draft-ietf-rats-eat-12.txt   draft-ietf-rats-eat-13.txt 
RATS Working Group L. Lundblade RATS Working Group L. Lundblade
Internet-Draft Security Theory LLC Internet-Draft Security Theory LLC
Intended status: Standards Track G. Mandyam Intended status: Standards Track G. Mandyam
Expires: August 27, 2022 J. O'Donoghue Expires: November 21, 2022 J. O'Donoghue
Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
February 23, 2022 May 20, 2022
The Entity Attestation Token (EAT) The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
draft-ietf-rats-eat-12 draft-ietf-rats-eat-13
Abstract Abstract
An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set
that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like
a phone, IoT device, network equipment or such. This claims set is a phone, IoT device, network equipment or such. This claims set is
used by a relying party, server or service to determine how much it used by a relying party, server or service to determine how much it
wishes to trust the entity. wishes to trust the entity.
An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1. Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. CWT, JWT, UCCS, UJCS and DEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.2. CWT, JWT and DEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. CDDL, CBOR and JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3. CDDL, CBOR and JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4. Operating Model and RATS Architecture . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4. Operating Model and RATS Architecture . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.1. Relationship between Attestation Evidence and 1.4.1. Relationship between Attestation Evidence and
Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. Top-Level Token Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. The Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Claims Describing the Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2.1. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2.2. Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.6. Hardware OEM Identification (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.3. Hardware OEM Identification (oemid) . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6.1. Random Number Based OEMID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.3.1. Random Number Based OEMID . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6.2. IEEE Based OEMID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2.3.2. IEEE Based OEMID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6.3. IANA Private Enterprise Number Based OEMID . . . . . 17 4.2.3.3. IANA Private Enterprise Number Based OEMID . . . 18
3.7. Hardware Model Claim (hardware-model) . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2.4. Hardware Model Claim (hardware-model) . . . . . . . . 18
3.8. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . . 18 4.2.5. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . 19
3.9. Software Name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.6. Software Name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.10. Software Version Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.7. Software Version Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.11. The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.8. The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . 20
3.12. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.2.9. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.13. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.2.10. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.13.1. Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.10.1. Enabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.13.2. Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.10.2. Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.13.3. Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.10.3. Disabled Since Boot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.13.4. Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.10.4. Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.13.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.10.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . 23
3.14. Including Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.2.11. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.15. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2.12. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.16. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2.13. The Boot Odometer Claim (odometer) . . . . . . . . . 25
3.17. The Boot Odometer Claim (odometer) . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2.14. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed) . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.18. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2.15. The DLOA (Digital Letter of Approval) Claim (dloas) . 26
3.19. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . . 26 4.2.16. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests) . . . . . . 26
3.20. The Profile Claim (profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4.2.17. The Software Evidence Claim (swevidence) . . . . . . 28
3.21. The DLOA (Digital Letter or Approval) Claim (dloas) . . . 27 4.2.18. The Measurement Results Claim (measurement-results) . 29
3.22. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests) . . . . . . . . 28 4.2.19. Submodules (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.23. The Software Evidence Claim (swevidence) . . . . . . . . 30 4.2.19.1. Submodule Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.24. The SW Measurement Results Claim (swresults) . . . . . . 30 4.2.19.2. No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.24.1. Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2.19.3. Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.24.2. Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2.19.4. Submodule Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.24.3. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.3. Claims Describing the Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.24.4. Objective Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.25. Submodules (submods) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.2. Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.25.1. Submodule Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.3. The Profile Claim (profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.25.1.1. Submodule Claims-Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3.4. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . 37
3.25.1.2. Nested Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.4. Including Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.25.1.3. Detached Submodule Digest . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.25.2. No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.25.3. Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.25.4. Submodule Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.25.5. CDDL for submods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4. Unprotected JWT Claims-Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5. Detached EAT Bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5. Detached EAT Bundles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. Endorsements and Verification Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 6. Endorsements and Verification Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1. Identification Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.1. Identification Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1.1. COSE/JWS Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6.1.1. COSE/JWS Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1.2. JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters . . . . . . . . 42 6.1.2. JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters . . . . . . . . 42
6.1.3. CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters . . . . . . . 42 6.1.3. CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters . . . . . . . 42
6.1.4. Claim-Based Key Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.1.4. Claim-Based Key Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6.2. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7. Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7. Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.1. Format of a Profile Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.1. Format of a Profile Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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7.2.14. Refined Claim Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.2.14. Refined Claim Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.15. CBOR Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.2.15. CBOR Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2.16. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims . . . . . . . 46 7.2.16. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims . . . . . . . 46
8. Encoding and Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8. Encoding and Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.1. Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.1. Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.2. Encoding Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.2. Encoding Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.1. Common Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.2.1. Common Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 8.2.2. JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.3. Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8.2.3. Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.3. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8.3. CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.3.1. EAT Constrained Device Serialization . . . . . . . . 48 8.3.1. EAT Constrained Device Serialization . . . . . . . . 49
8.4. Collected Common CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 8.4. Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.5. Collected CDDL for CBOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8.4.1. Payload CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.6. Collected CDDL for JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 8.4.2. CBOR-Specific CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
8.4.3. JSON-Specific CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.1. Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims 9.1. Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims
Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2. Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 9.2. Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . . 57 9.2.1. Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation . . . 56
9.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . . 57 9.2.2. Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . . 57
9.2.3. Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 9.2.3. Security Level Neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 9.2.4. Reuse of Extant Data Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.2.5. Proprietary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 9.2.5. Proprietary Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.3. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 58 9.3. Claims Registered by This Document . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.3.1. Claims for Early Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 9.3.1. Claims for Early Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
9.3.2. To be Assigned Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 9.3.2. To be Assigned Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9.3.3. Version Schemes Registered by this Document . . . . . 65 9.3.3. Version Schemes Registered by this Document . . . . . 65
9.3.4. UEID URN Registered by this Document . . . . . . . . 66 9.3.4. UEID URN Registered by this Document . . . . . . . . 65
9.3.5. Tag for Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 9.3.5. Tag for Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 10. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
10.1. UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . 67 10.1. UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . 66
10.2. Location Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 10.2. Location Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10.3. Replay Protection and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 10.3. Replay Protection and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.1. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 11.1. Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.1.1. Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11.1.1. Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.2. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11.2. Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
11.3. Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 11.3. Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.1. Simple TEE Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 A.1. Payload Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.2. Submodules for Board and Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 A.1.1. Simple TEE Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
A.3. EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block . . . . . . . 79 A.1.2. Submodules for Board and Device . . . . . . . . . . . 77
A.4. Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 A.1.3. EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block . . . . . 79
A.5. Key / Key Store Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 A.1.4. Key / Key Store Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
A.6. SW Measurements of an IoT Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 A.1.5. Submodules for Board and Device . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.7. Attestation Results in JSON format . . . . . . . . . . . 86 A.1.6. EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block . . . . . 83
Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 A.1.7. Key / Key Store Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
B.1. Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 A.1.8. SW Measurements of an IoT Device . . . . . . . . . . 85
B.2. No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 A.1.9. Attestation Results in JSON format . . . . . . . . . 87
A.1.10. JSON-encoded Token with Sumodules . . . . . . . . . . 88
A.2. Full Token Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.2.1. Basic CWT Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.2.2. Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.2.3. JSON-encoded Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . . . . . 92
Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1. Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B.2. No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix C. EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity Appendix C. EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity
(DevID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 (DevID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
C.1. DevID Used With EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 C.1. DevID Used With EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
C.2. How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity . . 91 C.2. How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity . . 97
C.3. An X.509 Format EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 C.3. An X.509 Format EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
C.4. Device Identifier Permanence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 C.4. Device Identifier Permanence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Appendix D. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Appendix D. CDDL for CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
D.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Appendix E. Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 E.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 E.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 E.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 E.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
D.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 E.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
D.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 E.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
D.8. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 E.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
D.9. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 E.8. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
D.10. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 E.9. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
D.11. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 E.10. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
D.12. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 E.11. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
D.13. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 E.12. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 E.13. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
E.14. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
EAT provides the definition of a base set of claims that can be made EAT provides the definition of a base set of claims that can be made
about an entity, a device, some software and/or some hardware. This about an entity, a device, some software and/or some hardware. This
claims set is received by a relying party who uses it to decide if claims set is received by a relying party who uses it to decide if
and how it will interact with the remote entity. It may choose to and how it will interact with the remote entity. It may choose to
not trust the entity and not interact with it. It may choose to not trust the entity and not interact with it. It may choose to
trust it. It may partially trust it, for example allowing monetary trust it. It may partially trust it, for example allowing monetary
transactions only up to a limit. transactions only up to a limit.
skipping to change at page 6, line 49 skipping to change at page 7, line 7
An entity also corresponds to a "system component" as defined in the An entity also corresponds to a "system component" as defined in the
Internet Security Glossary [RFC4949]. That glossary also defines Internet Security Glossary [RFC4949]. That glossary also defines
"entity" and "system entity" as something that may be a person or "entity" and "system entity" as something that may be a person or
organization as well as a system component. Here "entity" never organization as well as a system component. Here "entity" never
refers to a person or organization. refers to a person or organization.
An entity is never a server or a service. An entity is never a server or a service.
An entity may be the whole device or it may be a subsystem, a An entity may be the whole device or it may be a subsystem, a
subsystem of a subsystem and so on. EAT allows claims to be subsystem of a subsystem and so on. EAT allows claims to be
organized into submodules, nested EATs and so on. See Section 3.25. organized into submodules, nested EATs and so on. See
The entity to which a claim applies is the submodule in which it Section 4.2.19. The entity to which a claim applies is the submodule
appears, or to the top-level entity if it doesn't appear in a in which it appears, or to the top-level entity if it doesn't appear
submodule. in a submodule.
Some examples of entities: Some examples of entities:
o A Secure Element o A Secure Element
o A TEE o A TEE
o A card in a network router o A card in a network router
o A network router, perhaps with each card in the router a submodule o A network router, perhaps with each card in the router a submodule
skipping to change at page 7, line 30 skipping to change at page 7, line 37
o A smartphone with many submodules for its many subsystems o A smartphone with many submodules for its many subsystems
o A subsystem in a smartphone like the modem or the camera o A subsystem in a smartphone like the modem or the camera
An entity may have strong security like defenses against hardware An entity may have strong security like defenses against hardware
invasive attacks. It may also have low security, having no special invasive attacks. It may also have low security, having no special
security defenses. There is no minimum security requirement to be an security defenses. There is no minimum security requirement to be an
entity. entity.
1.2. CWT, JWT, UCCS, UJCS and DEB 1.2. CWT, JWT and DEB
An EAT is a claims set about an entity based on one of the following: An EAT is primarily a claims set about an entity based on one of the
following:
o CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] o CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392]
o Unprotected CWT Claims Sets (UCCS) [UCCS.Draft]
o JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] o JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519]
All definitions, requirements, creation and validation procedures, All definitions, requirements, creation and validation procedures,
security considerations, IANA registrations and so on from these security considerations, IANA registrations and so on from these
carry over to EAT. carry over to EAT.
This specification extends those specifications by defining This specification extends those specifications by defining
additional claims for attestation. This specification also describes additional claims for attestation. This specification also describes
the notion of a "profile" that can narrow the definition of an EAT, the notion of a "profile" that can narrow the definition of an EAT,
ensure interoperability and fill in details for specific usage ensure interoperability and fill in details for specific usage
scenarios. This specification also adds some considerations for scenarios. This specification also adds some considerations for
registration of future EAT-related claims. registration of future EAT-related claims.
The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or
JSON encoded, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT and JSON encoded, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT.
UCCS. Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT. In Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT. In some cases
some cases it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type). In other it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type). In other cases it may
cases it may be through use of CBOR tags. There is no fixed be through use of CBOR tags. There is no fixed mechanism across all
mechanism across all use cases. use cases.
This specification adds two more top-level messages:
o Unprotected JWT Claims Set (UJCS) Section 4 This specification adds one more top-level token type:
o Detached EAT Bundle (DEB), Section 5 o Detached EAT Bundle (DEB), Section 5
A DEB is structure to hold a collection of detached claims sets and A DEB is structure to hold a collection of detached claims sets and
the EAT that separately provides integrity and authenticity the EAT that separately provides integrity and authenticity
protection for them. It can be either CBOR or JSON encoded. protection for them. It can be either CBOR or JSON encoded.
Last, the definition of other token types is allowed. Of particular
use may be a token type that provides no authenticity or integrity
protection at all for use with transports like TLS that do provide
that.
1.3. CDDL, CBOR and JSON 1.3. CDDL, CBOR and JSON
This document defines Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) This document defines Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
[RFC8949] and Javascript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] encoding [RFC8949] and Javascript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] encoding
for an EAT. All claims in an EAT MUST use the same encoding except for an EAT. All claims in an EAT MUST use the same encoding except
where explicitly allowed. It is explicitly allowed for a nested where explicitly allowed. It is explicitly allowed for a nested
token to be of a different encoding. Some claims explicitly contain token to be of a different encoding. Some claims explicitly contain
objects and messages that may use a different encoding than the objects and messages that may use a different encoding than the
enclosing EAT. enclosing EAT.
This specification uses Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) This specification uses Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)
[RFC8610] for all definitions. The implementor interprets the CDDL [RFC8610] for all definitions. The implementor interprets the CDDL
to come to either the CBOR or JSON encoding. In the case of JSON, to come to either the CBOR or JSON encoding. In the case of JSON,
Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed. Additional rules are given in Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed. Additional rules are given in
Section 8.2.2 where Appendix E is insufficient. Section 8.2.2 where Appendix E is insufficient.
In most cases where the CDDL for CBOR is different than JSON a CDDL
Generic named "JC<>" is used. It is described in Appendix D.
The CWT and JWT specifications were authored before CDDL was The CWT and JWT specifications were authored before CDDL was
available and did not use CDDL. This specification includes a CDDL available and did not use CDDL. This specification includes a CDDL
definition of most of what is defined in [RFC8392]. Similarly, this definition of most of what is defined in [RFC8392]. Similarly, this
specification includes CDDL for most of what is defined in [RFC7519]. specification includes CDDL for most of what is defined in [RFC7519].
These definitions are in Appendix D and are not normative.
The UCCS specification does not include CDDL. This specification
provides CDDL for it.
1.4. Operating Model and RATS Architecture 1.4. Operating Model and RATS Architecture
While it is not required that EAT be used with the RATS operational While it is not required that EAT be used with the RATS operational
model described in Figure 1 in [RATS.Architecture], or even that it model described in Figure 1 in [RATS.Architecture], or even that it
be used for attestation, this document is oriented around that model. be used for attestation, this document is oriented around that model.
To summarize, an Attester generates Attestation Evidence. To summarize, an Attester generates Attestation Evidence.
Attestation Evidence is a claims set describing various Attestation Evidence is a claims set describing various
characteristics of an entity. Attestation Evidence also is usually characteristics of an entity. Attestation Evidence also is usually
skipping to change at page 9, line 27 skipping to change at page 9, line 37
Note that sometimes the Verifier and Relying Party are not separate Note that sometimes the Verifier and Relying Party are not separate
and thus there is no need for a protocol to carry Attestation and thus there is no need for a protocol to carry Attestation
Results. Results.
1.4.1. Relationship between Attestation Evidence and Attestation 1.4.1. Relationship between Attestation Evidence and Attestation
Results Results
Any claim defined in this document or in the IANA CWT or JWT registry Any claim defined in this document or in the IANA CWT or JWT registry
may be used in Attestation Evidence or Attestation Results. may be used in Attestation Evidence or Attestation Results.
Many claims in Attestation Evidence simply will pass through the The relationship of claims in Attestation Results to Attestation
Verifier to the Relying Party without modification. They will be Evidence is fundamentally governed by the Verifier and the Verifier's
verified as authentic from the entity by the Verifier just through Policy.
normal verification of the Attester's signature. The UEID,
Section 3.4, and Location, Section 3.15, are examples of claims that
may be passed through.
Some claims in Attestation Evidence will be verified by the Verifier A common use case is for the Verifier and its Policy to perform
by comparison to Reference Values. These claims will not likely be checks, calculations and processing with Attestation Evidence as the
conveyed to the Relying Party. Instead, some claim indicating they input to produce a summary result in Attestation Results that
were checked may be added to the Attestation Results or it may be indicates the overall health and status of the entity. For example,
tacitly known that the Verifier always does this check. For example, measurements in Attestation Evidence may be compared to Reference
the Verifier receives the Software Evidence claim, Section 3.23, Values the results of which are represented as a simple pass/fail in
compares it to Reference Values and conveys the results to the Attestation Results.
Relying Party in a Software Measurement Results Claim, Section 3.24.
In some cases the Verifier may provide privacy-preserving It is also possible that some claims in the Attestation Evidence will
functionality by stripping or modifying claims that do not posses be forwarded unmodified to the Relying Party in Attestation Results.
sufficient privacy-preserving characteristics. For example, the data This forwarding is subject to the Verifier's implementation and
in the Location claim, Section 3.15, may be modified to have a Policy. The Relying Party should be aware of the Verifier's Policy
precision of a few kilometers rather than a few meters. to know what checks it has performed on claims it forwards.
The Verifier may also modify or transform claims it forwards. This
may be to implement some privacy preservation functionality.
It is also possible the Verifier will put claims in the Attestation
Results that give details about the entity that it has computed or
looked up in a database. For example, the Verifier may be able to
put a HW OEM ID Claim in the Attestation Results by performing a look
up based on a UEID (serial number) it received in Attestation
Evidence.
There are no fixed rules for how a Verifier processes Attestation
Evidence to produce Attestation Results. What is important is the
Relying Party understand what the Verifier does and what its policies
are.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT
skipping to change at page 11, line 17 skipping to change at page 11, line 33
vouches for the validity of the results vouches for the validity of the results
Reference Values: A set of values against which values of Claims can Reference Values: A set of values against which values of Claims can
be compared as part of applying an Appraisal Policy for be compared as part of applying an Appraisal Policy for
Attestation Evidence. Reference Values are sometimes referred to Attestation Evidence. Reference Values are sometimes referred to
in other documents as known-good values, golden measurements, or in other documents as known-good values, golden measurements, or
nominal values, although those terms typically assume comparison nominal values, although those terms typically assume comparison
for equality, whereas here Reference Values might be more general for equality, whereas here Reference Values might be more general
and be used in any sort of comparison. and be used in any sort of comparison.
3. The Claims 3. Top-Level Token Definition
An EAT is a "message", a "token", or such whose content is a Claims-
Set about an entity or some number of entities. An EAT MUST always
contains a Claims-Set.
An EAT may be encoded in CBOR or JSON as defined here. While not
encouraged, other documents may define EAT encoding in other formats.
EAT as defined here is always integrity and authenticity protected
through use of CWT or JWT. Other token formats using other methods
of protection may be defined outside this document.
This document also defines the Detatched EAT Bundle Section 5, a
bundle of some detached Claims-Sets and CWTs or JWTs that provide
protection for the detached Claims-Set.
The following CDDL defines the top-levels of an EAT token as a socket
indicating future token formats may be defined. See Appendix D for
the CDDL definitions of a CWT and JWT.
Nesting of EATs is allowed and defined in Section 4.2.19.1.2. This
nesting includes nesting of a token that is a different format than
the enclosing token. The definition of Nested-Token references the
CDDL defined in this section. When new token formats are defined,
the means for identification in a nested token MUST also be defined.
EAT-CBOR-Token = $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token / $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token
$$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= CWT-Tagged-Message
$$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message
$$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= CWT-Untagged-Message
$$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message
EAT-JSON-Token = $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats
$$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= JWT-Message
$$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= DEB-Untagged-Message
4. The Claims
This section describes new claims defined for attestation that are to This section describes new claims defined for attestation that are to
be added to the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT [IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA be added to the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT [IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA
registries. registries.
This section also describes how several extant CWT and JWT claims This section also describes how several extant CWT and JWT claims
apply in EAT. apply in EAT.
CDDL, along with a text description, is used to define each claim CDDL, along with a text description, is used to define each claim
independent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group. In independent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group. In
Section 8 on encoding, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map entries and Section 8 on encoding, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map entries and
JSON name/value pairs. JSON name/value pairs.
Each claim described has a unique text string and integer that Each claim described has a unique text string and integer that
identifies it. CBOR encoded tokens MUST use only the integer for identifies it. CBOR encoded tokens MUST use only the integer for
Claim Keys. JSON encoded tokens MUST use only the text string for Claim Keys. JSON encoded tokens MUST use only the text string for
Claim Names. Claim Names.
3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti) 4.1. Nonce Claim (nonce)
CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These are
equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier
as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use
of the token but are distinct from the nonce that is used by the
Relying Party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay.
3.2. Timestamp claim (iat)
The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date- All EATs MUST have a nonce to prevent replay attacks.
of-creation of the token, the time at which the claims are collected
and the token is composed and signed.
The data for some claims may be held or cached for some period of This claim is either a single byte or text string or an array of byte
time before the token is created. This period may be long, even or text strings. The array is to accommodate multistage EAT
days. Examples are measurements taken at boot or a geographic verification and consumption. See the extensive discussion on
position fix taken the last time a satellite signal was received. attestation freshness in Appendix A of RATS Architecture
There are individual timestamps associated with these claims to [RATS.Architecture].
indicate their age is older than the "iat" timestamp.
CWT allows the use floating-point for this claim. EAT disallows the A claim named "nonce" is previously defined and registered with IANA
use of floating-point. An EAT token MUST NOT contain an iat claim in for JWT, but MUST not be used in an EAT. It does not support
float-point format. Any recipient of a token with a floating-point multiple nonces. No previous nonce claim was defined for CWT.
format iat claim MUST consider it an error. A 64-bit integer
representation of epoch time can represent a range of +/- 500 billion
years, so the only point of a floating-point timestamp is to have
precession greater than one second. This is not needed for EAT.
3.3. Nonce Claim (nonce) The nonce MUST have 64 bits of entropy as fewer bits are unlikely to
be secure. A maximum nonce size is set to limit the memory required
for an implementation. All receivers MUST be able to accommodate the
maximum size.
All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is In CBOR, the nonce is a byte string and every bit in the byte string
generated by the Relying Party, the end consumer of the token. It is contributes to entropy. The minimum size is 8 bytes. The maximum
conveyed to the entity over whatever transport is in use before the size is 64 bytes.
token is generated and then included in the token as the nonce claim.
This documents the nonce claim for registration in the IANA CWT In JSON the nonce is a text string. It is assumed that the only
claims registry. This is equivalent to the JWT nonce claim that is characters represented by the lower 7 bits will be used so the text
already registered. string must be one-seventh longer. The minimum size is 10 bytes.
The maximum size is 74 bytes.
The nonce must be at least 8 bytes (64 bits) long as fewer bytes are $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
unlikely to be secure. A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the (nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])
memory a constrained implementation uses. This size range is not set
for the already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size
recommendation when used in an EAT.
Multiple nonces are allowed to accommodate multistage verification nonce-type = JC< tstr .size (10..74), bstr .size (8..64)>
and consumption.
$$claims-set-claims //= 4.2. Claims Describing the Entity
(nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])
nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64) The claims in this section describe the entity itself. They describe
the entity whether they occur in Attestation Evidence or occur in
Attestation Results. See Section 1.4.1 for discussion on how
Attestation Results relate to Attestation Evidence.
3.4. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid) 4.2.1. Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)
A UEID identifies an individual manufactured entity like a mobile A UEID identifies an individual manufactured entity like a mobile
phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked security phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked security
camera. It may identify the entire entity or a submodule. It does camera. It may identify the entire entity or a submodule. It does
not identify types, models or classes of entities. It is akin to a not identify types, models or classes of entities. It is akin to a
serial number, though it does not have to be sequential. serial number, though it does not have to be sequential.
UEIDs MUST be universally and globally unique across manufacturers UEIDs MUST be universally and globally unique across manufacturers
and countries. UEIDs MUST also be unique across protocols and and countries. UEIDs MUST also be unique across protocols and
systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different
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| | | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include | | | | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include |
| | | Luhn checksum or SVN information. See | | | | Luhn checksum or SVN information. See |
| | | [ThreeGPP.IMEI]. | | | | [ThreeGPP.IMEI]. |
+------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+ +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: UEID Composition Types Table 1: UEID Composition Types
UEIDs are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on UEIDs are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined. the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.
The consumer (the Relying Party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a The consumer of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a completely opaque
completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its string of bytes and not make any use of its internal structure. For
internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of example, they should not use the OUI part of a type 0x02 UEID to
a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the entity. identify the manufacturer of the entity. Instead, they should use
Instead, they should use the OEMID claim. See Section 3.6. The the OEMID claim. See Section 4.2.3. The reasons for this are:
reasons for this are:
o UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next. o UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.
o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID o New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID
may be created based on some other manufacturer registration may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
scheme. scheme.
o Entity manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID o The manufacturing process for an entity is allowed to change from
to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can using one type of UEID to another. For example, a manufacturer
optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type may find they can optimize their process by switching from type
0x02 or vice versa. The essential requirement on the manufacturer 0x01 to type 0x02 or vice versa.
is that UEIDs be universally unique.
A Device Identifier URN is registered for UEIDs. See Section 9.3.4. A Device Identifier URN is registered for UEIDs. See Section 9.3.4.
$$claims-set-claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)
ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33) ueid-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (12..44) , bstr .size (7..33)>
3.5. Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs) 4.2.2. Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs)
An SEUID is of the same format as a UEID, but it MAY change to a An SEUID is of the same format as a UEID, but it MAY change to a
different value on device life-cycle events. Examples of these different value on device life-cycle events. Examples of these
events are change of ownership, factory reset and on-boarding into an events are change of ownership, factory reset and on-boarding into an
IoT device management system. An entity MAY have both a UEID and IoT device management system. An entity MAY have both a UEID and
SUEIDs, neither, one or the other. SUEIDs, neither, one or the other.
There MAY be multiple SUEIDs. Each one has a text string label the There MAY be multiple SUEIDs. Each one has a text string label the
purpose of which is to distinguish it from others in the token. The purpose of which is to distinguish it from others in the token. The
label MAY name the purpose, application or type of the SUEID. label MAY name the purpose, application or type of the SUEID.
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SUEIDs should be labeled. If there is only one SUEID, the claim SUEIDs should be labeled. If there is only one SUEID, the claim
remains a map and there still must be a label. For example, the remains a map and there still must be a label. For example, the
label for the SUEID used by FIDO Onboarding Protocol could simply be label for the SUEID used by FIDO Onboarding Protocol could simply be
"FDO". "FDO".
There are privacy considerations for SUEIDs. See Section 10.1. There are privacy considerations for SUEIDs. See Section 10.1.
A Device Indentifier URN is registered for SUEIDs. See A Device Indentifier URN is registered for SUEIDs. See
Section 9.3.4. Section 9.3.4.
$$claims-set-claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)
sueids-type = { sueids-type = {
+ tstr => ueid-type + tstr => ueid-type
} }
3.6. Hardware OEM Identification (oemid) 4.2.3. Hardware OEM Identification (oemid)
This claim identifies the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of This claim identifies the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of
the hardware. Any of the three forms described below MAY be used at the hardware. Any of the three forms described below MAY be used at
the convenience of the claim sender. The receiver of this claim MUST the convenience of the claim sender. The receiver of this claim MUST
be able to handle all three forms. be able to handle all three forms.
3.6.1. Random Number Based OEMID 4.2.3.1. Random Number Based OEMID
The random number based OEMID MUST always 16 bytes (128 bits). The random number based OEMID MUST always 16 bytes (128 bits).
The OEM MAY create their own ID by using a cryptographic-quality The OEM MAY create their own ID by using a cryptographic-quality
random number generator. They would perform this only once in the random number generator. They would perform this only once in the
life of the company to generate the single ID for said company. They life of the company to generate the single ID for said company. They
would use that same ID in every entity they make. This uniquely would use that same ID in every entity they make. This uniquely
identifies the OEM on a statistical basis and is large enough should identifies the OEM on a statistical basis and is large enough should
there be ten billion companies. there be ten billion companies.
The OEM MAY also use a hash function like SHA-256 and truncate the The OEM MAY also use a hash function like SHA-256 and truncate the
output to 128 bits. The input to the hash should be somethings that output to 128 bits. The input to the hash should be somethings that
have at least 96 bits of entropy, but preferably 128 bits of entropy. have at least 96 bits of entropy, but preferably 128 bits of entropy.
The input to the hash MAY be something whose uniqueness is managed by The input to the hash MAY be something whose uniqueness is managed by
a central registry like a domain name. a central registry like a domain name.
In JSON format tokens this MUST be base64url encoded. In JSON format tokens this MUST be base64url encoded.
3.6.2. IEEE Based OEMID 4.2.3.2. IEEE Based OEMID
The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company
IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents
of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID
[IEEE.RA]. An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used [IEEE.RA]. An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used
as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value
uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as
OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of
these. A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L, these. A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L,
but not for use as a MAC address. IEEE has published Guidelines for but not for use as a MAC address. IEEE has published Guidelines for
skipping to change at page 17, line 12 skipping to change at page 18, line 12
format. When this claim is encoded the order of bytes in the bstr format. When this claim is encoded the order of bytes in the bstr
are the same as the order in the Hexadecimal Representation. For are the same as the order in the Hexadecimal Representation. For
example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48" would be encoded in 3 bytes with example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48" would be encoded in 3 bytes with
values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48. values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48.
This format is always 3 bytes in size in CBOR. This format is always 3 bytes in size in CBOR.
In JSON format tokens, this MUST be base64url encoded and always 4 In JSON format tokens, this MUST be base64url encoded and always 4
bytes. bytes.
3.6.3. IANA Private Enterprise Number Based OEMID 4.2.3.3. IANA Private Enterprise Number Based OEMID
IANA maintains a integer-based company registry called the Private IANA maintains a integer-based company registry called the Private
Enterprise Number (PEN) [PEN]. Enterprise Number (PEN) [PEN].
PENs are often used to create an OID. That is not the case here. PENs are often used to create an OID. That is not the case here.
They are used only as an integer. They are used only as an integer.
In CBOR this value MUST be encoded as a major type 0 integer and is In CBOR this value MUST be encoded as a major type 0 integer and is
typically 3 bytes. In JSON, this value MUST be encoded as a number. typically 3 bytes. In JSON, this value MUST be encoded as a number.
oemid-pen = int $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
oemid-label => oemid-pen / oemid-ieee / oemid-random
)
oemid-ieee = bstr .size 3 oemid-pen = int
oemid-random = bstr .size 16 oemid-ieee = JC<oemid-ieee-json, oemid-ieee-cbor>
oemid-ieee-cbor = bstr .size 3
oemid-ieee-json = base64-url-text .size 4
$$claims-set-claims //= ( oemid-random = JC<oemid-random-json, oemid-random-cbor>
oemid-label => oemid-random-cbor = bstr .size 16
oemid-random / oemid-ieee / oemid-pen oemid-random-json = base64-url-text .size 24
)
3.7. Hardware Model Claim (hardware-model) 4.2.4. Hardware Model Claim (hardware-model)
This claim differentiates hardware models, products and variants This claim differentiates hardware models, products and variants
manufactured by a particular OEM, the one identified by OEM ID in manufactured by a particular OEM, the one identified by OEM ID in
Section 3.6. Section 4.2.3.
This claim must be unique so as to differentiate the models and This claim must be unique so as to differentiate the models and
products for the OEM ID. This claim does not have to be globally products for the OEM ID. This claim does not have to be globally
unique, but it can be. A receiver of this claim MUST not assume it unique, but it can be. A receiver of this claim MUST not assume it
is globally unique. To globally identify a particular product, the is globally unique. To globally identify a particular product, the
receiver should concatenate the OEM ID and this claim. receiver should concatenate the OEM ID and this claim.
The granularity of the model identification is for each OEM to The granularity of the model identification is for each OEM to
decide. It may be very granular, perhaps including some version decide. It may be very granular, perhaps including some version
information. It may be very general, perhaps only indicating top- information. It may be very general, perhaps only indicating top-
skipping to change at page 18, line 21 skipping to change at page 19, line 23
There is no minimum length so that an OEM with a very small number of There is no minimum length so that an OEM with a very small number of
models can use a one-byte encoding. The maximum length is 32 bytes. models can use a one-byte encoding. The maximum length is 32 bytes.
All receivers of this claim MUST be able to receive this maximum All receivers of this claim MUST be able to receive this maximum
size. size.
The receiver of this claim MUST treat it as a completely opaque The receiver of this claim MUST treat it as a completely opaque
string of bytes, even if there is some apparent naming or structure. string of bytes, even if there is some apparent naming or structure.
The OEM is free to alter the internal structure of these bytes as The OEM is free to alter the internal structure of these bytes as
long as the claim continues to uniquely identify its models. long as the claim continues to uniquely identify its models.
hardware-model-type = bytes .size (1..32) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
$$claims-set-claims //= (
hardware-model-label => hardware-model-type hardware-model-label => hardware-model-type
) )
3.8. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) hardware-model-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (4..44),
bytes .size (1..32)>
4.2.5. Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims)
The hardware version is a text string the format of which is set by The hardware version is a text string the format of which is set by
each manufacturer. The structure and sorting order of this text each manufacturer. The structure and sorting order of this text
string can be specified using the version-scheme item from CoSWID string can be specified using the version-scheme item from CoSWID
[CoSWID]. It is useful to know how to sort versions so the newer can [CoSWID]. It is useful to know how to sort versions so the newer can
be distinguished from the older. be distinguished from the older.
The hardware version can also be given by a 13-digit [EAN-13]. A new The hardware version can also be given by a 13-digit [EAN-13]. A new
CoSWID version scheme is registered with IANA by this document in CoSWID version scheme is registered with IANA by this document in
Section 9.3.3. An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article Section 9.3.3. An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article
Number or most commonly as a bar code. Number or most commonly as a bar code.
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
hardware-version-label => hardware-version-type hardware-version-label => hardware-version-type
) )
hardware-version-type = [ hardware-version-type = [
version: tstr, version: tstr,
scheme: $version-scheme ? scheme: $version-scheme
] ]
3.9. Software Name Claim 4.2.6. Software Name Claim
This is a free-form text claim for the name of the software for the This is a free-form text claim for the name of the software for the
entity or submodule. A CoSWID manifest or other type of manifest can entity or submodule. A CoSWID manifest or other type of manifest can
be used instead if this claim is to limited to correctly characterize be used instead if this claim is to limited to correctly characterize
the SW for the entity or submodule. the SW for the entity or submodule.
$$claims-set-claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr ) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr )
3.10. Software Version Claim 4.2.7. Software Version Claim
This makes use of the CoSWID version scheme data type to give a This makes use of the CoSWID version scheme data type to give a
simple version for the software. A full CoSWID manifest or other simple version for the software. A full CoSWID manifest or other
type of manifest can be instead if this is too simple. type of manifest can be instead if this is too simple.
$$claims-set-claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type)
sw-version-type = [ sw-version-type = [
version: tstr, version: tstr
scheme: $version-scheme ; As defined by CoSWID ? scheme: $version-scheme
] ]
3.11. The Security Level Claim (security-level) 4.2.8. The Security Level Claim (security-level)
This claim characterizes the entity's ability to defend against This claim characterizes the entity's ability to defend against
attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and
forging EATs. This is by defining four security levels. forging EATs.
This claim describes the security environment and countermeasures The intent of this claim is only to give the recipient a rough idea
available on the entity where the attestation key resides and the of the security the entity is aiming for. This is via a simple, non-
claims originate. extensible set of three levels.
1 - Unrestricted: There is some expectation that implementor will This takes a broad view of the range of defenses because EAT is
protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise, targeted at a broad range of use cases. The least secure level
the EAT provides no meaningful security assurances. involves minimal SW defenses. The most secure level involves
specialized hardware to defend against hardware-based attacks.
2 - Restricted: Entities at this level are not general-purpose Only through expansive certification programs like Common Criteria
operating environments that host features, such as app download and FIDO certification is it possible to sharply define security
systems, web browsers and complex applications. It is akin to the levels. Sharp definition of security levels is not possible here
secure-restricted level (see below) without the security because the IETF doesn't define and operate certification programs.
orientation. Examples include a Wi-Fi subsystem, an IoT camera, It is also not possible here because any sharp definition of security
or sensor device. Often these can be considered more secure than levels would be a document larger than the EAT specification. Thus,
unrestricted just because they are much simpler and a smaller this definition takes the view that the security level definition
attack surface, but this won't always be the case. Some possible here is a simple, modest, rough characterization.
unrestricted devices may be implemented in a way that provides
poor protection of signing keys.
3 - Secure-Restricted: Entities at this level must meet the criteria 1 - Unrestricted: An entity is categorized as unrestricted when it
doesn't meet the criteria for any of the higher levels. This
level does not indicate there is no protection at all, just that
the entity doesn't qualify for the higher levels.
2 - Restricted: Entities at this level MUST meet the criteria
defined in Section 4 of FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating defined in Section 4 of FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating
Environments [FIDO.AROE]. Examples include TEE's and schemes Environments [FIDO.AROE]. Examples include TEE's and schemes
using virtualization-based security. Security at this level is using virtualization-based security. Security at this level is
aimed at defending against large-scale network/remote attacks aimed at defending against large-scale network/remote attacks by
against the entity. having a reduced attack surface.
4 - Hardware: Entities at this level must include substantial 3 - Hardware: Entities at this level are indicating they have some
defense against physical or electrical attacks against the entity countermeasures to defend against physical or electrical attacks
itself. It is assumed the potential attacker has captured the against the entity. Security at this level is aimed at defending
entity and can disassemble it. Examples include TPMs and Secure against attackers that physically capture the entity to attack it.
Elements. Examples include TPMs and Secure Elements.
The entity should claim the highest security level it achieves and no The security level claimed should be for the weakest point in the
higher. This set is not extensible so as to provide a common entity, not the strongest. For example, if attestation key is
interoperable description of security level to the Relying Party. If protected by hardware, but the rest of the attester is in a TEE, the
a particular use case considers this claim to be inadequate, it can claim must be for restriced.
define its own proprietary claim. It may consider including both
this claim as a coarse indication of security and its own proprietary
claim as a refined indication.
This claim is not intended as a replacement for a formal security This set of three is not extensible so this remains a broad
certification scheme, such as those based on FIPS 140 [FIPS-140] or interoperable description of security level.
those based on Common Criteria [Common.Criteria]. See Section 3.21.
$$claims-set-claims //= ( In particular use cases, alternate claims may be defined that give
security-level-label => finer grained information than this claim.
security-level-cbor-type /
security-level-json-type
)
security-level-cbor-type = &( See also the DLOAs claim in Section 4.2.15, a claim that specifically
unrestricted: 1, provides information about certifications received.
restricted: 2,
secure-restricted: 3,
hardware: 4
)
security-level-json-type = $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
"unrestricted" / ( security-level-label => security-level-type )
"restricted" /
"secure-restricted" /
"hardware"
3.12. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) security-level-type = unrestricted /
restricted /
hardware
unrestricted = JC< "unrestricted", 1>
restricted = JC< "restricted", 2>
hardware = JC< "hardware", 3>
4.2.9. Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot)
The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled. Secure boot is The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled. Secure boot is
considered enabled when the firmware and operating system, are under considered enabled when the firmware and operating system, are under
control of the manufacturer of the entity identified in the OEMID control of the manufacturer of the entity identified in the OEMID
claim described in Section 3.6. Control by the manufacturer of the claim described in Section 4.2.3. Control by the manufacturer of the
firmware and the operating system may be by it being in ROM, being firmware and the operating system may be by it being in ROM, being
cryptographically authenticated, a combination of the two or similar. cryptographically authenticated, a combination of the two or similar.
$$claims-set-claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool)
3.13. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) 4.2.10. Debug Status Claim (debug-status)
This applies to entity-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the This applies to entity-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the
entity like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built into chips. It entity like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built into chips. It
applies to any software debug facilities related to root, operating applies to any software debug facilities related to root, operating
system or privileged software that allow system-wide memory system or privileged software that allow system-wide memory
inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software like user inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software like user
mode applications. mode applications.
This characterization assumes that debug facilities can be enabled This characterization assumes that debug facilities can be enabled
and disabled in a dynamic way or be disabled in some permanent way and disabled in a dynamic way or be disabled in some permanent way
skipping to change at page 22, line 20 skipping to change at page 23, line 16
the description of the states refers to that, not to any aggregation the description of the states refers to that, not to any aggregation
or inheritance. or inheritance.
The architecture of some chips or devices may be such that a debug The architecture of some chips or devices may be such that a debug
facility operates for the whole chip or device. If the EAT for such facility operates for the whole chip or device. If the EAT for such
a chip includes submodules, then each submodule should independently a chip includes submodules, then each submodule should independently
report the status of the whole-chip or whole-device debug facility. report the status of the whole-chip or whole-device debug facility.
This is the only way the receiver can know the debug status of the This is the only way the receiver can know the debug status of the
submodules since there is no inheritance. submodules since there is no inheritance.
3.13.1. Enabled 4.2.10.1. Enabled
If any debug facility, even manufacturer hardware diagnostics, is If any debug facility, even manufacturer hardware diagnostics, is
currently enabled, then this level must be indicated. currently enabled, then this level must be indicated.
3.13.2. Disabled 4.2.10.2. Disabled
This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled. It This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled. It
may be possible to enable them in the future. It may also be that may be possible to enable them in the future. It may also be that
they were enabled in the past, but they are currently disabled. they were enabled in the past, but they are currently disabled.
3.13.3. Disabled Since Boot 4.2.10.3. Disabled Since Boot
This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled and This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled and
have been so since the entity booted/started. have been so since the entity booted/started.
3.13.4. Disabled Permanently 4.2.10.4. Disabled Permanently
This level indicates all non-manufacturer facilities are permanently This level indicates all non-manufacturer facilities are permanently
disabled such that no end user or developer can enable them. Only disabled such that no end user or developer can enable them. Only
the manufacturer indicated in the OEMID claim can enable them. This the manufacturer indicated in the OEMID claim can enable them. This
also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and
have been so since boot/start. have been so since boot/start.
3.13.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently 4.2.10.5. Disabled Fully and Permanently
This level indicates that all debug facilities for the entity are This level indicates that all debug facilities for the entity are
permanently disabled. permanently disabled.
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( debug-status-label => debug-status-type )
debug-status-label =>
debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
)
debug-status-cbor-type = &(
enabled: 0,
disabled: 1,
disabled-since-boot: 2,
disabled-permanently: 3,
disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
)
debug-status-json-type =
"enabled" /
"disabled" /
"disabled-since-boot" /
"disabled-permanently" /
"disabled-fully-and-permanently"
3.14. Including Keys
An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key. The
signing of the EAT binds the key to all the other claims in the
token.
The purpose for inclusion of the key may vary by use case. For
example, the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding
protocol. When the FIDO protocol includes a public key in its
attestation message, the key represents the binding of a user, device
and Relying Party. This document describes how claims containing
keys should be defined for the various use cases. It does not define
specific claims for specific use cases.
Keys in CBOR format tokens SHOULD be the COSE_Key format [RFC8152]
and keys in JSON format tokens SHOULD be the JSON Web Key format
[RFC7517]. These two formats support many common key types. Their
use avoids the need to decode other serialization formats. These two
formats can be extended to support further key types through their
IANA registries.
The general confirmation claim format [RFC8747], [RFC7800] may also debug-status-type = ds-enabled /
be used. It provides key encryption. It also allows for inclusion disabled /
by reference through a key ID. The confirmation claim format may disabled-since-boot /
employed in the definition of some new claim for a a particular use disabled-permanently /
case. disabled-fully-and-permanently
When the actual confirmation claim is included in an EAT, this ds-enabled = JC< "enabled", 0 >
document associates no use case semantics other than proof of disabled = JC< "disabled", 1 >
possession. Different EAT use cases may choose to associate further disabled-since-boot = JC< "disabled-since-boot", 2 >
semantics. The key in the confirmation claim MUST be protected in disabled-permanently = JC< "disabled-permanently", 3 >
the same way as the key used to sign the EAT. That is, the same, disabled-fully-and-permanently = JC< "disabled-fully-and-permanently",
equivalent or better hardware defenses, access controls, key 4 >
generation and such must be used.
3.15. The Location Claim (location) 4.2.11. The Location Claim (location)
The location claim gives the location of the entity from which the The location claim gives the location of the entity from which the
attestation originates. It is derived from the W3C Geolocation API attestation originates. It is derived from the W3C Geolocation API
[W3C.GeoLoc]. The latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy must [W3C.GeoLoc]. The latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy must
conform to [WGS84]. The altitude is in meters above the [WGS84] conform to [WGS84]. The altitude is in meters above the [WGS84]
ellipsoid. The two accuracy values are positive numbers in meters. ellipsoid. The two accuracy values are positive numbers in meters.
The heading is in degrees relative to true north. If the entity is The heading is in degrees relative to true north. If the entity is
stationary, the heading is NaN (floating-point not-a-number). The stationary, the heading is NaN (floating-point not-a-number). The
speed is the horizontal component of the entity velocity in meters speed is the horizontal component of the entity velocity in meters
per second. per second.
When encoding floating-point numbers half-precision SHOULD NOT be
used. They usually do not provide enough precision for a geographic
location.
The location may have been cached for a period of time before token The location may have been cached for a period of time before token
creation. For example, it might have been minutes or hours or more creation. For example, it might have been minutes or hours or more
since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or
age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The
timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time. timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time.
The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time
it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set. The it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set. The
entity MUST still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval. entity MUST still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.
The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and
token creation. token creation.
See location-related privacy considerations in Section 10.2. See location-related privacy considerations in Section 10.2.
$$claims-set-claims //= (location-label => location-type) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (location-label => location-type)
location-type = { location-type = {
latitude => number, latitude => number,
longitude => number, longitude => number,
? altitude => number, ? altitude => number,
? accuracy => number, ? accuracy => number,
? altitude-accuracy => number, ? altitude-accuracy => number,
? heading => number, ? heading => number,
? speed => number, ? speed => number,
? timestamp => ~time-int, ? timestamp => ~time-int,
? age => uint ? age => uint
} }
latitude = 1 / "latitude" latitude = JC< "latitude", 1 >
longitude = 2 / "longitude" longitude = JC< "longitude", 2 >
altitude = 3 / "altitude" altitude = JC< "altitude", 3 >
accuracy = 4 / "accuracy" accuracy = JC< "accuracy", 4 >
altitude-accuracy = 5 / "altitude-accuracy" altitude-accuracy = JC< "altitude-accuracy", 5 >
heading = 6 / "heading" heading = JC< "heading", 6 >
speed = 7 / "speed" speed = JC< "speed", 7 >
timestamp = 8 / "timestamp" timestamp = JC< "timestamp", 8 >
age = 9 / "age" age = JC< "age", 9 >
3.16. The Uptime Claim (uptime) 4.2.12. The Uptime Claim (uptime)
The "uptime" claim MUST contain a value that represents the number of The "uptime" claim MUST contain a value that represents the number of
seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted. seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.
$$claims-set-claims //= (uptime-label => uint) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (uptime-label => uint)
3.17. The Boot Odometer Claim (odometer) 4.2.13. The Boot Odometer Claim (odometer)
The "odometer" claim contains a value that represents the number of The "odometer" claim contains a value that represents the number of
times the entity or submod has been booted. Support for this claim times the entity or submod has been booted. Support for this claim
requires a persistent storage on the device. requires a persistent storage on the device.
$$claims-set-claims //= (odometer-label => uint) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (odometer-label => uint)
3.18. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed) 4.2.14. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed)
The Boot Seed claim MUST contain a random value created at system The Boot Seed claim MUST contain a random value created at system
boot time that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot time that will allow differentiation of reports from different
boot sessions. boot sessions.
This value is usually public. It is not a secret and MUST NOT be This value is usually public. It is not a secret and MUST NOT be
used for any purpose that a secret seed is needed, such as seeding a used for any purpose that a secret seed is needed, such as seeding a
random number generator. random number generator.
$$claims-set-claims //= (boot-seed-label => bytes) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (boot-seed-label => binary-data)
3.19. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use)
EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications.
The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer
about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a
way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between
different ways it uses EAT.
1 - Generic: Generic attestation describes an application where the
EAT consumer requires the most up-to-date security assessment of
the attesting entity. It is expected that this is the most
commonly-used application of EAT.
2- Registration: Entities that are registering for a new service may
be expected to provide an attestation as part of the registration
process. This intended-use setting indicates that the attestation
is not intended for any use but registration.
3 - Provisioning: Entities may be provisioned with different values
or settings by an EAT consumer. Examples include key material or
device management trees. The consumer may require an EAT to
assess entity security state of the entity prior to provisioning.
4 - Certificate Issuance Certification Authorities (CA's) may
require attestations prior to the issuance of certificates related
to keypairs hosted at the entity. An EAT may be used as part of
the certificate signing request (CSR).
5 - Proof-of-Possession: An EAT consumer may require an attestation
as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) application.
More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the
recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the sender has
possession of a key. This kind of attestation may be necceesary
to verify the security state of the entity storing the private key
used in a PoP application.
$$claims-set-claims //= (
intended-use-label =>
intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
)
intended-use-cbor-type = &(
generic: 1,
registration: 2,
provisioning: 3,
csr: 4,
pop: 5
)
intended-use-json-type =
"generic" /
"registration" /
"provisioning" /
"csr" /
"pop"
3.20. The Profile Claim (profile)
See Section 7 for the detailed description of a profile.
A profile is identified by either a URL or an OID. Typically, the
URI will reference a document describing the profile. An OID is just
a unique identifier for the profile. It may exist anywhere in the
OID tree. There is no requirement that the named document be
publicly accessible. The primary purpose of the profile claim is to
uniquely identify the profile even if it is a private profile.
The OID is always absolute and never relative. In CBOR tokens, the
OID MUST be encoded according to [RFC9090] and the URI according to
[RFC8949]. Both are unwrapped and thus not CBOR tags. In JSON
tokens, the OID is a string of the form "X.X.X", and a URI is a
normal URI string.
Note that this is named "eat_profile" for JWT and is distinct from
the already registered "profile" claim in the JWT claims registry.
$$claims-set-claims //= (profile-label => ~uri / ~oid)
3.21. The DLOA (Digital Letter or Approval) Claim (dloas) 4.2.15. The DLOA (Digital Letter of Approval) Claim (dloas)
A DLOA (Digital Letter of Approval) [DLOA] is an XML document that A DLOA (Digital Letter of Approval) [DLOA] is an XML document that
describes a certification that an entity has received. Examples of describes a certification that an entity has received. Examples of
certifications represented by a DLOA include those issued by Global certifications represented by a DLOA include those issued by Global
Platform and those based on Common Criteria. The DLOA is unspecific Platform and those based on Common Criteria. The DLOA is unspecific
to any particular certification type or those issued by any to any particular certification type or those issued by any
particular organization. particular organization.
This claim is typically issued by a Verifier, not an Attester. When This claim is typically issued by a Verifier, not an Attester. When
this claim is issued by a Verifier, it MUST be because the entity has this claim is issued by a Verifier, it MUST be because the entity has
skipping to change at page 28, line 27 skipping to change at page 26, line 36
for fetching the DLOA from the particular registrar. for fetching the DLOA from the particular registrar.
This claim MUST be encoded as an array with either two or three This claim MUST be encoded as an array with either two or three
elements. The first element MUST be the URI for the registrar. The elements. The first element MUST be the URI for the registrar. The
second element MUST be a platform label indicating which platform was second element MUST be a platform label indicating which platform was
certified. If the DLOA applies to an application, then the third certified. If the DLOA applies to an application, then the third
element is added which MUST be an application label. The method of element is added which MUST be an application label. The method of
constructing the registrar URI, platform label and possibly constructing the registrar URI, platform label and possibly
application label is specified in [DLOA]. application label is specified in [DLOA].
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ] dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ]
) )
dloa-type = [ dloa-type = [
dloa_registrar: ~uri dloa_registrar: general-uri
dloa_platform_label: text dloa_platform_label: text
? dloa_application_label: text ? dloa_application_label: text
] ]
3.22. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests) 4.2.16. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests)
This claim contains descriptions of software present on the entity. This claim contains descriptions of software present on the entity.
These manifests are installed on the entity when the software is These manifests are installed on the entity when the software is
installed or are created as part of the installation process. installed or are created as part of the installation process.
Installation is anything that adds software to the entity, possibly Installation is anything that adds software to the entity, possibly
factory installation, the user installing elective applications and factory installation, the user installing elective applications and
so on. The defining characteristic is they are created by the so on. The defining characteristic is they are created by the
software manufacturer. The purpose of these claims in an EAT is to software manufacturer. The purpose of these claims in an EAT is to
relay them without modification to the Verifier and possibly to the relay them without modification to the Verifier and possibly to the
Relying Party. Relying Party.
Some manifests may be signed by their software manufacturer before Some manifests may be signed by their software manufacturer before
they are put into this EAT claim. When such manifests are put into they are put into this EAT claim. When such manifests are put into
this claim, the manufacturer's signature SHOULD be included. For this claim, the manufacturer's signature SHOULD be included. For
example, the manifest might be a CoSWID signed by the software example, the manifest might be a CoSWID signed by the software
manufacturer, in which case the full signed CoSWID should be put in manufacturer, in which case the full signed CoSWID should be put in
this claim. this claim.
This claim allows multiple formats for the manifest. For example, This claim allows multiple formats for the manifest. For example,
the manifest may be a CBOR-format CoSWID, an XML-format SWID or the manifest may be a CBOR-format CoSWID, an XML-format SWID or
other. Identification of the type of manifest is always by a CBOR other. Identification of the type of manifest is always by a CoAP
tag. In many cases, for examples CoSWID, a tag will already be Content-Format integer [RFC7252]. If there is no CoAP identifier
registered with IANA. If not, a tag MUST be registered. It can be registered for the manifest format, one should be registered, perhaps
in the first-come-first-served space which has minimal requirements in the experimental or first-come-first-served range.
for registration.
The claim is an array of one or more manifests. To facilitate hand
off of the manifest to a decoding library, each manifest is contained
in a byte string. This occurs for CBOR-format manifests as well as
non-CBOR format manifests.
If a particular manifest type uses CBOR encoding, then the item in This claim MUST be an array of one or more manifests. Each manifest
the array for it MUST be a byte string that contains a CBOR tag. The in the claim MUST be an array of two. The first item in the array of
EAT decoder must decode the byte string and then the CBOR within it two MUST be an integer CoAP Content-Format identifier. The second
to find the tag number to identify the type of manifest. The item is MUST be the actual manifest.
contents of the byte string is then handed to the particular manifest
processor for that type of manifest. CoSWID and SUIT manifest are
examples of this.
If a particular manifest type does not use CBOR encoding, then the In CBOR-encoded EATs the manifest, whatever format it is, MUST be
item in the array for it MUST be a CBOR tag that contains a byte placed in a byte string.
string. The EAT decoder uses the tag to identify the processor for
that type of manifest. The contents of the tag, the byte string, are
handed to the manifest processor. Note that a byte string is used to
contain the manifest whether it is a text based format or not. An
example of this is an XML format ISO/IEC 19770 SWID.
It is not possible to describe the above requirements in CDDL, so the In JSON-format tokens the manifest, whatever format it is, MUST be
type for an individual manifest is any in the CDDL below. The above placed in a text string. When a non-text format manifest like a
text sets the encoding requirement. CBOR-encoded CoSWID is put in a JSON-encoded token, the manifest MUST
be base-64 encoded.
This claim allows for multiple manifests in one token since multiple This claim allows for multiple manifests in one token since multiple
software packages are likely to be present. The multiple manifests software packages are likely to be present. The multiple manifests
MAY be of multiple formats. In some cases EAT submodules may be used MAY be of different formats. In some cases EAT submodules may be
instead of the array structure in this claim for multiple manifests. used instead of the array structure in this claim for multiple
manifests.
When the [CoSWID] format is used, it MUST be a payload CoSWID, not an When the [CoSWID] format is used, it MUST be a payload CoSWID, not an
evidence CoSWID. evidence CoSWID.
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
manifests-label => manifests-type manifests-label => manifests-type
) )
manifests-type = [+ $$manifest-formats] manifests-type = [+ manifest-format]
coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag> manifest-format = [
content-type: uint,
content-format: JC< $$manifest-body-json,
$$manifest-body-cbor >
]
$$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
$$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text
3.23. The Software Evidence Claim (swevidence) $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope
$$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text
suit-directive-process-dependency = 19
4.2.17. The Software Evidence Claim (swevidence)
This claim contains descriptions, lists, evidence or measurements of This claim contains descriptions, lists, evidence or measurements of
the software that exists on the entity. The defining characteristic the software that exists on the entity. The defining characteristic
of this claim is that its contents are created by processes on the of this claim is that its contents are created by processes on the
entity that inventory, measure or otherwise characterize the software entity that inventory, measure or otherwise characterize the software
on the entity. The contents of this claim do not originate from the on the entity. The contents of this claim do not originate from the
software manufacturer. software manufacturer.
This claim uses the same mechanism for identification of the type of This claim can be a [CoSWID]. When the CoSWID format is used, it
the swevidence as is used for the type of the manifest in the MUST be evidence CoSWIDs, not payload CoSWIDS.
manifests claim. It also uses the same byte string based mechanism
for containing the claim and easing the hand off to a processing
library. See the discussion above in the manifests claim.
When the [CoSWID] format is used, it MUST be evidence CoSWIDs, not Formats other than CoSWID can be used. The identification of format
payload CoSWIDS. is by CoAP Content Format, the same as the manifests claim in
Section 4.2.16.
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
swevidence-label => swevidence-type swevidence-label => swevidence-type
) )
swevidence-type = [+ $$swevidence-formats] swevidence-type = [+ swevidence-format]
coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag> swevidence-format = [
$$swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag content-type: uint,
content-format: JC< $$swevidence-body-json,
$$swevidence-body-cbor >
]
3.24. The SW Measurement Results Claim (swresults) $$swevidence-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
$$swevidence-body-json /= base64-url-text
This claims reports the outcome of the comparison of a measurement on 4.2.18. The Measurement Results Claim (measurement-results)
some software to the expected Reference Values. It may report a
successful comparison, failed comparison or other. This claim is a general-purpose structure for reporting comparison of
measurements to expected Reference Values. This claim provides a
simple standard way to report the result of a comparison as success,
failure, fail to run, ...
It is the nature of measurement systems that they are specific to the
operating system, software and hardware of the entity that is being
measured. It is not possible to standardize what is measured and how
it is measured across platforms, OS's, software and hardware. The
recipient must obtain the information about what was measured and
what it indicates for the characterization of the security of the
entity from the provider of the measurement system. What this claim
provides is a standard way to report basic success or failure of the
measurement. In some use cases it is valuable to know if
measurements succeeded or failed in a general way even if the details
of what was measured is not characterized.
This claim MAY be generated by the Verifier and sent to the Relying This claim MAY be generated by the Verifier and sent to the Relying
Party. For example, it could be the results of the Verifier Party. For example, it could be the results of the Verifier
comparing the contents of the swevidence claim to Reference Values. comparing the contents of the swevidence claim, {#swevidence}, to
Reference Values.
This claim MAY also be generated on the entity if the entity has the This claim MAY also be generated on the entity if the entity has the
ability for one subsystem to measure another subsystem. For example, ability for one subsystem to measure and evaluate another subsystem.
a TEE might have the ability to measure the software of the rich OS For example, a TEE might have the ability to measure the software of
and may have the Reference Values for the rich OS. the rich OS and may have the Reference Values for the rich OS.
Within an attestation target or submodule, multiple results can be
reported. For example, it may be desirable to report the results for
the kernel and each individual application separately.
For each software objective, the following can be reported. TODO:
defined objective
3.24.1. Scheme
This is the free-form text name of the verification system or scheme
that performed the verification. There is no official registry of
schemes or systems. It may be the name of a commercial product or
such.
3.24.2. Objective
This roughly characterizes the coverage of the software measurement
software. This corresponds to the attestation target or the
submodule. If all of the indicated target is not covered, the
measurement must indicate partial.
1 - all: Indicates all the software has been verified, for example,
all the software in the attestation target or the submodule
2 - firmware: Indicates all of and only the firmware
3 - kernel: Refers to all of the most-privileged software, for
example the Linux kernel
4 - privileged: Refers to all of the software used by the root,
system or administrative account
5 - system-libs: Refers to all of the system libraries that are
broadly shared and used by applications and such
6 - partial: Some other partial set of the software Within an entity, attestation target or submodule, multiple results
can be reported. For example, it may be desirable to report the
results for measurements of the file system, chip configuration,
installed software, running software and so on.
3.24.3. Results Note that this claim is not for reporting the overall result of a
Verifier. It is solely for reporting the result of comparison to
reference values.
This describes the result of the measurement and also the comparison An individual measurement result is an array of two, an identifier of
to Reference Values. the measurement and an enumerated type that is the result. The range
and values of the measurement identifier varies from one measurement
scheme to another.
1 - verification-not-run: Indicates that no attempt was made to run Each individual measurement result is part of a group that may
the verification contain many individual results. Each group has a text string that
names it, typically the name of the measurement scheme or system.
2 - verification-indeterminite: The verification was attempted, but The claim itself consists of one or more groups.
it did not produce a result; perhaps it ran out of memory, the
battery died or such
3 - verification-failed: The verification ran to completion, the The values for the results enumerated type are as follows:
comparison was completed and did not compare correctly to the
Reference Values
4 - fully-verified: The verification ran to completion and all 1 - comparison successful Indicates successful comparison to
measurements compared correctly to Reference Values reference values.
5 - partially-verified: The verification ran to completion and some, 2 - comparison fail The comparison was completed and did not compare
but not all, measurements compared correctly to Reference Values correctly to the Reference Values.
3.24.4. Objective Name 3 - comparison not run The comparison was not run. This includes
error conditions such as running out of memory.
This is a free-form text string that describes the objective. For 4 - measurement absent The particular measurement was not available
example, "Linux kernel" or "Facebook App" for comparison.
$$claims-set-claims //= (swresults-label => [ + swresult-type ])
verification-result-cbor-type = &( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
verification-not-run: 1, measurement-results-label =>
verification-indeterminate: 2, [ + measurement-results-group ] )
verification-failed: 3,
fully-verified: 4,
partially-verified: 5,
)
verification-result-json-type = measurement-results-group = [
"verification-not-run" / measurement-system: tstr,
"verification-indeterminate" / measruement-results: [ + individual-result ]
"verification-failed" / ]
"fully-verified" /
"partially-verified"
verification-objective-cbor-type = &( individual-result = [
all: 1, results-id: tstr / binary-data,
firmware: 2, result: result-type,
kernel: 3, ]
privileged: 4,
system-libs: 5,
partial: 6,
)
verification-objective-json-type = result-type = comparison-successful /
"all" / comparison-fail /
"firmware" / comparison-not-run /
"kernel" / measurement-absent
"privileged" /
"system-libs" /
"partial"
swresult-type = [ comparison-successful = JC< "success", 1 >
verification-system: tstr, comparison-fail = JC< "fail", 2 >
objective: verification-objective-cbor-type / comparison-not-run = JC< "not-run", 3 >
verification-objective-json-type, measurement-absent = JC< "absent", 4 >
result: verification-result-cbor-type /
verification-result-json-type,
? objective-name: tstr
]
3.25. Submodules (submods) 4.2.19. Submodules (submods)
Some devices are complex, having many subsystems. A mobile phone is Some devices are complex, having many subsystems. A mobile phone is
a good example. It may have several connectivity subsystems for a good example. It may have several connectivity subsystems for
communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may have subsystems communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may have subsystems
for low-power audio and video playback. It may have multiple for low-power audio and video playback. It may have multiple
security-oriented subsystems like a TEE and a Secure Element. security-oriented subsystems like a TEE and a Secure Element.
The claims for a subsystem can be grouped together in a submodule or The claims for a subsystem can be grouped together in a submodule or
submod. submod.
The submods are in a single map/object, one entry per submodule. The submods are in a single map/object, one entry per submodule.
There is only one submods map/object in a token. It is identified by There is only one submods map/object in a token. It is identified by
its specific label. It is a peer to other claims, but it is not its specific label. It is a peer to other claims, but it is not
called a claim because it is a container for a claims set rather than called a claim because it is a container for a claims set rather than
an individual claim. This submods part of a token allows what might an individual claim. This submods part of a token allows what might
be called recursion. It allows claims sets inside of claims sets be called recursion. It allows claims sets inside of claims sets
inside of claims sets... inside of claims sets...
3.25.1. Submodule Types 4.2.19.1. Submodule Types
The following sections define the three types of submodules: The following sections define the three types of submodules:
o A submodule Claims-Set o A submodule Claims-Set
o A nested token, which can be any valid EAT token, CBOR or JSON o A nested token, which can be any valid EAT token, CBOR or JSON
o The digest of a detached Claims-Set o The digest of a detached Claims-Set
3.25.1.1. Submodule Claims-Set $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })
Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest
4.2.19.1.1. Submodule Claims-Set
This is a subordinate Claims-Set containing claims about the This is a subordinate Claims-Set containing claims about the
submodule. submodule.
The submodule claims-set is produced by the same Attester as the The submodule Claims-Set is produced by the same Attester as the
surrounding token. It is secured using the same mechanism as the surrounding token. It is secured using the same mechanism as the
enclosing token (e.g., it is signed by the same attestation key). It enclosing token (e.g., it is signed by the same attestation key). It
roughly corresponds to an Attester Target Environment, as described roughly corresponds to an Attester Target Environment, as described
in the RATS architecture. in the RATS architecture.
It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or
superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may
have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further
subordinate submodule may also have a UEID. subordinate submodule may also have a UEID.
The encoding of a submodule Claims-Set MUST be the same as the The encoding of a submodule Claims-Set MUST be the same as the
encoding as the token it is part of. encoding as the token it is part of.
This data type for this type of submodule is a map/object. It is This data type for this type of submodule is a map/object. It is
identified when decoding by it's type being a map/object. identified when decoding by it's type being a map/object.
3.25.1.2. Nested Token 4.2.19.1.2. Nested Token
This type of submodule is a fully formed complete token. It is This type of submodule is a fully formed complete token. It is
typically produced by a separate Attester. It is typically used by a typically produced by a separate Attester. It is typically used by a
Composite Device as described in RATS Architecture Composite Device as described in RATS Architecture
[RATS.Architecture] In being a submodule of the surrounding token, it [RATS.Architecture] In being a submodule of the surrounding token, it
is cryptographically bound to the surrounding token. If it was is cryptographically bound to the surrounding token. If it was
conveyed in parallel with the surrounding token, there would be no conveyed in parallel with the surrounding token, there would be no
such binding and attackers could substitute a good attestation from such binding and attackers could substitute a good attestation from
another device for the attestation of an errant subsystem. another device for the attestation of an errant subsystem.
A nested token does not need to use the same encoding as the A nested token does not need to use the same encoding as the
enclosing token. This is to allow Composite Devices to be built enclosing token. This is to allow Composite Devices to be built
without regards to the encoding supported by their Attesters. Thus a without regards to the encoding supported by their Attesters. Thus,
CBOR-encoded token like a CWT or UCCS can have a JWT as a nested a CBOR-encoded token like a CWT can have a JWT as a nested token
token submodule and a JSON-encoded token can have a CWT or UCCS as a submodule and vice versa.
nested token submodule.
The following two sections describe how to encode and decode a nested
token.
3.25.1.2.1. Surrounding EAT is CBOR-Encoded 4.2.19.1.2.1. Surrounding EAT is CBOR-Encoded
This describes the encoding and decoding of CBOR or JSON-encoded This describes the encoding and decoding of CBOR or JSON-encoded
tokens nested inside a CBOR-encoded token. tokens nested inside a CBOR-encoded token.
If the nested token is CBOR-encoded, then it MUST be a CBOR tag and If the nested token is CBOR-encoded, then it MUST be a CBOR tag and
MUST be wrapped in a byte string. The tag identifies whether the MUST be wrapped in a byte string. The tag identifies whether the
nested token is a CWT, a UCCS, a CBOR-encoded DEB, or some other nested token is a CWT, a CBOR-encoded DEB, or some other CBOR-format
CBOR-format token defined in the future. A nested CBOR-encoded token token defined in the future. A nested CBOR-encoded token that is not
that is not a CBOR tag is NOT allowed. a CBOR tag is NOT allowed.
If the nested token is JSON-encoded, then the data item MUST be a If the nested token is JSON-encoded, then the data item MUST be a
text string. The text string MUST contain a JSON-encoded array of text string containing JSON. The JSON is defined in CDDL by JSON-
two items. The first item is a string identifying the type of the Nested-Token in the next section.
token. The second item is the JSON-encoded token.
The string identifying the JSON-encoded token MUST be one of the
following:
"JWT": The second item MUST be a JWT formatted according to
[RFC7519]
"UJCS": The second item MUST be a UJCS-Message as defined in this
document.
"DEB": The second item MUST be a JSON-encoded Detached EAT Bundle as
defined in this document.
The definition of additional types requires a standards action.
When decoding, if a byte string is encountered, it is known to be a When decoding, if a byte string is encountered, it is known to be a
nested CBOR-encoded token. The byte string wrapping is removed. The nested CBOR-encoded token. The byte string wrapping is removed. The
type of the token is determined by the CBOR tag. type of the token is determined by the CBOR tag.
When decoding, if a text string is encountered, it is known to be a When decoding, if a text string is encountered, it is known to be a
JSON-encoded token. The two-item array is decoded and tells the type JSON-encoded token. The two-item array is decoded and tells the type
of the JSON-encoded token. of the JSON-encoded token.
Nested-Token = Nested-Token = CBOR-Nested-Token
tstr / ; A JSON-encoded Nested-Token (see json-nested-token.cddl)
bstr .cbor Tagged-CBOR-Token
3.25.1.2.2. Surrounding EAT is JSON-Encoded CBOR-Nested-Token =
JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token /
CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token
CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = bstr .cbor $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token
JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = tstr
4.2.19.1.2.2. Surrounding EAT is JSON-Encoded
This describes the encoding and decoding of CBOR or JSON-encoded This describes the encoding and decoding of CBOR or JSON-encoded
tokens nested inside a JSON-encoded token. tokens nested inside a JSON-encoded token.
The nested token MUST be an array of two in the same format as The nested token MUST be an array of two, a text string type
described in the section above. indicator and the actual token.
A CBOR-encoded token nested inside a JSON-encoded MUST use the same The string identifying the JSON-encoded token MUST be one of the
array of two, but with the type as follows: following:
"CBOR": Some base64url-encoded CBOR that is a tag, typically a CWT, "JWT": The second array item MUST be a JWT formatted according to
UCCS or CBOR-encoded DEB [RFC7519]
"CBOR": The second array item must be some base64url-encoded CBOR
that is a tag, typically a CWT or CBOR-encoded DEB
"DEB": The second array item MUST be a JSON-encoded Detached EAT
Bundle as defined in this document.
Additional types may be defined by a standards action.
When decoding, the array of two is decoded. The first item indicates When decoding, the array of two is decoded. The first item indicates
the type and encoding of the nested token. If the type string is not the type and encoding of the nested token. If the type string is not
"CBOR", then the token is JSON-encoded and of the type indicated by "CBOR", then the token is JSON-encoded and of the type indicated by
the string. the string.
If the type string is "CBOR", then the token is CBOR-encoded. The If the type string is "CBOR", then the token is CBOR-encoded. The
base64url encoding is removed. The CBOR-encoded data is then base64url encoding is removed. The CBOR-encoded data is then
decoded. The type of nested token is determined by the CBOR-tag. It decoded. The type of nested token is determined by the CBOR-tag. It
is an error if the CBOR is not a tag. is an error if the CBOR is not a tag.
Nested-Token = [ Nested-Token = JSON-Nested-Token
type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "UJCS" / "DEB",
JSON-Nested-Token = [
type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "DEB",
nested-token : JWT-Message / nested-token : JWT-Message /
B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token / CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token /
DEB-JSON-Message / Detached-EAT-Bundle
UJCS-Message
] ]
B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+" CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token = base64-url-text
3.25.1.3. Detached Submodule Digest 4.2.19.1.3. Detached Submodule Digest
This is type of submodule equivalent to a Claims-Set submodule, This is type of submodule equivalent to a Claims-Set submodule,
except the Claims-Set is conveyed separately outside of the token. except the Claims-Set is conveyed separately outside of the token.
This type of submodule consists of a digest made using a This type of submodule consists of a digest made using a
cryptographic hash of a Claims-Set. The Claims-Set is not included cryptographic hash of a Claims-Set. The Claims-Set is not included
in the token. It is conveyed to the Verifier outside of the token. in the token. It is conveyed to the Verifier outside of the token.
The submodule containing the digest is called a detached digest. The The submodule containing the digest is called a detached digest. The
separately conveyed Claims-Set is called a detached claims set. separately conveyed Claims-Set is called a detached claims set.
skipping to change at page 38, line 16 skipping to change at page 35, line 38
two data items, an algorithm identifier and a byte string containing two data items, an algorithm identifier and a byte string containing
the digest. the digest.
When decoding a CBOR format token the detached digest type is When decoding a CBOR format token the detached digest type is
distringuished from the other types by it being an array. In CBOR distringuished from the other types by it being an array. In CBOR
the none of other submodule types are arrays. the none of other submodule types are arrays.
When decoding a JSON format token, a little more work is required When decoding a JSON format token, a little more work is required
because both the nested token and detached digest types are an array. because both the nested token and detached digest types are an array.
To distinguish the nested token from the detached digest, the first To distinguish the nested token from the detached digest, the first
element in the array is examined. If it is "JWT", "UJCS" or "DEB", element in the array is examined. If it is "JWT" or "DEB", then the
the the submodule is a nested token. Otherwise it will contain an submodule is a nested token. Otherwise it will contain an algorithm
algorithm identifier and is a detached digest. identifier and is a detached digest.
A DEB, described in Section 5, may be used to convey detached claims A DEB, described in Section 5, may be used to convey detached claims
sets and the token with their detached digests. EAT, however, sets and the token with their detached digests. EAT, however,
doesn't require use of a DEB. Any other protocols may be used to doesn't require use of a DEB. Any other protocols may be used to
convey detached claims sets and the token with their detached convey detached claims sets and the token with their detached
digests. Note that since detached Claims-Sets are usually signed, digests. Note that since detached Claims-Sets are signed, protocols
protocols conveying them must make sure they are not modified in conveying them must make sure they are not modified in transit.
transit.
3.25.2. No Inheritance Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
algorithm : JC< text, int >
digest : binary-data
]
4.2.19.2. No Inheritance
The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the containing The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the containing
token. The subordinate modules must explicitly include all of their token. The subordinate modules must explicitly include all of their
claims. This is the case even for claims like the nonce. claims. This is the case even for claims like the nonce.
This rule is in place for simplicity. It avoids complex inheritance This rule is in place for simplicity. It avoids complex inheritance
rules that might vary from one type of claim to another. rules that might vary from one type of claim to another.
3.25.3. Security Levels 4.2.19.3. Security Levels
The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always
be less than or equal to that of the containing modules in the case be less than or equal to that of the containing modules in the case
of non-token submodules. It makes no sense for a module of lesser of non-token submodules. It makes no sense for a module of lesser
security to be signing claims of a module of higher security. An security to be signing claims of a module of higher security. An
example of this is a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts example of this is a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts
(e.g. the high-level OS) of the device. (e.g. the high-level OS) of the device.
The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have
their own more secure key material. An example of this is an their own more secure key material. An example of this is an
embedded secure element. embedded secure element.
3.25.4. Submodule Names 4.2.19.4. Submodule Names
The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text
string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name. string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name.
3.25.5. CDDL for submods 4.3. Claims Describing the Token
The submodule type is distinguished in the encoded bytes by its data The claims in this section provide meta data about the token they
type, map/object for a Claims-Set, string for nested token and array occur in. They do not describe the entity.
for a detached submodule. Nested tokens are byte-string wrapped when
encoded in CBOR and base64 encoded for JSON.
$$claims-set-claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule }) They may appear in Attestation Evidence or Attestation Results. When
these claims appear in Attestation Evidence, they SHOULD not be
passed through the Verifier into Attestation Results.
Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest 4.3.1. Token ID Claim (cti and jti)
Detached-Submodule-Digest = [ CWT defines the "cti" claim. JWT defines the "jti" claim. These are
algorithm : int / text, equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier
digest : bstr as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use
] of the token but are distinct from the nonce that is used by the
Relying Party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay.
4. Unprotected JWT Claims-Sets 4.3.2. Timestamp claim (iat)
This is simply the JSON equivalent of an Unprotected CWT Claims-Set The "iat" claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date-
[UCCS.Draft]. of-creation of the token, the time at which the claims are collected
and the token is composed and signed.
It has no protection of its own so protections must be provided by The data for some claims may be held or cached for some period of
the protocol carrying it. These are extensively discussed in time before the token is created. This period may be long, even
[UCCS.Draft]. All the security discussion and security days. Examples are measurements taken at boot or a geographic
considerations in [UCCS.Draft] apply to UJCS. position fix taken the last time a satellite signal was received.
There are individual timestamps associated with these claims to
indicate their age is older than the "iat" timestamp.
(Note: The EAT author is open to this definition being moved into the CWT allows the use floating-point for this claim. EAT disallows the
UCCS draft, perhaps along with the related CDDL. It is place here use of floating-point. An EAT token MUST NOT contain an iat claim in
for now so that the current UCCS draft plus this document are float-point format. Any recipient of a token with a floating-point
complete. UJCS is needed for the same use cases that a UCCS is format iat claim MUST consider it an error. A 64-bit integer
needed. Further, JSON will commonly be used to convey Attestation representation of epoch time can represent a range of +/- 500 billion
Results since JSON is common for server to server communications. years, so the only point of a floating-point timestamp is to have
Server to server communications will often have established security precession greater than one second. This is not needed for EAT.
(e.g., TLS) therefore the signing and encryption from JWS and JWE are
unnecssary and burdensome). 4.3.3. The Profile Claim (profile)
See Section 7 for the detailed description of a profile.
A profile is identified by either a URL or an OID. Typically, the
URI will reference a document describing the profile. An OID is just
a unique identifier for the profile. It may exist anywhere in the
OID tree. There is no requirement that the named document be
publicly accessible. The primary purpose of the profile claim is to
uniquely identify the profile even if it is a private profile.
The OID is always absolute and never relative.
See Section 8.2.1 for OID and URI encoding.
Note that this is named "eat_profile" for JWT and is distinct from
the already registered "profile" claim in the JWT claims registry.
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= (profile-label => general-uri / general-oid)
4.3.4. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use)
EAT's may be used in the context of several different applications.
The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer
about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a
way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between
different ways it uses EAT.
1 - Generic: Generic attestation describes an application where the
EAT consumer requires the most up-to-date security assessment of
the attesting entity. It is expected that this is the most
commonly-used application of EAT.
2- Registration: Entities that are registering for a new service may
be expected to provide an attestation as part of the registration
process. This intended-use setting indicates that the attestation
is not intended for any use but registration.
3 - Provisioning: Entities may be provisioned with different values
or settings by an EAT consumer. Examples include key material or
device management trees. The consumer may require an EAT to
assess entity security state of the entity prior to provisioning.
4 - Certificate Issuance Certification Authorities (CA's) may
require attestations prior to the issuance of certificates related
to keypairs hosted at the entity. An EAT may be used as part of
the certificate signing request (CSR).
5 - Proof-of-Possession: An EAT consumer may require an attestation
as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) application.
More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the
recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the sender has
possession of a key. This kind of attestation may be necceesary
to verify the security state of the entity storing the private key
used in a PoP application.
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( intended-use-label => intended-use-type )
intended-use-type = generic /
registration /
provisioning /
csr /
pop
generic = JC< "generic", 1 >
registration = JC< "registration", 2 >
provisioning = JC< "provisioning", 3 >
csr = JC< "csr", 4 >
pop = JC< "pop", 5 >
4.4. Including Keys
An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key. The
signing of the EAT binds the key to all the other claims in the
token.
The purpose for inclusion of the key may vary by use case. For
example, the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding
protocol. When the FIDO protocol includes a public key in its
attestation message, the key represents the binding of a user, device
and Relying Party. This document describes how claims containing
keys should be defined for the various use cases. It does not define
specific claims for specific use cases.
Keys in CBOR format tokens SHOULD be the COSE_Key format [RFC8152]
and keys in JSON format tokens SHOULD be the JSON Web Key format
[RFC7517]. These two formats support many common key types. Their
use avoids the need to decode other serialization formats. These two
formats can be extended to support further key types through their
IANA registries.
The general confirmation claim format [RFC8747], [RFC7800] may also
be used. It provides key encryption. It also allows for inclusion
by reference through a key ID. The confirmation claim format may
employed in the definition of some new claim for a a particular use
case.
When the actual confirmation claim is included in an EAT, this
document associates no use case semantics other than proof of
possession. Different EAT use cases may choose to associate further
semantics. The key in the confirmation claim MUST be protected in
the same way as the key used to sign the EAT. That is, the same,
equivalent or better hardware defenses, access controls, key
generation and such must be used.
5. Detached EAT Bundles 5. Detached EAT Bundles
A detached EAT bundle is a structure to convey a fully-formed and A detached EAT bundle is a structure to convey a fully-formed and
signed token plus detached claims set that relate to that token. It signed token plus detached claims set that relate to that token. It
is a top-level EAT message like a CWT, JWT, UCCS and UJCS. It can be is a top-level EAT message like a CWT or JWT. It can be occur any
used any place that CWT, JWT, UCCS or UJCS messages are used. It may place that CWT or JWT messages occur. It may also be sent as a
also be sent as a submodule. submodule.
A DEB has two main parts. A DEB has two main parts.
The first part is a full top-level token. This top-level token must The first part is a full top-level token. This top-level token must
have at least one submodule that is a detached digest. This top- have at least one submodule that is a detached digest. This top-
level token may be either CBOR or JSON-encoded. It may be a CWT, level token may be either CBOR or JSON-encoded. It may be a CWT, or
JWT, UCCS or UJCS, but not a DEB. The same mechanism for JWT but not a DEB. It may also be some future-defined token type.
distinguishing the type for nested token submodules is used here. The same mechanism for distinguishing the type for nested token
submodules is used here.
The second part is a map/object containing the detached Claims-Sets The second part is a map/object containing the detached Claims-Sets
corresponding to the detached digests in the full token. When the corresponding to the detached digests in the full token. When the
DEB is CBOR-encoded, each Claims-Set is wrapped in a byte string. DEB is CBOR-encoded, each Claims-Set is wrapped in a byte string.
When the DEB is JSON-encoded, each Claims-Set is base64url encoded. When the DEB is JSON-encoded, each Claims-Set is base64url encoded.
All the detached Claims-Sets MUST be encoded in the same format as All the detached Claims-Sets MUST be encoded in the same format as
the DEB. No mixing of encoding formats is allowed for the Claims- the DEB. No mixing of encoding formats is allowed for the Claims-
Sets in a DEB. Sets in a DEB.
For CBOR-encoded DEBs, tag TBD602 can be used to identify it. The For CBOR-encoded DEBs, tag TBD602 can be used to identify it. The
normal rules apply for use or non-use of a tag. When it is sent as a normal rules apply for use or non-use of a tag. When it is sent as a
submodule, it is always sent as a tag to distinguish it from the submodule, it is always sent as a tag to distinguish it from the
other types of nested tokens. other types of nested tokens.
The digests of the detached claims sets are associated with detached The digests of the detached claims sets are associated with detached
claims-sets by label/name. It is up to the constructor of the Claims-Sets by label/name. It is up to the constructor of the
detached EAT bundle to ensure the names uniquely identify the detached EAT bundle to ensure the names uniquely identify the
detached claims sets. Since the names are used only in the detached detachedclaims sets. Since the names are used only in the detached
EAT bundle, they can be very short, perhaps one byte. EAT bundle, they can be very short, perhaps one byte.
DEB-Messages = DEB-Tagged-Message / DEB-Untagged-Message
DEB-Tagged-Message = #6.TBD(DEB-Untagged-Message)
DEB-Untagged-Message = Detached-EAT-Bundle
Detached-EAT-Bundle = [ Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
main-token : Nested-Token, main-token : Nested-Token,
detached-claims-sets: { detached-claims-sets: {
+ tstr => cbor-wrapped-claims-set / json-wrapped-claims-set + tstr => JC<json-wrapped-claims-set,
cbor-wrapped-claims-set>
} }
] ]
json-wrapped-claims-set = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+" json-wrapped-claims-set = base64-url-text
cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set
6. Endorsements and Verification Keys 6. Endorsements and Verification Keys
The Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs the The Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs the
cryptographic part of an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE/ cryptographic part of an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE/
JOSE signature). This section describes several ways to identify the JOSE signature). This section describes several ways to identify the
verification key. There is not one standard method. verification key. There is not one standard method.
skipping to change at page 43, line 22 skipping to change at page 43, line 17
7. Profiles 7. Profiles
This EAT specification does not gaurantee that implementations of it This EAT specification does not gaurantee that implementations of it
will interoperate. The variability in this specification is will interoperate. The variability in this specification is
necessary to accommodate the widely varying use cases. An EAT necessary to accommodate the widely varying use cases. An EAT
profile narrows the specification for a specific use case. An ideal profile narrows the specification for a specific use case. An ideal
EAT profile will guarantee interoperability. EAT profile will guarantee interoperability.
The profile can be named in the token using the profile claim The profile can be named in the token using the profile claim
described in Section 3.20. described in Section 4.3.3.
A profile can apply to Attestation Evidence or to Attestation Results A profile can apply to Attestation Evidence or to Attestation Results
or both. or both.
7.1. Format of a Profile Document 7.1. Format of a Profile Document
A profile document doesn't have to be in any particular format. It A profile document doesn't have to be in any particular format. It
may be simple text, something more formal or a combination. may be simple text, something more formal or a combination.
In some cases CDDL may be created that replaces CDDL in this or other In some cases CDDL may be created that replaces CDDL in this or other
document to express some profile requirements. For example, to document to express some profile requirements. For example, to
require the altitude data item in the location claim, CDDL can be require the altitude data item in the location claim, CDDL can be
written that replicates the location claim with the altitude no written that replicates the location claim with the altitude no
longer optional. longer optional.
7.2. List of Profile Issues 7.2. List of Profile Issues
The following is a list of EAT, CWT, UCCS, JWS, UJCS, COSE, JOSE and The following is a list of EAT, CWT, JWS, COSE, JOSE and CBOR options
CBOR options that a profile should address. that a profile should address.
7.2.1. Use of JSON, CBOR or both 7.2.1. Use of JSON, CBOR or both
The profile should indicate whether the token format should be CBOR, The profile should indicate whether the token format should be CBOR,
JSON, both or even some other encoding. If some other encoding, a JSON, both or even some other encoding. If some other encoding, a
specification for how the CDDL described here is serialized in that specification for how the CDDL described here is serialized in that
encoding is necessary. encoding is necessary.
This should be addressed for the top-level token and for any nested This should be addressed for the top-level token and for any nested
tokens. For example, a profile might require all nested tokens to be tokens. For example, a profile might require all nested tokens to be
skipping to change at page 44, line 36 skipping to change at page 44, line 36
7.2.4. CBOR Preferred Serialization 7.2.4. CBOR Preferred Serialization
The profile should indicate whether encoders must use preferred The profile should indicate whether encoders must use preferred
serialization. The profile should indicate whether decoders must serialization. The profile should indicate whether decoders must
accept non-preferred serialization. accept non-preferred serialization.
7.2.5. COSE/JOSE Protection 7.2.5. COSE/JOSE Protection
COSE and JOSE have several options for signed, MACed and encrypted COSE and JOSE have several options for signed, MACed and encrypted
messages. EAT/CWT has the option to have no protection using UCCS messages. JWT may use the JOSE NULL protection option. It is
and JOSE has a NULL protection option. It is possible to implement possible to implement no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then
no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then encrypt and so on. All encrypt and so on. All combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, and
combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, CWT, UCCS and UJCS are CWT are allowed by EAT.
allowed by EAT.
The profile should list the protections that must be supported by all The profile should list the protections that must be supported by all
decoders implementing the profile. The encoders them must implement decoders implementing the profile. The encoders them must implement
a subset of what is listed for the decoders, perhaps only one. a subset of what is listed for the decoders, perhaps only one.
Implementations may choose to sign or MAC before encryption so that Implementations may choose to sign or MAC before encryption so that
the implementation layer doing the signing or MACing can be the the implementation layer doing the signing or MACing can be the
smallest. It is often easier to make smaller implementations more smallest. It is often easier to make smaller implementations more
secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware. The key secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware. The key
material for a signature or MAC is a private key, while for material for a signature or MAC is a private key, while for
skipping to change at page 46, line 19 skipping to change at page 46, line 19
7.2.14. Refined Claim Definition 7.2.14. Refined Claim Definition
The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims. For The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims. For
example, it may require altitude in the location claim, or it may example, it may require altitude in the location claim, or it may
require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13. require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13.
7.2.15. CBOR Tags 7.2.15. CBOR Tags
The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or
not. Similarly, the profile should specify whether the token should not.
be a UCCS tag or not.
When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE
tags are used or not. Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used tags are used or not. Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used
in a CWT tag. in a CWT tag.
Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying
protocol identifies the object as an EAT. protocol identifies the object as an EAT.
7.2.16. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims 7.2.16. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims
skipping to change at page 46, line 49 skipping to change at page 46, line 48
how to encode the CDDL in CBOR or JSON. Since CBOR can express some how to encode the CDDL in CBOR or JSON. Since CBOR can express some
things that JSON can't (e.g., tags) or that are expressed differently things that JSON can't (e.g., tags) or that are expressed differently
(e.g., labels) there is some CDDL that is specific to the encoding (e.g., labels) there is some CDDL that is specific to the encoding
format. format.
8.1. Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT 8.1. Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT
CDDL was not used to define CWT or JWT. It was not available at the CDDL was not used to define CWT or JWT. It was not available at the
time. time.
This document defines CDDL for both CWT and JWT as well as UCCS. This document defines CDDL for both CWT and JWT. This document does
This document does not change the encoding or semantics of anything not change the encoding or semantics of anything in a CWT or JWT.
in a CWT or JWT.
A Claims-Set is the central data structure for EAT, CWT, JWT and A Claims-Set is the central data structure for EAT, CWT and JWT. It
UCCS. It holds all the claims and is the structure that is secured holds all the claims and is the structure that is secured by signing
by signing or other means. It is not possible to define EAT, CWT, or other means. It is not possible to define EAT, CWT, or JWT in
JWT or UCCS in CDDL without it. The CDDL definition of Claims-Set CDDL without it. The CDDL definition of Claims-Set here is
here is applicable to EAT, CWT, JWT and UCCS. applicable to EAT, CWT and JWT.
This document specifies how to encode a Claims-Set in CBOR or JSON. This document specifies how to encode a Claims-Set in CBOR or JSON.
With the exception of nested tokens and some other externally defined With the exception of nested tokens and some other externally defined
structures (e.g., SWIDs) an entire Claims-Set must be in encoded in structures (e.g., SWIDs) an entire Claims-Set must be in encoded in
either CBOR or JSON, never a mixture. either CBOR or JSON, never a mixture.
CDDL for the seven claims defined by [RFC8392] and [RFC7519] is CDDL for the seven claims defined by [RFC8392] and [RFC7519] is
included here. included here.
8.2. Encoding Data Types 8.2. Encoding Data Types
This makes use of the types defined in [RFC8610] Appendix D, Standard This makes use of the types defined in [RFC8610] Appendix D, Standard
Prelude. Prelude.
8.2.1. Common Data Types 8.2.1. Common Data Types
time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows
floating-point representation. floating-point representation.
The OID encoding from [RFC9090] is used without the tag number in
CBOR-encoded tokens. In JSON tokens OIDs are a text string in the
common form of "nn.nn.nn...".
Unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not the URI tag defined in Unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not the URI tag defined in
[RFC8949]. They are just text strings that contain a URI. [RFC8949]. They are just text strings that contain a URI.
string-or-uri = tstr
time-int = #6.1(int) time-int = #6.1(int)
binary-data = JC< base64-url-text, bstr>
base64-url-text = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"
general-oid = JC< json-oid, ~oid >
json-oid = tstr .regexp "[0-9\.]+"
general-uri = JC< text, ~uri >
8.2.2. JSON Interoperability 8.2.2. JSON Interoperability
JSON should be encoded per [RFC8610] Appendix E. In addition, the JSON should be encoded per [RFC8610] Appendix E. In addition, the
following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows: following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:
o bstr - must be base64url encoded o bstr - must be base64url encoded
o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of o time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
[RFC7519]. [RFC7519].
o string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described o string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
section 2 of [RFC7519]. section 2 of [RFC7519].
o uri - must be a URI [RFC3986]. o uri - must be a URI [RFC3986].
o oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted- o oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted-
decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1"). decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1").
skipping to change at page 48, line 8 skipping to change at page 48, line 15
[RFC7519]. [RFC7519].
o string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described o string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
section 2 of [RFC7519]. section 2 of [RFC7519].
o uri - must be a URI [RFC3986]. o uri - must be a URI [RFC3986].
o oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted- o oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted-
decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1"). decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1").
The CDDL generic "JC< >" is used in most places where there is a
variance between CBOR and JSON. The first argument is the CDDL for
JSON and the second is CDDL for CBOR.
8.2.3. Labels 8.2.3. Labels
Map labels, including Claims-Keys and Claim-Names, and enumerated- Map labels, including Claims-Keys and Claim-Names, and enumerated-
type values are always integers when encoding in CBOR and strings type values are always integers when encoding in CBOR and strings
when encoding in JSON. There is an exception to this for naming when encoding in JSON. There is an exception to this for naming
submodules and detached claims sets in a DEB. These are strings in submodules and detached claims sets in a DEB. These are strings in
CBOR. CBOR.
The CDDL in most cases gives both the integer label and the string The CDDL in most cases gives both the integer label and the string
label as it is not convenient to have conditional CDDL for such. label as it is not convenient to have conditional CDDL for such.
skipping to change at page 49, line 19 skipping to change at page 49, line 29
o Sorting of maps by key is not required. The EAT decoder must not o Sorting of maps by key is not required. The EAT decoder must not
rely on sorting. rely on sorting.
o Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8949] is o Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8949] is
not required. not required.
o Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must be o Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must be
followed. The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels followed. The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels
or invalid UTF-8 strings. or invalid UTF-8 strings.
8.4. Collected Common CDDL 8.4. Collected CDDL
Claims-Set = { 8.4.1. Payload CDDL
* $$claims-set-claims,
* Claim-Label .feature "extended-label" => any
}
Claim-Label = int / text This CDDL defines all the EAT Claims that are added to the main
string-or-uri = tstr definition of a Claim-Set in Appendix D. Claims-Set is the payload
for CWT, JWT and potentially other token types. This is for both
CBOR and JSON. When there is variation between CBOR and JSON, the
JC<> CDDL generic defined in Appendix D.
time-int = #6.1(int) This CDDL uses, but doesn't define Nested-Token because its
$$claims-set-claims //= (iss-label => text) definition varies between CBOR and JSON and the JC<> generic can't be
$$claims-set-claims //= (sub-label => text) used to define it. Nested-Token is the one place that that a CBOR
$$claims-set-claims //= (aud-label => text) token can be nested inside a JSON token and vice versa. Nested-Token
$$claims-set-claims //= (exp-label => ~time) is defined in the following sections.
$$claims-set-claims //= (nbf-label => ~time)
$$claims-set-claims //= (iat-label => ~time)
$$claims-set-claims //= time-int = #6.1(int)
(nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])
nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64) binary-data = JC< base64-url-text, bstr>
$$claims-set-claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)
ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33) base64-url-text = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"
$$claims-set-claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)
sueids-type = { general-oid = JC< json-oid, ~oid >
+ tstr => ueid-type json-oid = tstr .regexp "[0-9\.]+"
}
oemid-pen = int
oemid-ieee = bstr .size 3 general-uri = JC< text, ~uri >
oemid-random = bstr .size 16
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
oemid-label => (nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])
oemid-random / oemid-ieee / oemid-pen
)
$$claims-set-claims //= (
hardware-version-label => hardware-version-type
)
hardware-version-type = [ nonce-type = JC< tstr .size (10..74), bstr .size (8..64)>
version: tstr,
scheme: $version-scheme
]
hardware-model-type = bytes .size (1..32)
$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)
hardware-model-label => hardware-model-type
)
$$claims-set-claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr )
$$claims-set-claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type)
sw-version-type = [ ueid-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (12..44) , bstr .size (7..33)>
version: tstr,
scheme: $version-scheme ; As defined by CoSWID
]
$$claims-set-claims //= (
security-level-label =>
security-level-cbor-type /
security-level-json-type
)
security-level-cbor-type = &( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)
unrestricted: 1,
restricted: 2,
secure-restricted: 3,
hardware: 4
)
security-level-json-type = sueids-type = {
"unrestricted" / + tstr => ueid-type
"restricted" / }
"secure-restricted" /
"hardware"
$$claims-set-claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool)
$$claims-set-claims //= (
debug-status-label =>
debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
)
debug-status-cbor-type = &( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
enabled: 0, oemid-label => oemid-pen / oemid-ieee / oemid-random
disabled: 1, )
disabled-since-boot: 2,
disabled-permanently: 3,
disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4
)
debug-status-json-type = oemid-pen = int
"enabled" /
"disabled" /
"disabled-since-boot" /
"disabled-permanently" /
"disabled-fully-and-permanently"
$$claims-set-claims //= (location-label => location-type)
location-type = { oemid-ieee = JC<oemid-ieee-json, oemid-ieee-cbor>
latitude => number, oemid-ieee-cbor = bstr .size 3
longitude => number, oemid-ieee-json = base64-url-text .size 4
? altitude => number,
? accuracy => number,
? altitude-accuracy => number,
? heading => number,
? speed => number,
? timestamp => ~time-int,
? age => uint
}
latitude = 1 / "latitude" oemid-random = JC<oemid-random-json, oemid-random-cbor>
longitude = 2 / "longitude" oemid-random-cbor = bstr .size 16
altitude = 3 / "altitude" oemid-random-json = base64-url-text .size 24
accuracy = 4 / "accuracy"
altitude-accuracy = 5 / "altitude-accuracy"
heading = 6 / "heading"
speed = 7 / "speed"
timestamp = 8 / "timestamp"
age = 9 / "age"
$$claims-set-claims //= (uptime-label => uint)
$$claims-set-claims //= (boot-seed-label => bytes)
$$claims-set-claims //= (odometer-label => uint)
$$claims-set-claims //= (
intended-use-label =>
intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
)
intended-use-cbor-type = &(
generic: 1,
registration: 2,
provisioning: 3,
csr: 4,
pop: 5
)
intended-use-json-type = $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
"generic" / hardware-version-label => hardware-version-type
"registration" / )
"provisioning" /
"csr" /
"pop"
$$claims-set-claims //= (
dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ]
)
dloa-type = [ hardware-version-type = [
dloa_registrar: ~uri version: tstr,
dloa_platform_label: text ? scheme: $version-scheme
? dloa_application_label: text ]
]
$$claims-set-claims //= (profile-label => ~uri / ~oid)
$$claims-set-claims //= (
manifests-label => manifests-type
)
manifests-type = [+ $$manifest-formats] $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
hardware-model-label => hardware-model-type
)
hardware-model-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (4..44),
bytes .size (1..32)>
coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag> $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr )
$$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx$$claims-set-claims //= ( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type)
swevidence-label => swevidence-type
)
swevidence-type = [+ $$swevidence-formats] sw-version-type = [
version: tstr
? scheme: $version-scheme
]
coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag> $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
$$swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag ( security-level-label => security-level-type )
$$claims-set-claims //= (swresults-label => [ + swresult-type ])
verification-result-cbor-type = &( security-level-type = unrestricted /
verification-not-run: 1, restricted /
verification-indeterminate: 2, hardware
verification-failed: 3,
fully-verified: 4,
partially-verified: 5,
) unrestricted = JC< "unrestricted", 1>
restricted = JC< "restricted", 2>
hardware = JC< "hardware", 3>
verification-result-json-type = $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool)
"verification-not-run" /
"verification-indeterminate" /
"verification-failed" /
"fully-verified" /
"partially-verified"
verification-objective-cbor-type = &( $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( debug-status-label => debug-status-type )
all: 1,
firmware: 2,
kernel: 3,
privileged: 4,
system-libs: 5,
partial: 6,
)
verification-objective-json-type = debug-status-type = ds-enabled /
"all" / disabled /
"firmware" / disabled-since-boot /
"kernel" / disabled-permanently /
"privileged" / disabled-fully-and-permanently
"system-libs" /
"partial"
swresult-type = [ ds-enabled = JC< "enabled", 0 >
verification-system: tstr, disabled = JC< "disabled", 1 >
objective: verification-objective-cbor-type / disabled-since-boot = JC< "disabled-since-boot", 2 >
verification-objective-json-type, disabled-permanently = JC< "disabled-permanently", 3 >
result: verification-result-cbor-type / disabled-fully-and-permanently = JC< "disabled-fully-and-permanently",
verification-result-json-type, 4 >
? objective-name: tstr
]
$$claims-set-claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })
Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (location-label => location-type)
Detached-Submodule-Digest = [ location-type = {
algorithm : int / text, latitude => number,
digest : bstr longitude => number,
] ? altitude => number,
Detached-EAT-Bundle = [ ? accuracy => number,
main-token : Nested-Token, ? altitude-accuracy => number,
detached-claims-sets: { ? heading => number,
+ tstr => cbor-wrapped-claims-set / json-wrapped-claims-set ? speed => number,
? timestamp => ~time-int,
? age => uint
}
} latitude = JC< "latitude", 1 >
] longitude = JC< "longitude", 2 >
altitude = JC< "altitude", 3 >
accuracy = JC< "accuracy", 4 >
altitude-accuracy = JC< "altitude-accuracy", 5 >
heading = JC< "heading", 6 >
speed = JC< "speed", 7 >
timestamp = JC< "timestamp", 8 >
age = JC< "age", 9 >
json-wrapped-claims-set = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+" $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (uptime-label => uint)
cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (boot-seed-label => binary-data)
8.5. Collected CDDL for CBOR $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (odometer-label => uint)
CBOR-Token = Tagged-CBOR-Token / Untagged-CBOR-Token $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( intended-use-label => intended-use-type )
Tagged-CBOR-Token = CWT-Tagged-Message intended-use-type = generic /
Tagged-CBOR-Token /= UCCS-Tagged-Message registration /
Tagged-CBOR-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message provisioning /
csr /
pop
Untagged-CBOR-Token = CWT-Untagged-Message generic = JC< "generic", 1 >
Untagged-CBOR-Token /= UCCS-Untagged-Message registration = JC< "registration", 2 >
Untagged-CBOR-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message provisioning = JC< "provisioning", 3 >
csr = JC< "csr", 4 >
pop = JC< "pop", 5 >
CWT-Tagged-Message = COSE_Tagged_Message $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
CWT-Untagged-Message = COSE_Untagged_Message dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ]
)
UCCS-Message = UCCS-Tagged-Message / UCCS-Untagged-Message dloa-type = [
dloa_registrar: general-uri
dloa_platform_label: text
? dloa_application_label: text
]
UCCS-Tagged-Message = #6.601(UCCS-Untagged-Message) $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (profile-label => general-uri / general-oid)
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
manifests-label => manifests-type
)
UCCS-Untagged-Message = Claims-Set manifests-type = [+ manifest-format]
DEB-Tagged-Message = #6.602(DEB-Untagged-Message) manifest-format = [
content-type: uint,
content-format: JC< $$manifest-body-json,
$$manifest-body-cbor >
]
DEB-Untagged-Message = Detached-EAT-Bundle $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
$$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text
Nested-Token = $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope
tstr / ; A JSON-encoded Nested-Token (see json-nested-token.cddl) $$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text
bstr .cbor Tagged-CBOR-Token
iss-label = 1 suit-directive-process-dependency = 19
sub-label = 2
aud-label = 3
exp-label = 4
nbf-label = 5
iat-label = 6
cti-label = 7nonce-label = 10
ueid-label = 256
sueids-label = 257
oemid-label = 258
hardware-model-label = 259
hardware-version-label = 260
secure-boot-label = 262
debug-status-label = 263
location-label = 264
profile-label = 265
submods-label = 266
security-level-label = <TBD>
uptime-label = <TBD>
boot-seed-label = <TB>
odometer-label = <TBD>
intended-use-label = <TBD>
dloas-label = <TBD>
sw-name-label = <TBD>
sw-version-label = <TBD>
manifests-label = <TBD>
swevidence-label = <TBD>
swresults-label = <TBD>
8.6. Collected CDDL for JSON $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
swevidence-label => swevidence-type
)
JWT-Message = text .regexp [A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+ swevidence-type = [+ swevidence-format]
UJCS-Message = Claims-Set swevidence-format = [
content-type: uint,
content-format: JC< $$swevidence-body-json,
$$swevidence-body-cbor >
]
Nested-Token = [ $$swevidence-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "UJCS" / "DEB", $$swevidence-body-json /= base64-url-text
nested-token : JWT-Message /
B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token /
DEB-JSON-Message /
UJCS-Message
]
B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+" $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
iss-label = "iss" measurement-results-label =>
sub-label = "sub" [ + measurement-results-group ] )
aud-label = "aud"
exp-label = "exp"
nbf-label = "nbf"
iat-label = "iat"
cti-label = "cti"nonce-label /= "nonce"
ueid-label /= "ueid" measurement-results-group = [
sueids-label /= "sueids" measurement-system: tstr,
oemid-label /= "oemid" measruement-results: [ + individual-result ]
hardware-model-label /= "hwmodel" ]
hardware-version-label /= "hwversion"
security-level-label /= "seclevel"
secure-boot-label /= "secboot"
debug-status-label /= "dbgstat"
location-label /= "location"
profile-label /= "eat-profile"
uptime-label /= "uptime"
boot-seed-label /= "bootseed"
odometer-label /= "odometer"
intended-use-label /= "intuse"
dloas-label /= "dloas"
sw-name-label /= "swname"
sw-version-label /= "swversion"
manifests-label /= "manifests"
swevidence-label /= "swevidence"
swresults-label /= "swresults"
submods-label /= "submods"
latitude /= "lat" individual-result = [
longitude /= "long" results-id: tstr / binary-data,
altitude /= "alt" result: result-type,
accuracy /= "accry"
altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry" ]
heading /= "heading"
speed /= "speed" result-type = comparison-successful /
comparison-fail /
comparison-not-run /
measurement-absent
comparison-successful = JC< "success", 1 >
comparison-fail = JC< "fail", 2 >
comparison-not-run = JC< "not-run", 3 >
measurement-absent = JC< "absent", 4 >
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })
Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest
Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
algorithm : JC< text, int >
digest : binary-data
]
DEB-Messages = DEB-Tagged-Message / DEB-Untagged-Message
DEB-Tagged-Message = #6.TBD(DEB-Untagged-Message)
DEB-Untagged-Message = Detached-EAT-Bundle
Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
main-token : Nested-Token,
detached-claims-sets: {
+ tstr => JC<json-wrapped-claims-set,
cbor-wrapped-claims-set>
}
]
json-wrapped-claims-set = base64-url-text
cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set
nonce-label = JC< "eat_nonce", 10 >
ueid-label = JC< "ueid", 256 >
sueids-label = JC< "sueids", 257 >
oemid-label = JC< "oemid", 258 >
hardware-model-label = JC< "hwmodel", 259 >
hardware-version-label = JC< "hwvers", 260 >
secure-boot-label = JC< "secboot", 262 >
debug-status-label = JC< "dbgstat", 263 >
location-label = JC< "location", 264 >
profile-label = JC< "eat_profile",265 >
submods-label = JC< "submods", 266 >
security-level-label = JC< "seclevel", TBD >
uptime-label = JC< "uptime", TBD >
boot-seed-label = JC< "bootseed", TBD >
intended-use-label = JC< "intuse", TBD >
dloas-label = JC< "dloas", TBD >
sw-name-label = JC< "swname", TBD >
sw-version-label = JC< "swversion", TBD >
manifests-label = JC< "manifests", TBD >
swevidence-label = JC< "swevidence", TBD >
measurement-results-label = JC< "measres" , TBD >
odometer-label = JC< "odometer", TBD >
8.4.2. CBOR-Specific CDDL
EAT-CBOR-Token = $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token / $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token
$$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= CWT-Tagged-Message
$$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message
$$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= CWT-Untagged-Message
$$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message
Nested-Token = CBOR-Nested-Token
CBOR-Nested-Token =
JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token /
CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token
CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = bstr .cbor $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token
JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = tstr
8.4.3. JSON-Specific CDDL
EAT-JSON-Token = $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats
$$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= JWT-Message
$$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= DEB-Untagged-Message
Nested-Token = JSON-Nested-Token
JSON-Nested-Token = [
type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "DEB",
nested-token : JWT-Message /
CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token /
Detached-EAT-Bundle
]
CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token = base64-url-text
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
9.1. Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims Registries 9.1. Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims Registries
Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT and JWT so Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT and JWT so
the CWT and JWT Claims Registries, [IANA.CWT.Claims] and the CWT and JWT Claims Registries, [IANA.CWT.Claims] and
[IANA.JWT.Claims], are re used. No new IANA registry is created. [IANA.JWT.Claims], are re used. No new IANA registry is created.
All EAT claims defined in this document are placed in both All EAT claims defined in this document are placed in both
skipping to change at page 60, line 23 skipping to change at page 60, line 4
o Claim Description: Semi-permanent UEIDs o Claim Description: Semi-permanent UEIDs
o JWT Claim Name: "sueids" o JWT Claim Name: "sueids"
o CWT Claim Key: TBD (requested value 257) o CWT Claim Key: TBD (requested value 257)
o Claim Value Type(s): map o Claim Value Type(s): map
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): *this document* o Specification Document(s): *this document*
o Claim Name: Hardware OEMID o Claim Name: Hardware OEMID
o Claim Description: Hardware OEM ID o Claim Description: Hardware OEM ID
o JWT Claim Name: "oemid" o JWT Claim Name: "oemid"
o Claim Key: TBD (requested value 258) o Claim Key: TBD (requeste value 258)
o Claim Value Type(s): byte string or integer o Claim Value Type(s): byte string or integer
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): *this document* o Specification Document(s): *this document*
o Claim Name: Hardware Model o Claim Name: Hardware Model
o Claim Description: Model identifier for hardware o Claim Description: Model identifier for hardware
skipping to change at page 61, line 23 skipping to change at page 61, line 4
o Claim Value Type(s): array o Claim Value Type(s): array
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): *this document* o Specification Document(s): *this document*
o Claim Name: Secure Boot o Claim Name: Secure Boot
o Claim Description: Indicate whether the boot was secure o Claim Description: Indicate whether the boot was secure
o JWT Claim Name: "secboot" o JWT Claim Name: "secboot"
o Claim Key: TBD (requested value 262) o Claim Key: 262
o Claim Value Type(s): Boolean o Claim Value Type(s): Boolean
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): *this document* o Specification Document(s): *this document*
o Claim Name: Debug Status o Claim Name: Debug Status
o Claim Description: Indicate status of debug facilities o Claim Description: Indicate status of debug facilities
o JWT Claim Name: "dbgstat" o JWT Claim Name: "dbgstat"
o Claim Key: TBD (requested value 263) o Claim Key: 263
o Claim Value Type(s): integer or string o Claim Value Type(s): integer or string
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): *this document* o Specification Document(s): *this document*
o Claim Name: Location o Claim Name: Location
o Claim Description: The geographic location o Claim Description: The geographic location
skipping to change at page 70, line 17 skipping to change at page 69, line 46
downstream consumers is not strictly required. Nevertheless, downstream consumers is not strictly required. Nevertheless,
downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to
the EAT they are consuming. the EAT they are consuming.
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[CoSWID] Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D. [CoSWID] Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", draft- Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", draft-
ietf-sacm-coswid-20 (work in progress), January 2022. ietf-sacm-coswid-21 (work in progress), March 2022.
[DLOA] "Digital Letter of Approval", November 2015, [DLOA] "Digital Letter of Approval", November 2015,
<https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ <https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
GPC_DigitalLetterOfApproval_v1.0.pdf>. GPC_DigitalLetterOfApproval_v1.0.pdf>.
[EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes", [EAN-13] GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",
2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>. 2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.
[FIDO.AROE] [FIDO.AROE]
The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted
skipping to change at page 71, line 22 skipping to change at page 71, line 5
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
skipping to change at page 72, line 41 skipping to change at page 72, line 27
DOI 10.17487/RFC9090, July 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9090, July 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9090>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9090>.
[ThreeGPP.IMEI] [ThreeGPP.IMEI]
3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical 3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering, Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering,
addressing and identification", 2019, addressing and identification", 2019,
<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>. SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.
[UCCS.Draft]
Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C.
Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets",
draft-ietf-rats-uccs-02 (work in progress), January 2022.
[WGS84] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), "WORLD [WGS84] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), "WORLD
GEODETIC SYSTEM 1984, NGA.STND.0036_1.0.0_WGS84", July GEODETIC SYSTEM 1984, NGA.STND.0036_1.0.0_WGS84", July
2014, <https://earth-info.nga.mil/php/ 2014, <https://earth-info.nga.mil/php/
download.php?file=coord-wgs84>. download.php?file=coord-wgs84>.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[BirthdayAttack] [BirthdayAttack]
"Birthday attack", "Birthday attack",
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>.
skipping to change at page 76, line 7 skipping to change at page 75, line 7
DOI 10.17487/RFC9039, June 2021, DOI 10.17487/RFC9039, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9039>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9039>.
[W3C.GeoLoc] [W3C.GeoLoc]
Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/ 2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>. geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.
Appendix A. Examples Appendix A. Examples
These examples are either UCCS, shown as CBOR diagnostic, or UJCS Most examples are shown as just a Claims-Set that would be a payload
messages. Full CWT and JWT examples with signing and encryption are for a CWT, JWT, DEB or future token types. It is shown this way
not given. because the payload is all the claims, the most interesting part and
showing full tokens makes it harder to show the claims.
All UCCS examples can be the payload of a CWT. To do so, they must
be converted from the UCCS message to a Claims-Set, which is achieve
by "removing" the tag.
UJCS messages can be directly used as the payload of a JWT. Some examples of full tokens are also given.
WARNING: These examples use tag and label numbers not yet assigned by WARNING: These examples use tag and label numbers not yet assigned by
IANA. IANA.
A.1. Simple TEE Attestation A.1. Payload Examples
A.1.1. Simple TEE Attestation
This is a simple attestation of a TEE that includes a manifest that This is a simple attestation of a TEE that includes a manifest that
is a payload CoSWID to describe the TEE's software. is a payload CoSWID to describe the TEE's software.
/ This is a UCCS EAT that describes a simple TEE. / / This is an EAT payload that describes a simple TEE. /
601({ {
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ security-level / 261: 3, / secure-restricted / / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot / / debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
/ manfests / 273: [ / manfests / 273: [
[
121, / CoAP Content ID. A /
/ made up one until one /
/ is assigned for CoSWID /
/ This is byte-string wrapped / / This is byte-string wrapped /
/ payload CoSWID. It gives the TEE / / payload CoSWID. It gives the TEE /
/ software name, the version and / / software name, the version and /
/ the name of the file it is in. / / the name of the file it is in. /
h' da53574944a60064336132340c01016b / {0: "3a24", /
/ 12: 1, /
/ 1: "Acme TEE OS", /
/ 13: "3.1.4", /
/ 2: [{31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 1}, /
/ {31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 2}], /
/ 6: { /
/ 17: { /
/ 24: "acme_tee_3.exe" /
/ } /
/ } /
/ } /
h' a60064336132340c01016b
41636d6520544545204f530d65332e31 41636d6520544545204f530d65332e31
2e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545 2e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545
204f53182101a2181f6b41636d652054 204f53182101a2181f6b41636d652054
4545204f5318210206a111a118186e61 4545204f5318210206a111a118186e61
636d655f7465655f332e657865' 636d655f7465655f332e657865'
]
] ]
}) }
/ A payload CoSWID created by the SW vendor. All this really does / / A payload CoSWID created by the SW vendor. All this really does /
/ is name the TEE SW, its version and lists the one file that / / is name the TEE SW, its version and lists the one file that /
/ makes up the TEE. / / makes up the TEE. /
1398229316({ 1398229316({
/ Unique CoSWID ID / 0: "3a24", / Unique CoSWID ID / 0: "3a24",
/ tag-version / 12: 1, / tag-version / 12: 1,
/ software-name / 1: "Acme TEE OS", / software-name / 1: "Acme TEE OS",
/ software-version / 13: "3.1.4", / software-version / 13: "3.1.4",
/ entity / 2: [ / entity / 2: [
skipping to change at page 77, line 30 skipping to change at page 77, line 30
/ role / 33: 2 / software-creator / / role / 33: 2 / software-creator /
} }
], ],
/ payload / 6: { / payload / 6: {
/ ...file / 17: { / ...file / 17: {
/ ...fs-name / 24: "acme_tee_3.exe" / ...fs-name / 24: "acme_tee_3.exe"
} }
} }
}) })
A.2. Submodules for Board and Device A.1.2. Submodules for Board and Device
/ This example shows use of submodules to give information / / This example shows use of submodules to give information /
/ about the chip, board and overall device. / / about the chip, board and overall device. /
/ / / /
/ The main attestation is associated with the chip with the / / The main attestation is associated with the chip with the /
/ CPU and running the main OS. It is what has the keys and / / CPU and running the main OS. It is what has the keys and /
/ produces the token. / / produces the token. /
/ / / /
/ The board is made by a different vendor than the chip. / / The board is made by a different vendor than the chip. /
/ Perhaps it is some generic IoT board. / / Perhaps it is some generic IoT board. /
/ / / /
skipping to change at page 78, line 33 skipping to change at page 78, line 33
/ UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', / UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
/ HW OEM ID / 258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID / / HW OEM ID / 258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID /
/ HW Model ID / 259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8' / HW Model ID / 259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8'
/ Hash of chip model name /, / Hash of chip model name /,
/ HW Version / 260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipartnumeric version / / HW Version / 260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipartnumeric version /
/ SW Name / 271: "Acme OS", / SW Name / 271: "Acme OS",
/ SW Version / 272: ["3.5.5", 1], / SW Version / 272: ["3.5.5", 1],
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 3, / permanent-disable / / debug-status / 263: 3, / permanent-disable /
/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1526542894, / timestamp (iat) / 6: 1526542894,
/ security-level / 261: 3, / secure restricted OS / / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted OS /
/ submods / 266: { / submods / 266: {
/ A submodule to hold some claims about the circuit board / / A submodule to hold some claims about the circuit board /
"board" : { "board" : {
/ HW OEM ID / 258: h'9bef8787eba13e2c8f6e7cb4b1f4619a', / HW OEM ID / 258: h'9bef8787eba13e2c8f6e7cb4b1f4619a',
/ HW Model ID / 259: h'ee80f5a66c1fb9742999a8fdab930893' / HW Model ID / 259: h'ee80f5a66c1fb9742999a8fdab930893'
/ Hash of board module name /, / Hash of board module name /,
/ HW Version / 260: ["2.0a", 2] / multipartnumeric+suffix / / HW Version / 260: ["2.0a", 2] / multipartnumeric+suffix /
}, },
/ A submodule to hold claims about the overall device / / A submodule to hold claims about the overall device /
"device" : { "device" : {
/ HW OEM ID / 258: 61234, / PEN Format OEM ID / / HW OEM ID / 258: 61234, / PEN Format OEM ID /
/ HW Version / 260: ["4012345123456", 5] / EAN-13 format (barcode) / / HW Version / 260: ["4012345123456", 5] / EAN-13 format (barcode) /
} }
} }
} }
A.3. EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block A.1.3. EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block
/ This is an example of a token produced by a HW block / / This is an example of a token produced by a HW block /
/ purpose-built for attestation. Only the nonce claim changes / / purpose-built for attestation. Only the nonce claim changes /
/ from one attestation to the next as the rest either come / / from one attestation to the next as the rest either come /
/ directly from the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory / / directly from the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory /
/ (e.g. a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte / / (e.g. a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte /
/ UEID). / / UEID). /
601({ {
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', / UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
/ OEMID / 258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number / / OEMID / 258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
/ security-level / 261: 4, / hardware level security / / security-level / 261: 3, / hardware level security /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 3, / disabled-permanently / / debug-status / 263: 3, / disabled-permanently /
/ HW version / 260: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric / / HW version / 260: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric /
}) }
A.4. Detached EAT Bundle A.1.4. Key / Key Store Attestation
/ This is an EAT payload that describes a simple TEE. /
In this DEB main token is produced by a HW attestation block. The {
detached Claims-Set is produced by a TEE and is largely identical to / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
the Simple TEE examples above. The TEE digests its Claims-Set and / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted /
feeds that digest to the HW block. / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
/ manfests / 273: [
[
121, / CoAP Content ID. A /
/ made up one until one /
/ is assigned for CoSWID /
In a better example the attestation produced by the HW block would be / This is byte-string wrapped /
a CWT and thus signed and secured by the HW block. Since the / payload CoSWID. It gives the TEE /
signature covers the digest from the TEE that Claims-Set is also / software name, the version and /
secured. / the name of the file it is in. /
/ {0: "3a24", /
/ 12: 1, /
/ 1: "Acme TEE OS", /
/ 13: "3.1.4", /
/ 2: [{31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 1}, /
/ {31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 2}], /
/ 6: { /
/ 17: { /
/ 24: "acme_tee_3.exe" /
/ } /
/ } /
/ } /
h' a60064336132340c01016b
41636d6520544545204f530d65332e31
2e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545
204f53182101a2181f6b41636d652054
4545204f5318210206a111a118186e61
636d655f7465655f332e657865'
]
]
}
/ A payload CoSWID created by the SW vendor. All this really does /
/ is name the TEE SW, its version and lists the one file that /
/ makes up the TEE. /
The DEB itself can be assembled by untrusted SW. 1398229316({
/ Unique CoSWID ID / 0: "3a24",
/ tag-version / 12: 1,
/ software-name / 1: "Acme TEE OS",
/ software-version / 13: "3.1.4",
/ entity / 2: [
{
/ entity-name / 31: "Acme TEE OS",
/ role / 33: 1 / tag-creator /
},
{
/ entity-name / 31: "Acme TEE OS",
/ role / 33: 2 / software-creator /
}
],
/ payload / 6: {
/ ...file / 17: {
/ ...fs-name / 24: "acme_tee_3.exe"
}
}
})
/ This is a detached EAT bundle (DEB) tag. / A.1.5. Submodules for Board and Device
/ This example shows use of submodules to give information /
/ about the chip, board and overall device. /
/ /
/ The main attestation is associated with the chip with the /
/ CPU and running the main OS. It is what has the keys and /
/ produces the token. /
/ /
/ The board is made by a different vendor than the chip. /
/ Perhaps it is some generic IoT board. /
/ /
/ The device is some specific appliance that is made by a /
/ different vendor than either the chip or the board. /
/ /
/ Here the board and device submodules aren't the typical /
/ target environments as described by the RATS architecture /
/ document, but they are a valid use of submodules. /
602([ {
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
/ UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
/ HW OEM ID / 258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID /
/ HW Model ID / 259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8'
/ Hash of chip model name /,
/ HW Version / 260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipartnumeric version /
/ SW Name / 271: "Acme OS",
/ SW Version / 272: ["3.5.5", 1],
/ secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 3, / permanent-disable /
/ timestamp (iat) / 6: 1526542894,
/ security-level / 261: 2, / restricted OS /
/ submods / 266: {
/ A submodule to hold some claims about the circuit board /
"board" : {
/ HW OEM ID / 258: h'9bef8787eba13e2c8f6e7cb4b1f4619a',
/ HW Model ID / 259: h'ee80f5a66c1fb9742999a8fdab930893'
/ Hash of board module name /,
/ HW Version / 260: ["2.0a", 2] / multipartnumeric+suffix /
},
/ First part is a full EAT token with claims like nonce and / / A submodule to hold claims about the overall device /
/ UEID. Most importantly, it includes a submodule that is a / "device" : {
/ detached digest which is the hash of the "TEE" claims set / / HW OEM ID / 258: 61234, / PEN Format OEM ID /
/ in the next section. / / HW Version / 260: ["4012345123456", 5] / EAN-13 format (barcode) /
/ / }
/ This token here is in UCCS format (unsigned). In a more / }
/ realistic example, it would be a signed CWT. / }
h'd90259a80a48948f8860d13a463e190100500198 A.1.6. EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block
f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea19010219faf2
19010504190106f5190107031901048263332e31
0119010aa163544545822f5820e5cf95fd24fab7
1446742dd58d43dae178e55fe2b94291a9291082
ffc2635a0b',
{
/ A CBOR-encoded byte-string wrapped EAT claims-set. It /
/ contains claims suitable for a TEE /
"TEE" : h'a50a48948f8860d13a463e19010503190106f519
01070219011181585dda53574944a60064336132
340c01016b41636d6520544545204f530d65332e
312e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545204f53
182101a2181f6b41636d6520544545204f531821
0206a111a118186e61636d655f7465655f332e65
7865'
}
])
/ This example contains submodule that is a detached digest, / / This is an example of a token produced by a HW block /
/ which is the hash of a Claims-Set convey outside this token. / / purpose-built for attestation. Only the nonce claim changes /
/ Other than that is is the other example of a token from an / / from one attestation to the next as the rest either come /
/ attestation HW block / / directly from the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory /
/ (e.g. a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte /
/ UEID). /
601({ {
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', / UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
/ OEMID / 258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number / / OEMID / 258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
/ security-level / 261: 4, / hardware level security / / security-level / 261: 3, / hardware level security /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 3, / disabled-permanently / / debug-status / 263: 3, / disabled-permanently /
/ hw version / 260: [ "3.1", 1 ], / multipartnumeric / / HW version / 260: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric /
/ submods/ 266: { }
"TEE": [ / detached digest submod /
-16, / SHA-256 /
h'e5cf95fd24fab7144674
2dd58d43dae178e55fe2
b94291a9291082ffc2635
a0b'
]
}
})
A.5. Key / Key Store Attestation A.1.7. Key / Key Store Attestation
/ This is an attestation of a public key and the key store / / This is an attestation of a public key and the key store /
/ implementation that protects and manages it. The key store / / implementation that protects and manages it. The key store /
/ implementation is in a security-oriented execution / / implementation is in a security-oriented execution /
/ environment separate from the high-level OS, for example a / / environment separate from the high-level OS, for example a /
/ TEE. The key store is the Attester. / / TEE. The key store is the Attester. /
/ / / /
/ There is some attestation of the high-level OS, just version / / There is some attestation of the high-level OS, just version /
/ and boot & debug status. It is a Claims-Set submodule because/ / and boot & debug status. It is a Claims-Set submodule because/
/ it has lower security level than the key store. The key / / it has lower security level than the key store. The key /
/ store's implementation has access to info about the HLOS, so / / store's implementation has access to info about the HLOS, so /
/ it is able to include it. / / it is able to include it. /
/ / / /
/ A key and an indication of the user authentication given to / / A key and an indication of the user authentication given to /
/ allow access to the key is given. The labels for these are / / allow access to the key is given. The labels for these are /
/ in the private space since this is just a hypothetical / / in the private space since this is just a hypothetical /
/ example, not part of a standard protocol. / / example, not part of a standard protocol. /
/ / / /
/ This is similar to Android Key Attestation. / / This is similar to Android Key Attestation. /
601({ {
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ security-level / 261: 3, / secure-restricted / / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot / / debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
/ manifests / 273: [ / manifests / 273: [
h'da53574944a600683762623334383766
0c000169436172626f6e6974650d6331 [ 121, / CoAP Content ID. A /
2e320e0102a2181f75496e6475737472 / made up one until one /
69616c204175746f6d6174696f6e1821 / is assigned for CoSWID /
02' h'a600683762623334383766
0c000169436172626f6e6974650d6331
2e320e0102a2181f75496e6475737472
69616c204175746f6d6174696f6e1821
02'
]
/ Above is an encoded CoSWID / / Above is an encoded CoSWID /
/ with the following data / / with the following data /
/ SW Name: "Carbonite" / / SW Name: "Carbonite" /
/ SW Vers: "1.2" / / SW Vers: "1.2" /
/ SW Creator: / / SW Creator: /
/ "Industrial Automation" / / "Industrial Automation" /
], ],
/ expiration / 4: 1634324274, / 2021-10-15T18:57:54Z / / expiration / 4: 1634324274, / 2021-10-15T18:57:54Z /
/ creation time / 6: 1634317080, / 2021-10-15T16:58:00Z / / creation time / 6: 1634317080, / 2021-10-15T16:58:00Z /
-80000 : "fingerprint", -80000 : "fingerprint",
skipping to change at page 82, line 40 skipping to change at page 84, line 40
/ y-coord / -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3d / y-coord / -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3d
c9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c' c9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c'
}, },
/ submods / 266 : { / submods / 266 : {
"HLOS" : { / submod for high-level OS / "HLOS" : { / submod for high-level OS /
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ security-level / 261: 1, / unrestricted / / security-level / 261: 1, / unrestricted /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ manifests / 273: [ / manifests / 273: [
h'da53574944a600687337 [ 121, / CoAP Content ID. A /
/ made up one until one /
/ is assigned for CoSWID /
h'a600687337
6537346b78380c000168 6537346b78380c000168
44726f6964204f530d65 44726f6964204f530d65
52322e44320e0302a218 52322e44320e0302a218
1F75496E647573747269 1F75496E647573747269
616c204175746f6d6174 616c204175746f6d6174
696f6e182102' 696f6e182102'
/ Above is an encoded CoSWID / ]
/ with the following data: / / Above is an encoded CoSWID /
/ SW Name: "Droid OS" / / with the following data: /
/ SW Vers: "R2.D2" / / SW Name: "Droid OS" /
/ SW Creator: / / SW Vers: "R2.D2" /
/ "Industrial Automation"/ / SW Creator: /
/ "Industrial Automation"/
] ]
} }
} }
}) }
A.6. SW Measurements of an IoT Device A.1.8. SW Measurements of an IoT Device
This is a simple token that might be for and IoT device. It includes This is a simple token that might be for and IoT device. It includes
CoSWID format measurments of the SW. The CoSWID is in byte-string CoSWID format measurments of the SW. The CoSWID is in byte-string
wrapped in the token and also shown in diagnostic form. wrapped in the token and also shown in diagnostic form.
/ This EAT UCCS is for an IoT device with a TEE. The attestation / / This EAT payload is for an IoT device with a TEE. The attestation /
/ is produced by the TEE. There is a submodule for the IoT OS (the / / is produced by the TEE. There is a submodule for the IoT OS (the /
/ main OS of the IoT device that is not as secure as the TEE). The / / main OS of the IoT device that is not as secure as the TEE). The /
/ submodule contains claims for the IoT OS. The TEE also measures / / submodule contains claims for the IoT OS. The TEE also measures /
/ the IoT OS and puts the measurements in the submodule. / / the IoT OS and puts the measurements in the submodule. /
601({ {
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e', / nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ security-level / 261: 3, / secure-restricted / / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot / / debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
/ OEMID / 258: h'8945ad', / IEEE CID based / / OEMID / 258: h'8945ad', / IEEE CID based /
/ UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', / UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
/ sumods / 266: { / sumods / 266: {
"OS" : { "OS" : {
/ security-level / 261: 2, / restricted / / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted /
/ secure-boot / 262: true, / secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot / / debug-status / 263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
/ swevidence / 274: [ / swevidence / 274: [
/ This is a byte-string wrapped / [
/ evidence CoSWID. It has / 121, / CoAP Content ID. A /
/ hashes of the main files of / / made up one until one /
/ the IoT OS. / / is assigned for CoSWID /
h'da53574944a600663463613234350c
17016d41636d6520522d496f542d4f / This is a byte-string wrapped /
530d65332e312e3402a2181f724163 / evidence CoSWID. It has /
6d6520426173652041747465737465 / hashes of the main files of /
7218210103a11183a318187161636d / the IoT OS. /
655f725f696f745f6f732e65786514 h'a600663463613234350c
1a0044b349078201582005f6b327c1 17016d41636d6520522d496f542d4f
73b4192bd2c3ec248a292215eab456 530d65332e312e3402a2181f724163
611bf7a783e25c1782479905a31818 6d6520426173652041747465737465
6d7265736f75726365732e72736314 7218210103a11183a318187161636d
1a000c38b10782015820c142b9aba4 655f725f696f745f6f732e65786514
280c4bb8c75f716a43c99526694caa 1a0044b349078201582005f6b327c1
be529571f5569bb7dc542f98a31818 73b4192bd2c3ec248a292215eab456
6a636f6d6d6f6e2e6c6962141a0023 611bf7a783e25c1782479905a31818
3d3b0782015820a6a9dcdfb3884da5 6d7265736f75726365732e72736314
f884e4e1e8e8629958c2dbc7027414 1a000c38b10782015820c142b9aba4
43a913e34de9333be6' 280c4bb8c75f716a43c99526694caa
] be529571f5569bb7dc542f98a31818
} 6a636f6d6d6f6e2e6c6962141a0023
} 3d3b0782015820a6a9dcdfb3884da5
}) f884e4e1e8e8629958c2dbc7027414
43a913e34de9333be6'
]
]
}
}
}
/ An evidence CoSWID created for the "Acme R-IoT-OS" created by / / An evidence CoSWID created for the "Acme R-IoT-OS" created by /
/ the "Acme Base Attester" (both fictious names). It provides / / the "Acme Base Attester" (both fictious names). It provides /
/ measurements of the SW (other than the attester SW) on the / / measurements of the SW (other than the attester SW) on the /
/ device. / / device. /
1398229316({ 1398229316({
/ Unique CoSWID ID / 0: "4ca245", / Unique CoSWID ID / 0: "4ca245",
/ tag-version / 12: 23, / Attester-maintained counter / / tag-version / 12: 23, / Attester-maintained counter /
/ software-name / 1: "Acme R-IoT-OS", / software-name / 1: "Acme R-IoT-OS",
skipping to change at page 86, line 4 skipping to change at page 87, line 27
/ ...size / 20: 2309435, / ...size / 20: 2309435,
/ ...hash / 7: [ / ...hash / 7: [
1, / SHA-256 / 1, / SHA-256 /
h'a6a9dcdfb3884da5 h'a6a9dcdfb3884da5
f884e4e1e8e86299 f884e4e1e8e86299
58c2dbc702741443 58c2dbc702741443
a913e34de9333be6' a913e34de9333be6'
] ]
} }
] ]
} }
}) })
A.7. Attestation Results in JSON format A.1.9. Attestation Results in JSON format
This is a UJCS format token that might be the output of a Verifier This is a JSON-format payload that might be the output of a Verifier
that evaluated the IoT Attestation example immediately above. that evaluated the IoT Attestation example immediately above.
This particular Verifier knows enough about the TEE Attester to be This particular Verifier knows enough about the TEE Attester to be
able to pass claims like security level directly through to the able to pass claims like security level directly through to the
Relying Party. The Verifier also knows the Reference Values for the Relying Party. The Verifier also knows the Reference Values for the
measured SW components and is able to check them. It informs the measured SW components and is able to check them. It informs the
Relying Party that they were correct in the swresults claim. Relying Party that they were correct in the swresults claim.
"Trustus Verifications" is the name of the services that verifies the "Trustus Verifications" is the name of the services that verifies the
SW component measurements. SW component measurements.
This UJCS is identical to JSON-encoded Claims-Set that could be a JWT
payload.
{ {
"nonce" : "lI+IYNE6Rj4=", "eat_nonce" : "jkd8KL-8=Qlzg4",
"seclevel" : "secure-restricted", "seclevel" : "restricted",
"secboot" : true, "secboot" : true,
"dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot", "dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot",
"OEMID" : "iUWt", "oemid" : "iUWt",
"UEID" : "AZj1Ck/2wFhhyIYNE6Y4", "ueid" : "AZj1Ck_2wFhhyIYNE6Y4",
"submods" : { "swname" : "Acme R-IoT-OS",
"seclevel" : "restricted", "swversion" : [
"secboot" : true,
"dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot",
"swname" : "Acme R-IoT-OS",
"sw-version" : [
"3.1.4" "3.1.4"
], ],
"swresults" : [ "measres" : [
[
"Trustus Measurements",
[ [
"Trustus Verifications", [ "all" , "success" ]
"all",
"fully-verified"
] ]
] ]
]
} }
Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale A.1.10. JSON-encoded Token with Sumodules
{
"eat_nonce": "lI-IYNE6Rj6O",
"ueid": "AJj1Ck_2wFhhyIYNE6Y46g==",
"secboot": true,
"dbgstat": "disabled-permanently",
"iat": 1526542894,
"seclevel": "restricted",
"submods": {
"Android App Foo" : {
"seclevel": "unrestricted"
},
"Secure Element Eat" : [
"CBOR",
"2D3ShEOhASagWGaoCkiUj4hg0TpGPhkBAFABmPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqGQECGfryGQEFBBkBBvUZAQcDGQEEgmMzLjEBGQEKoWNURUWCL1gg5c-V_ST6txRGdC3VjUPa4XjlX-K5QpGpKRCC_8JjWgtYQPaQywOIZ3-mJKN3X9fLxOhAnsmBa-MvpHRzOw-Ywn-67bvJljuctezAPD41s6_At7NbSV3qwJlxIuqGfwe41es="
],
"Linux Android": {
"seclevel": "unrestricted"
},
"Subsystem J": [
"JWT",
"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJKLUF0dGVzdGVyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjUxNzc0ODY4LCJleHAiOm51bGwsImF1ZCI6IiIsInN1YiI6IiJ9.gjw4nFMhLpJUuPXvMPzK1GMjhyJq2vWXg1416XKszwQ"
]
}
}
A.2. Full Token Examples
A.2.1. Basic CWT Example
This is a simple ECDSA signed CWT-format token.
/ This is a full CWT-format token with a very simple payloal. /
/ The main structure visible here is that of the COSE_Sign1. /
61( 18( [
h'A10126', / protected headers /
{}, / empty unprotected headers /
h'A20B46024A6B0978DE0A49000102030405060708', / payload /
h'9B9B2F5E470000F6A20C8A4157B5763FC45BE759
9A5334028517768C21AFFB845A56AB557E0C8973
A07417391243A79C478562D285612E292C622162
AB233787' / signature /
] ) )
A.2.2. Detached EAT Bundle
In this DEB main token is produced by a HW attestation block. The
detached Claims-Set is produced by a TEE and is largely identical to
the Simple TEE examples above. The TEE digests its Claims-Set and
feeds that digest to the HW block.
In a better example the attestation produced by the HW block would be
a CWT and thus signed and secured by the HW block. Since the
signature covers the digest from the TEE that Claims-Set is also
secured.
The DEB itself can be assembled by untrusted SW.
/ This is a detached EAT bundle (DEB) tag. /
/ Note that 602, the tag identifying a DEB is not yet registered with IANA /
602([
/ First part is a full EAT token with claims like nonce and /
/ UEID. Most importantly, it includes a submodule that is a /
/ detached digest which is the hash of the "TEE" claims set /
/ in the next section. The COSE payload follows: /
/ { /
/ 10: h'948F8860D13A463E', /
/ 256: h'0198F50A4FF6C05861C8860D13A638EA', /
/ 258: 64242, /
/ 261: 4, /
/ 262: true, /
/ 263: 3, /
/ 260: ["3.1", 1], /
/ 266: { /
/ "TEE": [ /
/ -16, /
/ h'E5CF95FD24FAB71446742DD58D43DAE1 /
/ 78E55FE2B94291A9291082FFC2635A0B' /
/ ] /
/ } /
/ } /
h'D83DD28443A10126A05866A80A48948F8860D13A463E1901
00500198F50A4FF6C05861C8860D13A638EA19010219FAF2
19010504190106F5190107031901048263332E310119010A
A163544545822F5820E5CF95FD24FAB71446742DD58D43DA
E178E55FE2B94291A9291082FFC2635A0B5840F690CB0388
677FA624A3775FD7CBC4E8409EC9816BE32FA474733B0F98
C27FBAEDBBC9963B9CB5ECC03C3E35B3AFC0B7B35B495DEA
C0997122EA867F07B8D5EB',
{
/ A CBOR-encoded byte-string wrapped EAT claims-set. It /
/ contains claims suitable for a TEE /
"TEE" : h'a50a48948f8860d13a463e19010503190106
f519010702190111818218795858a6006433
6132340c01016b41636d6520544545204f53
0d65332e312e340282a2181f6b41636d6520
544545204f53182101a2181f6b41636d6520
544545204f5318210206a111a118186e6163
6d655f7465655f332e657865'
}
])
/ This example contains submodule that is a detached digest, /
/ which is the hash of a Claims-Set convey outside this token. /
/ Other than that is is the other example of a token from an /
/ attestation HW block /
{
/ nonce / 10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
/ UEID / 256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
/ OEMID / 258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
/ security-level / 261: 3, / hardware level security /
/ secure-boot / 262: true,
/ debug-status / 263: 3, / disabled-permanently /
/ hw version / 260: [ "3.1", 1 ], / multipartnumeric /
/ submods/ 266: {
"TEE": [ / detached digest submod /
-16, / SHA-256 /
h'e5cf95fd24fab7144674
2dd58d43dae178e55fe2
b94291a9291082ffc2635
a0b'
]
}
}
A.2.3. JSON-encoded Detached EAT Bundle
In this bundle there are two detached Claims-Sets, "CS1" and "CS2".
The JWT at the start of the bundle has detached signature submodules
with hashes of "CS1" and "CS2". TODO: make the JWT actually be
correct verifiable JWT.
[
[ "JWT",
"eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJKLUF0dGVzdGVyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjUxNzc0ODY4LCJleHAiOm51bGwsImF1ZCI6IiIsInN1YiI6IiJ9.gjw4nFMhLpJUuPXvMPzK1GMjhyJq2vWXg1416XKszwQ"
],
{
"Audio Subsystem Claims": "ewogICAgICAgICAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAgICAgImxJK0lZTkU2Umo2TyIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJpYXQiOiAgICAgIDE1MjY1NDI4OTQKICAgICAgICAgfQo=",
"Graphics Subsystem Claims": "ewogICAgICAgICAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAgICJsSStJWU5FNlJqNk8iLAogICAgICAgICAgICAiaWF0IjogICAgIDE1MjY1NDI4OTQKICAgICAgICB9"
}
]
Appendix B. UEID Design Rationale
B.1. Collision Probability B.1. Collision Probability
This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of
UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of
entities in a particular entity management database. entities in a particular entity management database.
Three different sized databases are considered. The number of Three different sized databases are considered. The number of
devices per person roughly models non-personal devices such as devices per person roughly models non-personal devices such as
traffic lights, devices in stores they shop in, facilities they work traffic lights, devices in stores they shop in, facilities they work
in and so on, even considering individual light bulbs. A device may in and so on, even considering individual light bulbs. A device may
skipping to change at page 92, line 26 skipping to change at page 98, line 26
described this way because [IEEE.802.1AR] is oriented around the described this way because [IEEE.802.1AR] is oriented around the
definition of an implementation with a particular level of defense definition of an implementation with a particular level of defense
against attack. against attack.
EAT is not defined around a particular implementation and must work EAT is not defined around a particular implementation and must work
on a range of devices that have a range of defenses against attack. on a range of devices that have a range of defenses against attack.
EAT thus can't be defined permanence in terms of defense against EAT thus can't be defined permanence in terms of defense against
attack. EAT's definition of permanence is in terms of operations and attack. EAT's definition of permanence is in terms of operations and
device lifecycle. device lifecycle.
Appendix D. Changes from Previous Drafts Appendix D. CDDL for CWT and JWT
[RFC8392] was published before CDDL was available and thus is
specified in prose, not CDDL. Following is CDDL specifying CWT as it
is needed to complete this specification. This CDDL also covers the
Claims-Set for JWT.
This however is NOT a normative or standard definition of CWT or JWT
in CDDL. The prose in CWT and JWT remain the normative definition.
; This is replicated from draft-ietf-rats-uccs
Claims-Set = {
* $$Claims-Set-Claims
* Claim-Label .feature "extended-claims-label" => any
}
Claim-Label = int / text
string-or-uri = text
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( iss-claim-label => string-or-uri )
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( sub-claim-label => string-or-uri )
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( aud-claim-label => string-or-uri )
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( exp-claim-label => ~time )
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( nbf-claim-label => ~time )
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( iat-claim-label => ~time )
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( cti-claim-label => bytes )
iss-claim-label = JC<"iss", 1>
sub-claim-label = JC<"sub", 2>
aud-claim-label = JC<"aud", 3>
exp-claim-label = JC<"exp", 4>
nbf-claim-label = JC<"nbf", 5>
iat-claim-label = JC<"iat", 6>
cti-claim-label = CBOR-ONLY<7> ; jti in JWT: different name and text
JSON-ONLY<J> = J .feature "json"
CBOR-ONLY<C> = C .feature "cbor"
; Be sure to have cddl 0.8.29 or higher for this to work
JC<J,C> = JSON-ONLY<J> / CBOR-ONLY<C>
; A JWT message is either a JWS or JWE in compact serialization form
; with the payload a Claims-Set. Compact serialization is the
; protected headers, payload and signature, each b64url encoded and
; separated by a ".". This CDDL simply matches top-level syntax of of
; a JWS or JWE since it is not possible to do more in CDDL.
JWT-Message = text .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"
; Note that the payload of a JWT is defined in claims-set.cddl. That
; definition is common to CBOR and JSON.
; This is some CDDL describing a CWT at the top level This is
; not normative. RFC 8392 is the normative definition of CWT.
CWT-Messages = CWT-Tagged-Message / CWT-Untagged-Message
; The payload of the COSE_Message is always a Claims-Set
; The contents of a CWT Tag must always be a COSE tag
CWT-Tagged-Message = #6.61(COSE_Tagged_Message)
; An untagged CWT may be a COSE tag or not
CWT-Untagged-Message = COSE_Messages
Appendix E. Changes from Previous Drafts
The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts. The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.
This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see
the significant differences. the significant differences.
D.1. From draft-rats-eat-01 E.1. From draft-rats-eat-01
o Added UEID design rationale appendix o Added UEID design rationale appendix
D.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00 E.2. From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00
This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
no new claims have been added. no new claims have been added.
o Separate information and data model using CDDL. o Separate information and data model using CDDL.
o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT o Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT
o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims o Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims
D.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 E.3. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01
o Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim o Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim
o Minor spelling and other fixes o Minor spelling and other fixes
o Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim o Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim
D.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 E.4. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02
o Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type o Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type
o UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256. o UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256.
o Added appendix justifying UEID design and size. o Added appendix justifying UEID design and size.
o Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named o Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named
and there can be more tha one of them and there can be more tha one of them
o Lots of fixes to the CDDL o Lots of fixes to the CDDL
o Added security considerations o Added security considerations
D.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 E.5. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03
o Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims o Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims
o Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans o Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans
D.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 E.6. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04
o Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string o Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string
o CDDL cleaned up some more o CDDL cleaned up some more
o CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs o CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs
o CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped o CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped
o Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa o Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa
skipping to change at page 94, line 12 skipping to change at page 102, line 5
o Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not o Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not
extensible extensible
o Security level claim is not extensible o Security level claim is not extensible
o Improve specification of location claim and added a location o Improve specification of location claim and added a location
privacy section privacy section
o Add intended use claim o Add intended use claim
D.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 E.7. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05
o CDDL format issues resolved o CDDL format issues resolved
o Corrected reference to Location Privacy section o Corrected reference to Location Privacy section
D.8. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06 E.8. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06
o Added boot-seed claim o Added boot-seed claim
o Rework CBOR interoperability section o Rework CBOR interoperability section
o Added profiles claim and section o Added profiles claim and section
D.9. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07 E.9. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07
o Filled in IANA and other sections for possible preassignment of o Filled in IANA and other sections for possible preassignment of
Claim Keys for well understood claims Claim Keys for well understood claims
D.10. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08 E.10. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08
o Change profile claim to be either a URL or an OID rather than a o Change profile claim to be either a URL or an OID rather than a
test string test string
D.11. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09 E.11. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09
o Add SUEIDs o Add SUEIDs
o Add appendix comparing IDevID to EAT o Add appendix comparing IDevID to EAT
o Added section on use for Evidence and Attestation Results o Added section on use for Evidence and Attestation Results
o Fill in the key ID and endorsements identificaiton section o Fill in the key ID and endorsements identificaiton section
o Remove origination claim as it is replaced by key IDs and o Remove origination claim as it is replaced by key IDs and
endorsements endorsements
o Added manifests and software evidence claims o Added manifests and software evidence claims
o Add string labels non-claim labels for use with JSON (e.g. labels o Add string labels non-claim labels for use with JSON (e.g. labels
for members of location claim) for members of location claim)
o EAN-13 HW versions are no longer a separate claim. Now they are o EAN-13 HW versions are no longer a separate claim. Now they are
folded in as a CoSWID version scheme. folded in as a CoSWID version scheme.
D.12. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10 E.12. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10
o Hardware version is made into an array of two rather than two o Hardware version is made into an array of two rather than two
claims claims
o Corrections and wording improvements for security levels claim o Corrections and wording improvements for security levels claim
o Add swresults claim o Add swresults claim
o Add dloas claim - Digitial Letter of Approvals, a list of o Add dloas claim - Digitial Letter of Approvals, a list of
certifications certifications
skipping to change at page 96, line 4 skipping to change at page 103, line 49
o Clearly separate CDDL for JSON and CBOR-specific data items o Clearly separate CDDL for JSON and CBOR-specific data items
o Define UJCS (unsigned JWTs) o Define UJCS (unsigned JWTs)
o Add CDDL for a general Claims-Set used by UCCS, UJCS, CWT, JWT and o Add CDDL for a general Claims-Set used by UCCS, UJCS, CWT, JWT and
EAT EAT
o Top level CDDL for CWT correctly refers to COSE o Top level CDDL for CWT correctly refers to COSE
o OEM ID is specifically for HW, not for SW o OEM ID is specifically for HW, not for SW
o HW OEM ID can now be a PEN o HW OEM ID can now be a PEN
o HW OEM ID can now be a 128-bit random number o HW OEM ID can now be a 128-bit random number
o Expand the examples section o Expand the examples section
o Add software and version claims as easy / JSON alternative to o Add software and version claims as easy / JSON alternative to
CoSWID CoSWID
D.13. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-11 E.13. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-11
o Add HW model claim o Add HW model claim
o Change reference for CBOR OID draft to RFC 9090 o Change reference for CBOR OID draft to RFC 9090
o Correct the iat claim in some examples o Correct the iat claim in some examples
o Make HW Version just one claim rather than 3 (device, board and o Make HW Version just one claim rather than 3 (device, board and
chip) chip)
skipping to change at page 96, line 46 skipping to change at page 104, line 42
o Improve wording in submodules section, particularly how to o Improve wording in submodules section, particularly how to
distinguish types when decoding distinguish types when decoding
o Remove security-level from early allocation o Remove security-level from early allocation
o Add boot odometer claim o Add boot odometer claim
o Add privacy considerations for replay protection o Add privacy considerations for replay protection
E.14. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-12
o Make use of the JC<> generic to express CDDL for both JSON and
CBOR
o Reorganize claims into 4 sections, particularly claims about the
entity and about the token
o Nonce wording - say nonce is required and other improvements
o Clarify relationship of claims in evidence to results when
forwarding
o Clarify manufacturer switching UEID types
o Add new section on the top-level token type that has CBOR-specific
and JSON-specific CDDL since the top-level can't be handled with
JC<>
o Remove definition of UCCS and UJCS, replacing it with a CDDL
socket and mention of future token types
o Split the examples into payload and top level tokens since UCCS
can't be used for examples any more (It was nice because you could
see the payload claims in it easily, where you can't with CWT)
o DEB tag number is TBD rather than hard coded
o Add appendix with non-normative CDDL for a Claims-Set, CWT and JWT
o (Large reorganization of the document build and example
verification makefile)
o Use CoAP content format ID to distinguish manifest and evidence
formats instead of CBOR tag
o Added more examples, both CBOR and JSON
o All CDDL is validating against all examples
o Unassigned IANA requests are clearly TBD in the document (and have
real values as is necessary in the example validation process)
o Improve security-level claim
o swresults claim is now measurement results claim
o substantial redesign of measurement results claim
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Laurence Lundblade Laurence Lundblade
Security Theory LLC Security Theory LLC
EMail: lgl@securitytheory.com EMail: lgl@securitytheory.com
Giridhar Mandyam Giridhar Mandyam
Qualcomm Technologies Inc. Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
5775 Morehouse Drive 5775 Morehouse Drive
San Diego, California San Diego, California
 End of changes. 319 change blocks. 
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