RFC

 profile-claim = (
     profile => ~uri / ~oid
 )

3.18.

3.19.  The Software Manifests DLOA (Digital Letter or Approval) Claim (manifests)

   This claim contains descriptions (dloas)

   A DLOA (Digital Letter of software that Approval) [DLOA] is present on the
   device.  These manifests are installed on the an XML document that
   describes a certification that a device when the
   software is installed or are created as part entity has received.
   Examples of the installation
   process.  Installation certifications represented by a DLOA include those issued
   by Global Platform and those based on Common Criteria.  The DLOA is anything that adds software
   unspecific to the device,
   possibly factory any particular certification type or those issued by
   any particular organization.

   This claim is typically issued by a Verifier, not an Attester.  When
   this claim is issued by a Verifier, it MUST be because the entity,
   device or submodule has received the certification in the DLOA.

   This claim can contain more than one DLOA.  If multiple DLOAs are
   present, it MUST be because the entity, device or submodule received
   all of the certifications.

   DLOA XML documents are always fetched from a registrar that stores
   them.  This claim contains several data items used to construct a URL
   for fetching the DLOA from the particular registrar.

   The first data item is a URI for the registrar.  The second data item
   is a platform label to indicate the particular platform that was
   certified.  For platform certifications only these two are needed.

   A DLOA may equally apply to an application.  In that case it has the
   URI for the registrar, a platform label and additionally an
   application label.

   The method of combining the registrar URI, platform label and
   possibly application label is specified in [DLOA].

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ]
   )

   dloa-type = [
       dloa_registrar: ~uri
       dloa_platform_label: text
       ? dloa_application_label: text
   ]

3.20.  The Software Manifests Claim (manifests)

   This claim contains descriptions of software that is present on the
   device.  These manifests are installed on the device when the
   software is installed or are created as part of the installation
   process.  Installation is anything that adds software to the device,
   possibly factory installation, the user installing elective
   applications and so on.  The defining characteristic is that they are
   created by the software manufacturer.  The purpose of these claims in
   an EAT is to relay them without modification to the Verifier and/or
   the Relying Party.

   In some cases these will be signed by the software manufacturer
   independent of any signing for the purpose of EAT attestation.
   Manifest claims should include the manufacturer's signature (which
   will be signed over by the attestation signature).  In other cases
   the attestation signature will be the only one.

   This claim allows multiple formats for the manifest.  For example the
   manifest may be a CBOR-format CoSWID, an XML-format SWID or other.
   Identification of the type of manifest is always by a CBOR tag.  In
   many cases, for examples CoSWID, a tag will already be registered
   with IANA.  If not, a tag MUST be registered.  It can be in the
   first-come-first-served space which has minimal requirements for
   registration.

   The claim is an array of one or more manifests.  To facilitate hand
   off of the manifest to a decoding library, each manifest is contained
   in a byte string.  This occurs for CBOR-format manifests as well as
   non-CBOR format manifests.

   If a particular manifest type uses CBOR encoding, then the item in
   the array for it MUST be a byte string that contains a CBOR tag.  The
   EAT decoder must decode the byte string and then the CBOR within it
   to find the tag number to identify the type of manifest.  The
   contents of the byte string is then handed to the particular manifest
   processor for that type of manifest.  CoSWID and SUIT manifest are
   examples of this.

   If a particular manifest type does not use CBOR encoding, then the
   item in the array for it must be a CBOR tag that contains a byte
   string.  The EAT decoder uses the tag to identify the processor for
   that type of manifest.  The contents of the tag, the byte string, are
   handed to the manifest processor.  Note that a byte string is used to
   contain the manifest whether it is a text based format or not.  An
   example of this is an XML format ISO/IEC 19770 SWID.

   It is not possible to describe the above requirements in CDDL so the
   type for an individual manifest is any in the CDDL below.  The above
   text sets the encoding requirement.

   This claim allows for multiple manifests in one token since multiple
   software packages are likely to be present.  The multiple manifests
   may be of multiple formats.  In some cases EAT submodules may be used
   instead of the array structure in this claim for multiple manifests.

   When the [CoSWID] format is used, it MUST be a payload CoSWID, not an
   evidence CoSWID.

   manifests-claim =

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       manifests
       manifests-label => manifests-type
   )

   manifests-type = [+ $manifest-formats] $$manifest-formats]

   ; Must be a CoSWID payload type
   $manifest-formats
   ; TODO: signed CoSWIDs
   coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>

   $$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag

   $manifest-formats coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx

   ; TODO: make this work too
   ;$$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope_Tagged

3.19.

3.21.  The Software Evidence Claim {swevidence} (swevidence)

   This claim contains descriptions, lists, evidence or measurements of
   the software that exists on the device.  The defining characteristic
   of this claim is that its contents are created by processes on the
   device that inventory, measure or otherwise characterize the software
   on the device.  The contents of this claim do not originate from the
   software manufacturer.

   In most cases the contents of this claim are signed as part of
   attestation signing, but independent signing in addition to the
   attestation signing is not ruled out when a particular evidence
   format supports it.

   This claim uses the same mechanism for identification of the type of
   the swevidence as is used for the type of the manifest in the
   manifests claim.  It also uses the same byte string based mechanism
   for containing the claim and easing the hand off to a processing
   library.  See the discussion above in the manifests claim.

   When the [CoSWID] format is used, it MUST be evidence CoSWIDs, not
   payload CoSWIDS.

   swevidence-claim =

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       swevidence
       swevidence-label => swevidence-type
   )

   swevidence-type = [+ $swevidence-formats] $$swevidence-formats]

   ; Must be a CoSWID evidence type
   $swevidence-formats that is a CBOR tag
   ; TODO: fix the CDDL so a signed CoSWID is allowed too
   coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>
   $$swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag

3.20. coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag

3.22.  The Submodules Part SW Measurement Results Claim (swresults)

   This claims reports the outcome of the comparison of a Token (submods)

   Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules.  A
   mobile phone is a good example. measurement on
   some software to the expected Reference Values.  It may have several connectivity
   submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular).  It report a
   successful comparison, failed comparison or other.

   This claim may
   have subsystems for low-power audio be generated by the Verifier and video playback.  It may have sent to the Relying
   Party.  For example, it could be the results of the Verifier
   comparing the contents of the swevidence claim to Reference Values.

   This claim can also be generated on the device if the device has the
   ability for one or more security-oriented subsystems like subsystem to measure another subsystem.  For example,
   a TEE might have the ability to measure the software of the rich OS
   and may have the Reference Values for the rich OS.

   Within an attestation target or a Secure
   Element.

   The claims submodule, multiple results can be
   reported.  For example, it may be desirable to report the results for
   the kernel and each these individual application separately.

   For each software objective, the following can be grouped together in a submodule.

   The submods part reported.

3.22.1.  Scheme

   This is the free-form text name of a token are in a single map/object with many
   entries, one per submodule. the verification system or scheme
   that performed the verification.  There is only one submods map in a
   token.  It is identified by its specific label. no official registry of
   schemes or systems.  It is may be the name of a peer commercial product or
   such.

3.22.2.  Objective

   This roughly characterizes the coverage of the software measurement
   software.  This corresponds to
   other claims, but it the attestation target or the
   submodule.  If all of the indicated target is not called a claim because it is a container covered, the
   measurement must indicate partial.

   1 - all  Indicates all the software has been verified, for a claim set rather than an individual claim.  This submods part
   of a token allows what might be called recursion.  It allows claim
   sets inside of claim sets inside of claims sets...

3.20.1.  Two Types of Submodules

   Each entry example,
      all the software in the submod map is one of two types:

   o  A non-token submodule that is a map attestation target or object directly containing
      claims for the submodule.

   o  A nested EAT that is a fully formed, independently signed EAT
      token

3.20.1.1.  Non-token Submodules

   This is simply a map or object containing claims about submodule

   2 - firmware  Indicates all of and only the submodule.

   It may contain claims that are firmware

   3 - kernel  Refers to all of the same as its surrounding token or
   superior submodules.  For example, most-privileged software, for
      example the top-level Linux kernel

   4 - privileged  Refers to all of the token may
   have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further
   subordinate submodule may also have a UEID.

   It is signed/encrypted along with software used by the rest root,
      system or administrative account

   5 - system-libs  Refers to all of the token and thus the
   claims system libraries that are secured
      broadly shared and used by applications and such

   6 - partial  Some other partial set of the same Attester with the same signing key as software

3.22.3.  Results

   This describes the rest result of the token.

   If measurement and also the comparison
   to Reference Values.

   1 - verificaton-not-run  Indicates no attempt was made to run the
      verification

   2 - verification-indeterminite  The verification was attempted, but
      it did not produce a token is in CBOR format (a CWT result; perhaps it ran out of memory, the
      battery died or a UCCS), such

   3 - verification-failed  The verification ran to completion, the
      comparison was completed and did not compare correctly to the
      Reference Values

   4 - fully-verified  The verification ran to completion and all non-token
   submodules must be CBOR format.  If a token in in JSON format (a
   JWT),
      measurements compared correctly to Reference Values

   5 - partially-verified  The verification ran to completion and some,
      but not all non-token submodules must be in JSON format.

   When decoding, this type of submodule is recognized from the other
   type by being a data item of type map for CBOR or type object for
   JSON.

3.20.1.2.  Nested EATs measurements compared correctly to Reference Values

3.22.4.  Objective Name

   This type of submodule is a fully formed secured EAT as defined in
   this document except free-form text string that it MUST NOT be a UCCS describes the objective.  For
   example, "Linux kernel" or an unsecured JWT. "Facebook App"
   $$claims-set-claims //= (swresults-label => [ + swresult-type ])

   verification-result-cbor-type = &(
       verification-not-run: 1,
       verification-indeterminate: 2,
       verification-failed: 3,
       fully-verified: 4,
       partially-verified: 5,
   )

   verification-result-json-type =
       "verification-not-run" /
       "verification-indeterminate" /
       "verification-failed" /
       "fully-verified" /
       "partially-verified"

   verification-objective-cbor-type = &(
       all: 1,
       firmware: 2,
       kernel: 3,
       privileged: 4,
       system-libs: 5,
       partial: 6,
   )

   verification-objective-json-type =
       "all" /
       "firmware" /
       "kernel" /
       "privileged" /
       "system-libs" /
       "partial"

   swresult-type = [
       verification-system: tstr,
       objective: verification-objective-cbor-type /
           verification-objective-json-type,
       result: verification-result-cbor-type /
           verification-result-json-type,
       ? objective-name: tstr
   ]

3.23.  Submodules (submods)

   Some devices are complex, having many subsystems.  A nested token that mobile phone is
   a good example.  It may have several connectivity subsystems for
   communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular).  It may have subsystems
   for low-power audio and video playback.  It may have one that is always secured using COSE or JOSE,
   usually by an independent Attester.  When the surrounding EAT is more
   security-oriented subsystems like a
   CWT TEE or secured JWT, the nested token becomes securely bound with the
   other a Secure Element.

   The claims in the surrounding token.

   It is allowed to have for a CWT as subsystem can be grouped together in a submodule or
   submod.

   The submods are in a JWT and vice versa,
   but this SHOULD be avoided unless necessary.

3.20.1.2.1.  Surrounding EAT single map/object, one entry per submodule.
   There is CBOR format

   They type of an EAT nested only one submods map/object in a CWT token.  It is determined identified by whether the CBOR
   type
   its specific label.  It is a text string or a byte string.  If a text string, then peer to other claims, but it is not
   called a JWT.  If a byte string, then claim because it is a CWT.

   A CWT nested in container for a CBOR-format token is always wrapped by claims set rather than
   an individual claim.  This submods part of a byte
   string for easier handling with standard CBOR decoders and token
   processing APIs that will typically take a byte buffer as input.

   Nested CWTs may allows what might
   be either a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message.
   COSE layers in called recursion.  It allows claims sets inside of claims sets
   inside of claims sets...

3.23.1.  Submodule Types

   The following sections define the three major types of submodules:

   o  A submodule Claims-Set

   o  A nested CWT EATs MUST token, which can be a COSE_Tagged_Message, never a
   COSE_Untagged_Message.  If a nested any valid EAT has more than one level token, CBOR or JSON

   o  The digest of
   COSE, for example one that is both encrypted and signed, a
   COSE_Tagged_message must detached Claims-Set

   These are distinguished primarily by their data type which may be used at every level.

3.20.1.2.2.  Surrounding EAT is JSON format

   When a CWT
   map/object, string or array.

3.23.1.1.  Submodule Claims-Set

   This is nested in a JWT, it must be as a 55799 tag in order to
   distinguish it from a nested JWT.

   When a nested EAT in simply a JWT subordinate Claims-Set containing claims about the
   submodule.

   The submodule claims-set is decoded, first remove produced by the base64url
   encoding.  Next, check to see if it starts with same Attester as the bytes 0xd9d9f7.
   If so, then it
   surrounding token.  It is a CWT secured using the same mechanism as a JWT will never start with these four
   bytes.  If not if it is a JWT.

   Other than the 55799 tag requirement, tag usage for CWT's nested in a
   JSON format
   enclosing token follow (e.g., it is signed by the same rules attestation key).  It
   roughly corresponds to an Attester Target Environment as for CWTs nested described in CBOR-
   format tokens.
   the RATS architecture.

   It may be a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message
   and COSE_Tagged_Message MUST be used at all COSE layers.

3.20.1.3.  Unsecured JWTs and UCCS Tokens contain claims that are the same as Submodules

   To incorporate a UCCS its surrounding token as a submodule, it MUST be as a non-token
   submodule.  This can be accomplished inserting or
   superior submodules.  For example, the content top-level of the
   UCCS Tag into the token may
   have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further
   subordinate submodule map. may also have a UEID.

   The content encoding of a UCCS tag submodule Claims-Set is
   exactly a map of claims always the same as required for a non-token submodule.  If the UCCS
   encoding as the token it is part of.

   This data type for this type of submodule is not a UCCS tag, then it can just be inserted into map/object as that is
   the
   submodule map directly.

   The definition type of a nested EAT Claims-Set.

3.23.1.2.  Nested Token

   This type of submodule is that it is one
   that a fully formed complete token.  It is secured (signed)
   typically produced by an a separate Attester.  Since UCCS tokens are
   unsecured, they do not fulfill this definition and must be non-token
   submodules.

   To incorporate an Unsecured JWT  It is typically used by a
   Composite Device as described in RATS Architecture
   [RATS.Architecture]

   In being a submodule, submodule of the null-security
   JOSE wrapping should be removed.  The resulting claims set should be
   inserted as a non-token submodule.

   To incorporate a UCCS token in a surrounding JSON token, the UCCS
   token claims should be translated from CBOR it is
   cryptographically bound to JSON.  To incorporate
   an Unsecured JWT into a the surrounding CBOR-format token, token.  If it was conveyed
   in parallel with the null-
   security JOSE should surrounding token, there would be removed no such
   binding and the claims translated from JSON
   to CBOR.

3.20.2.  No Inheritance

   The subordinate modules do not inherit anything attackers could substitute a good attestation from
   another device for the containing
   token.  The subordinate modules must explicitly include all attestation of their
   claims.  This is an errant subsystem.

   A nested token does NOT need to use the case even for claims like same encoding as the nonce and age.
   enclosing token.  This rule is in place for simplicity.  It avoids complex inheritance
   rules that might vary from one type of claim to another.

3.20.3.  Security Levels

   The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always allow Composite Devices to be less than or equal built
   without regards to that of the containing modules in the case
   of non-token submodules.  It makes no sense for encoding supported by their Attesters.

   Thus a module of lesser
   security to be signing claims of CBOR-encoded token like a module of higher security.  An
   example of CWT or UCCS can have a JWT as a
   nested token submodule and a JSON-encoded token can have a CWT or
   UCCS as a nested token submodule.

   The data type for this type of submodule is either a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts
   (e.g. text or byte
   string.

   Mechanisms are defined for identifying the high-level OS) encoding and type of the device.

   The opposite may be true for the
   nested tokens.  They usually have
   their own more secure key material.  An example of this is an
   embedded secure element.

3.20.4.  Submodule Names

   The label or name token.  These mechanisms are different for each submodule in the submods map is a text
   string naming the submodule.  No submodules may have the same name.

3.20.5.  submods CDDL
   ; CBOR and JSON
   encoding.  The part type of a CBOR-encoded nested token that contains all the submodules.  It is a peer
   ; with identified
   using the claims CBOR tagging mechanism and thus is in the token, but not a claim, only common with
   identification used when any CBOR-encoded token is part of a map/object to
   ; hold all CBOR-
   based protocol.  A new simple type mechanism is defined for
   indication of the submodules.

   submods-part = (
       submods => submods-type
   )

   submods-type = { + submod-type }

   ; The type of a JSON-encoded token since there is no JSON
   equivalent of tagging.

3.23.1.2.1.  Surrounding EAT is CBOR-Encoded

   If the submodule which can either be is a byte string, then the nested claim set or token is CBOR-
   encoded.  The byte string always wraps a
   ; token that is a tag.  The
   tag identifies whether the nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in token is a bstr
   ; CWT, a UCCS or a tstr.

   submod-type = (
       submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token
   )

   ; When this CBOR-
   encoded DEB.

   If the submodule is a bstr, text string, then the contents are an eat-token nested token is JSON-
   encoded.  The text string contains JSON.  That JSON is the exactly
   the JSON described in CWT or UCCS the next section with one exception.  The token
   can't be CBOR-encoded.

   ; format.  When this This specifies how one fully-formed token is nested inside a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT
   ; format.

   nested-token = bstr / tstr; CBOR-format token.  The fully-formed nested token is any valid
   ; Each submodule has a unique text string name.

   submod-name = tstr

4.  Endorsements and Verification Keys token, CBOR or JSON (JWT, CWT, UCCS, DEB...)  The Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs mechanism for
   ; identifying the
   cryptographic part type of an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE
   signature).  This section describes several ways to identify the
   verification key.  There nested token is not one standard method.

   The verification key itself may be a public key, a symmetric key or
   something complicated in specific to the case format
   ; of a scheme like Direct Anonymous
   Attestation (DAA).

   RATS Architecture [RATS.Architecture] describes what the surrounding token, CBOR in this case.
   ;
   ; A primary reason this is called an
   Endorsement.  This encoding-specific is that JSON does not
   ; have an input equivalent to CBOR tags.
   ;
   ; If the Verifier that data type here is usually text, then the
   basis nested token is JSON
   ; format, one of the trust placed a JWT, UJCS or JSON-encoded DEB. The means for
   ; distinguishing which is in an EAT and the Attester that generated
   it.  It may contain the public key for verification definition of JSON-encoded
   ; Nested-Token.  If the signature
   on data type is bstr, then the EAT. nested token
   ; is CBOR format. It may contain Reference Values to which is byte-string wrapped and identified by a
   ;CBOR tag.

   Nested-Token =
       tstr / ; A JSON-encoded Nested-Token (see json-nested-token.cddl)
       bstr .cbor Tagged-CBOR-Token

3.23.1.2.2.  Surrounding EAT claims are
   compared as part is JSON-Encoded

   A nested token in a JSON-encoded token is an array of the verification process.  It may contain implied
   claims, those two items.  The
   first is a string that are passed on to indicates the Relying Party in Attestation
   Results.

   There type of the second item as
   follows:

   "JWT"  A JWT formatted according to [RFC7519]

   "CBOR"  Some base64url-encoded CBOR that is not yet any standard format(s) for an Endorsement.  One
   format a tag that may be used for an Endorsement is either a
      CWT, UCCS or CBOR-encoded DEB

   "UJCS"  A UJCS-Message.  (A UJCS-Message is identical to a JSON-
      encoded Claims-Set)

   "DEB"  A JSON-encoded Detached EAT Bundle.

   ; This describes a nested token that occurs inside a JSON-encoded
   ; token. It uses an X.509 certificate.
   Endorsement data like Reference Values array that is made up of a type indicator and implied claims can be
   carried in X.509 v3 extensions.  In this use, the public key in the
   X.509 certificate becomes
   ; actual token.  This is a substitute for the verification key, so identification CBOR tag mechanism that
   ; JSON does not have.

   Nested-Token = [
      type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "UJCS" / "DEB",
      nested-token : JWT-Message /
                     B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token /
                     DEB-JSON-Message /
                     UJCS-Message
   ]

   ; This text is a Tagged-CBOR-Token (see cbor-token.cddl) that is
   ; base64url encoded.  For example, it is a CWT that is a COSE_Sign1
   ; that is a CBOR tag that has been base64url encoded.

   B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

3.23.1.3.  Detached Submodule Digest

   This is type of submodule equivalent to a Claims-Set submodule,
   except the Endorsement Claims-Set is also identification conveyed separately outside of the verification key.

   The verification key identification and establishment token.

   This type of trust submodule consists of a digest made using a
   cryptographic hash of a Claims-Set.  The Claims-Set is not included
   in the
   EAT and the attester may also be by some other means than an
   Endorsement.

   For token.  It is conveyed to the components (Attester, Verifier, Relying Party,...) Verifier outside of a
   particular end-end attestation system to reliably interoperate, its
   definition should specify how the verification key token.
   The submodule containing the digest is identified.
   Usually, this will be in the profile document for called a particular
   attestation system.

4.1.  Identification Methods

   Following detached digest.  The
   separately conveyed Claims-Set is called a list detached claims set.

   The input to the digest is exactly the byte-string wrapped encoded
   form of possible methods the Claims-Set for the submodule.  That Claims-Set can
   include other submodules including nested tokens and detached
   digests.

   The primary use for this is to facilitate the implementation of key a
   small and secure attester, perhaps purely in hardware.  This small,
   secure attester implements COSE signing and only a few claims,
   perhaps just UEID and hardware identification.  A
   specific attestation system may employ any one  It has inputs for
   digests of these or one not
   listed here. submodules, perhaps 32-byte hardware registers.  Software
   running on the device constructs larger claim sets, perhaps very
   large, encodes them and digests them.  The following assumes Endorsements digests are X.509 certificates or
   equivalent written into
   the small secure attesters registers.  The EAT produced by the small
   secure attester only contains the UEID, hardware identification and
   digests and thus does not mention or define any identifier for
   Endorsements in other formats.  If such an Endorsement format is
   created, new identifiers for them will also need thus simple enough to be created.

4.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID implemented in hardware.
   Probably, every data item in it is of fixed length.

   The COSE standard header parameter integrity protection for Key ID (kid) may be used.  See
   [RFC8152] and [RFC7515]

   COSE leaves the semantics of the key ID open-ended.  It could larger Claims Sets will not be a
   record locator as
   secure as those originating in a database, a hash of a public key, an input to a
   KDF, an authority key identifier (AKI) for an X.509 certificate or
   other.  The profile document should specify what hardware block, but the key ID's
   semantics are.

4.1.2.  JWS material
   and COSE X.509 Header Parameters

   COSE X.509 [COSE.X509.Draft] and JSON Web Siganture [RFC7515] define
   several header parameters (x5t, x5u,...) hardware-based claims will be.  It is possible for referencing or carrying
   X.509 certificates any the hardware
   to enforce hardware access control (memory protection) on the digest
   registers so that some of which may the larger claims can be used.

   The X.509 certificate more secure.  For
   example, one register may be writable only by the TEE, so the
   detached claims from the TEE will have TEE-level security.

   The data type for this type of submodule is an Endorsement array It contains two
   data items, an algorithm identifier and thus carrying
   additional input to a byte string containing the Verifier.  It
   digest.

   A DEB, described in Section 5, may be just an X.509
   certificate, not an Endorsement.  The same header parameters are used
   in both cases.  It is up to the attestation system design convey detached claims
   sets and the
   Verifier to determine which.

4.1.3.  CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters

   Compressed X.509 and CBOR Native certificates are defined by CBOR
   Certificates [CBOR.Cert.Draft].  These are semantically compatible token with X.509 and therefore can be used as an equivalent to X.509 as
   described above.

   These are identified by their own header parameters (c5t, c5u,...).

4.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification

   For some attestation systems, detached digests.  EAT, however,
   doesn't require use of a claim DEB.  Any other protocols may be re-used as a key
   identifier.  For example, the UEID uniquely identifies the device used to
   convey detached claims sets and
   therefore can work well as a key identifier or Endorsement
   identifier.

   This has the advantage token with their detached
   digests.  Note that key identification requires no additional
   bytes since detached Claims-Sets are usually signed,
   protocols conveying them must make sure they are not modified in
   transit.

3.23.2.  No Inheritance

   The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the EAT and makes the EAT smaller.

   This has the disadvantage that the unverified EAT containing
   token.  The subordinate modules must be
   substantially decoded to obtain explicitly include all of their
   claims.  This is the identifier since case even for claims like the identifier nonce.

   This rule is in the COSE/JOSE payload, not in the headers.

4.2.  Other Considerations

   In all cases there must be some way place for simplicity.  It avoids complex inheritance
   rules that the verification key is
   itself verified or determined might vary from one type of claim to be trustworthy. another.

3.23.3.  Security Levels

   The key
   identification itself is never enough.  This will security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always
   be by some
   out-of-band mechanism less than or equal to that is not described here.  For example, of the
   Verifier may containing modules in the case
   of non-token submodules.  It makes no sense for a module of lesser
   security to be configured with signing claims of a root certificate or module of higher security.  An
   example of this is a master key TEE signing claims made by the Verifier system administrator.

   Often an X.509 certificate or an Endorsement carries more than just non-TEE parts
   (e.g. the verification key.  For example, an X.509 certificate might high-level OS) of the device.

   The opposite may be true for the nested tokens.  They usually have
   their own more secure key usage constraints and an Endorsement might have Reference Values.
   When material.  An example of this is the case, the key identifier must be either a protected
   header an
   embedded secure element.

3.23.4.  Submodule Names

   The label or name for each submodule in the payload such that it submods map is cryptographically bound to a text
   string naming the EAT.  This is in line with submodule.  No submodules may have the requirements in section 6 on Key
   Identification in JSON Web Signature [RFC7515].

5.  Profiles same name.

3.23.5.  CDDL for submods

   ; This EAT specification does not gaurantee that implementations is the part of it
   will interoperate.  The variability in this specification a token that contains all the submodules.  It
   ; is
   necessary to accommodate a peer with the widely varying use cases.  An EAT
   profile narrows claims in the specification for token, but not a specific use case.  An ideal
   EAT profile will gauarantee interoperability.

   The profile claim, only a
   ; map/object to hold all the submodules.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })

   ; A submodule can be named be:
   ; - A simple Claims-Set (encoded in the token using same format as the profile claim
   described in Section 3.17.

5.1.  Format token)
   ; - A digest of a Profile Document

   A profile document doesn't have to be detached Claims-Set (encoded in any particular format.  It
   may be simple text, something more formal or a combination.

   In some cases CDDL the same format as
   ;    the token)
   ; - A nested token which may be created that replaces CDDL in this either CBOR or other
   document to express some profile requirements.  For example, to
   require JSON format. Further,
   ;   the altitude data item in mechanism for identifying and containing the location claim, CDDL can be
   written that replicates nested token
   ;   depends on the location claim with format of the altitude no
   longer optional.

5.2.  List surrounding token, particularly
   ;   because JSON doesn't have any equivalent of Profile Issues

   The following is a list of EAT, CWT, UCCS, JWS, COSE, JOSE and CBOR
   options that tag so a profile should address.

5.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or both

   The profile should indicate whether
   ;   JSON-specific mechanism is invented. Also, there is the token format should issue
   ;   that binary data must be CBOR,
   JSON, both or even some other encoding.  If some other encoding, a
   specification for how the CDDL described here B64 encoded when carried in
   ;   JSON. Nested-Token is serialized defined in the format specific CDDL, not
   ;   here.

   ; Note that at nested token can either be a signed token like a CWT
   ; or JWT, an unsigned token like a UCCS or UJCS, or a DEB (detached
   ; EAT bundle).  The specific encoding of these is necessary. format-specific
   ; so it doesn't appear here.

   Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest

   ; This should be addressed is for the top-level token both JSON and CBOR.  JSON uses text label for any nested
   tokens.  For example, a profile might require all nested tokens to be
   of
   ; algorithm from JOSE registry. CBOR uses integer label for
   ; algorithm from COSE registry. In JSON the same encoding digest is base64
   ; encoded.

   Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
      algorithm : int / text,
      digest : bstr
   ]

4.  Unprotected JWT Claims-Sets

   This is simply the JSON equivalent of an Unprotected CWT Claims-Set
   [UCCS.Draft].

   It has no protection of its own so protections must be provided by
   the top level token.

5.2.2.  CBOR Map protocol carrying it.  These are extensively discussed in
   [UCCS.Draft].  All the security discussion and Array Encoding security
   considerations in [UCCS.Draft] apply to UJCS.

   (Note: The profile should indicate whether definite-length arrays/maps,
   indefinite-length arrays/maps or both are allowed.  A good default EAT author is open to allow only definite-length arrays/maps.

   An alternate this definition being moved into the
   UCCS draft, perhaps along with the related CDDL.  It is to allow both definite and indefinite-length arrays/
   maps.  The decoder should accept either.  Encoders place here
   for now so that need to fit
   on very small hardware or be actually implement in hardware can use
   indefinite-length encoding.

   This applies to individual EAT claims, CWT and COSE parts of the
   implementation.

5.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding

   The profile should indicate whether definite-length strings,
   indefinite-length strings or both current UCCS draft plus this document are allowed.  A good default
   complete.  UJCS is to
   allow only definite-length strings.  As with map and array encoding,
   allowing indefinite-length strings can be beneficial needed for some smaller
   implementations.

5.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization

   The profile should indicate whether encoders must the same use preferred
   serialization.  The profile should indicate whether decoders must
   accept non-preferred serialization.

5.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection

   COSE and JOSE have several options cases that a UCCS is
   needed.  Further, JSON will commonly be used to convey Attestation
   Results since JSON is common for signed, MACed and encrypted
   messages.  EAT/CWT has the option server to server communications.
   Server to server communications will often have no protection using UCCS established security
   (e.g., TLS) therefore the signing and JOSE has a NULL protection option.  It encryption from JWS and JWE are
   unnecssary and burdensome).

5.  Detached EAT Bundles

   A detached EAT bundle is possible a structure to implement
   no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then encrypt convey a fully-formed and so on.  All
   combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE,
   signed token plus detached claims set that relate to that token.  It
   is a top-level EAT message like a CWT, JWT, CWT UCCS and UJCS.  It can be
   used any place that CWT, JWT, UCCS or UJCS messages are allowed by
   EAT.

   The profile should list the protections that must used.  It may
   also be supported by all
   decoders implementing the profile.  The encoders them must implement sent as a subset of what submodule.

   A DEB has two main parts.

   The first part is listed a full top-level token.  This top-level token must
   have at least one submodule that is a detached digest.  This top-
   level token may be either CBOR or JSON-encoded.  It may be a CWT,
   JWT, UCCS or UJCS, but not a DEB.  The same mechanism for
   distinguishing the decoders, perhaps only one.

   Implementations may choose type for nested token submodules is used here.

   The second part is a map/object containing the detached Claims-Sets
   corresponding to sign or MAC before encryption so that the implementation layer doing detached digests in the signing or MACing can be full token.  When the
   smallest.  It
   DEB is often easier to make smaller implementations more
   secure, perhaps even implementing CBOR-encoded, each Claims-Set is wrapped in solely a byte string.
   When the DEB is JSON-encoded, each Claims-Set is base64url encoded.
   All the detached Claims-Sets MUST be encoded in hardware.  The key
   material the same format as
   the DEB.  No mixing of encoding formats is allowed for the Claims-
   Sets in a signature DEB.

   For CBOR-encoded DEBs, tag TBD602 can be used to identify it.  The
   normal rules apply for use or MAC non-use of a tag.  When it is sent as a private key, while for
   encryption
   submodule, it is likely to be always sent as a public key.  The key for encryption
   requires less protection.

5.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms

   The profile document should list tag to distinguish it from the COSE algorithms that a Verifier
   must implement.
   other types of nested tokens.

   The Attester will select one digests of them.  Since there the detached claims sets are associated with detached
   claims-sets by label/name.  It is no negotiation, up to the Verifier should implement all algorithms
   listed constructor of the
   detached EAT bundle to ensure the names uniquely identify the
   detached claims sets.  Since the names are used only in the profile.

5.2.7.  Verification Key Identification

   Section Section 4 describes a number detached
   EAT bundle, they can be very short, perhaps one byte.

   ; Top-level definition of methods a DEB for identifying CBOR and JSON

   Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
       main-token : Nested-Token,
       detached-claims-sets: {
           + tstr => cbor-wrapped-claims-set / json-wrapped-claims-set
       }
   ]

   ; text content is a
   verification key. base64url encoded JSON-format Claims-Set

   json-wrapped-claims-set = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

   cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set

6.  Endorsements and Verification Keys

   The profile document should specify one Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs the
   cryptographic part of these
   or one that an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE/
   JOSE signature).  This section describes several ways to identify the
   verification key.  There is not described.  The ones described in this document
   are only roughly described. one standard method.

   The profile document should go into the
   full detail.

5.2.8.  Endorsement Identification

   Similar to, verification key itself may be a public key, a symmetric key or perhaps the same as Verification Key Identification,
   something complicated in the profile may wish to specify how Endorsements are case of a scheme like Direct Anonymous
   Attestation (DAA).

   RATS Architecture [RATS.Architecture] describes what is called an
   Endorsement.  This is an input to be
   identified.  However note the Verifier that Endorsement Identification is
   optional, where as key identification is not.

5.2.9.  Freshness

   Just about every use case will require some means usually the
   basis of knowing the trust placed in an EAT
   is recent enough and not a replay the Attester that generated
   it.  It may contain the public key for verification of an old token.  The profile
   should describe how freshness is achieved.  The section the signature
   on Freshness
   in [RATS-Architecture] describes some of the possible solutions EAT.  It may contain Reference Values to
   achieve this.

5.2.10.  Required Claims

   The profile can list which EAT claims whose absence results in Verification
   failure.

5.2.11.  Prohibited Claims

   The profile can list claims whose presence results are
   compared as part of the verification process.  It may contain implied
   claims, those that are passed on to the Relying Party in Verification
   failure.

5.2.12.  Additional Claims

   The profile Attestation
   Results.

   There is not yet any standard format(s) for an Endorsement.  One
   format that may describe entirely new claims.  These be used for an Endorsement is an X.509 certificate.
   Endorsement data like Reference Values and implied claims can be
   required or optional.

5.2.13.  Refined Claim Definition
   carried in X.509 v3 extensions.  In this use, the public key in the
   X.509 certificate becomes the verification key, so identification of
   the Endorsement is also identification of the verification key.

   The profile may lock down optional aspects verification key identification and establishment of individual claims.  For
   example, it may require altitude trust in the location claim, or it
   EAT and the attester may
   require that HW Versions always also be described using EAN-13.

5.2.14.  CBOR Tags

   The profile should specify whether by some other means than an
   Endorsement.

   For the token should be components (Attester, Verifier, Relying Party,...) of a CWT Tag or
   not.  Similarly, the profile
   particular end-end attestation system to reliably interoperate, its
   definition should specify whether how the token should
   be a UCCS tag or not.

   When COSE protection verification key is used, the profile should specify whether COSE
   tags are used or not.  Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags identified.
   Usually, this will be used in a CWT tag.

   Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying
   protocol identifies the object as an EAT.

5.2.15.  Manifests and Software Evidence Claims

   The profile should specify which formats are allowed document for the
   manifests and software evidence claims.  The profile may also go on
   to say which parts and options a particular
   attestation system.

6.1.  Identification Methods

   Following is a list of these formats are used, allowed and
   prohibited.

6.  Encoding

   This makes use possible methods of the types defined in CDDL Appendix D, Standard
   Prelude.

   Some key identification.  A
   specific attestation system may employ any one of the CDDL included here is for claims that are defined in CWT
   [RFC8392] or JWT [RFC7519] these or one not
   listed here.

   The following assumes Endorsements are in the IANA CWT X.509 certificates or JWT registries.
   CDDL was
   equivalent and thus does not mention or define any identifier for
   Endorsements in use when these claims where defined.

6.1.  Common CDDL Types

   time-int other formats.  If such an Endorsement format is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows
   floating-point representation.

   Note that unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not the URI tag
   defined in [RFC8949].  They are just text strings that contain a URI.

   string-or-uri = tstr

   time-int = #6.1(int)

6.2.  CDDL
   created, new identifiers for CWT-defined Claims

   This section provides CDDL them will also need to be created.

6.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID

   The COSE standard header parameter for Key ID (kid) may be used.  See
   [RFC8152] and [RFC7515]

   COSE leaves the claims defined in CWT.  It is non-
   normative as [RFC8392] is the authoritative definition semantics of these
   claims.

   Note that the subject, issue and audience claims may key ID open-ended.  It could be a text string
   containing a URI per [RFC8392] and [RFC7519].  These are never the
   URI tag defined
   record locator in [RFC8949].

   $$eat-extension //= (
       ? issuer => text,
       ? subject => text,
       ? audience => text,
       ? expiration => time,
       ? not-before => time,
       ? issued-at => time,
       ? cwt-id => bytes,
   )

   issuer = 1
   subject = 2
   audience = 3
   expiration = 4
   not-before = 5
   issued-at = 6
   cwt-id = 7

6.3.  JSON

6.3.1.  JSON Labels
; The following are Claim Keys (labels) assigned a database, a hash of a public key, an input to a
   KDF, an authority key identifier (AKI) for JSON-encoded tokens.

ueid /= "ueid"
sueids /= "sueids"
nonce /= "nonce"
oemid /= "oemid"
security-level /= "seclevel"
secure-boot /= "secboot"
debug-status /= "dbgstat"
location /= "location"
uptime /= "uptime" an X.509 certificate or
   other.  The profile /= "eat-profile"
intended-use /= "intuse"
boot-seed /= "bootseed"
submods /= "submods"
timestamp /= "timestamp"
manifests /= "manifests"
swevidence /= "swevidence"

latitude /= "lat"
longitude /= "long"
altitude /= "alt"
accuracy /= "accry"
altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
heading /= "heading"
speed /= "speed"

6.3.2.  JSON Interoperability

   JSON document should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E.  In addition, specify what the
   following CDDL types are encoded in key ID's
   semantics are.

6.1.2.  JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters

   COSE X.509 [COSE.X509.Draft] and JSON as follows:

   o  bstr - must be base64url encoded

   o  time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 Web Siganture [RFC7515] define
   several header parameters (x5t, x5u,...) for referencing or carrying
   X.509 certificates any of
      [RFC7519].

   o  string-or-uri - must which may be encoded as StringOrURI as described
      section 2 of [RFC7519].

   o  uri - must used.

   The X.509 certificate may be a URI [RFC3986].

   o  oid - encoded as a string using an Endorsement and thus carrying
   additional input to the well established dotted-
      decimal notation (e.g., Verifier.  It may be just an X.509
   certificate, not an Endorsement.  The same header parameters are used
   in both cases.  It is up to the text "1.2.250.1").

6.4. attestation system design and the
   Verifier to determine which.

6.1.3.  CBOR

6.4.1. Certificate COSE Header Parameters

   Compressed X.509 and CBOR Interoperability Native certificates are defined by CBOR allows data items
   Certificates [CBOR.Cert.Draft].  These are semantically compatible
   with X.509 and therefore can be used as an equivalent to X.509 as
   described above.

   These are identified by their own header parameters (c5t, c5u,...).

6.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification

   For some attestation systems, a claim may be serialized in more than one form.  If
   the sender uses re-used as a form that key
   identifier.  For example, the receiver can't decode, there will not
   be interoperability.

   This specification gives no blanket requirements to narrow CBOR
   serialization for all uses of EAT. UEID uniquely identifies the device and
   therefore can work well as a key identifier or Endorsement
   identifier.

   This allows individual uses to
   tailor serialization to has the environment.  It also may result in EAT
   implementations advantage that don't interoperate.

   One way to guarantee interoperability is to clearly specify CBOR
   serialization key identification requires no additional
   bytes in a profile document.  See Section 5 for a list of
   serialization issues the EAT and makes the EAT smaller.

   This has the disadvantage that should be addressed. the unverified EAT will must be commonly used where
   substantially decoded to obtain the device generating identifier since the attestation identifier
   is constrained and in the receiver/verifier of COSE/JOSE payload, not in the attestation headers.

6.2.  Other Considerations

   In all cases there must be some way that the verification key is a
   capacious server.  Following
   itself verified or determined to be trustworthy.  The key
   identification itself is a set of serialization requirements
   that work well for never enough.  This will always be by some
   out-of-band mechanism that use case and are guaranteed to interoperate.
   Use of this serialization is recommended where possible, but not
   required.  An EAT profile described here.  For example, the
   Verifier may just reference be configured with a root certificate or a master key by
   the following section
   rather Verifier system administrator.

   Often an X.509 certificate or an Endorsement carries more than spell out serialization details.

6.4.1.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization

   o  Preferred serialization described in section 4.1 of [RFC8949] just
   the verification key.  For example, an X.509 certificate might have
   key usage constraints and an Endorsement might have Reference Values.
   When this is
      not required.  The EAT decoder the case, the key identifier must accept all forms of number
      serialization.  The EAT encoder may use any form be either a protected
   header or in the payload such that it wishes.

   o  The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length arrays and maps as
      described is cryptographically bound to
   the EAT.  This is in line with the requirements in section 3.2.2 of [RFC8949].  The 6 on Key
   Identification in JSON Web Signature [RFC7515].

7.  Profiles

   This EAT encoder may use
      indefinite length arrays and maps if specification does not gaurantee that implementations of it wishes.

   o
   will interoperate.  The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length strings as described variability in section 3.2.3 of [RFC8949].  The EAT encoder may use indefinite
      length strings if it wishes.

   o  Sorting of maps by key this specification is not required.  The
   necessary to accommodate the widely varying use cases.  An EAT decoder must not
      rely on sorting.

   o  Deterministic encoding
   profile narrows the specification for a specific use case.  An ideal
   EAT profile will guarantee interoperability.

   The profile can be named in the token using the profile claim
   described in Section 4.2 3.18.

   A profile can apply to Attestation Evidence or to Attestation Results
   or both.

7.1.  Format of [RFC8949] is
      not required.

   o  Basic validity described a Profile Document

   A profile document doesn't have to be in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must any particular format.  It
   may be
      followed.  The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels simple text, something more formal or invalid UTF-8 strings.

6.5.  Collected a combination.

   In some cases CDDL may be created that replaces CDDL

; This is the top-level definition of the claims in EAT tokens.  To
; form an actual EAT Token, this claim set is enclosed in a COSE, JOSE
; or UCCS message.

eat-claim-set = {
    ? ueid-claim,
    ? sueids-claim,
    ? nonce-claim,
    ? oemid-claim,
    ? hardware-version-claims,
    ? security-level-claim,
    ? secure-boot-claim,
    ? debug-status-claim,
    ? location-claim,
    ? intended-use-claim,
    ? profile-claim,
    ? uptime-claim,
    ? manifests-claim,
    ? swevidence-claim,
    ? submods-part,
    * $$eat-extension,
}

; This is other
   document to express some profile requirements.  For example, to
   require the top-level definition altitude data item in the location claim, CDDL can be
   written that replicates the location claim with the altitude no
   longer optional.

7.2.  List of an EAT Token.  It Profile Issues

   The following is a list of EAT, CWT, JWT
; UCCS, JWS, UJCS, COSE, JOSE and
   CBOR options that a profile should address.

7.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or UCSS where both

   The profile should indicate whether the payload is an eat-claim-set. A JWT_Message is what
; is defined by JWT in RFC 7519. (RFC 7519 doesn't use CDDL so a there
; is no actual CDDL definition of JWT_Message).

eat-token = EAT_Tagged_Message / EAT_Untagged_Message / JWT_Message

; This is CBOR-format EAT token in the CWT or UCCS format that is should be CBOR,
   JSON, both or even some other encoding.  If some other encoding, a
; tag.  COSE_Tagged_message
   specification for how the CDDL described here is defined serialized in RFC 8152.  Tag 601 that
   encoding is
; proposed by the UCCS draft, but not yet assigned.

EAT_Tagged_Message = #6.61(COSE_Tagged_Message) / #6.601(eat-claim-set)

; necessary.

   This is a CBOR-format EAT should be addressed for the top-level token that is and for any nested
   tokens.  For example, a CWT profile might require all nested tokens to be
   of the same encoding of the top level token.

7.2.2.  CBOR Map and Array Encoding

   The profile should indicate whether definite-length arrays/maps,
   indefinite-length arrays/maps or UCSS that both are allowed.  A good default is not a
; tag COSE_Tagged_message
   to allow only definite-length arrays/maps.

   An alternate is to allow both definite and COSE_Untagged_Message are defined indefinite-length arrays/
   maps.  The decoder should accept either.  Encoders that need to fit
   on very small hardware or be actually implement in RFC
; 8152.

EAT_Untagged_Message = COSE_Tagged_Message / COSE_Untagged_Message / UCCS_Untagged_Message
; hardware can use
   indefinite-length encoding.

   This is an "unwrapped" UCCS tag. Unwrapping a tag means applies to use the
; definition individual EAT claims, CWT and COSE parts of its content without the preceding type 6 tag
; integer. Since a UCCS
   implementation.

7.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding

   The profile should indicate whether definite-length strings,
   indefinite-length strings or both are allowed.  A good default is nothing but a tag for an unsecured CWT
; claim set, unwrapping reduces to a bare eat-claim-set.

UCCS_Untagged_Message = eat-claim-set

string-or-uri = tstr

time-int = #6.1(int)
$$eat-extension //= (
    ? issuer => text,
   allow only definite-length strings.  As with map and array encoding,
   allowing indefinite-length strings can be beneficial for some smaller
   implementations.

7.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization

   The profile should indicate whether encoders must use preferred
   serialization.  The profile should indicate whether decoders must
   accept non-preferred serialization.

7.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection

   COSE and JOSE have several options for signed, MACed and encrypted
   messages.  EAT/CWT has the option to have no protection using UCCS
   and JOSE has a NULL protection option.  It is possible to implement
   no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then encrypt and so on.  All
   combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, CWT, UCCS and UJCS are
   allowed by EAT.

   The profile should list the protections that must be supported by all
   decoders implementing the profile.  The encoders them must implement
   a subset of what is listed for the decoders, perhaps only one.

   Implementations may choose to sign or MAC before encryption so that
   the implementation layer doing the signing or MACing can be the
   smallest.  It is often easier to make smaller implementations more
   secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware.  The key
   material for a signature or MAC is a private key, while for
   encryption it is likely to be a public key.  The key for encryption
   requires less protection.

7.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms

   The profile document should list the COSE algorithms that a Verifier
   must implement.  The Attester will select one of them.  Since there
   is no negotiation, the Verifier should implement all algorithms
   listed in the profile.  If detached submodules are used, the COSE
   algorithms allowed for their digests should also be in the profile.

7.2.7.  DEB Support

   A Detatched EAT Bundle Section 5 is a special case message that will
   not often be used.  A profile may prohibit its use.

7.2.8.  Verification Key Identification

   Section Section 6 describes a number of methods for identifying a
   verification key.  The profile document should specify one of these
   or one that is not described.  The ones described in this document
   are only roughly described.  The profile document should go into the
   full detail.

7.2.9.  Endorsement Identification

   Similar to, or perhaps the same as Verification Key Identification,
   the profile may wish to specify how Endorsements are to be
   identified.  However note that Endorsement Identification is
   optional, where as key identification is not.

7.2.10.  Freshness

   Just about every use case will require some means of knowing the EAT
   is recent enough and not a replay of an old token.  The profile
   should describe how freshness is achieved.  The section on Freshness
   in [RATS.Architecture] describes some of the possible solutions to
   achieve this.

7.2.11.  Required Claims

   The profile can list claims whose absence results in Verification
   failure.

7.2.12.  Prohibited Claims

   The profile can list claims whose presence results in Verification
   failure.

7.2.13.  Additional Claims

   The profile may describe entirely new claims.  These claims can be
   required or optional.

7.2.14.  Refined Claim Definition

   The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims.  For
   example, it may require altitude in the location claim, or it may
   require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13.

7.2.15.  CBOR Tags

   The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or
   not.  Similarly, the profile should specify whether the token should
   be a UCCS tag or not.

   When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE
   tags are used or not.  Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used
   in a CWT tag.

   Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying
   protocol identifies the object as an EAT.

7.2.16.  Manifests and Software Evidence Claims

   The profile should specify which formats are allowed for the
   manifests and software evidence claims.  The profile may also go on
   to say which parts and options of these formats are used, allowed and
   prohibited.

8.  Encoding and Collected CDDL

   An EAT is fundamentally defined using CDDL.  This document specifies
   how to encode the CDDL in CBOR or JSON.  Since CBOR can express some
   things that JSON can't (e.g., tags) or that are expressed differently
   (e.g., labels) there is some CDDL that is specific to the encoding
   format.

8.1.  Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT

   CDDL was not used to define CWT or JWT.  It was not available at the
   time.

   This document defines CDDL for both CWT and JWT as well as UCCS.
   This document does not change the encoding or semantics of anything
   in a CWT or JWT.

   A Claims-Set is the central data structure for EAT, CWT, JWT and
   UCCS.  It holds all the claims and is the structure that is secured
   by signing or other means.  It is not possible to define EAT, CWT,
   JWT or UCCS in CDDL without it.  The CDDL definition of Claims-Set
   here is applicable to EAT, CWT, JWT and UCCS.

   This document specifies how to encode a Claims-Set in CBOR or JSON.

   With the exception of nested tokens and some other externally defined
   structures (e.g., SWIDs) an entire Claims-Set must be in encoded in
   either CBOR or JSON, never a mixture.

   CDDL for the seven claims defined by [RFC8392] and [RFC7519] is
   included here.

8.2.  Encoding Data Types

   This makes use of the types defined in [RFC8610] Appendix D, Standard
   Prelude.

8.2.1.  Common Data Types

   time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows
   floating-point representation.

   Unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not the URI tag defined in
   [RFC8949].  They are just text strings that contain a URI.

   string-or-uri = tstr

   time-int = #6.1(int)

8.2.2.  JSON Interoperability

   JSON should be encoded per [RFC8610] Appendix E.  In addition, the
   following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:

   o  bstr - must be base64url encoded

   o  time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
      [RFC7519].

   o  string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
      section 2 of [RFC7519].

   o  uri - must be a URI [RFC3986].

   o  oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted-
      decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1").

8.2.3.  Labels

   Map labels, including Claims-Keys and Claim-Names, and enumerated-
   type values are always integers when encoding in CBOR and strings
   when encoding in JSON.  There is an exception to this for naming
   submodules and detached claims sets in a DEB.  These are strings in
   CBOR.

   The CDDL in most cases gives both the integer label and the string
   label as it is not convenient to have conditional CDDL for such.

8.3.  CBOR Interoperability

   CBOR allows data items to be serialized in more than one form.  If
   the sender uses a form that the receiver can't decode, there will not
   be interoperability.

   This specification gives no blanket requirements to narrow CBOR
   serialization for all uses of EAT.  This allows individual uses to
   tailor serialization to the environment.  It also may result in EAT
   implementations that don't interoperate.

   One way to guarantee interoperability is to clearly specify CBOR
   serialization in a profile document.  See Section 7 for a list of
   serialization issues that should be addressed.

   EAT will be commonly used where the device generating the attestation
   is constrained and the receiver/Verifier of the attestation is a
   capacious server.  Following is a set of serialization requirements
   that work well for that use case and are guaranteed to interoperate.
   Use of this serialization is recommended where possible, but not
   required.  An EAT profile may just reference the following section
   rather than spell out serialization details.

8.3.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization

   o  Preferred serialization described in section 4.1 of [RFC8949] is
      not required.  The EAT decoder must accept all forms of number
      serialization.  The EAT encoder may use any form it wishes.

   o  The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length arrays and maps as
      described in section 3.2.2 of [RFC8949].  The EAT encoder may use
      indefinite length arrays and maps if it wishes.

   o  The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length strings as described
      in section 3.2.3 of [RFC8949].  The EAT encoder may use indefinite
      length strings if it wishes.

   o  Sorting of maps by key is not required.  The EAT decoder must not
      rely on sorting.

   o  Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8949] is
      not required.

   o  Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must be
      followed.  The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels
      or invalid UTF-8 strings.

8.4.  Collected Common CDDL

   ; This is the fundamental definition of a Claims-Set for both CBOR
   ; and JSON. It is a set of label-value pairs each of which is a
   ; claim.
   ;
   ; In CBOR the labels can be integers or strings with a strong
   ; preference for integers.  For JSON, the labels are always strings.
   ;
   ; The values can be anything, with some consideration for types that
   ; can work in both CBOR and JSON.

   Claims-Set = {
       * $$claims-set-claims,
       * Claim-Label .feature "extended-label" => any
   }

   Claim-Label = int / text
   string-or-uri = tstr

   time-int = #6.1(int)
   ; This is CDDL for the 7 individual claims that are defined in CWT
   ; and JWT.  This CDDL works for either CBOR format CWT or JSON format
   ; JWT The integer format CWT Claim Keys (the labels) are defined in
   ; cwt-labels.cddl.  The string format JWT Claim Names (the labels)
   ; are defined in jwt-labels.cddl.

   ; $$claims-set-claims is defined in claims-set.cddl

   $$claims-set-claims //= (iss-label => text)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (sub-label => text)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (aud-label => text)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (exp-label => ~time)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (nbf-label => ~time)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (iat-label => ~time)

   ; TODO: how does the bstr get handled in JSON validation with the
   ; cddl tool?  TODO: should this be a text for JSON?
   ; $$claims-set-claims //= (cti-label : bytes)
   $$claims-set-claims //=
       (nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])

   nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)

   $$claims-set-claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)

   ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)
   sueids-type = {
       + tstr => ueid-type
   }

   oemid-pen = int

   oemid-ieee = bstr .size 3

   oemid-random = bstr .size 16

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       oemid-label =>
           oemid-random / oemid-ieee / oemid-pen
   )
   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       chip-version-label => hw-version-type
   )

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       board-version-label => hw-version-type
   )

   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       device-version-label => hw-version-type
   )

   hw-version-type = [
       version:  tstr,
       scheme:  $version-scheme
   ]
   $$claims-set-claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr )

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       security-level-label =>
           security-level-cbor-type /
           security-level-json-type
   )

   security-level-cbor-type = &(
       unrestricted: 1,
       restricted: 2,
       secure-restricted: 3,
       hardware: 4
   )

   security-level-json-type =
       "unrestricted" /
       "restricted" /
       "secure-restricted" /
       "hardware"
   $$claims-set-claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool)
   $$claims-set-claims //=  (
       debug-status-label =>
           debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
   )

   debug-status-cbor-type = &(
       enabled: 0,
       disabled: 1,
       disabled-since-boot: 2,
       disabled-permanently: 3,
       disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
   )

   debug-status-json-type =
       "enabled" /
       "disabled" /
       "disabled-since-boot" /
       "disabled-permanently" /
       "disabled-fully-and-permanently"
   $$claims-set-claims //= (location-label => location-type)

   location-type = {
       latitude => number,
       longitude => number,
       ? subject altitude => text, number,
       ? accuracy => number,
       ? altitude-accuracy => number,
       ? heading => number,
       ? speed => number,
       ? audience timestamp => text, ~time-int,
       ? expiration age => time, uint
   }

   latitude = 1 / "latitude"
   longitude = 2 / "longitude"
   altitude = 3 / "altitude"
   accuracy = 4 / "accuracy"
   altitude-accuracy = 5 / "altitude-accuracy"
   heading = 6 / "heading"
   speed = 7 / "speed"
   timestamp = 8 / "timestamp"
   age = 9 / "age"

   $$claims-set-claims //= (uptime-label => uint)
   $$claims-set-claims //=  (boot-seed-label => bytes)
   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       intended-use-label =>
           intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
   )

   intended-use-cbor-type = &(
       generic: 1,
       registration: 2,
       provisioning: 3,
       csr: 4,
       pop: 5
   )

   intended-use-json-type =
       "generic" /
       "registration" /
       "provisioning" /
       "csr" /
       "pop"

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ]
   )

   dloa-type = [
       dloa_registrar: ~uri
       dloa_platform_label: text
       ? not-before dloa_application_label: text
   ]

   $$claims-set-claims //= (profile-label => time, ~uri / ~oid)

   oid = #6.4000(bstr) ; TODO: Replace with CDDL from OID RFC

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       manifests-label => manifests-type
   )

   manifests-type = [+ $$manifest-formats]

   ; Must be a CoSWID payload type
   ; TODO: signed CoSWIDs
   coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>

   $$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx
   ; TODO: make this work too
   ;$$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope_Tagged

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       swevidence-label => swevidence-type
   )

   swevidence-type = [+ $$swevidence-formats]

   ; Must be a CoSWID evidence type that is a CBOR tag
   ; TODO: fix the CDDL so a signed CoSWID is allowed too
   coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>
   $$swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag

   $$claims-set-claims //= (swresults-label => [ + swresult-type ])

   verification-result-cbor-type = &(
       verification-not-run: 1,
       verification-indeterminate: 2,
       verification-failed: 3,
       fully-verified: 4,
       partially-verified: 5,
   )

   verification-result-json-type =
       "verification-not-run" /
       "verification-indeterminate" /
       "verification-failed" /
       "fully-verified" /
       "partially-verified"

   verification-objective-cbor-type = &(
       all: 1,
       firmware: 2,
       kernel: 3,
       privileged: 4,
       system-libs: 5,
       partial: 6,
   )

   verification-objective-json-type =
       "all" /
       "firmware" /
       "kernel" /
       "privileged" /
       "system-libs" /
       "partial"

   swresult-type = [
       verification-system: tstr,
       objective: verification-objective-cbor-type /
           verification-objective-json-type,
       result: verification-result-cbor-type /
           verification-result-json-type,
       ? issued-at objective-name: tstr
   ]
   ; This is the part of a token that contains all the submodules.  It
   ; is a peer with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a
   ; map/object to hold all the submodules.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (submods-label => time,
    ? cwt-id { + text => bytes,
)

issuer Submodule })

   ; A submodule can be:
   ; - A simple Claims-Set (encoded in the same format as the token)
   ; - A digest of a detached Claims-Set (encoded in the same format as
   ;    the token)
   ; - A nested token which may be either CBOR or JSON format. Further,
   ;   the mechanism for identifying and containing the nested token
   ;   depends on the format of the surrounding token, particularly
   ;   because JSON doesn't have any equivalent of a CBOR tag so a
   ;   JSON-specific mechanism is invented. Also, there is the issue
   ;   that binary data must be B64 encoded when carried in
   ;   JSON. Nested-Token is defined in the format specific CDDL, not
   ;   here.

   ; Note that at nested token can either be a signed token like a CWT
   ; or JWT, an unsigned token like a UCCS or UJCS, or a DEB (detached
   ; EAT bundle).  The specific encoding of these is format-specific
   ; so it doesn't appear here.

   Submodule = 1
subject Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest

   ; This is for both JSON and CBOR.  JSON uses text label for
   ; algorithm from JOSE registry. CBOR uses integer label for
   ; algorithm from COSE registry. In JSON the digest is base64
   ; encoded.

   Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
      algorithm : int / text,
      digest : bstr
   ]
   ; Top-level definition of a DEB for CBOR and JSON

   Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
       main-token : Nested-Token,
       detached-claims-sets: {
           + tstr => cbor-wrapped-claims-set / json-wrapped-claims-set
       }
   ]

   ; text content is a base64url encoded JSON-format Claims-Set

   json-wrapped-claims-set = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

   cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set

8.5.  Collected CDDL for CBOR

; The top-level definition of a CBOR-encoded token.

CBOR-Token = Tagged-CBOR-Token / Untagged-CBOR-Token

; All forms of a CBOR-encoded token that are a CBOR tag.

Tagged-CBOR-Token  = CWT-Tagged-Message
Tagged-CBOR-Token /= UCCS-Tagged-Message
Tagged-CBOR-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message

; All forms of a CBOR-encoded token that are not a CBOR tag.

Untagged-CBOR-Token  = 2
audience CWT-Untagged-Message
Untagged-CBOR-Token /= UCCS-Untagged-Message
Untagged-CBOR-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message

; The payload of the COSE message is always a Claims-Set

CWT-Tagged-Message = 3
expiration COSE_Tagged_Message
CWT-Untagged-Message = 4
not-before COSE_Untagged_Message

UCCS-Message = 5
issued-at UCCS-Tagged-Message / UCCS-Untagged-Message
UCCS-Tagged-Message = 6
cwt-id #6.601(UCCS-Untagged-Message)

UCCS-Untagged-Message = 7

debug-status-cbor-type Claims-Set

DEB-Tagged-Message = &(
    enabled: 0,
    disabled: 1,
    disabled-since-boot: 2,
    disabled-permanently: 3,
    disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
)

debug-status-json-type #6.602(DEB-Untagged-Message)

DEB-Untagged-Message =
    "enabled" /
    "disabled" /
    "disabled-since-boot" /
    "disabled-permanently" /
    "disabled-fully-and-permanently"

debug-status-claim Detached-EAT-Bundle

; This specifies how one fully-formed token is nested inside a
; CBOR-format token.  The fully-formed nested token is any valid
; token, CBOR or JSON (JWT, CWT, UCCS, DEB...)  The mechanism for
; identifying the type of the nested token is specific to the format
; of the surrounding token, CBOR in this case.
;
; A primary reason this is encoding-specific is that JSON does not
; have an equivalent to CBOR tags.
;
; If the data type here is text, then the nested token is JSON
; format, one of a JWT, UJCS or JSON-encoded DEB. The means for
; distinguishing which is in the definition of JSON-encoded
; Nested-Token.  If the data type is bstr, then the nested token
; is CBOR format. It is byte-string wrapped and identified by a
;CBOR tag.

Nested-Token = (
    debug-status => debug-status-cbor-type
    tstr / debug-status-json-type
)
location-type = {
    latitude => number,
    longitude => number,
    ? altitude => number,
    ? accuracy => number,
    ? altitude-accuracy => number,
    ? heading => number,
    ? speed => number,
    ? timestamp => ~time-int,
    ? age => uint
}

latitude ; A JSON-encoded Nested-Token (see json-nested-token.cddl)
    bstr .cbor Tagged-CBOR-Token

; This is the CDDL definition of the labels for a CBOR format web
; token, a CWT.  The CDDL for the claims is in web-token-claims.cddl

iss-label = 1 / "latitude"
longitude
sub-label = 2 / "longitude"
altitude
aud-label = 3 / "altitude"
accuracy
exp-label = 4 / "accuracy"
altitude-accuracy
nbf-label = 5 / "altitude-accuracy"
heading
iat-label = 6 / "heading"
speed
cti-label = 7 / "speed"
timestamp 7; The following Claim Keys (labels) are pre-assigned by IANA.
; They are for CBOR-based tokens (CWT and UCCS).
; They are not expected to change in the final publication as an RFC.

nonce-label = 8 / "timestamp"
age 10
ueid-label = 9 / "age"

location-claim 11
oemid-label = ( 13
security-level-label = 14
secure-boot-label = 15
debug-status-label = 16
location-label => location-type
)
nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64)

nonce-claim 17
profile-label = (
    nonce => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ]
)
oemid-claim 18
submods-label = (
    oemid => bstr
)
chip-version-claim 20

; These are not yet assigned in any way and may change.
; These are intentionally above 24 so as to not use up
; single-byte labels.

sueids-label = (
    chip-version => tstr
)

chip-version-scheme-claim <TBD25>
chip-version-label = (
    chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)

board-version-claim <TBD26>
board-version-label = (
    board-version => tstr
)

board-version-scheme-claim <TBD27>
device-version-label = (
    board-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)

device-version-claim <TBD28>
sw-name-label = (
    device-version => tstr
)

device-version-scheme-claim <TBD29>
sw-version-label = (
    device-version-scheme => $version-scheme
)

hardware-version-claims <TBD30>
uptime-label = (
    ? chip-version-claim,
    ? board-version-claim,
    ? device-version-claim,
    ? chip-version-scheme-claim,
    ? board-version-scheme-claim,
    ? device-version-scheme-claim,
)

secure-boot-claim <TBD31>
boot-seed-label = (
    secure-boot => bool
)
security-level-cbor-type <TBD32>
intended-use-label = &(
    unrestricted: 1,
    restricted: 2,
    secure-restricted: 3,
    hardware: 4
)

security-level-json-type <TBD33>
dloas-label =
    "unrestricted" /
    "restricted" /
    "secure-restricted" /
    "hardware"

security-level-claim <TBD34>
manifests-label = (
    security-level => security-level-cbor-type / security-level-json-type
) <TBD35>
swevidence-label = <TBD36>
swresults-label = <TBD37>

8.6.  Collected CDDL for JSON

; The part of a token that contains all the submodules.  It A JWT message is either a peer JWS or JWE in compact serialization form
; with the claims in the token, but not payload a claim, only Claims-Set. Compact serialization is the
; protected headers, payload and signature, each b64url encoded and
; separated by a map/object to ".". This CDDL simply matches top-level syntax of of
; hold all the submodules.

submods-part = (
    submods => submods-type
)

submods-type a JWS or JWE since it is not possible to do more in CDDL.

JWT-Message = { + submod-type } text .regexp [A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+

; The type This defines the JSON equivalent of a submodule which can either be UCCS message, a nested claim set token with
; no integrity or a authenticity protection.

UJCS-Message = Claims-Set

; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in This describes a bstr
; or nested token that occurs inside a tstr.

submod-type = (
    submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token
) JSON-encoded
; When this token. It uses an array that is made up of a bstr, type indicator and the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS
; format.  When this actual token.  This is a tstr, substitute for the contents are an eat-token in JWT CBOR tag mechanism that
; format.

nested-token JSON does not have.

Nested-Token = bstr [
   type : "JWT" / tstr;

; Each submodule has a unique text string name.

submod-name = tstr

ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33)

ueid-claim = (
     ueid => ueid-type
)
sueids-type = {
    + tstr => ueid-type
}

sueids-claim = (
     sueids => sueids-type
)
intended-use-cbor-type = &(
    generic: 1,
    registration: 2,
    provisioning: 3,
    csr: 4,
    pop:  5
)

intended-use-json-type =
    "generic" "CBOR" /
    "registration" "UJCS" /
    "provisioning" "DEB",
   nested-token : JWT-Message /
    "csr"
                  B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token /
    "pop"

intended-use-claim = (
    intended-use => intended-use-cbor-type
                  DEB-JSON-Message / intended-use-json-type
)
oid = #6.4000(bstr)
                  UJCS-Message
]

; TODO: fill this in with correct CDDL from OID RFC

uptime-claim = (
    uptime => uint
)

manifests-claim = (
    manifests => manifests-type
)

manifests-type = [+ $manifest-formats] This text is a Tagged-CBOR-Token (see cbor-token.cddl) that is
; Must be base64url encoded.  For example, it is a CoSWID payload type
$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag

$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope_Tagged

swevidence-claim = (
    swevidence => swevidence-type
)

swevidence-type = [+ $swevidence-formats] CWT that is a COSE_Sign1
; Must be that is a CoSWID evidence type
$swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag

oid CBOR tag that has been base64url encoded.

B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token = #6.4000(bstr) tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"
; TODO: fill this in with correct This is the CDDL from OID RFC

profile-claim definition of the labels for a JSON format web
; token, a JWT.  The CDDL for the claims is in web-token-claims.cddl

iss-label = (
    profile => ~uri / ~oid
)

boot-seed-claim "iss"
sub-label = (
    boot-seed => bytes
)

7. "sub"
aud-label = "aud"
exp-label = "exp"
nbf-label = "nbf"
iat-label = "iat"
cti-label = "cti"; The following are claim names for JSON encoded tokens.

ueid-label /= "ueid"
sueids-label /= "sueids"
nonce-label /= "nonce"
oemid-label /= "oemid"
security-level-label /= "seclevel"
secure-boot-label /= "secboot"
debug-status-label /= "dbgstat"
location-label /= "location"
uptime-label /= "uptime"
profile-label /= "eat-profile"
intended-use-label /= "intuse"
boot-seed-label /= "bootseed"
submods-label /= "submods"
timestamp /= "timestamp"
manifests-label /= "manifests"
swevidence-label /= "swevidence"
dloas-label /= "dloas"
swresults-label /= "swresults"
sw-name-label /= "swname"
sw-version-label /= "swversion"

latitude /= "lat"
longitude /= "long"
altitude /= "alt"
accuracy /= "accry"
altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
heading /= "heading"
speed /= "speed"

9.  IANA Considerations

7.1.

9.1.  Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT) (CWT and JWT) Claims Registry Registries

   Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT and JWT so
   the CWT and JWT Claims Registry is Registries, [IANA.CWT.Claims] and
   [IANA.JWT.Claims], are re used.  No new IANA registry is created.

   All EAT claims defined in this document are placed in both
   registries.  All new EAT claims defined subsequently should be registered placed
   in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries.

7.2. both registries.

9.2.  Claim Characteristics

   The following is design guidance for creating new EAT claims,
   particularly those to be registered with IANA.

   Much of this guidance is generic and could also be considered when
   designing new CWT or JWT claims.

7.2.1.

9.2.1.  Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation

   It is a broad goal that EATs can be processed by relying parties Relying Parties in a
   general way regardless of the type, manufacturer or technology of the
   device from which they originate.  It is a goal that there be
   general-purpose verification implementations that can verify tokens
   for large numbers of use cases with special cases and configurations
   for different device types.  This is a goal of interoperability of
   the semantics of claims themselves, not just of the signing, encoding
   and serialization formats.

   This is a lofty goal and difficult to achieve broadly requiring
   careful definition of claims in a technology neutral way.  Sometimes
   it will be difficult to design a claim that can represent the
   semantics of data from very different device types.  However, the
   goal remains even when difficult.

7.2.2.

9.2.2.  Operating System and Technology Neutral

   Claims should be defined such that they are not specific to an
   operating system.  They should be applicable to multiple large high-
   level operating systems from different vendors.  They should also be
   applicable to multiple small embedded operating systems from multiple
   vendors and everything in between.

   Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a SW
   environment or programming language.

   Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a chip or
   particular hardware.  For example, they should not just be the
   contents of some HW status register as it is unlikely that the same
   HW status register with the same bits exists on a chip of a different
   manufacturer.

   The boot and debug state claims in this document are an example of a
   claim that has been defined in this neutral way.

7.2.3.

9.2.3.  Security Level Neutral

   Many use cases will have EATs generated by some of the most secure
   hardware and software that exists.  Secure Elements and smart cards
   are examples of this.  However, EAT is intended for use in low-
   security use cases the same as high-security use case.  For example,
   an app on a mobile device may generate EATs on its own.

   Claims should be defined and registered on the basis of whether they
   are useful and interoperable, not based on security level.  In
   particular, there should be no exclusion of claims because they are
   just used only in low-security environments.

7.2.4.

9.2.4.  Reuse of Extant Data Formats

   Where possible, claims should use already standardized data items,
   identifiers and formats.  This takes advantage of the expertise put
   into creating those formats and improves interoperability.

   Often extant claims will not be defined in an encoding or
   serialization format used by EAT.  It is preferred to define a CBOR
   and JSON format for them so that EAT implementations do not require a
   plethora of encoders and decoders for serialization formats.

   In some cases, it may be better to use the encoding and serialization
   as is.  For example, signed X.509 certificates and CRLs can be
   carried as-is in a byte string.  This retains interoperability with
   the extensive infrastructure for creating and processing X.509
   certificates and CRLs.

7.2.5.

9.2.5.  Proprietary Claims

   EAT allows the definition and use of proprietary claims.

   For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with
   proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service
   offered by that device manufacturer.  This is a supported use case.

   In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious
   way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general
   standardized claims is preferred.

7.3.

9.3.  Claims Registered by This Document

   This specification adds the following values to the "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry established by [RFC7519] and the "CBOR Web Token
   Claims Registry" established by [RFC8392].  Each entry below is an
   addition to both registries (except for the nonce claim which is
   already registered for JWT, but not registered for CWT).

   The "Claim Description", "Change Controller" and "Specification
   Documents" are common and equivalent for the JWT and CWT registries.
   The "Claim Key" and "Claim Value Types(s)" are for the CWT registry
   only.  The "Claim Name" is as defined for the CWT registry, not the
   JWT registry.  The "JWT Claim Name" is equivalent to the "Claim Name"
   in the JWT registry.

7.3.1.

9.3.1.  Claims for Early Assignment

   RFC Editor: in the final publication this section should be combined
   with the following section as it will no longer be necessary to
   distinguish claims with early assignment.  Also, the following
   paragraph should be removed.

   The claims in this section have been (requested for / given) early
   assignment according to [RFC7120].  They have been assigned values
   and registered before final publication of this document.  While
   their semantics is not expected to change in final publication, it is
   possible that they will.  The JWT Claim Names and CWT Claim Keys are
   not expected to change.

   o  Claim Name: Nonce

   o  Claim Description: Nonce

   o  JWT Claim Name: "nonce" (already registered for JWT)

   o  Claim Key: 10

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string

   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): [OpenIDConnectCore], *this document*

   o  Claim Name: UEID

   o  Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID

   o  JWT Claim Name: "ueid"

   o  CWT Claim Key: 11

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: OEMID

   o  Claim Description: IEEE-based OEM ID

   o  JWT Claim Name: "oemid"

   o  Claim Key: 13

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Security Level

   o  Claim Description: Characterization of the security of an Attester
      or submodule

   o  JWT Claim Name: "seclevel"

   o  Claim Key: 14

   o  Claim Value Type(s): integer

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Secure Boot

   o  Claim Description: Indicate whether the boot was secure
   o  JWT Claim Name: "secboot"

   o  Claim Key: 15

   o  Claim Value Type(s): Boolean

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Debug Status

   o  Claim Description: Indicate status of debug facilities

   o  JWT Claim Name: "dbgstat"

   o  Claim Key: 16

   o  Claim Value Type(s): integer

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Location

   o  Claim Description: The geographic location

   o  JWT Claim Name: "location"

   o  Claim Key: 17

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Profile

   o  Claim Description: Indicates the EAT profile followed

   o  JWT Claim Name: "eat_profile"

   o  Claim Key: 18

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map
   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Submodules Section

   o  Claim Description: The section containing submodules (not actually
      a claim)

   o  JWT Claim Name: "submods"

   o  Claim Key: 20

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

7.3.2.

9.3.2.  To be Assigned Claims

   TODO: add the rest of the claims in here

7.3.3.

9.3.3.  Version Schemes Registered by this Document

   IANA is requested to register a new value in the "Software Tag
   Version Scheme Values" established by [CoSWID].

   The new value is a version scheme a 13-digit European Article Number
   [EAN-13].  An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article Number
   or most commonly as a bar code.  This version scheme is the ASCII
   text representation of EAN-13 digits, the same ones often printed
   with a bar code.  This version scheme must comply with the EAN
   allocation and assignment rules.  For example, this requires the
   manufacturer to obtain a manufacture code from GS1.

              +-------+---------------------+---------------+
              | Index | Version Scheme Name | Specification |
              +-------+---------------------+---------------+
              | 5     | ean-13              | This document |
              +-------+---------------------+---------------+

8.
              +-------+---------------------+---------------+

9.3.4.  UEID URN Registered by this Document

   IANA is requested to register the following new subtypes in the "DEV
   URN Subtypes" registry under "Device Identification".  See [RFC9039].

   +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
   | Subtype | Description                             | Reference     |
   +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
   | ueid    | Universal Entity Identifier             | This document |
   | sueid   | Semi-permanent Universal Entity         | This document |
   |         | Identifier                              |               |
   +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+

9.3.5.  Tag for Detached EAT Bundle

   In the registry [IANA.cbor-tags], IANA is requested to allocate the
   following tag from the FCFS space, with the present document as the
   specification reference.

          +--------+------------+-------------------------------+
          | Tag    | Data Items | Semantics                     |
          +--------+------------+-------------------------------+
          | TBD602 | array      | Detached EAT Bundle Section 5 |
          +--------+------------+-------------------------------+

10.  Privacy Considerations

   Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and
   therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-
   preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.
   Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's
   provided to unauthenticated consumers.

8.1.

10.1.  UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations

   A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving.  Any set of relying parties Relying Parties
   that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be
   able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to
   track the device.  Thus, in many usage situations UEID violates
   governmental privacy regulation.  In other usage situations a UEID
   will not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give
   privacy for the end user.  It will often be the case that tokens will
   not have a UEID for these reasons.

   An SUEID is also usually not privacy-preserving.  In some cases it
   may have fewer privacy issues than a UEID depending on when and how
   and when it is generated.

   There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put
   UEIDs and SUEIDs in tokens:

   o  The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device
      to use the UEID/SUEID.  This may be through a prompt.  It may also
      be through a license agreement.  For example, agreements for some
      online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a
      UEID/SUEID.

   o  The UEID/SUEID is used only in a particular context or particular
      use case.  It is used only by one relying party. Relying Party.

   o  The device authenticates the relying party Relying Party and generates a derived
      UEID/SUEID just for that particular relying party. Relying Party.  For example,
      the relying party Relying Party could prove their identity cryptographically to
      the device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying
      party Relying
      Party by hashing a proofed relying party Relying Party ID with the main device
      UEID/SUEID.

   Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in
   multiple UEIDs and SUEIDs per device.  Each UEID/SUEID is used in a
   different context, use case or system on the device.  However, from
   the view of the relying party, Relying Party, there is just one UEID and it is still
   globally universal across manufacturers.

8.2.

10.2.  Location Privacy Considerations

   Geographic location is most always considered personally identifiable
   information.  Implementers should consider laws and regulations
   governing the transmission of location data from end user devices to
   servers and services.  Implementers should consider using location
   management facilities offered by the operating system on the device
   generating the attestation.  For example, many mobile phones prompt
   the user for permission when before sending location data.

9.

11.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations provided in Section 8 of [RFC8392] and
   Section 11 of [RFC7519] apply to EAT in its CWT and JWT form,
   respectively.  In addition, implementors should consider the
   following.

9.1.

11.1.  Key Provisioning

   Private key material can be used to sign and/or encrypt the EAT, or
   can be used to derive the keys used for signing and/or encryption.
   In some instances, the manufacturer of the entity may create the key
   material separately and provision the key material in the entity
   itself.  The manfuacturer of any entity that is capable of producing
   an EAT should take care to ensure that any private key material be
   suitably protected prior to provisioning the key material in the
   entity itself.  This can require creation of key material in an
   enclave (see [RFC4949] for definition of "enclave"), secure
   transmission of the key material from the enclave to the entity using
   an appropriate protocol, and persistence of the private key material
   in some form of secure storage to which (preferably) only the entity
   has access.

9.1.1.

11.1.1.  Transmission of Key Material

   Regarding transmission of key material from key material from the enclave to the
   entity, the key material may pass through one or more intermediaries.
   Therefore some form of protection ("key wrapping") may be necessary.
   The transmission itself may be performed electronically, but can also
   be done by human courier.  In the latter case, there should be
   minimal to no exposure of the key material to the human (e.g.
   encrypted portable memory).  Moreover, the human should transport the
   key material directly from the secure enclave where it was created to
   a destination secure enclave where it can be provisioned.

11.2.  Transport Security

   As stated in Section 8 of [RFC8392], "The security of the CWT relies
   upon on the protections offered by COSE".  Similar considerations
   apply to EAT when sent as a CWT.  However, EAT introduces the concept
   of a nonce to protect against replay.  Since an EAT may be created by
   an entity that may not support the same type of transport security as
   the consumer of the EAT, intermediaries may be required to bridge
   communications between the entity and consumer.  As a result, it is
   RECOMMENDED that both the consumer create a nonce, and the entity
   leverage the nonce along with COSE mechanisms for encryption and/or
   signing to create the EAT.

   Similar considerations apply to the use of EAT as a JWT.  Although
   the security of a JWT leverages the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and
   JSON Web Signature (JWS) specifications, it is still recommended to
   make use of the enclave EAT nonce.

11.3.  Multiple EAT Consumers

   In many cases, more than one EAT consumer may be required to fully
   verify the
   entity, the key material may pass through one entity attestation.  Examples include individual consumers
   for nested EATs, or more intermediaries.
   Therefore some form consumers for individual claims with an EAT.
   When multiple consumers are required for verification of protection ("key wrapping") may be necessary.
   The transmission itself may be performed electronically, but can also
   be done by human courier. an EAT, it
   is important to minimize information exposure to each consumer.  In
   addition, the latter case, there communication between multiple consumers should be
   minimal to no exposure of the key material to
   secure.

   For instance, consider the human (e.g. example of an encrypted portable memory).  Moreover, the human should transport and signed EAT
   with multiple claims.  A consumer may receive the
   key material directly from EAT (denoted as the secure enclave where it was created
   "receiving consumer"), decrypt its payload, verify its signature, but
   then pass specific subsets of claims to
   a destination secure enclave where it can other consumers for
   evaluation ("downstream consumers").  Since any COSE encryption will
   be provisioned.

9.2.  Transport Security

   As stated in Section 8 of [RFC8392], "The security of removed by the CWT relies
   upon on receiving consumer, the protections offered by COSE".  Similar considerations
   apply communication of claim
   subsets to EAT when sent as any downstream consumer should leverage a CWT. secure protocol
   (e.g.one that uses transport-layer security, i.e. TLS),

   However, EAT introduces assume the concept EAT of the previous example is hierarchical and
   each claim subset for a nonce to protect against replay.  Since an EAT may be downstream consumer is created by
   an entity that may not support in the same type form of
   a nested EAT.  Then transport security as
   the consumer of the EAT, intermediaries may be required to bridge
   communications between the entity receiving and consumer.  As a result, it
   downstream consumers is
   RECOMMENDED that both the consumer create not strictly required.  Nevertheless,
   downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce, and the entity
   leverage the nonce along with COSE mechanisms for encryption and/or
   signing to create the EAT.

   Similar considerations apply unique to
   the use of EAT as a JWT.  Although
   the security they are consuming.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [CBOR.OID]
              Bormann, C., "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
              Tags for Object Identifiers", draft-ietf-cbor-tags-oid-08
              (work in progress), May 2021.

   [CoSWID]   Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
              Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", draft-
              ietf-sacm-coswid-19 (work in progress), October 2021.

   [DLOA]     "Digital Letter of a JWT leverages the JSON Approval", November 2015,
              <https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
              GPC_DigitalLetterOfApproval_v1.0.pdf>.

   [EAN-13]   GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",
              2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.

   [FIDO.AROE]
              The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted
              Operating Environments List", November 2020,
              <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-
              requirements/fido-authenticator-allowed-restricted-
              operating-environments-list-v1.2-fd-20201102.html>.

   [IANA.cbor-tags]
              "IANA CBOR Tags Registry", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags/cbor-
              tags.xhtml>.

   [IANA.CWT.Claims]
              IANA, "CBOR Web Encryption (JWE) Token (CWT) Claims",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.

   [IANA.JWT.Claims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

   [OpenIDConnectCore]
              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 1", November 2014,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [PEN]      "Private Enterprise Number (PEN) Request", n.d.,
              <https://pen.iana.org/pen/PenApplication.page>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and
   JSON N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS) specifications, it is still recommended to
   make use of the EAT nonce.

9.3.  Multiple EAT Consumers

   In many cases, more than one EAT consumer may be required to fully
   verify the entity attestation.  Examples include individual consumers
   for nested EATs, or consumers for individual claims with an EAT.
   When multiple consumers are required for verification of an EAT, it
   is important to minimize information exposure to each consumer.  In
   addition, the communication between multiple consumers should be
   secure.

   For instance, consider the example of an encrypted (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and signed EAT
   with multiple claims.  A consumer may receive the EAT (denoted as the
   "receiving consumer"), decrypt its payload, verify its signature, but
   then pass specific subsets of claims to other consumers N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for
   evaluation ("downstream consumers").  Since any COSE encryption will
   be removed by the receiving consumer, the communication of claim
   subsets to any downstream consumer should leverage a secure protocol
   (e.g.one that uses transport-layer security, i.e. TLS),

   However, assume the EAT of the previous example is hierarchical JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and
   each claim subset T. Narten, "Guidelines for a downstream consumer is created
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in the form of
   a nested EAT.  Then transport security between the receiving RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and
   downstream consumers is not strictly required.  Nevertheless,
   downstream consumers Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to
   the EAT they are consuming.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [CBOR-OID]
              Bormann, Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8392]  Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
              "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
              May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
              Tags and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8747]  Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
              Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Identifiers", draft-ietf-cbor-tags-oid-06
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

   [ThreeGPP.IMEI]
              3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
              Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering,
              addressing and identification", 2019,
              <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
              SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.

   [UCCS.Draft]
              Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C.
              Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets",
              draft-ietf-rats-uccs-01 (work in progress), March July 2021.

   [WGS84]    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), "WORLD
              GEODETIC SYSTEM 1984, NGA.STND.0036_1.0.0_WGS84", July
              2014, <https://earth-info.nga.mil/php/
              download.php?file=coord-wgs84>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [BirthdayAttack]
              "Birthday attack",
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>.

   [CBOR.Cert.Draft]
              Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Hoeglund, J., and
              M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoding of Encoded X.509 Certificates (CBOR (C509
              Certificates)", 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
              mattsson-cose-cbor-cert-compress-05>. draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-02 (work
              in progress), July 2021.

   [Common.Criteria]
              "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
              Evaluation", April 2017,
              <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>.

   [COSE.X509.Draft]
              Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Header parameters for carrying and referencing X.509
              certificates", 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-cose-x509-08>.

   [CoSWID]   "Concise Software Identification Tags", November 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-16>.

   [EAN-13]   GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",
              2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.

   [FIDO.AROE]
              The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted
              Operating Environments List", November 2019,
              <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.0-fd-20191115/
              fido-allowed-AROE-v1.0-fd-20191115.html>.

   [IANA.CWT.Claims]
              IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.

   [IANA.JWT.Claims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

   [OpenIDConnectCore]
              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., draft-ietf-cose-x509-08 (work in progress),
              December 2020.

   [ECMAScript]
              "Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
              5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,
              <http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-
              262.pdf>.

   [FIPS-140]
              National Institue of Standards, "Security Requirements for
              Cryptographic Modules", May 2001,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/
              final>.

   [IEEE.802-2001]
              "IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks
              Overview And Architecture", 2007,
              <https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ieee/
              ieee8022001r2007>.

   [IEEE.802.1AR]
              "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

   [IEEE.RA]  "IEEE Registration Authority",
              <https://standards.ieee.org/products-services/regauth/
              index.html>.

   [OUI.Guide]
              "Guidelines for Use of Extended Unique Identifier (EUI),
              Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 1", November 2014,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [RATS-Architecture] Company ID
              (CID)", August 2017,
              <https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
              standards/standards/web/documents/tutorials/eui.pdf>.

   [OUI.Lookup]
              "IEEE Registration Authority Assignments",
              <https://regauth.standards.ieee.org/standards-ra-web/pub/
              view.html#registries>.

   [RATS.Architecture]
              Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture",
              draft-ietf-rats-architecture-12 (work in progress), April
              2021.

   [RATS.Architecture]
              Birkholz, H., "Remote Attestation Procedures
              Architecture", 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
              ietf-rats-architecture-08>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones,

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 7517, 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 7519, 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC7120]  Cotton, M., Bradley, "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
              Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.

   [RFC9039]  Arkko, J., Jennings, C., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics Z. Shelby, "Uniform Resource
              Names for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", Device Identifiers", RFC 7800, 9039,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., 10.17487/RFC9039, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9039>.

   [W3C.GeoLoc]
              Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
              2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
              geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.

Appendix A.  Examples

   These examples are either UCCS, shown as CBOR diagnostic, or UJCS
   messages.  Full CWT and JWT examples with signing and encryption are
   not given.

   All UCCS examples can be the payload of a CWT.  To do so, they must
   be converted from the UCCS message to a Claims-Set, which is achieve
   by "removing" the tag.

   UJCS messages can be directly used as the payload of a JWT.

   WARNING: These examples use tag and label numbers not yet assigned by
   IANA.

A.1.  Simple TEE Attestation

   This is a simple attestation of a TEE that includes a manifest that
   is a payload CoSWID to describe the TEE's software.

   / This is a UCCS EAT that describes a simple TEE. /

   601({
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / security-level /  14: 3, / secure-restricted /
       / secure-boot /     15: true,
       / debug-status /    16: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
       / manfests /        35: [
                                  / This is byte-string wrapped      /
                                  / payload CoSWID. It gives the TEE /
                                  / software name, the version and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing   /
                                  / the  name of the file it is in.  /
                                  h' da53574944a60064336132340c01016b
                                     41636d6520544545204f530d65332e31
                                     2e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545
                                     204f53182101a2181f6b41636d652054
                                     4545204f5318210206a111a118186e61
                                     636d655f7465655f332e657865'
                           ]
   })
   / A payload CoSWID created by the SW vendor. All this really does /
   / is name the TEE SW, its version and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity lists the one file that     /
   / makes up the TEE. /

   1398229316({
       / Unique CoSWID ID /    0: "3a24",
       / tag-version /        12: 1,
       / software-name /       1: "Acme TEE OS",
       / software-version /   13: "3.1.4",
       / entity /              2: [
                                      {
           / entity-name /                31: "Acme TEE OS",
           / role        /                33: 1 / tag-creator /
                                      },
                                      {
           / entity-name /                31: "Acme TEE OS",
           / role        /                33: 2 / software-creator /
                                      }
                                  ],
       / payload /                6: {
           / ...file /                17: {
               / ...fs-name /             24: "acme_tee_3.exe"
                                      }
                                  }
   })

A.2.  EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block

   / This is an example of Uppercase vs Lowercase a token produced by a HW block            /
   / purpose-built for attestation.  Only the nonce claim changes    /
   / from one attestation to the next as the rest  either come       /
   / directly from the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory /
   / (e.g. a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8392]  Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte  /
   / UEID). /

   601({
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / UEID /            11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / OEMID /           13: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
       / security-level /  14: 4, / hardware level security /
       / secure-boot /     15: true,
       / debug-status /    16: 3, / disabled-permanently /
       / chip-version /    26: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric /
   })

A.3.  Detached EAT Bundle

   In this DEB main token is produced by a HW attestation block.  The
   detached Claims-Set is produced by a TEE and H. Tschofenig,
              "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
              May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., is largely identical to
   the Simple TEE examples above.  The TEE digests its Claims-Set and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention
   feeds that digest to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) the HW block.

   In a better example the attestation produced by the HW block would be
   a CWT and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8747]  Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., thus signed and H.
              Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession secured by the HW block.  Since the
   signature covers the digest from the TEE that Claims-Set is also
   secured.

   The DEB itself can be assembled by untrusted SW.

   / This is a detached EAT bundle (DEB) tag.  /

   602([

       / First part is a full EAT token with claims like nonce and /
       / UEID. Most importantly, it includes a submodule that is a /
       / detached digest which is the hash of the "TEE" claims set /
       / in the next section.                                      /
       /                                                           /
       / This token here is in UCCS format (unsigned). In a more   /
       / realistic example, it would be a signed CWT.              /
       h'd90259a80a48948f8860d13a463e0b500198f50a4ff6c058
         61c8860d13a638ea0d19faf20e040ff51003181a8263332e
         310114a163544545822f5820e5cf95fd24fab71446742dd5
         8d43dae178e55fe2b94291a9291082ffc2635a0b',

       {
          / A CBOR-encoded byte-string wrapped EAT claims-set. It /
          / contains claims suitable for a TEE                    /
          "TEE" : h'a50a48948f8860d13a463e0e030ff51002182381
                    585dda53574944a60064336132340c01016b4163
                    6d6520544545204f530d65332e312e340282a218
                    1f6b41636d6520544545204f53182101a2181f6b
                    41636d6520544545204f5318210206a111a11818
                    6e61636d655f7465655f332e657865'
       }
    ])

   / This example contains submodule that is a detached digest,   /
   / which is the hash of a Claims-Set convey outside this token. /
   / Other than that is is the other example of a token from an   /
   / attestation HW block                                         /

   601({
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / UEID /            11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / OEMID /           13: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
       / security-level /  14: 4, / hardware level security /
       / secure-boot /     15: true,
       / debug-status /    16: 3, / disabled-permanently /
       / chip-version /    26: [ "3.1", 1 ], / multipartnumeric /
       / submods/          20: {
                                   "TEE": [ / detached digest submod /
                                       -16, / SHA-256 /
                                       h'e5cf95fd24fab7144674
                                         2dd58d43dae178e55fe2
                                         b94291a9291082ffc2635
                                         a0b'
                                   ]
                               }
   })

A.4.  Key Semantics for CBOR
              Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

   [ThreeGPP.IMEI]
              3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
              Specification Group Core Network / Key Store Attestation

   / This is an attestation of a public key and Terminals; Numbering,
              addressing the key store     /
   / implementation that protects and identification", 2019,
              <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
              SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.

   [UCCS.Draft]
              Birkholz, H., "A CBOR Tag manages it. The key store   /
   / implementation is in a security-oriented execution           /
   / environment separate from the high-level OS, for Unprotected CWT Claims
              Sets", 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-birkholz-rats-uccs-01>.

   [WGS84]    National Imagery example a   /
   / TEE. The key store is the Attester.                          /
   /                                                              /
   / There is some attestation of the high-level OS, just version /
   / and Mapping Agency, "National Imagery boot & debug status. It is a Claims-Set submodule because/
   / it has lower security level than the key store. The key      /
   / store's implementation has access to info about the HLOS, so /
   / it is able to include it.                                    /
   /                                                              /
   / A key and
              Mapping Agency Technical Report 8350.2, Third Edition",
              2000, <http://earth-
              info.nga.mil/GandG/publications/tr8350.2/wgs84fin.pdf>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [BirthdayAttack]
              "Birthday attack",
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>.

   [Common.Criteria]
              "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
              Evaluation", April 2017,
              <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>.

   [ECMAScript]
              "Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
              5.1 Edition", ECMA Standard 262", June 2011,
              <http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/ECMA-
              262.pdf>.

   [FIDO.Registry] an indication of the user authentication given to  /
   / allow access to the key is given. The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Registry of Predefined Values",
              December 2019, <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-
              specs/fido-registry-v2.1-ps-20191217.html>.

   [FIPS-140]
              National Institue labels for these are   /
   / in the private space since this is just a hypothetical       /
   / example, not part of Standards, "Security Requirements a standard protocol.                    /
   /                                                              /
   / This is similar to Android Key Attestation.                  /

   601({
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / security-level /  14: 3, / secure-restricted /
       / debug-status /    16: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
       / secure-boot /     15: true,
       / manifests /       35: [
                                   h'da53574944a600683762623334383766
                                     0c000169436172626f6e6974650d6331
                                     2e320e0102a2181f75496e6475737472
                                     69616c204175746f6d6174696f6e1821
                                     02'
                                    / Above is an encoded CoSWID     /
                                    / with the following data        /
                                    /   SW Name: "Carbonite"         /
                                    /   SW Vers: "1.2"               /
                                    /   SW Creator:                  /
                                    /      "Industrial Automation"   /
                               ],
       / expiration /       4: 1634324274, / 2021-10-15T18:57:54Z /
       / creation time /    6: 1634317080, / 2021-10-15T16:58:00Z /
                      -80000 : "fingerprint",
                      -80001 : { / The key -- A COSE_Key  /
                   / kty /       1: 2, / EC2, eliptic curve with x & y /
                   / kid /       2: h'36675c206f96236c3f51f54637b94ced',
                   / curve /    -1: 2, / curve is P-256 /
                   / x-coord /  -2: h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a
                                      10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c08551d',
                   / y-coord /  -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3d
                                      c9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c'
                },

       / submods /        20 : {
                              "HLOS" : { / submod for
              Cryptographic Modules", May 2001,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/
              final>.

   [IEEE.802-2001]
              "IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks
              Overview And Architecture", 2007,
              <https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ieee/
              ieee8022001r2007>.

   [IEEE.802.1AR]
              "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure high-level OS /
            / nonce /             10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
              / security-level /  14: 1, / unrestricted /
              / secure-boot /     15: true,
              / manifests /       35: [
                                       h'da53574944a600687337
                                         6537346b78380c000168
                                         44726f6964204f530d65
                                         52322e44320e0302a218
                                         1F75496E647573747269
                                         616c204175746f6d6174
                                         696f6e182102'
                                        / Above is an encoded CoSWID /
                                        / with the following data:   /
                                        /   SW Name: "Droid OS"      /
                                        /   SW Vers: "R2.D2"         /
                                        /   SW Creator:              /
                                        /     "Industrial Automation"/
                                  ]
                              }
                          }
   })

A.5.  SW Measurements of an IoT Device Identifier"",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

   [IEEE.RA]  "IEEE Registration Authority",
              <https://standards.ieee.org/products-services/regauth/
              index.html>.

   [OUI.Guide]
              "Guidelines

   This is a simple token that might be for Use of Extended Unique Identifier (EUI),
              Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), and Company ID
              (CID)", August 2017,
              <https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
              standards/standards/web/documents/tutorials/eui.pdf>.

   [OUI.Lookup]
              "IEEE Registration Authority Assignments",
              <https://regauth.standards.ieee.org/standards-ra-web/pub/
              view.html#registries>.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC7120]  Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation IoT device.  It includes
   CoSWID format measurments of Standards Track Code
              Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.

   [W3C.GeoLoc]
              Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
              2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
              geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.

Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Very Simple EAT

   This the SW.  The CoSWID is in byte-string
   wrapped in the token and also shown in CBOR diagnostic form.  Only

   / This EAT UCCS is for an IoT device with a TEE. The attestation   /
   / is produced by the TEE. There is a submodule for the IoT OS (the /
   / main OS of the IoT device that is not as secure as the TEE). The /
   / submodule contains claims for the IoT OS. The TEE also measures  /
   / the IoT OS and puts the measurements in the submodule.           /

   601({
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / security-level /  14: 3, / secure-restricted /
       / secure-boot /     15: true,
       / debug-status /    16: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
       / OEMID /           13: h'8945ad', / IEEE CID based /
       / UEID /            11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / sumods /          20: {
                               "OS" : {
           / security-level /      14: 2, / restricted /
           / secure-boot /         15: true,
           / debug-status /        16: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
           / swevidence /          36: [
                                       / This is a byte-string wrapped /
                                       / evidence CoSWID. It has       /
                                       / hashes of the payload signed main files of   /
                                       / the IoT OS.  /
                                       h'da53574944a600663463613234350c
                                         17016d41636d6520522d496f542d4f
                                         530d65332e312e3402a2181f724163
                                         6d6520426173652041747465737465
                                         7218210103a11183a318187161636d
                                         655f725f696f745f6f732e65786514
                                         1a0044b349078201582005f6b327c1
                                         73b4192bd2c3ec248a292215eab456
                                         611bf7a783e25c1782479905a31818
                                         6d7265736f75726365732e72736314
                                         1a000c38b10782015820c142b9aba4
                                         280c4bb8c75f716a43c99526694caa
                                         be529571f5569bb7dc542f98a31818
                                         6a636f6d6d6f6e2e6c6962141a0023
                                         3d3b0782015820a6a9dcdfb3884da5
                                         f884e4e1e8e8629958c2dbc7027414
                                         43a913e34de9333be6'
                                   ]
                               }
                           }
   })

   / An evidence CoSWID created for the "Acme R-IoT-OS" created by
   COSE is shown.

   { / issuer
   /           1: "joe", the "Acme Base Attester" (both fictious names).  It provides  / nonce
   /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e', measurements of the SW (other than the attester SW) on the    / UEID
   /            11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', device. / secure-boot

   1398229316({
       /     15: true, Unique CoSWID ID / debug-disable    0: "4ca245",
       /   16: 3, tag-version / permanent-disable        12: 23, / Attester-maintained counter / timestamp (iat)
       /  6: 1(1526542894)
   }

A.2.  Example with Submodules, Nesting and Security Levels

  { software-name / nonce       1: "Acme R-IoT-OS",
       /                 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e', software-version / UEID   13: "3.1.4",
       /                  11: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', entity / secure-boot              2: {
           /           15: true, entity-name / debug-disable        31: "Acme Base Attester",
           /         16: 3, role        / permanent-disable        33: 1 / tag-creator / timestamp (iat)
                               },
       /        6: 1(1526542894), evidence / security-level            3: {
           /        14: 3, ...file / secure restricted OS             17: [
                                       {
               / ...fs-name / submods              24: "acme_r_iot_os.exe",
               / ...size    /              20: { 4502345,
               / first submod, an Android Application ...hash    /
          "Android App Foo" :               7: [
                                                1, / SHA-256 /
                                                h'05f6b327c173b419
                                                  2bd2c3ec248a2922
                                                  15eab456611bf7a7
                                                  83e25c1782479905'
                                            ]
                                       },
                                       {
               / security-level ...fs-name /  14: 1              24: "resources.rsc",
               / unrestricted ...size    /              20: 800945,
               / ...hash    /               7: [
                                                 1, / SHA-256 /
                                                h'c142b9aba4280c4b
                                                  b8c75f716a43c995
                                                  26694caabe529571
                                                  f5569bb7dc542f98'
                                            ]
                                       },
                                       {
               / 2nd submod, A nested EAT from a secure element ...fs-name /
          "Secure Element Eat" :              24: "common.lib",
               / an embedded EAT, bytes of which are not shown ...size    /
              h'420123',              20: 2309435,
               / 3rd submod, information about Linux Android ...hash    /
          "Linux Android":               7: [
                                                1, / SHA-256 /
                                                h'a6a9dcdfb3884da5
                                                  f884e4e1e8e86299
                                                  58c2dbc702741443
                                                  a913e34de9333be6'
                                            ]
                                       }
                                   ]

                               }
   })

A.6.  Attestation Results in JSON format

   This is a UJCS format token that might be the output of a Verifier
   that evaluated the IoT Attestation example immediately above.

   This particular Verifier knows enough about the TEE Attester to be
   able to pass claims like security level directly through to the
   Relying Party.  The Verifier also knows the Reference Values for the
   measured SW components and is able to check them.  It informs the
   Relying Party that they were correct in the swresults claim.
   "Trustus Verifications" is the name of the services that verifies the
   SW component measurements.

   This UJCS is identical to JSON-encoded Claims-Set that could be a JWT
   payload.

   {
       "nonce" : "lI+IYNE6Rj4=",
       "seclevel" : "secure-restricted",
       "secboot" : true,
       "dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot",
       "OEMID" : "iUWt",
       "UEID" : "AZj1Ck/2wFhhyIYNE6Y4",
       "submods" : {
              / security-level /  14: 1 / unrestricted /
          }
      }
           "seclevel" : "restricted",
           "secboot" : true,
           "dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot",
           "swname" : "Acme R-IoT-OS",
           "sw-version" : [
               "3.1.4"
           ],
           "swresults" : [
               [
                   "Trustus Verifications",
                   "all",
                   "fully-verified"
               ]
          ]
   }

Appendix B.  UEID Design Rationale

B.1.  Collision Probability

   This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of
   UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of
   entities in a particular entity management database.

   Three different sized databases are considered.  The number of
   devices per person roughly models non-personal devices such as
   traffic lights, devices in stores they shop in, facilities they work
   in and so on, even considering individual light bulbs.  A device may
   have individually attested subsystems, for example parts of a car or
   a mobile phone.  It is assumed that the largest database will have at
   most 10% of the world's population of devices.  Note that databases
   that handle more than a trillion records exist today.

   The trillion-record database size models an easy-to-imagine reality
   over the next decades.  The quadrillion-record database is roughly at
   the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated.
   The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving
   nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird.
   It is included to round out the analysis.

   Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and
   are not individually connected to the network.  They may be connected
   to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on.  This is
   not the same problem as sizing IP addresses.

   +---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
   | People  | Devices /  | Subsystems / | Database   | Database Size  |
   |         | Person     | Device       | Portion    |                |
   +---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
   | 10      | 100        | 10           | 10%        | trillion       |
   | billion |            |              |            | (10^12)        |
   | 10      | 100,000    | 10           | 10%        | quadrillion    |
   | billion |            |              |            | (10^15)        |
   | 100     | 1,000,000  | 10           | 10%        | 100            |
   | billion |            |              |            | quadrillion    |
   |         |            |              |            | (10^17)        |
   +---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+

   This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the
   number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of
   people.  It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where
   collisions of the output of hash functions are considered.

   The proper formula for the collision calculation is
      p = 1 - e^{-k^2/(2n)}

      p   Collision Probability
      n   Total possible population
      k   Actual population

   However, for the very large values involved here, this formula
   requires floating point precision higher than commonly available in
   calculators and SW so this simple approximation is used.  See
   [BirthdayAttack].

       p = k^2 / 2n

   For this calculation:

       p  Collision Probability
       n  Total population based on number of bits in UEID
       k  Population in a database

   +----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Database Size        | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
   +----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
   | trillion (10^12)     | 2 * 10^-15   | 8 * 10^-35   | 5 * 10^-55   |
   | quadrillion (10^15)  | 2 * 10^-09   | 8 * 10^-29   | 5 * 10^-49   |
   | 100 quadrillion      | 2 * 10^-05   | 8 * 10^-25   | 5 * 10^-45   |
   | (10^17)              |              |              |              |
   +----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+

   Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one
   year's operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size
   is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year.
   For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states
   per year.  Each of those states has the above calculated probability
   of a collision.

   This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of
   the database is completely independent from the previous state.  In
   reality this is unlikely as state changes will be the addition or
   deletion of a few records.

   The following tables gives the time interval until there is a
   probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number
   of states per year as the number of records in the database.

     t = 1 / ((k / 10) * p)

     t  Time until a collision
     p  Collision probability for UEID size
     k  Database size

   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Database Size       | 128-bit UEID  | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | trillion (10^12)    | 60,000 years  | 10^24 years  | 10^44 years  |
   | quadrillion (10^15) | 8 seconds     | 10^14 years  | 10^34 years  |
   | 100 quadrillion     | 8             | 10^11 years  | 10^31 years  |
   | (10^17)             | microseconds  |              |              |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+

   Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement
   that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits.

   There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record
   databases are not expected in the near future and because this time-
   to-collision calculation is a very worst case.  A future update of
   the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a
   requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs.

B.2.  No Use of UUID

   A UEID is not a UUID [RFC4122] by conscious choice for the following
   reasons.

   UUIDs are limited to 128 bits which may not be enough for some future
   use cases.

   Today, cryptographic-quality random numbers are available from common
   CPUs and hardware.  This hardware was introduced between 2010 and
   2015.  Operating systems and cryptographic libraries give access to
   this hardware.  Consequently, there is little need for
   implementations to construct such random values from multiple sources
   on their own.

   Version 4 UUIDs do allow for use of such cryptographic-quality random
   numbers, but do so by mapping into the overall UUID structure of time
   and clock values.  This structure is of no value here yet adds
   complexity.  It also slightly reduces the number of actual bits with
   entropy.

   UUIDs seem to have been designed for scenarios where the implementor
   does not have full control over the environment and uniqueness has to
   be constructed from identifiers at hand.  UEID takes the view that
   hardware, software and/or manufacturing process directly implement
   UEID in a simple and direct way.  It takes the view that
   cryptographic quality random number generators are readily available
   as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware.

Appendix C.  EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity (DevID)

   This section describes several distinct ways in which an IEEE IDevID
   [IEEE.802.1AR] relates to EAT, particularly to UEID and SUEID.

   [IEEE.802.1AR] orients around the definition of an implementation
   called a "DevID Module."  It describes how IDevIDs and LDevIDs are
   stored, protected and accessed using a DevID Module.  A particular
   level of defense against attack that should be achieved to be a DevID
   is defined.  The intent is that IDevIDs and LDevIDs are used with an
   open set of network protocols for authentication and such.  In these
   protocols the DevID secret is used to sign a nonce or similar to
   proof the association of the DevID certificates with the device.

   By contrast, EAT defines network protocol for proving trustworthiness
   to a relying party, Relying Party, the very thing that is not defined in
   [IEEE.802.1AR].  Nor does not give details on how keys, data and such
   are stored protected and accessed.  EAT is intended to work with a
   variety of different on-device implementations ranging from minimal
   protection of assets to the highest levels of asset protection.  It
   does not define any particular level of defense against attack,
   instead providing a set of security considerations.

   EAT and DevID can be viewed as complimentary when used together or as
   competing to provide a device identity service.

C.1.  DevID Used With EAT

   As just described, EAT defines a network protocol and [IEEE.802.1AR]
   doesn't.  Vice versa, EAT doesn't define a an device implementation
   and DevID does.

   Hence, EAT can be the network protocol that a DevID is used with.
   The DevID secret becomes the attestation key used to sign EATs.  The
   DevID and its certificate chain become the Endorsement sent to the
   Verifier.

   In this case the EAT and the DevID are likely to both provide a
   device identifier (e.g. a serial number).  In the EAT it is the UEID
   (or SUEID).  In the DevID (used as an endorsement), it is a device
   serial number included in the subject field of the DevID certificate.
   It is probably a good idea in this use for them to be the same serial
   number or for the UEID to be a hash of the DevID serial number.

C.2.  How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity

   The UEID, SUEID and other claims like OEM ID are equivalent to the
   secure device identity put into the subject field of a DevID
   certificate.  These EAT claims can represent all the same fields and
   values that can be put in a DevID certificate subject.  EAT
   explicitly and carefully defines a variety of useful claims.

   EAT secures the conveyance of these claims by having them signed on
   the device by the attestation key when the EAT is generated.  EAT
   also signs the nonce that gives freshness at this time.  Since these
   claims are signed for every EAT generated, they can include things
   that vary over time like GPS location.

   DevID secures the device identity fields by having them signed by the
   manufacturer of the device sign them into a certificate.  That
   certificate is created once during the manufacturing of the device
   and never changes so the fields cannot change.

   So in one case the signing of the identity happens on the device and
   the other in a manufacturing facility, but in both cases the signing
   of the nonce that proves the binding to the actual device happens on
   the device.

   While EAT does not specify how the signing keys, signature process
   and storage of the identity values should be secured against attack,
   an EAT implementation may have equal defenses against attack.  One
   reason EAT uses CBOR is because it is simple enough that a basic EAT
   implementation can be constructed entirely in hardware.  This allows
   EAT to be implemented with the strongest defenses possible.

C.3.  An X.509 Format EAT

   It is possible to define a way to encode EAT claims in an X.509
   certificate.  For example, the EAT claims might be mapped to X.509 v3
   extensions.  It is even possible to stuff a whole CBOR-encoded
   unsigned EAT token into a X.509 certificate.

   If that X.509 certificate is an IDevID or LDevID, this becomes
   another way to use EAT and DevID together.

   Note that the DevID must still be used with an authentication
   protocol that has a nonce or equivalent.  The EAT here is not being
   used as the protocol to interact with the rely party.

C.4.  Device Identifier Permanence

   In terms of permanence, an IDevID is similar to a UEID in that they
   do not change over the life of the device.  They cease to exist only
   when the device is destroyed.

   An SUEID is similar to an LDevID.  They change on device life-cycle
   events.

   [IEEE.802.1AR] describes much of this permanence as resistant to
   attacks that seek to change the ID.  IDevID permanence can be
   described this way because [IEEE.802.1AR] is oriented around the
   definition of an implementation with a particular level of defense
   against attack.

   EAT is not defined around a particular implementation and must work
   on a range of devices that have a range of defenses against attack.
   EAT thus can't be defined permanence in terms of defense against
   attack.  EAT's definition of permanence is in terms of operations and
   device lifecycle.

Appendix D.  Changes from Previous Drafts

   The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.
   This list is non-authoritative.  It is meant to help reviewers see
   the significant differences.

D.1.  From draft-rats-eat-01

   o  Added UEID design rationale appendix

D.2.  From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00

   This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
   no new claims have been added.

   o  Separate information and data model using CDDL.

   o  Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT

   o  Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims

D.3.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01

   o  Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim

   o  Minor spelling and other fixes
   o  Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim

D.4.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02

   o  Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type

   o  UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256.

   o  Added appendix justifying UEID design and size.

   o  Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named
      and there can be more tha one of them

   o  Lots of fixes to the CDDL

   o  Added security considerations

D.5.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03

   o  Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims

   o  Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans

D.6.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04

   o  Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string

   o  CDDL cleaned up some more

   o  CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs

   o  CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped

   o  Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa

   o  Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens

   o  Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens

   o  Add section on key inclusion

   o  Add hardware version claims

   o  Collected CDDL is now filled in.  Other CDDL corrections.

   o  Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not
      extensible

   o  Security level claim is not extensible

   o  Improve specification of location claim and added a location
      privacy section

   o  Add intended use claim

D.7.  From draft-ietf-rats-05 draft-ietf-rats-eat-05

   o  CDDL format issues resolved

   o  Corrected reference to Location Privacy section

D.8.  From draft-ietf-rats-06 draft-ietf-rats-eat-06

   o  Added boot-seed claim

   o  Rework CBOR interoperability section

   o  Added profiles claim and section

D.9.  From draft-ietf-rats-07 draft-ietf-rats-eat-07

   o  Filled in IANA and other sections for possible preassignment of
      claim keys
      Claim Keys for well understood claims

D.10.  From draft-ietf-rats-08 draft-ietf-rats-eat-08

   o  Change profile claim to be either a URL or an OID rather than a
      test string

D.11.  From draft-ietf-rats-09 draft-ietf-rats-eat-09

   o  Add SUEIDs

   o  Add appendix comparing IDevID to EAT

   o  Added section on use for Evidence and Attestation Results

   o  Fill in the key ID and endorsements identificaiton section

   o  Remove origination claim as it is replaced by key IDs and
      endorsements

   o  Added manifests and software evidence claims

   o  Add string labels non-claim labels for use with JSON (e.g. labels
      for members of location claim)

   o  EAN-13 HW versions are no longer a separate claim.  Now they are
      folded in as a CoSWID version scheme.

D.12.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10

   o  Hardware version is made into an array of two rather than two
      claims

   o  Corrections and wording improvements for security levels claim

   o  Add swresults claim

   o  Add dloas claim - Digitial Letter of Approvals, a list of
      certifications

   o  CDDL for each claim no longer in a separate sub section

   o  Consistent use of terminology from RATS architecture document

   o  Consistent use of terminology from CWT and JWT documents

   o  Remove operating model and procedures; refer to CWT, JWT and RATS
      architecture instead

   o  Some reorganization of Section 1

   o  Moved a few references, including RATS Architecture, to
      informative.

   o  Add detached submodule digests and detached eat bundles (DEBs)

   o  New simpler and more universal scheme for identifying the encoding
      of a nested token

   o  Made clear that CBOR and JSON are only mixed when nesting a token
      in another token

   o  Clearly separate CDDL for JSON and CBOR-specific data items

   o  Define UJCS (unsigned JWTs)

   o  Add CDDL for a general Claims-Set used by UCCS, UJCS, CWT, JWT and
      EAT

   o  Top level CDDL for CWT correctly refers to COSE

   o  OEM ID is specifically for HW, not for SW
   o  HW OEM ID can now be a PEN

   o  HW OEM ID can now be a 128-bit random number

   o  Expand the examples section

   o  Add software and version claims as easy / JSON alternative to
      CoSWID

Authors' Addresses

   Giridhar Mandyam
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, California
   USA

   Phone: +1 858 651 7200
   EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com

   Laurence Lundblade
   Security Theory LLC

   EMail: lgl@island-resort.com

   Miguel Ballesteros lgl@securitytheory.com

   Giridhar Mandyam
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, California
   USA

   Phone: +1 858 651 4299 7200
   EMail: mballest@qti.qualcomm.com mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com

   Jeremy O'Donoghue
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   279 Farnborough Road
   Farnborough  GU14 7LS
   United Kingdom

   Phone: +44 1252 363189
   EMail: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com