RATS Working Group                                          L. Lundblade
Internet-Draft                                       Security Theory LLC
Intended status: Standards Track                              G. Mandyam
Expires: August 27, November 21, 2022                                 J. O'Donoghue
                                              Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
                                                       February 23,
                                                            May 20, 2022

                   The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)
                         draft-ietf-rats-eat-12
                         draft-ietf-rats-eat-13

Abstract

   An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set
   that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like
   a phone, IoT device, network equipment or such.  This claims set is
   used by a relying party, server or service to determine how much it
   wishes to trust the entity.

   An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with
   attestation-oriented claims.  To a large degree, all this document
   does is extend CWT and JWT.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, November 21, 2022.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Entity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  CWT, JWT, UCCS, UJCS JWT and DEB  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.3.  CDDL, CBOR and JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.4.  Operating Model and RATS Architecture . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
       1.4.1.  Relationship between Attestation Evidence and
               Attestation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  The Claims  .  Top-Level Token Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  The Claims  . . . . . . .  11
     3.1.  Token ID Claim (cti and jti) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat) . . . .  12
     4.1.  Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.3.  Nonce Claim (nonce) . . . . .  12
     4.2.  Claims Describing the Entity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.4.  13
       4.2.1.  Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.5.  13
       4.2.2.  Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     3.6.  16
       4.2.3.  Hardware OEM Identification (oemid) . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.6.1.  17
         4.2.3.1.  Random Number Based OEMID . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.6.2.  17
         4.2.3.2.  IEEE Based OEMID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.6.3.  17
         4.2.3.3.  IANA Private Enterprise Number Based OEMID  . . . . .  17
     3.7.  18
       4.2.4.  Hardware Model Claim (hardware-model) . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.8.  18
       4.2.5.  Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims) . . . .  18
     3.9.  19
       4.2.6.  Software Name Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.10.  20
       4.2.7.  Software Version Claim  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.11.  20
       4.2.8.  The Security Level Claim (security-level) . . . . . . . .  19
     3.12.  20
       4.2.9.  Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     3.13.
       4.2.10. Debug Status Claim (debug-status) . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.13.1.  22
         4.2.10.1.  Enabled  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.13.2.  23
         4.2.10.2.  Disabled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.13.3.  23
         4.2.10.3.  Disabled Since Boot  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.13.4.  23
         4.2.10.4.  Disabled Permanently . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       3.13.5.  23
         4.2.10.5.  Disabled Fully and Permanently . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     3.14. Including Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     3.15.
       4.2.11. The Location Claim (location) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.16.
       4.2.12. The Uptime Claim (uptime) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.17.
       4.2.13. The Boot Odometer Claim (odometer)  . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.18.
       4.2.14. The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     3.19. The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . . . .  26
     3.20. The Profile Claim (profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     3.21.
       4.2.15. The DLOA (Digital Letter or of Approval) Claim (dloas) . . .  27
     3.22.  26
       4.2.16. The Software Manifests Claim (manifests)  . . . . . . . .  28
     3.23.  26
       4.2.17. The Software Evidence Claim (swevidence)  . . . . . . . .  30
     3.24.  28
       4.2.18. The SW Measurement Results Claim (swresults)  . . . (measurement-results) .  29
       4.2.19. Submodules (submods)  . .  30
       3.24.1.  Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
         4.2.19.1.  Submodule Types  . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.24.2.  Objective . . . . . . .  32
         4.2.19.2.  No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       3.24.3.  Results . . .  36
         4.2.19.3.  Security Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
         4.2.19.4.  Submodule Names  . . .  31
       3.24.4.  Objective Name . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     4.3.  Claims Describing the Token . . . . . .  32
     3.25. Submodules (submods) . . . . . . . . .  36
       4.3.1.  Token ID Claim (cti and jti)  . . . . . . . . .  34
       3.25.1.  Submodule Types . . .  36
       4.3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
         3.25.1.1.  Submodule Claims-Set .  37
       4.3.3.  The Profile Claim (profile) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
         3.25.1.2.  Nested Token  37
       4.3.4.  The Intended Use Claim (intended-use) . . . . . . . .  37
     4.4.  Including Keys  . . . . . . . . . .  35
         3.25.1.3.  Detached Submodule Digest  . . . . . . . . . . .  37
       3.25.2.  No Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       3.25.3.  Security Levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       3.25.4.  Submodule Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
       3.25.5.  CDDL for submods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   4.  Unprotected JWT Claims-Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   5.  Detached EAT Bundles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   6.  Endorsements and Verification Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     6.1.  Identification Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       6.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
       6.1.2.  JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters  . . . . . . . .  42
       6.1.3.  CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters . . . . . . .  42
       6.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification  . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     6.2.  Other Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   7.  Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     7.1.  Format of a Profile Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     7.2.  List of Profile Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       7.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or both . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
       7.2.2.  CBOR Map and Array Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization  . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
       7.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.7.  DEB Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.8.  Verification Key Identification . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.9.  Endorsement Identification  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.10. Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.11. Required Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.12. Prohibited Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
       7.2.13. Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       7.2.14. Refined Claim Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       7.2.15. CBOR Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
       7.2.16. Manifests and Software Evidence Claims  . . . . . . .  46
   8.  Encoding and Collected CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     8.1.  Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     8.2.  Encoding Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       8.2.1.  Common Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       8.2.2.  JSON Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
       8.2.3.  Labels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     8.3.  CBOR Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       8.3.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization  . . . . . . . .  48  49
     8.4.  Collected Common CDDL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     8.5.  Collected
       8.4.1.  Payload CDDL for CBOR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     8.6.  Collected . . .  49
       8.4.2.  CBOR-Specific CDDL for JSON  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
       8.4.3.  JSON-Specific CDDL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
     9.1.  Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims
           Registries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
     9.2.  Claim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57  56
       9.2.1.  Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation  . . .  57  56
       9.2.2.  Operating System and Technology Neutral . . . . . . .  57
       9.2.3.  Security Level Neutral  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58  57
       9.2.4.  Reuse of Extant Data Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . .  58  57
       9.2.5.  Proprietary Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     9.3.  Claims Registered by This Document  . . . . . . . . . . .  58
       9.3.1.  Claims for Early Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59  58
       9.3.2.  To be Assigned Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
       9.3.3.  Version Schemes Registered by this Document . . . . .  65
       9.3.4.  UEID URN Registered by this Document  . . . . . . . .  66  65
       9.3.5.  Tag for Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     10.1.  UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . .  67  66
     10.2.  Location Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
     10.3.  Replay Protection and Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68  67
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
     11.1.  Key Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
       11.1.1.  Transmission of Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . .  69  68
     11.2.  Transport Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69  68
     11.3.  Multiple EAT Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70  69
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70  69
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73  72
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76  75
     A.1.  Payload Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
       A.1.1.  Simple TEE Attestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
     A.2.  75
       A.1.2.  Submodules for Board and Device . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
     A.3.
       A.1.3.  EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block  . . . . .  79
       A.1.4.  Key / Key Store Attestation . . . . . . . .  79
     A.4.  Detached EAT Bundle . . . . .  79
       A.1.5.  Submodules for Board and Device . . . . . . . . . . .  81
       A.1.6.  EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block  . . . . .  79
     A.5.  83
       A.1.7.  Key / Key Store Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     A.6.  83
       A.1.8.  SW Measurements of an IoT Device  . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
     A.7.  85
       A.1.9.  Attestation Results in JSON format  . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   Appendix B.  UEID Design Rationale  87
       A.1.10. JSON-encoded Token with Sumodules . . . . . . . . . .  88
     A.2.  Full Token Examples . . . . .  87
     B.1.  Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
       A.2.1.  Basic CWT Example . . . .  87
     B.2.  No Use of UUID . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
       A.2.2.  Detached EAT Bundle . . . . . . .  89 . . . . . . . . . .  90
       A.2.3.  JSON-encoded Detached EAT Bundle  . . . . . . . . . .  92
   Appendix B.  UEID Design Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     B.1.  Collision Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     B.2.  No Use of UUID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
   Appendix C.  EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity
                (DevID)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90  96
     C.1.  DevID Used With EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90  96
     C.2.  How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity . .  91  97
     C.3.  An X.509 Format EAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91  97
     C.4.  Device Identifier Permanence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92  98
   Appendix D.  CDDL for CWT and JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
   Appendix E.  Changes from Previous Drafts . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     D.1. 100
     E.1.  From draft-rats-eat-01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     D.2. 100
     E.2.  From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     D.3. 100
     E.3.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  92
     D.4. 100
     E.4.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     D.5. 100
     E.5.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     D.6. 101
     E.6.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     D.7. 101
     E.7.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
     D.8. 102
     E.8.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
     D.9. 102
     E.9.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
     D.10. 102
     E.10. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
     D.11. 102
     E.11. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  94
     D.12. 102
     E.12. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
     D.13. 103
     E.13. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96 104
     E.14. From draft-ietf-rats-eat-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96 105

1.  Introduction

   EAT provides the definition of a base set of claims that can be made
   about an entity, a device, some software and/or some hardware.  This
   claims set is received by a relying party who uses it to decide if
   and how it will interact with the remote entity.  It may choose to
   not trust the entity and not interact with it.  It may choose to
   trust it.  It may partially trust it, for example allowing monetary
   transactions only up to a limit.

   EAT defines the encoding of the claims set in CBOR [RFC8949] and JSON
   [RFC7159].  EAT is an extension to CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] and
   JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519].

   The claims set is secured in transit with the same mechanisms used by
   CWT and JWT, in particular CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
   [RFC8152] and JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) [RFC7515]
   [RFC7516].  Authenticity and integrity protection must always be
   provided.  Privacy (encryption) may additionally be provided.  The
   key material used to sign and encrypt is specifically created and
   provisioned for the purpose of attestation.  It is the use of this
   key material that make the claims set "attested" rather than just
   some parameters sent to the relying party by the device.

   EAT is focused on authenticating, identifying and characterizing
   implementations where implementations are devices, chips, hardware,
   software and such.  This is distinct from protocols like TLS
   [RFC8446] that authenticate and identify servers and services.  It is
   equally distinct from protocols like SASL [RFC4422] that authenticate
   and identify persons.

   The notion of attestation is large, ranging over a broad variety of
   use cases and security levels.  Here are a few examples of claims:

   o  Make and model of manufactured consumer device

   o  Make and model of a chip or processor, particularly for a
      security-oriented chip

   o  Identification and measurement of the software running on a device

   o  Configuration and state of a device

   o  Environmental characteristics of a device like its GPS location

   o  Formal certifications received

   EAT also supports nesting of sets of claims and EAT tokens for use
   with complex composite devices.

   This document uses the terminology and main operational model defined
   in [RATS.Architecture].  In particular, it can be used for RATS
   Attestation Evidence and Attestation Results.

1.1.  Entity Overview

   The document uses the term "entity" to refer to the target of the
   attestation token.  The claims defined in this document are claims
   about an entity.

   An entity is an implementation in hardware, software or both.

   An entity is the same as the Attester Target Environment defined in
   RATS Architecture.

   An entity also corresponds to a "system component" as defined in the
   Internet Security Glossary [RFC4949].  That glossary also defines
   "entity" and "system entity" as something that may be a person or
   organization as well as a system component.  Here "entity" never
   refers to a person or organization.

   An entity is never a server or a service.

   An entity may be the whole device or it may be a subsystem, a
   subsystem of a subsystem and so on.  EAT allows claims to be
   organized into submodules, nested EATs and so on.  See
   Section 3.25. 4.2.19.  The entity to which a claim applies is the submodule
   in which it appears, or to the top-level entity if it doesn't appear
   in a submodule.

   Some examples of entities:

   o  A Secure Element

   o  A TEE

   o  A card in a network router

   o  A network router, perhaps with each card in the router a submodule

   o  An IoT device

   o  An individual process

   o  An app on a smartphone

   o  A smartphone with many submodules for its many subsystems

   o  A subsystem in a smartphone like the modem or the camera

   An entity may have strong security like defenses against hardware
   invasive attacks.  It may also have low security, having no special
   security defenses.  There is no minimum security requirement to be an
   entity.

1.2.  CWT, JWT, UCCS, UJCS JWT and DEB

   An EAT is primarily a claims set about an entity based on one of the
   following:

   o  CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392]

   o  Unprotected CWT Claims Sets (UCCS) [UCCS.Draft]

   o  JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519]

   All definitions, requirements, creation and validation procedures,
   security considerations, IANA registrations and so on from these
   carry over to EAT.

   This specification extends those specifications by defining
   additional claims for attestation.  This specification also describes
   the notion of a "profile" that can narrow the definition of an EAT,
   ensure interoperability and fill in details for specific usage
   scenarios.  This specification also adds some considerations for
   registration of future EAT-related claims.

   The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or
   JSON encoded, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT and
   UCCS. JWT.
   Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT.  In some cases
   it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type).  In other cases it may
   be through use of CBOR tags.  There is no fixed mechanism across all
   use cases.

   This specification adds two one more top-level messages:

   o  Unprotected JWT Claims Set (UJCS) Section 4 token type:

   o  Detached EAT Bundle (DEB), Section 5

   A DEB is structure to hold a collection of detached claims sets and
   the EAT that separately provides integrity and authenticity
   protection for them.  It can be either CBOR or JSON encoded.

   Last, the definition of other token types is allowed.  Of particular
   use may be a token type that provides no authenticity or integrity
   protection at all for use with transports like TLS that do provide
   that.

1.3.  CDDL, CBOR and JSON

   This document defines Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
   [RFC8949] and Javascript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] encoding
   for an EAT.  All claims in an EAT MUST use the same encoding except
   where explicitly allowed.  It is explicitly allowed for a nested
   token to be of a different encoding.  Some claims explicitly contain
   objects and messages that may use a different encoding than the
   enclosing EAT.

   This specification uses Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)
   [RFC8610] for all definitions.  The implementor interprets the CDDL
   to come to either the CBOR or JSON encoding.  In the case of JSON,
   Appendix E of [RFC8610] is followed.  Additional rules are given in
   Section 8.2.2 where Appendix E is insufficient.

   In most cases where the CDDL for CBOR is different than JSON a CDDL
   Generic named "JC<>" is used.  It is described in Appendix D.

   The CWT and JWT specifications were authored before CDDL was
   available and did not use CDDL.  This specification includes a CDDL
   definition of most of what is defined in [RFC8392].  Similarly, this
   specification includes CDDL for most of what is defined in [RFC7519].

   The UCCS specification does
   These definitions are in Appendix D and are not include CDDL.  This specification
   provides CDDL for it. normative.

1.4.  Operating Model and RATS Architecture

   While it is not required that EAT be used with the RATS operational
   model described in Figure 1 in [RATS.Architecture], or even that it
   be used for attestation, this document is oriented around that model.

   To summarize, an Attester generates Attestation Evidence.
   Attestation Evidence is a claims set describing various
   characteristics of an entity.  Attestation Evidence also is usually
   signed by a key that proves the entity and the evidence it produces
   are authentic.  The claims set includes a nonce or some other means
   to provide freshness.  EAT is designed to carry Attestation Evidence.
   The Attestation Evidence goes to a Verifier where the signature is
   verified.  Some of the claims may also be checked against Reference
   Values.  The Verifier then produces Attestation Results which is also
   usually a claims set.  EAT is also designed to carry Attestation
   Results.  The Attestation Results go to the Relying Party which is
   the ultimate consumer of the Remote Attestation Procedure.  The
   Relying Party uses the Attestation Results as needed for the use
   case, perhaps allowing an entity on the network, allowing a financial
   transaction or such.

   Note that sometimes the Verifier and Relying Party are not separate
   and thus there is no need for a protocol to carry Attestation
   Results.

1.4.1.  Relationship between Attestation Evidence and Attestation
        Results

   Any claim defined in this document or in the IANA CWT or JWT registry
   may be used in Attestation Evidence or Attestation Results.

   Many

   The relationship of claims in Attestation Results to Attestation
   Evidence simply will pass through is fundamentally governed by the Verifier to the Relying Party without modification.  They will be
   verified as authentic from and the entity by Verifier's
   Policy.

   A common use case is for the Verifier just through
   normal verification of the Attester's signature.  The UEID,
   Section 3.4, and Location, Section 3.15, are examples of claims that
   may be passed through.

   Some claims in its Policy to perform
   checks, calculations and processing with Attestation Evidence will be verified by the Verifier
   by comparison to Reference Values.  These claims will not likely be
   conveyed to as the Relying Party.  Instead, some claim indicating they
   were checked may be added
   input to the produce a summary result in Attestation Results or it may be
   tacitly known that
   indicates the Verifier always does this check. overall health and status of the entity.  For example,
   the Verifier receives the Software
   measurements in Attestation Evidence claim, Section 3.23,
   compares it may be compared to Reference
   Values and conveys the results of which are represented as a simple pass/fail in
   Attestation Results.

   It is also possible that some claims in the Attestation Evidence will
   be forwarded unmodified to the Relying Party in a Software Measurement Results Claim, Section 3.24.

   In some cases Attestation Results.
   This forwarding is subject to the Verifier's implementation and
   Policy.  The Relying Party should be aware of the Verifier's Policy
   to know what checks it has performed on claims it forwards.

   The Verifier may provide privacy-preserving
   functionality by stripping also modify or modifying transform claims it forwards.  This
   may be to implement some privacy preservation functionality.

   It is also possible the Verifier will put claims in the Attestation
   Results that do not posses
   sufficient privacy-preserving characteristics.  For example, give details about the data entity that it has computed or
   looked up in a database.  For example, the Location claim, Section 3.15, Verifier may be modified able to have
   put a
   precision of HW OEM ID Claim in the Attestation Results by performing a few kilometers rather than look
   up based on a few meters. UEID (serial number) it received in Attestation
   Evidence.

   There are no fixed rules for how a Verifier processes Attestation
   Evidence to produce Attestation Results.  What is important is the
   Relying Party understand what the Verifier does and what its policies
   are.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document reuses terminology from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT
   [RFC8392].

   Claim:  A piece of information asserted about a subject.  A claim is
      represented as pair with a value and either a name or key to
      identify it.

   Claim Name:  A unique text string that identifies the claim.  It is
      used as the claim name for JSON encoding.

   Claim Key:  The CBOR map key used to identify a claim.

   Claim Value:  The value portion of the claim.  A claim value can be
      any CBOR data item or JSON value.

   CWT/JWT Claims Set:  The CBOR map or JSON object that contains the
      claims conveyed by the CWT or JWT.

   This document reuses terminology from RATS Architecure
   [RATS.Architecture]
   Attester:  A role performed by an entity (typically a device) whose
      Evidence must be appraised in order to infer the extent to which
      the Attester is considered trustworthy, such as when deciding
      whether it is authorized to perform some operation.

   Verifier:  A role that appraises the validity of Attestation Evidence
      about an Attester and produces Attestation Results to be used by a
      Relying Party.

   Relying Party:  A role that depends on the validity of information
      about an Attester, for purposes of reliably applying application
      specific actions.  Compare /relying party/ in [RFC4949].

   Attestation Evidence:  A Claims Set generated by an Attester to be
      appraised by a Verifier.  Attestation Evidence may include
      configuration data, measurements, telemetry, or inferences.

   Attestation Results:  The output generated by a Verifier, typically
      including information about an Attester, where the Verifier
      vouches for the validity of the results

   Reference Values:  A set of values against which values of Claims can
      be compared as part of applying an Appraisal Policy for
      Attestation Evidence.  Reference Values are sometimes referred to
      in other documents as known-good values, golden measurements, or
      nominal values, although those terms typically assume comparison
      for equality, whereas here Reference Values might be more general
      and be used in any sort of comparison.

3.  Top-Level Token Definition

   An EAT is a "message", a "token", or such whose content is a Claims-
   Set about an entity or some number of entities.  An EAT MUST always
   contains a Claims-Set.

   An EAT may be encoded in CBOR or JSON as defined here.  While not
   encouraged, other documents may define EAT encoding in other formats.

   EAT as defined here is always integrity and authenticity protected
   through use of CWT or JWT.  Other token formats using other methods
   of protection may be defined outside this document.

   This document also defines the Detatched EAT Bundle Section 5, a
   bundle of some detached Claims-Sets and CWTs or JWTs that provide
   protection for the detached Claims-Set.

   The following CDDL defines the top-levels of an EAT token as a socket
   indicating future token formats may be defined.  See Appendix D for
   the CDDL definitions of a CWT and JWT.

   Nesting of EATs is allowed and defined in Section 4.2.19.1.2.  This
   nesting includes nesting of a token that is a different format than
   the enclosing token.  The definition of Nested-Token references the
   CDDL defined in this section.  When new token formats are defined,
   the means for identification in a nested token MUST also be defined.

   EAT-CBOR-Token = $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token / $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token

   $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= CWT-Tagged-Message
   $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message

   $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= CWT-Untagged-Message
   $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message

   EAT-JSON-Token = $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats

   $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= JWT-Message
   $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= DEB-Untagged-Message

4.  The Claims

   This section describes new claims defined for attestation that are to
   be added to the CWT [IANA.CWT.Claims] and JWT [IANA.JWT.Claims] IANA
   registries.

   This section also describes how several extant CWT and JWT claims
   apply in EAT.

   CDDL, along with a text description, is used to define each claim
   independent of encoding.  Each claim is defined as a CDDL group.  In
   Section 8 on encoding, the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map entries and
   JSON name/value pairs.

   Each claim described has a unique text string and integer that
   identifies it.  CBOR encoded tokens MUST use only the integer for
   Claim Keys.  JSON encoded tokens MUST use only the text string for
   Claim Names.

3.1.  Token ID

4.1.  Nonce Claim (cti and jti)

   CWT defines the "cti" claim.  JWT defines the "jti" claim.  These are
   equivalent (nonce)

   All EATs MUST have a nonce to each other in prevent replay attacks.

   This claim is either a single byte or text string or an array of byte
   or text strings.  The array is to accommodate multistage EAT
   verification and carry a unique token identifier
   as they do consumption.  See the extensive discussion on
   attestation freshness in JWT Appendix A of RATS Architecture
   [RATS.Architecture].

   A claim named "nonce" is previously defined and CWT.  They may registered with IANA
   for JWT, but MUST not be used to defend against re use
   of the token but are distinct from the in an EAT.  It does not support
   multiple nonces.  No previous nonce that is used by the
   Relying Party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay.

3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat)

   The "iat" claim was defined in CWT and JWT for CWT.

   The nonce MUST have 64 bits of entropy as fewer bits are unlikely to
   be secure.  A maximum nonce size is used set to indicate the date-
   of-creation of limit the token, memory required
   for an implementation.  All receivers MUST be able to accommodate the time at which
   maximum size.

   In CBOR, the claims are collected nonce is a byte string and every bit in the token byte string
   contributes to entropy.  The minimum size is composed and signed. 8 bytes.  The data for some claims may be held or cached for some period of
   time before maximum
   size is 64 bytes.

   In JSON the token nonce is created.  This period may be long, even
   days.  Examples are measurements taken at boot or a geographic
   position fix taken the last time a satellite signal was received.
   There are individual timestamps associated with these claims to
   indicate their age is older than the "iat" timestamp.

   CWT allows the use floating-point for this claim.  EAT disallows the
   use of floating-point.  An EAT token MUST NOT contain an iat claim in
   float-point format.  Any recipient of a token with a floating-point
   format iat claim MUST consider it an error.  A 64-bit integer
   representation of epoch time can represent a range of +/- 500 billion
   years, so text string.  It is assumed that the only point of a floating-point timestamp is to have
   precession greater than one second.  This is not needed for EAT.

3.3.  Nonce Claim (nonce)

   All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks.  The nonce is
   generated
   characters represented by the Relying Party, the end consumer of the token.  It is
   conveyed to the entity over whatever transport is in use before the
   token is generated and then included in the token as the nonce claim.

   This documents the nonce claim for registration in the IANA CWT
   claims registry.  This is equivalent to lower 7 bits will be used so the JWT nonce claim that is
   already registered.

   The nonce text
   string must be at least 8 bytes (64 bits) long as fewer bytes are
   unlikely to be secure.  A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the
   memory a constrained implementation uses.  This one-seventh longer.  The minimum size range is not set
   for the already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this 10 bytes.
   The maximum size
   recommendation when used in an EAT.

   Multiple nonces are allowed to accommodate multistage verification
   and consumption.

   $$claims-set-claims is 74 bytes.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
       (nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])

   nonce-type = JC< tstr .size (10..74), bstr .size (8..64)

3.4.  Universal (8..64)>

4.2.  Claims Describing the Entity ID Claim (ueid)

   A UEID

   The claims in this section describe the entity itself.  They describe
   the entity whether they occur in Attestation Evidence or occur in
   Attestation Results.  See Section 1.4.1 for discussion on how
   Attestation Results relate to Attestation Evidence.

4.2.1.  Universal Entity ID Claim (ueid)

   A UEID identifies an individual manufactured entity like a mobile
   phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked security
   camera.  It may identify the entire entity or a submodule.  It does
   not identify types, models or classes of entities.  It is akin to a
   serial number, though it does not have to be sequential.

   UEIDs MUST be universally and globally unique across manufacturers
   and countries.  UEIDs MUST also be unique across protocols and
   systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different
   protocols and systems.  No two products anywhere, even in completely
   different industries made by two different manufacturers in two
   different countries should have the same UEID (if they are not global
   and universal in this way, then Relying Parties receiving them will
   have to track other characteristics of the entity to keep entities
   distinct between manufacturers).

   There are privacy considerations for UEIDs.  See Section 10.1.

   The UEID is permanent.  It MUST never change for a given entity.

   A UEID is constructed of a single type byte followed by the bytes
   that are the identifier.  Several types are allowed to accommodate
   different industries, different manufacturing processes and to have
   an alternative that doesn't require paying a registration fee.

   Creation of new types requires a Standards Action [RFC8126].

   UEIDs are variable length.  All implementations MUST be able to
   receive UEIDs that are 33 bytes long (1 type byte and 256 bits).  No
   UEID longer than 33 bytes SHOULD be sent.

   +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
   | Type | Type | Specification                                       |
   | Byte | Name |                                                     |
   +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+
   | 0x01 | RAND | This is a 128, 192 or 256-bit random number         |
   |      |      | generated once and stored in the entity. This may   |
   |      |      | be constructed by concatenating enough identifiers  |
   |      |      | to make up an equivalent number of random bits and  |
   |      |      | then feeding the concatenation through a            |
   |      |      | cryptographic hash function. It may also be a       |
   |      |      | cryptographic quality random number generated once  |
   |      |      | at the beginning of the life of the entity and      |
   |      |      | stored. It MUST NOT be smaller than 128 bits. See   |
   |      |      | the length analysis in Appendix B.                  |
   | 0x02 | IEEE | This uses the IEEE company identification registry. |
   |      | EUI  | An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or EUI-64 and    |
   |      |      | made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID, different       |
   |      |      | registered company identifiers, and some unique     |
   |      |      | per-entity identifier. EUIs are often the same as   |
   |      |      | or similar to MAC addresses. This type includes     |
   |      |      | MAC-48, an obsolete name for EUI-48. (Note that     |
   |      |      | while entities with multiple network interfaces may |
   |      |      | have multiple MAC addresses, there is only one UEID |
   |      |      | for an entity) [IEEE.802-2001], [OUI.Guide].        |
   | 0x03 | IMEI | This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an      |
   |      |      | 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial   |
   |      |      | number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL   |
   |      |      | be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each    |
   |      |      | byte as the digit's value (not the ASCII encoding   |
   |      |      | of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not      |
   |      |      | 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include     |
   |      |      | Luhn checksum or SVN information. See               |
   |      |      | [ThreeGPP.IMEI].                                    |
   +------+------+-----------------------------------------------------+

                      Table 1: UEID Composition Types

   UEIDs are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on
   the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined.

   The consumer (the Relying Party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a completely opaque
   string of bytes and not make any use of its internal structure.  For
   example, they should not use the OUI part of a type 0x02 UEID to
   identify the manufacturer of the entity.  Instead, they should use
   the OEMID claim.  See Section 3.6. 4.2.3.  The reasons for this are:

   o  UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next.

   o  New types of UEIDs may be created.  For example, a type 0x07 UEID
      may be created based on some other manufacturer registration
      scheme.

   o  Entity manufacturers are  The manufacturing process for an entity is allowed to change from
      using one type of UEID to another anytime they want. another.  For example, they a manufacturer
      may find they can optimize their manufacturing process by switching from type
      0x01 to type 0x02 or vice versa.  The essential requirement on the manufacturer
      is that UEIDs be universally unique.

   A Device Identifier URN is registered for UEIDs.  See Section 9.3.4.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)

   ueid-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (12..44) , bstr .size (7..33)

3.5. (7..33)>

4.2.2.  Semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs)

   An SEUID is of the same format as a UEID, but it MAY change to a
   different value on device life-cycle events.  Examples of these
   events are change of ownership, factory reset and on-boarding into an
   IoT device management system.  An entity MAY have both a UEID and
   SUEIDs, neither, one or the other.

   There MAY be multiple SUEIDs.  Each one has a text string label the
   purpose of which is to distinguish it from others in the token.  The
   label MAY name the purpose, application or type of the SUEID.
   Typically, there will be few SUEDs so there is no need for a formal
   labeling mechanism like a registry.  The EAT profile MAY describe how
   SUEIDs should be labeled.  If there is only one SUEID, the claim
   remains a map and there still must be a label.  For example, the
   label for the SUEID used by FIDO Onboarding Protocol could simply be
   "FDO".

   There are privacy considerations for SUEIDs.  See Section 10.1.

   A Device Indentifier URN is registered for SUEIDs.  See
   Section 9.3.4.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)

   sueids-type = {
       + tstr => ueid-type
   }

3.6.

4.2.3.  Hardware OEM Identification (oemid)

   This claim identifies the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of
   the hardware.  Any of the three forms described below MAY be used at
   the convenience of the claim sender.  The receiver of this claim MUST
   be able to handle all three forms.

3.6.1.

4.2.3.1.  Random Number Based OEMID

   The random number based OEMID MUST always 16 bytes (128 bits).

   The OEM MAY create their own ID by using a cryptographic-quality
   random number generator.  They would perform this only once in the
   life of the company to generate the single ID for said company.  They
   would use that same ID in every entity they make.  This uniquely
   identifies the OEM on a statistical basis and is large enough should
   there be ten billion companies.

   The OEM MAY also use a hash function like SHA-256 and truncate the
   output to 128 bits.  The input to the hash should be somethings that
   have at least 96 bits of entropy, but preferably 128 bits of entropy.
   The input to the hash MAY be something whose uniqueness is managed by
   a central registry like a domain name.

   In JSON format tokens this MUST be base64url encoded.

3.6.2.

4.2.3.2.  IEEE Based OEMID

   The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company
   IDs.  This claim uses that database to identify OEMs.  The contents
   of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID
   [IEEE.RA].  An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used
   as the first half of a MAC address.  MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value
   uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as
   OUI-36, a 36-bit value.  Many companies already have purchased one of
   these.  A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L,
   but not for use as a MAC address.  IEEE has published Guidelines for
   Use of EUI, OUI, and CID [OUI.Guide] and provides a lookup service
   [OUI.Lookup].

   Companies that have more than one of these IDs or MAC address blocks
   SHOULD select one and prefer that for all their entities.

   Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation as
   described in [IEEE.802-2001].  It is also called the Canonical
   format.  When this claim is encoded the order of bytes in the bstr
   are the same as the order in the Hexadecimal Representation.  For
   example, an MA-L like "AC-DE-48" would be encoded in 3 bytes with
   values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48.

   This format is always 3 bytes in size in CBOR.

   In JSON format tokens, this MUST be base64url encoded and always 4
   bytes.

3.6.3.

4.2.3.3.  IANA Private Enterprise Number Based OEMID

   IANA maintains a integer-based company registry called the Private
   Enterprise Number (PEN) [PEN].

   PENs are often used to create an OID.  That is not the case here.
   They are used only as an integer.

   In CBOR this value MUST be encoded as a major type 0 integer and is
   typically 3 bytes.  In JSON, this value MUST be encoded as a number.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
       oemid-label => oemid-pen / oemid-ieee / oemid-random
   )

   oemid-pen = int

   oemid-ieee = JC<oemid-ieee-json, oemid-ieee-cbor>
   oemid-ieee-cbor = bstr .size 3
   oemid-ieee-json = base64-url-text .size 4

   oemid-random = JC<oemid-random-json, oemid-random-cbor>
   oemid-random-cbor = bstr .size 16

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       oemid-label =>
           oemid-random / oemid-ieee / oemid-pen
   )

3.7.
   oemid-random-json = base64-url-text .size 24

4.2.4.  Hardware Model Claim (hardware-model)

   This claim differentiates hardware models, products and variants
   manufactured by a particular OEM, the one identified by OEM ID in
   Section 3.6. 4.2.3.

   This claim must be unique so as to differentiate the models and
   products for the OEM ID.  This claim does not have to be globally
   unique, but it can be.  A receiver of this claim MUST not assume it
   is globally unique.  To globally identify a particular product, the
   receiver should concatenate the OEM ID and this claim.

   The granularity of the model identification is for each OEM to
   decide.  It may be very granular, perhaps including some version
   information.  It may be very general, perhaps only indicating top-
   level products.

   The purpose of this claim is to identify models within protocols, not
   for human-readable descriptions.  The format and encoding of this
   claim should not be human-readable to discourage use other than in
   protocols.  If this claim is to be derived from an already-in-use
   human-readable identifier, it can be run through a hash function.

   There is no minimum length so that an OEM with a very small number of
   models can use a one-byte encoding.  The maximum length is 32 bytes.
   All receivers of this claim MUST be able to receive this maximum
   size.

   The receiver of this claim MUST treat it as a completely opaque
   string of bytes, even if there is some apparent naming or structure.
   The OEM is free to alter the internal structure of these bytes as
   long as the claim continues to uniquely identify its models.

   hardware-model-type = bytes .size (1..32)

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
       hardware-model-label => hardware-model-type
   )

3.8.

   hardware-model-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (4..44),
                            bytes .size (1..32)>

4.2.5.  Hardware Version Claims (hardware-version-claims)

   The hardware version is a text string the format of which is set by
   each manufacturer.  The structure and sorting order of this text
   string can be specified using the version-scheme item from CoSWID
   [CoSWID].  It is useful to know how to sort versions so the newer can
   be distinguished from the older.

   The hardware version can also be given by a 13-digit [EAN-13].  A new
   CoSWID version scheme is registered with IANA by this document in
   Section 9.3.3.  An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article
   Number or most commonly as a bar code.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //=  (
       hardware-version-label => hardware-version-type
   )

   hardware-version-type = [
       version:  tstr,
       ? scheme:  $version-scheme
   ]

3.9.

4.2.6.  Software Name Claim

   This is a free-form text claim for the name of the software for the
   entity or submodule.  A CoSWID manifest or other type of manifest can
   be used instead if this claim is to limited to correctly characterize
   the SW for the entity or submodule.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr )

3.10.

4.2.7.  Software Version Claim

   This makes use of the CoSWID version scheme data type to give a
   simple version for the software.  A full CoSWID manifest or other
   type of manifest can be instead if this is too simple.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type)

   sw-version-type = [
       version:  tstr,  tstr
       ? scheme:  $version-scheme ; As defined by CoSWID
   ]

3.11.

4.2.8.  The Security Level Claim (security-level)

   This claim characterizes the entity's ability to defend against
   attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at
   forging EATs.  This is by defining four security levels.

   This

   The intent of this claim describes is only to give the recipient a rough idea
   of the security environment and countermeasures
   available on the entity where the attestation key resides and the
   claims originate.

   1 - Unrestricted:  There is some expectation that implementor will
      protect the attestation signing keys at this level.  Otherwise, aiming for.  This is via a simple, non-
   extensible set of three levels.

   This takes a broad view of the range of defenses because EAT provides no meaningful security assurances.

   2 - Restricted:  Entities is
   targeted at this a broad range of use cases.  The least secure level are not general-purpose
      operating environments that host features, such as app download
      systems, web browsers
   involves minimal SW defenses.  The most secure level involves
   specialized hardware to defend against hardware-based attacks.

   Only through expansive certification programs like Common Criteria
   and complex applications.  It FIDO certification is akin it possible to the
      secure-restricted level (see below) without the sharply define security
      orientation.  Examples include a Wi-Fi subsystem, an IoT camera,
      or sensor device.  Often these can be considered more secure than
      unrestricted just
   levels.  Sharp definition of security levels is not possible here
   because they are much simpler the IETF doesn't define and operate certification programs.
   It is also not possible here because any sharp definition of security
   levels would be a smaller
      attack surface, but document larger than the EAT specification.  Thus,
   this won't always be definition takes the case.  Some
      unrestricted devices may be implemented in a way view that provides
      poor protection the security level definition
   possible here is a simple, modest, rough characterization.

   1 - Unrestricted:  An entity is categorized as unrestricted when it
      doesn't meet the criteria for any of signing keys.

   3 the higher levels.  This
      level does not indicate there is no protection at all, just that
      the entity doesn't qualify for the higher levels.

   2 - Secure-Restricted: Restricted:  Entities at this level must MUST meet the criteria
      defined in Section 4 of FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating
      Environments [FIDO.AROE].  Examples include TEE's and schemes
      using virtualization-based security.  Security at this level is
      aimed at defending against large-scale network/remote attacks
      against the entity.

   4 by
      having a reduced attack surface.

   3 - Hardware:  Entities at this level must include substantial
      defense are indicating they have some
      countermeasures to defend against physical or electrical attacks
      against the entity
      itself.  It entity.  Security at this level is assumed the potential attacker has captured aimed at defending
      against attackers that physically capture the entity and can disassemble to attack it.
      Examples include TPMs and Secure Elements.

   The entity should claim the highest security level it achieves and no
   higher. claimed should be for the weakest point in the
   entity, not the strongest.  For example, if attestation key is
   protected by hardware, but the rest of the attester is in a TEE, the
   claim must be for restriced.

   This set of three is not extensible so as to provide this remains a common broad
   interoperable description of security level to the Relying Party.  If
   a level.

   In particular use case considers this claim to be inadequate, it can
   define its own proprietary claim.  It cases, alternate claims may consider including both be defined that give
   finer grained information than this claim.

   See also the DLOAs claim as a coarse indication of security and its own proprietary
   claim as in Section 4.2.15, a refined indication.

   This claim is not intended as a replacement for a formal security
   certification scheme, such as those based on FIPS 140 [FIPS-140] or
   those based on Common Criteria [Common.Criteria].  See Section 3.21.

   $$claims-set-claims that specifically
   provides information about certifications received.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
       ( security-level-label =>
           security-level-cbor-type /
           security-level-json-type
   )

   security-level-cbor-type = &(
       unrestricted: 1,
       restricted: 2,
       secure-restricted: 3,
       hardware: 4 security-level-type )

   security-level-json-type

   security-level-type =
       "unrestricted" /
       "restricted" unrestricted /
       "secure-restricted"
                         restricted /
       "hardware"

3.12.
                         hardware

   unrestricted       = JC< "unrestricted",      1>
   restricted         = JC< "restricted",        2>
   hardware           = JC< "hardware",          3>

4.2.9.  Secure Boot Claim (secure-boot)

   The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled.  Secure boot is
   considered enabled when the firmware and operating system, are under
   control of the manufacturer of the entity identified in the OEMID
   claim described in Section 3.6. 4.2.3.  Control by the manufacturer of the
   firmware and the operating system may be by it being in ROM, being
   cryptographically authenticated, a combination of the two or similar.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool)

3.13.

4.2.10.  Debug Status Claim (debug-status)

   This applies to entity-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the
   entity like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built into chips.  It
   applies to any software debug facilities related to root, operating
   system or privileged software that allow system-wide memory
   inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software like user
   mode applications.

   This characterization assumes that debug facilities can be enabled
   and disabled in a dynamic way or be disabled in some permanent way
   such that no enabling is possible.  An example of dynamic enabling is
   one where some authentication is required to enable debugging.  An
   example of permanent disabling is blowing a hardware fuse in a chip.
   The specific type of the mechanism is not taken into account.  For
   example, it does not matter if authentication is by a global password
   or by per-entity public keys.

   As with all claims, the absence of the debug level claim means it is
   not reported.  A conservative interpretation might assume the enabled
   state.

   This claim is not extensible so as to provide a common interoperable
   description of debug status.  If a particular implementation
   considers this claim to be inadequate, it can define its own
   proprietary claim.  It may consider including both this claim as a
   coarse indication of debug status and its own proprietary claim as a
   refined indication.

   The higher levels of debug disabling requires that all debug
   disabling of the levels below it be in effect.  Since the lowest
   level requires that all of the target's debug be currently disabled,
   all other levels require that too.

   There is no inheritance of claims from a submodule to a superior
   module or vice versa.  There is no assumption, requirement or
   guarantee that the target of a superior module encompasses the
   targets of submodules.  Thus, every submodule must explicitly
   describe its own debug state.  The receiver of an EAT MUST not assume
   that debug is turned off in a submodule because there is a claim
   indicating it is turned off in a superior module.

   An entity may have multiple debug facilities.  The use of plural in
   the description of the states refers to that, not to any aggregation
   or inheritance.

   The architecture of some chips or devices may be such that a debug
   facility operates for the whole chip or device.  If the EAT for such
   a chip includes submodules, then each submodule should independently
   report the status of the whole-chip or whole-device debug facility.
   This is the only way the receiver can know the debug status of the
   submodules since there is no inheritance.

3.13.1.

4.2.10.1.  Enabled

   If any debug facility, even manufacturer hardware diagnostics, is
   currently enabled, then this level must be indicated.

3.13.2.

4.2.10.2.  Disabled

   This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled.  It
   may be possible to enable them in the future.  It may also be that
   they were enabled in the past, but they are currently disabled.

3.13.3.

4.2.10.3.  Disabled Since Boot

   This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled and
   have been so since the entity booted/started.

3.13.4.

4.2.10.4.  Disabled Permanently

   This level indicates all non-manufacturer facilities are permanently
   disabled such that no end user or developer can enable them.  Only
   the manufacturer indicated in the OEMID claim can enable them.  This
   also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and
   have been so since boot/start.

3.13.5.

4.2.10.5.  Disabled Fully and Permanently

   This level indicates that all debug facilities for the entity are
   permanently disabled.

   $$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( debug-status-label =>
           debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
   )

   debug-status-cbor-type = &(
       enabled: 0,
       disabled: 1,
       disabled-since-boot: 2,
       disabled-permanently: 3,
       disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4 debug-status-type )

   debug-status-json-type

  debug-status-type =
       "enabled" ds-enabled /
       "disabled"
                      disabled /
       "disabled-since-boot"
                      disabled-since-boot /
       "disabled-permanently"
                      disabled-permanently /
       "disabled-fully-and-permanently"

3.14.  Including Keys

   An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key.
                      disabled-fully-and-permanently

  ds-enabled                     = JC< "enabled", 0 >
  disabled                       = JC< "disabled", 1 >
  disabled-since-boot            = JC< "disabled-since-boot", 2 >
  disabled-permanently           = JC< "disabled-permanently", 3 >
  disabled-fully-and-permanently = JC< "disabled-fully-and-permanently",
                                        4 >

4.2.11.  The
   signing Location Claim (location)

   The location claim gives the location of the EAT binds entity from which the key
   attestation originates.  It is derived from the W3C Geolocation API
   [W3C.GeoLoc].  The latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy must
   conform to all [WGS84].  The altitude is in meters above the other claims [WGS84]
   ellipsoid.  The two accuracy values are positive numbers in meters.
   The heading is in degrees relative to true north.  If the
   token. entity is
   stationary, the heading is NaN (floating-point not-a-number).  The purpose for inclusion
   speed is the horizontal component of the key entity velocity in meters
   per second.

   The location may vary by use case. have been cached for a period of time before token
   creation.  For example, it might have been minutes or hours or more
   since the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding
   protocol.  When the FIDO protocol includes last contact with a public key in its
   attestation message, GPS satellite.  Either the key represents the binding of a user, device
   and Relying Party.  This document describes how claims containing
   keys should be defined for the various use cases.  It does not define
   specific claims for specific use cases.

   Keys in CBOR format tokens SHOULD be the COSE_Key format [RFC8152]
   and keys in JSON format tokens SHOULD be the JSON Web Key format
   [RFC7517].  These two formats support many common key types.  Their
   use avoids the need to decode other serialization formats.  These two
   formats timestamp or
   age data item can be extended used to support further key types through their
   IANA registries. quantify the cached period.  The general confirmation claim format [RFC8747], [RFC7800] may also
   be used.  It provides key encryption.  It also allows for inclusion
   by reference through
   timestamp data item is preferred as it a key ID. non-relative time.

   The confirmation claim format may
   employed in the definition of some new claim for a a particular use
   case.

   When age data item can be used when the actual confirmation claim entity doesn't know what time
   it is included in an EAT, this
   document associates no use case semantics other than proof of
   possession.  Different EAT use cases may choose to associate further
   semantics. either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set.  The key in the confirmation claim
   entity MUST be protected in
   the same way as the key used to sign still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.
   The age is the EAT.  That is, interval between acquisition of the same,
   equivalent or better hardware defenses, access controls, key
   generation and such must be used.

3.15.  The Location Claim (location)

   The location claim gives the location of the entity from which the
   attestation originates.  It is derived from the W3C Geolocation API
   [W3C.GeoLoc].  The latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy must
   conform to [WGS84].  The altitude is in meters above the [WGS84]
   ellipsoid.  The two accuracy values are positive numbers in meters.
   The heading is in degrees relative to true north.  If the entity is
   stationary, the heading is NaN (floating-point not-a-number).  The
   speed is the horizontal component of the entity velocity in meters
   per second.

   When encoding floating-point numbers half-precision SHOULD NOT be
   used.  They usually do not provide enough precision for a geographic
   location.

   The location may have been cached for a period of time before token
   creation.  For example, it might have been minutes or hours or more
   since the last contact with a GPS satellite.  Either the timestamp or
   age data item can be used to quantify the cached period.  The
   timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time.

   The age data item can be used when the entity doesn't know what time
   it is either because it doesn't have a clock or it isn't set.  The
   entity MUST still have a "ticker" that can measure a time interval.
   The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data location data and
   token creation.

   See location-related privacy considerations in Section 10.2.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (location-label => location-type)

   location-type = {
       latitude => number,
       longitude => number,
       ? altitude => number,
       ? accuracy => number,
       ? altitude-accuracy => number,
       ? heading => number,
       ? speed => number,
       ? timestamp => ~time-int,
       ? age => uint
   }

   latitude          = JC< "latitude",          1 / "latitude" >
   longitude         = JC< "longitude",         2 / "longitude" >
   altitude          = JC< "altitude",          3 / "altitude" >
   accuracy          = JC< "accuracy",          4 / "accuracy" >
   altitude-accuracy = JC< "altitude-accuracy", 5 / "altitude-accuracy" >
   heading           = JC< "heading",           6 / "heading" >
   speed             = JC< "speed",             7 / "speed" >
   timestamp         = JC< "timestamp",         8 / "timestamp" >
   age               = JC< "age",               9 / "age"

3.16. >

4.2.12.  The Uptime Claim (uptime)

   The "uptime" claim MUST contain a value that represents the number of
   seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (uptime-label => uint)

3.17.

4.2.13.  The Boot Odometer Claim (odometer)

   The "odometer" claim contains a value that represents the number of
   times the entity or submod has been booted.  Support for this claim
   requires a persistent storage on the device.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (odometer-label => uint)

3.18.

4.2.14.  The Boot Seed Claim (boot-seed)

   The Boot Seed claim MUST contain a random value created at system
   boot time that will allow differentiation of reports from different
   boot sessions.

   This value is usually public.  It is not a secret and MUST NOT be
   used for any purpose that a secret seed is needed, such as seeding a
   random number generator.

   $$claims-set-claims

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //=  (boot-seed-label => bytes)

3.19. binary-data)

4.2.15.  The Intended Use DLOA (Digital Letter of Approval) Claim (intended-use)

   EAT's may be used in the context (dloas)

   A DLOA (Digital Letter of several different applications.
   The intended-use claim provides Approval) [DLOA] is an indication to XML document that
   describes a certification that an EAT consumer
   about the intended usage entity has received.  Examples of the token.
   certifications represented by a DLOA include those issued by Global
   Platform and those based on Common Criteria.  The DLOA is unspecific
   to any particular certification type or those issued by any
   particular organization.

   This claim can be used as is typically issued by a
   way for Verifier, not an application using EAT to internally distinguish between
   different ways Attester.  When
   this claim is issued by a Verifier, it uses EAT.

   1 - Generic:  Generic attestation describes an application where MUST be because the
      EAT consumer requires entity has
   received the most up-to-date security assessment of certification in the attesting entity.  It is expected that this is DLOA.

   This claim MAY contain more than one DLOA.  If multiple DLOAs are
   present, it MUST be because the most
      commonly-used application entity received all of EAT.

   2- Registration:  Entities that the
   certifications.

   DLOA XML documents are registering for always fetched from a new service may
      be expected registrar that stores
   them.  This claim contains several data items used to provide an attestation as part of construct a URL
   for fetching the registration
      process.  This intended-use setting indicates that DLOA from the attestation
      is not intended for any use but registration.

   3 - Provisioning:  Entities may particular registrar.

   This claim MUST be provisioned with different values
      or settings by encoded as an EAT consumer.  Examples include key material array with either two or
      device management trees. three
   elements.  The consumer may require an EAT to
      assess entity security state of the entity prior to provisioning.

   4 - Certificate Issuance  Certification Authorities (CA's) may
      require attestations prior to first element MUST be the issuance of certificates related
      to keypairs hosted at URI for the entity.  An EAT may registrar.  The
   second element MUST be used as part of
      the certificate signing request (CSR).

   5 - Proof-of-Possession:  An EAT consumer may require an attestation
      as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) application.
      More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the
      recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that platform label indicating which platform was
   certified.  If the sender has
      possession of a key.  This kind of attestation may be necceesary DLOA applies to verify an application, then the security state third
   element is added which MUST be an application label.  The method of
   constructing the entity storing the private key
      used registrar URI, platform label and possibly
   application label is specified in a PoP application.

   $$claims-set-claims [DLOA].

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
       intended-use-label
       dloas-label =>
           intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
   )

   intended-use-cbor-type = &(
       generic: 1,
       registration: 2,
       provisioning: 3,
       csr: 4,
       pop: 5 [ + dloa-type ]
   )

   intended-use-json-type

   dloa-type =
       "generic" /
       "registration" /
       "provisioning" /
       "csr" /
       "pop"

3.20. [
       dloa_registrar: general-uri
       dloa_platform_label: text
       ? dloa_application_label: text
   ]

4.2.16.  The Profile Software Manifests Claim (profile)

   See Section 7 for the detailed description (manifests)

   This claim contains descriptions of a profile.

   A profile is identified by either a URL or an OID.  Typically, software present on the
   URI will reference a document describing entity.
   These manifests are installed on the profile.  An OID is just
   a unique identifier for entity when the profile.  It may exist anywhere in software is
   installed or are created as part of the
   OID tree.  There installation process.
   Installation is no requirement anything that adds software to the named document be
   publicly accessible. entity, possibly
   factory installation, the user installing elective applications and
   so on.  The defining characteristic is they are created by the
   software manufacturer.  The primary purpose of the profile claim these claims in an EAT is to
   uniquely identify
   relay them without modification to the profile even if it is a private profile.

   The OID is always absolute Verifier and never relative.  In CBOR tokens, the
   OID MUST be encoded according possibly to [RFC9090] and the URI according to
   [RFC8949].  Both
   Relying Party.

   Some manifests may be signed by their software manufacturer before
   they are unwrapped and thus not CBOR tags.  In JSON
   tokens, put into this EAT claim.  When such manifests are put into
   this claim, the OID is manufacturer's signature SHOULD be included.  For
   example, the manifest might be a string of CoSWID signed by the form "X.X.X", and software
   manufacturer, in which case the full signed CoSWID should be put in
   this claim.

   This claim allows multiple formats for the manifest.  For example,
   the manifest may be a URI CBOR-format CoSWID, an XML-format SWID or
   other.  Identification of the type of manifest is always by a
   normal URI string.

   Note that this CoAP
   Content-Format integer [RFC7252].  If there is named "eat_profile" no CoAP identifier
   registered for JWT and is distinct from the already registered "profile" claim manifest format, one should be registered, perhaps
   in the JWT claims registry.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (profile-label => ~uri / ~oid)

3.21.  The DLOA (Digital Letter experimental or Approval) Claim (dloas)

   A DLOA (Digital Letter of Approval) [DLOA] is first-come-first-served range.

   This claim MUST be an XML document that
   describes a certification that array of one or more manifests.  Each manifest
   in the claim MUST be an entity has received.  Examples array of
   certifications represented by a DLOA include those issued by Global
   Platform and those based on Common Criteria. two.  The DLOA is unspecific
   to any particular certification type or those issued by any
   particular organization.

   This claim is typically issued by a Verifier, not first item in the array of
   two MUST be an Attester.  When
   this claim integer CoAP Content-Format identifier.  The second
   item is issued by a Verifier, it MUST be because the entity has
   received actual manifest.

   In CBOR-encoded EATs the certification manifest, whatever format it is, MUST be
   placed in a byte string.

   In JSON-format tokens the DLOA.

   This claim MAY contain more than one DLOA.  If multiple DLOAs are
   present, manifest, whatever format it is, MUST be because the entity received all of the
   certifications.

   DLOA XML documents are always fetched from
   placed in a registrar that stores
   them.  This claim contains several data items used to construct text string.  When a URL
   for fetching the DLOA from non-text format manifest like a
   CBOR-encoded CoSWID is put in a JSON-encoded token, the particular registrar. manifest MUST
   be base-64 encoded.

   This claim MUST allows for multiple manifests in one token since multiple
   software packages are likely to be encoded as an array with either two or three
   elements. present.  The first element MUST multiple manifests
   MAY be the URI for the registrar.  The
   second element MUST of different formats.  In some cases EAT submodules may be a platform label indicating which platform was
   certified.  If
   used instead of the DLOA applies to an application, then array structure in this claim for multiple
   manifests.

   When the third
   element [CoSWID] format is added which used, it MUST be a payload CoSWID, not an application label.  The method of
   constructing the registrar URI, platform label and possibly
   application label is specified in [DLOA].

   $$claims-set-claims
   evidence CoSWID.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
       dloas-label
       manifests-label => [ + dloa-type ] manifests-type
   )

   dloa-type

   manifests-type = [+ manifest-format]

   manifest-format = [
       dloa_registrar: ~uri
       dloa_platform_label: text
       ? dloa_application_label: text
       content-type:   uint,
       content-format: JC< $$manifest-body-json,
                           $$manifest-body-cbor >
   ]

3.22.

   $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
   $$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text

   $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope
   $$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text

   suit-directive-process-dependency = 19

4.2.17.  The Software Manifests Evidence Claim (manifests) (swevidence)

   This claim contains descriptions of software present on the entity.
   These manifests are installed on the entity when the software is
   installed descriptions, lists, evidence or are created as part measurements of
   the installation process.
   Installation is anything that adds software to the entity, possibly
   factory installation, that exists on the user installing elective applications and
   so on. entity.  The defining characteristic
   of this claim is they that its contents are created by processes on the
   entity that inventory, measure or otherwise characterize the software manufacturer.
   on the entity.  The purpose contents of these claims in an EAT is to
   relay them without modification to the Verifier and possibly to the
   Relying Party.

   Some manifests may be signed by their software manufacturer before
   they are put into this EAT claim.  When such manifests are put into this claim, claim do not originate from the manufacturer's signature SHOULD
   software manufacturer.

   This claim can be included.  For
   example, a [CoSWID].  When the manifest might CoSWID format is used, it
   MUST be a evidence CoSWIDs, not payload CoSWIDS.

   Formats other than CoSWID signed can be used.  The identification of format
   is by CoAP Content Format, the software
   manufacturer, in which case same as the full signed CoSWID should be put manifests claim in
   this claim.
   Section 4.2.16.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
       swevidence-label => swevidence-type
   )

   swevidence-type = [+ swevidence-format]

   swevidence-format = [
       content-type:   uint,
       content-format: JC< $$swevidence-body-json,
                           $$swevidence-body-cbor >
   ]

   $$swevidence-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
   $$swevidence-body-json /= base64-url-text

4.2.18.  The Measurement Results Claim (measurement-results)

   This claim allows multiple formats for the manifest.  For example,
   the manifest may be is a CBOR-format CoSWID, an XML-format SWID or
   other.  Identification general-purpose structure for reporting comparison of
   measurements to expected Reference Values.  This claim provides a
   simple standard way to report the type result of manifest is always by a CBOR
   tag.  In many cases, for examples CoSWID, a tag will already be
   registered with IANA.  If not, a tag MUST be registered. comparison as success,
   failure, fail to run, ...

   It can be
   in the first-come-first-served space which has minimal requirements
   for registration.

   The claim is an array the nature of one or more manifests.  To facilitate hand
   off measurement systems that they are specific to the
   operating system, software and hardware of the manifest entity that is being
   measured.  It is not possible to a decoding library, each manifest standardize what is contained
   in a byte string.  This occurs for CBOR-format manifests as well as
   non-CBOR format manifests.

   If a particular manifest type uses CBOR encoding, then the item in
   the array for measured and how
   it MUST be a byte string that contains a CBOR tag. is measured across platforms, OS's, software and hardware.  The
   EAT decoder
   recipient must decode obtain the byte string information about what was measured and then the CBOR within
   what it
   to find indicates for the tag number to identify characterization of the type security of manifest.  The
   contents the
   entity from the provider of the byte string measurement system.  What this claim
   provides is then handed a standard way to the particular manifest
   processor for that type of manifest.  CoSWID and SUIT manifest are
   examples report basic success or failure of this.

   If a particular manifest type does not use CBOR encoding, then the
   item in the array for
   measurement.  In some use cases it MUST be a CBOR tag that contains a byte
   string.  The EAT decoder uses the tag is valuable to identify the processor for
   that type of manifest.  The contents of the tag, the byte string, are
   handed to the manifest processor.  Note that know if
   measurements succeeded or failed in a byte string is used to
   contain general way even if the manifest whether it is a text based format or not.  An
   example details
   of this is an XML format ISO/IEC 19770 SWID.

   It what was measured is not possible to describe the above requirements in CDDL, so the
   type for an individual manifest is any in the CDDL below.  The above
   text sets the encoding requirement. characterized.

   This claim allows for multiple manifests in one token since multiple
   software packages are likely to be present.  The multiple manifests MAY be of multiple formats.  In some cases EAT submodules may be used
   instead of generated by the array structure in this claim for multiple manifests.

   When Verifier and sent to the [CoSWID] format is used, Relying
   Party.  For example, it MUST could be a payload CoSWID, not an
   evidence CoSWID.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       manifests-label => manifests-type
   )

   manifests-type = [+ $$manifest-formats]

   coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>

   $$manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx

3.23.  The Software Evidence Claim (swevidence)

   This claim contains descriptions, lists, evidence or measurements of
   the software that exists on the entity.  The defining characteristic results of this claim is that its contents are created by processes on the
   entity that inventory, measure or otherwise characterize the software
   on Verifier
   comparing the entity.  The contents of this claim do not originate from the
   software manufacturer. swevidence claim, {#swevidence}, to
   Reference Values.

   This claim uses MAY also be generated on the same mechanism for identification of entity if the type of entity has the swevidence as is used
   ability for the type of the manifest in the
   manifests claim.  It also uses the same byte string based mechanism
   for containing the claim and easing the hand off to a processing
   library.  See the discussion above in the manifests claim.

   When the [CoSWID] format is used, it MUST be evidence CoSWIDs, not
   payload CoSWIDS.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (
       swevidence-label => swevidence-type
   )

   swevidence-type = [+ $$swevidence-formats]

   coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>
   $$swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag

3.24.  The SW Measurement Results Claim (swresults)

   This claims reports the outcome of the comparison of a measurement on
   some software to the expected Reference Values.  It may report a
   successful comparison, failed comparison or other.

   This claim MAY be generated by the Verifier and sent to the Relying
   Party.  For example, it could be the results of the Verifier
   comparing the contents of the swevidence claim to Reference Values.

   This claim MAY also be generated on the entity if the entity has the
   ability for one subsystem to measure another subsystem.  For example,
   a TEE might have one subsystem to measure and evaluate another subsystem.
   For example, a TEE might have the ability to measure the software of
   the rich OS and may have the Reference Values for the rich OS.

   Within an entity, attestation target or submodule, multiple results
   can be reported.  For example, it may be desirable to report the
   results for measurements of the kernel and each individual application separately.

   For each file system, chip configuration,
   installed software, running software objective, the following can be reported.  TODO:
   defined objective

3.24.1.  Scheme

   This and so on.

   Note that this claim is not for reporting the free-form text name overall result of a
   Verifier.  It is solely for reporting the verification system or scheme
   that performed the verification.  There result of comparison to
   reference values.

   An individual measurement result is no official registry an array of
   schemes or systems.  It may be the name two, an identifier of a commercial product or
   such.

3.24.2.  Objective

   This roughly characterizes
   the coverage measurement and an enumerated type that is the result.  The range
   and values of the software measurement
   software.  This corresponds to the attestation target or the
   submodule.  If all of the indicated target is not covered, the identifier varies from one measurement must indicate partial.

   1 - all:  Indicates all the software has been verified, for example,
      all the software in the attestation target or the submodule

   2 - firmware:  Indicates all of and only the firmware

   3 - kernel:  Refers
   scheme to all another.

   Each individual measurement result is part of a group that may
   contain many individual results.  Each group has a text string that
   names it, typically the most-privileged software, for
      example the Linux kernel

   4 - privileged:  Refers to all name of the software used by the root,
      system measurement scheme or administrative account

   5 - system-libs:  Refers to all system.

   The claim itself consists of one or more groups.

   The values for the system libraries that results enumerated type are
      broadly shared and used by applications and such

   6 - partial:  Some other partial set of the software

3.24.3.  Results

   This describes the result of the measurement and also the comparison
   to Reference Values. as follows:

   1 - verification-not-run: comparison successful  Indicates that no attempt was made successful comparison to run
      the verification
      reference values.

   2 - verification-indeterminite:  The verification was attempted, but
      it did not produce a result; perhaps it ran out of memory, the
      battery died or such

   3 - verification-failed: comparison fail  The verification ran to completion, the comparison was completed and did not compare
      correctly to the Reference Values

   4 Values.

   3 - fully-verified: comparison not run  The verification ran to completion and all
      measurements compared correctly to Reference Values

   5 comparison was not run.  This includes
      error conditions such as running out of memory.

   4 - partially-verified: measurement absent  The verification ran to completion and some,
      but particular measurement was not all, measurements compared correctly to Reference Values

3.24.4.  Objective Name

   This is a free-form text string that describes the objective.  For
   example, "Linux kernel" or "Facebook App"
   $$claims-set-claims available
      for comparison.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (swresults-label (
       measurement-results-label =>
           [ + swresult-type ])

   verification-result-cbor-type = &(
       verification-not-run: 1,
       verification-indeterminate: 2,
       verification-failed: 3,
       fully-verified: 4,
       partially-verified: 5, measurement-results-group ] )

   verification-result-json-type

   measurement-results-group =
       "verification-not-run" /
       "verification-indeterminate" /
       "verification-failed" /
       "fully-verified" /
       "partially-verified"

   verification-objective-cbor-type = &(
       all: 1,
       firmware: 2,
       kernel: 3,
       privileged: 4,
       system-libs: 5,
       partial: 6,
   )

   verification-objective-json-type [
       measurement-system: tstr,
       measruement-results: [ + individual-result ]
   ]

   individual-result =
       "all" /
       "firmware" [
       results-id: tstr /
       "kernel" binary-data,
       result:     result-type,
   ]

   result-type = comparison-successful /
       "privileged"
                 comparison-fail /
       "system-libs"
                 comparison-not-run /
       "partial"

   swresult-type
                 measurement-absent

   comparison-successful    = [
       verification-system: tstr,
       objective: verification-objective-cbor-type /
           verification-objective-json-type,
       result: verification-result-cbor-type /
           verification-result-json-type,
       ? objective-name: tstr
   ]

3.25. JC< "success",       1 >
   comparison-fail          = JC< "fail",          2 >
   comparison-not-run       = JC< "not-run",       3 >
   measurement-absent       = JC< "absent",        4 >

4.2.19.  Submodules (submods)

   Some devices are complex, having many subsystems.  A mobile phone is
   a good example.  It may have several connectivity subsystems for
   communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular).  It may have subsystems
   for low-power audio and video playback.  It may have multiple
   security-oriented subsystems like a TEE and a Secure Element.

   The claims for a subsystem can be grouped together in a submodule or
   submod.

   The submods are in a single map/object, one entry per submodule.
   There is only one submods map/object in a token.  It is identified by
   its specific label.  It is a peer to other claims, but it is not
   called a claim because it is a container for a claims set rather than
   an individual claim.  This submods part of a token allows what might
   be called recursion.  It allows claims sets inside of claims sets
   inside of claims sets...

3.25.1.

4.2.19.1.  Submodule Types

   The following sections define the three types of submodules:

   o  A submodule Claims-Set

   o  A nested token, which can be any valid EAT token, CBOR or JSON

   o  The digest of a detached Claims-Set

3.25.1.1.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })

   Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest

4.2.19.1.1.  Submodule Claims-Set

   This is a subordinate Claims-Set containing claims about the
   submodule.

   The submodule claims-set Claims-Set is produced by the same Attester as the
   surrounding token.  It is secured using the same mechanism as the
   enclosing token (e.g., it is signed by the same attestation key).  It
   roughly corresponds to an Attester Target Environment, as described
   in the RATS architecture.

   It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or
   superior submodules.  For example, the top-level of the token may
   have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further
   subordinate submodule may also have a UEID.

   The encoding of a submodule Claims-Set MUST be the same as the
   encoding as the token it is part of.

   This data type for this type of submodule is a map/object.  It is
   identified when decoding by it's type being a map/object.

3.25.1.2.

4.2.19.1.2.  Nested Token

   This type of submodule is a fully formed complete token.  It is
   typically produced by a separate Attester.  It is typically used by a
   Composite Device as described in RATS Architecture
   [RATS.Architecture] In being a submodule of the surrounding token, it
   is cryptographically bound to the surrounding token.  If it was
   conveyed in parallel with the surrounding token, there would be no
   such binding and attackers could substitute a good attestation from
   another device for the attestation of an errant subsystem.

   A nested token does not need to use the same encoding as the
   enclosing token.  This is to allow Composite Devices to be built
   without regards to the encoding supported by their Attesters.  Thus  Thus,
   a CBOR-encoded token like a CWT or UCCS can have a JWT as a nested token
   submodule and a JSON-encoded token can have a CWT or UCCS as a
   nested token submodule.

   The following two sections describe how to encode and decode a nested
   token.

3.25.1.2.1. vice versa.

4.2.19.1.2.1.  Surrounding EAT is CBOR-Encoded

   This describes the encoding and decoding of CBOR or JSON-encoded
   tokens nested inside a CBOR-encoded token.

   If the nested token is CBOR-encoded, then it MUST be a CBOR tag and
   MUST be wrapped in a byte string.  The tag identifies whether the
   nested token is a CWT, a UCCS, a CBOR-encoded DEB, or some other CBOR-format
   token defined in the future.  A nested CBOR-encoded token that is not
   a CBOR tag is NOT allowed.

   If the nested token is JSON-encoded, then the data item MUST be a
   text string.  The text string MUST contain a JSON-encoded array of
   two items.  The first item is a string identifying the type of the
   token. containing JSON.  The second item JSON is the JSON-encoded token.

   The string identifying the JSON-encoded token MUST be one of the
   following:

   "JWT":  The second item MUST be a JWT formatted according to
      [RFC7519]

   "UJCS":  The second item MUST be a UJCS-Message as defined in this
      document.

   "DEB":  The second item MUST be a JSON-encoded Detached EAT Bundle as
      defined CDDL by JSON-
   Nested-Token in this document.

   The definition of additional types requires a standards action. the next section.

   When decoding, if a byte string is encountered, it is known to be a
   nested CBOR-encoded token.  The byte string wrapping is removed.  The
   type of the token is determined by the CBOR tag.

   When decoding, if a text string is encountered, it is known to be a
   JSON-encoded token.  The two-item array is decoded and tells the type
   of the JSON-encoded token.

   Nested-Token =
       tstr CBOR-Nested-Token

   CBOR-Nested-Token =
       JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token / ; A JSON-encoded Nested-Token (see json-nested-token.cddl)
       CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token

   CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = bstr .cbor Tagged-CBOR-Token

3.25.1.2.2. $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token

   JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = tstr

4.2.19.1.2.2.  Surrounding EAT is JSON-Encoded

   This describes the encoding and decoding of CBOR or JSON-encoded
   tokens nested inside a JSON-encoded token.

   The nested token MUST be an array of two in two, a text string type
   indicator and the same format as
   described in actual token.

   The string identifying the section above.

   A CBOR-encoded token nested inside a JSON-encoded token MUST use the same
   array be one of two, but with the type as follows:
   following:

   "JWT":  The second array item MUST be a JWT formatted according to
      [RFC7519]

   "CBOR":  Some  The second array item must be some base64url-encoded CBOR
      that is a tag, typically a CWT,
      UCCS CWT or CBOR-encoded DEB

   When decoding,

   "DEB":  The second array item MUST be a JSON-encoded Detached EAT
      Bundle as defined in this document.

   Additional types may be defined by a standards action.

   When decoding, the array of two is decoded.  The first item indicates
   the type and encoding of the nested token.  If the type string is not
   "CBOR", then the token is JSON-encoded and of the type indicated by
   the string.

   If the type string is "CBOR", then the token is CBOR-encoded.  The
   base64url encoding is removed.  The CBOR-encoded data is then
   decoded.  The type of nested token is determined by the CBOR-tag.  It
   is an error if the CBOR is not a tag.

   Nested-Token = JSON-Nested-Token

   JSON-Nested-Token = [
      type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "UJCS" / "DEB",
      nested-token : JWT-Message /
                     B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token
                     CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token /
                     DEB-JSON-Message /
                     UJCS-Message
                     Detached-EAT-Bundle
   ]

   B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token

   CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

3.25.1.3. base64-url-text

4.2.19.1.3.  Detached Submodule Digest

   This is type of submodule equivalent to a Claims-Set submodule,
   except the Claims-Set is conveyed separately outside of the token.

   This type of submodule consists of a digest made using a
   cryptographic hash of a Claims-Set.  The Claims-Set is not included
   in the token.  It is conveyed to the Verifier outside of the token.
   The submodule containing the digest is called a detached digest.  The
   separately conveyed Claims-Set is called a detached claims set.

   The input to the digest is exactly the byte-string wrapped encoded
   form of the Claims-Set for the submodule.  That Claims-Set can
   include other submodules including nested tokens and detached
   digests.

   The primary use for this is to facilitate the implementation of a
   small and secure attester, perhaps purely in hardware.  This small,
   secure attester implements COSE signing and only a few claims,
   perhaps just UEID and hardware identification.  It has inputs for
   digests of submodules, perhaps 32-byte hardware registers.  Software
   running on the device constructs larger claim sets, perhaps very
   large, encodes them and digests them.  The digests are written into
   the small secure attesters registers.  The EAT produced by the small
   secure attester only contains the UEID, hardware identification and
   digests and is thus simple enough to be implemented in hardware.
   Probably, every data item in it is of fixed length.

   The integrity protection for the larger Claims Sets will not be as
   secure as those originating in hardware block, but the key material
   and hardware-based claims will be.  It is possible for the hardware
   to enforce hardware access control (memory protection) on the digest
   registers so that some of the larger claims can be more secure.  For
   example, one register may be writable only by the TEE, so the
   detached claims from the TEE will have TEE-level security.

   The data type for this type of submodule MUST be an array It contains
   two data items, an algorithm identifier and a byte string containing
   the digest.

   When decoding a CBOR format token the detached digest type is
   distringuished from the other types by it being an array.  In CBOR
   the none of other submodule types are arrays.

   When decoding a JSON format token, a little more work is required
   because both the nested token and detached digest types are an array.
   To distinguish the nested token from the detached digest, the first
   element in the array is examined.  If it is "JWT", "UJCS" "JWT" or "DEB",
   the then the
   submodule is a nested token.  Otherwise it will contain an algorithm
   identifier and is a detached digest.

   A DEB, described in Section 5, may be used to convey detached claims
   sets and the token with their detached digests.  EAT, however,
   doesn't require use of a DEB.  Any other protocols may be used to
   convey detached claims sets and the token with their detached
   digests.  Note that since detached Claims-Sets are usually signed, protocols
   conveying them must make sure they are not modified in transit.

3.25.2.

   Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
      algorithm : JC< text, int >
      digest    : binary-data
   ]

4.2.19.2.  No Inheritance

   The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the containing
   token.  The subordinate modules must explicitly include all of their
   claims.  This is the case even for claims like the nonce.

   This rule is in place for simplicity.  It avoids complex inheritance
   rules that might vary from one type of claim to another.

3.25.3.

4.2.19.3.  Security Levels

   The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always
   be less than or equal to that of the containing modules in the case
   of non-token submodules.  It makes no sense for a module of lesser
   security to be signing claims of a module of higher security.  An
   example of this is a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts
   (e.g. the high-level OS) of the device.

   The opposite may be true for the nested tokens.  They usually have
   their own more secure key material.  An example of this is an
   embedded secure element.

3.25.4.

4.2.19.4.  Submodule Names

   The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text
   string naming the submodule.  No submodules may have the same name.

3.25.5.  CDDL for submods

4.3.  Claims Describing the Token

   The submodule type is distinguished claims in the encoded bytes by its this section provide meta data
   type, map/object for a Claims-Set, string for nested about the token and array
   for a detached submodule.  Nested tokens are byte-string wrapped when
   encoded they
   occur in.  They do not describe the entity.

   They may appear in CBOR and base64 encoded for JSON.

   $$claims-set-claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })

   Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest

   Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
      algorithm : int / text,
      digest : bstr
   ]

4.  Unprotected JWT Claims-Sets

   This is simply Attestation Evidence or Attestation Results.  When
   these claims appear in Attestation Evidence, they SHOULD not be
   passed through the JSON equivalent of an Unprotected Verifier into Attestation Results.

4.3.1.  Token ID Claim (cti and jti)

   CWT Claims-Set
   [UCCS.Draft].

   It has no protection of its own so protections must be provided by defines the protocol carrying it. "cti" claim.  JWT defines the "jti" claim.  These are extensively discussed
   equivalent to each other in
   [UCCS.Draft].  All the security discussion EAT and security
   considerations carry a unique token identifier
   as they do in [UCCS.Draft] apply to UJCS.

   (Note: The EAT author is open JWT and CWT.  They may be used to this definition being moved into defend against re use
   of the
   UCCS draft, perhaps along with token but are distinct from the related CDDL.  It nonce that is place here
   for now so that the current UCCS draft plus this document are
   complete.  UJCS is needed for the same use cases that a UCCS is
   needed.  Further, JSON will commonly be used to convey Attestation
   Results since JSON is common for server to server communications.
   Server to server communications will often have established security
   (e.g., TLS) therefore by the signing and encryption from JWS
   Relying Party to guarantee freshness and JWE are
   unnecssary defend against replay.

4.3.2.  Timestamp claim (iat)

   The "iat" claim defined in CWT and burdensome).

5.  Detached EAT Bundles

   A detached EAT bundle JWT is a structure used to convey a fully-formed indicate the date-
   of-creation of the token, the time at which the claims are collected
   and
   signed the token plus detached claims set that relate to that token.  It is a top-level EAT message like a CWT, JWT, UCCS composed and UJCS.  It can be
   used any place that CWT, JWT, UCCS or UJCS messages are used.  It signed.

   The data for some claims may
   also be sent as a submodule.

   A DEB has two main parts.

   The first part is a full top-level token.  This top-level held or cached for some period of
   time before the token must
   have at least one submodule that is a detached digest. created.  This top-
   level token period may be either CBOR long, even
   days.  Examples are measurements taken at boot or JSON-encoded.  It may be a CWT,
   JWT, UCCS or UJCS, but not geographic
   position fix taken the last time a DEB.  The same mechanism for
   distinguishing satellite signal was received.
   There are individual timestamps associated with these claims to
   indicate their age is older than the type "iat" timestamp.

   CWT allows the use floating-point for nested token submodules is used here.

   The second part is a map/object containing the detached Claims-Sets
   corresponding to the detached digests in the full token.  When the
   DEB is CBOR-encoded, each Claims-Set is wrapped in a byte string.
   When the DEB is JSON-encoded, each Claims-Set is base64url encoded.
   All this claim.  EAT disallows the detached Claims-Sets
   use of floating-point.  An EAT token MUST be encoded NOT contain an iat claim in the same
   float-point format.  Any recipient of a token with a floating-point
   format as
   the DEB.  No mixing iat claim MUST consider it an error.  A 64-bit integer
   representation of encoding formats is allowed for epoch time can represent a range of +/- 500 billion
   years, so the Claims-
   Sets in only point of a DEB.

   For CBOR-encoded DEBs, tag TBD602 can be used floating-point timestamp is to identify it. have
   precession greater than one second.  This is not needed for EAT.

4.3.3.  The
   normal rules apply Profile Claim (profile)

   See Section 7 for use or non-use the detailed description of a tag.  When it profile.

   A profile is sent as identified by either a
   submodule, it is always sent as URL or an OID.  Typically, the
   URI will reference a tag to distinguish it from document describing the
   other types of nested tokens.

   The digests of profile.  An OID is just
   a unique identifier for the detached claims sets are associated with detached
   claims-sets by label/name. profile.  It may exist anywhere in the
   OID tree.  There is up to no requirement that the constructor named document be
   publicly accessible.  The primary purpose of the
   detached EAT bundle profile claim is to ensure the names
   uniquely identify the
   detached claims sets.  Since the names are used only profile even if it is a private profile.

   The OID is always absolute and never relative.

   See Section 8.2.1 for OID and URI encoding.

   Note that this is named "eat_profile" for JWT and is distinct from
   the already registered "profile" claim in the detached
   EAT bundle, they can be very short, perhaps one byte.

   Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
       main-token : Nested-Token,
       detached-claims-sets: {
           + tstr JWT claims registry.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (profile-label => cbor-wrapped-claims-set general-uri / json-wrapped-claims-set
       }
   ]

   json-wrapped-claims-set = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

   cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set

6.  Endorsements and Verification Keys

   The Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs the
   cryptographic part of an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE/
   JOSE signature).  This section describes several ways to identify the
   verification key.  There is not one standard method. general-oid)

4.3.4.  The verification key itself Intended Use Claim (intended-use)

   EAT's may be a public key, a symmetric key or
   something complicated used in the case context of a scheme like Direct Anonymous
   Attestation (DAA).

   RATS Architecture [RATS.Architecture] describes what is called an
   Endorsement.  This is several different applications.
   The intended-use claim provides an input indication to an EAT consumer
   about the Verifier that is usually the
   basis intended usage of the trust placed in token.  This claim can be used as a
   way for an application using EAT and to internally distinguish between
   different ways it uses EAT.

   1 - Generic:  Generic attestation describes an application where the Attester that generated
   it.  It may contain
      EAT consumer requires the public key for verification most up-to-date security assessment of
      the signature
   on attesting entity.  It is expected that this is the most
      commonly-used application of EAT.  It may contain Reference Values to which EAT claims

   2- Registration:  Entities that are
   compared registering for a new service may
      be expected to provide an attestation as part of the verification registration
      process.  It may contain implied
   claims, those  This intended-use setting indicates that are passed on to the Relying Party in Attestation
   Results.

   There attestation
      is not yet any standard format(s) intended for an Endorsement.  One
   format that any use but registration.

   3 - Provisioning:  Entities may be used for an Endorsement is provisioned with different values
      or settings by an X.509 certificate.
   Endorsement data like Reference Values and implied claims can be
   carried in X.509 v3 extensions.  In this use, the public EAT consumer.  Examples include key in the
   X.509 certificate becomes the verification key, so identification material or
      device management trees.  The consumer may require an EAT to
      assess entity security state of the Endorsement is also identification of entity prior to provisioning.

   4 - Certificate Issuance  Certification Authorities (CA's) may
      require attestations prior to the verification key.

   The verification key identification and establishment issuance of trust in certificates related
      to keypairs hosted at the entity.  An EAT and the attester may also be by some other means than an
   Endorsement.

   For used as part of
      the components (Attester, Verifier, Relying Party,...) certificate signing request (CSR).

   5 - Proof-of-Possession:  An EAT consumer may require an attestation
      as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) application.
      More precisely, a
   particular end-end attestation system PoP transaction is intended to provide to reliably interoperate, its
   definition should specify how the verification key is identified.
   Usually, this will be in
      recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the profile document for sender has
      possession of a particular key.  This kind of attestation system.

6.1.  Identification Methods

   Following is a list of possible methods of key identification.  A
   specific attestation system may employ any one of these or one not
   listed here.

   The following assumes Endorsements are X.509 certificates or
   equivalent and thus does not mention or define any identifier for
   Endorsements in other formats.  If such an Endorsement format is
   created, new identifiers for them will also need to be created.

6.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID

   The COSE standard header parameter for Key ID (kid) may be used.  See
   [RFC8152] and [RFC7515]

   COSE leaves necceesary
      to verify the semantics security state of the entity storing the private key ID open-ended.  It could be a
   record locator
      used in a database, PoP application.

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( intended-use-label => intended-use-type )

   intended-use-type = generic /
                       registration /
                       provisioning /
                       csr /
                       pop

   generic      = JC< "generic",      1 >
   registration = JC< "registration", 2 >
   provisioning = JC< "provisioning", 3 >
   csr          = JC< "csr",          4 >
   pop          = JC< "pop",          5 >

4.4.  Including Keys

   An EAT may include a hash of cryptographic key such as a public key, an input to a
   KDF, an authority key identifier (AKI) for an X.509 certificate or
   other. key.  The profile document should specify what
   signing of the EAT binds the key ID's
   semantics are.

6.1.2.  JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters

   COSE X.509 [COSE.X509.Draft] and JSON Web Siganture [RFC7515] define
   several header parameters (x5t, x5u,...) to all the other claims in the
   token.

   The purpose for referencing or carrying
   X.509 certificates any inclusion of which may be used.

   The X.509 certificate the key may be an Endorsement and thus carrying
   additional input to vary by use case.  For
   example, the Verifier.  It key may be just an X.509
   certificate, not included as part of an Endorsement.  The same header parameters are used IoT device onboarding
   protocol.  When the FIDO protocol includes a public key in both its
   attestation message, the key represents the binding of a user, device
   and Relying Party.  This document describes how claims containing
   keys should be defined for the various use cases.  It is up to does not define
   specific claims for specific use cases.

   Keys in CBOR format tokens SHOULD be the attestation system design COSE_Key format [RFC8152]
   and keys in JSON format tokens SHOULD be the
   Verifier JSON Web Key format
   [RFC7517].  These two formats support many common key types.  Their
   use avoids the need to determine which.

6.1.3.  CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters

   Compressed X.509 and CBOR Native certificates are defined by CBOR
   Certificates [CBOR.Cert.Draft]. decode other serialization formats.  These are semantically compatible
   with X.509 and therefore two
   formats can be used as an equivalent extended to X.509 as
   described above.

   These are identified by support further key types through their own header parameters (c5t, c5u,...).

6.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification

   For some attestation systems, a
   IANA registries.

   The general confirmation claim format [RFC8747], [RFC7800] may also
   be re-used as used.  It provides key encryption.  It also allows for inclusion
   by reference through a key
   identifier.  For example, the UEID uniquely identifies ID.  The confirmation claim format may
   employed in the entity and
   therefore can work well as definition of some new claim for a key identifier or Endorsement
   identifier.

   This has a particular use
   case.

   When the advantage that key identification requires no additional
   bytes actual confirmation claim is included in the an EAT, this
   document associates no use case semantics other than proof of
   possession.  Different EAT and makes the EAT smaller.

   This has the disadvantage that the unverified EAT must be
   substantially decoded use cases may choose to obtain the identifier since the identifier
   is associate further
   semantics.  The key in the COSE/JOSE payload, not confirmation claim MUST be protected in
   the headers.

6.2.  Other Considerations

   In all cases there must be some same way that as the verification key is
   itself verified or determined used to be trustworthy.  The key
   identification itself is never enough.  This will always be by some
   out-of-band mechanism that is not described here.  For example, sign the
   Verifier may be configured with a root certificate or a master key by EAT.  That is, the Verifier system administrator.

   Often an X.509 certificate same,
   equivalent or an Endorsement carries more than just
   the verification key.  For example, an X.509 certificate might have better hardware defenses, access controls, key usage constraints
   generation and an Endorsement might have Reference Values.
   When this is the case, the key identifier such must be either used.

5.  Detached EAT Bundles

   A detached EAT bundle is a protected
   header or in the payload such structure to convey a fully-formed and
   signed token plus detached claims set that it is cryptographically bound relate to
   the EAT.  This that token.  It
   is in line with the requirements in section 6 on Key
   Identification in JSON Web Signature [RFC7515].

7.  Profiles

   This a top-level EAT specification does not gaurantee message like a CWT or JWT.  It can be occur any
   place that implementations of it
   will interoperate. CWT or JWT messages occur.  It may also be sent as a
   submodule.

   A DEB has two main parts.

   The variability in this specification first part is
   necessary to accommodate the widely varying use cases.  An EAT
   profile narrows the specification for a specific use case.  An ideal
   EAT profile will guarantee interoperability.

   The profile can be named in the full top-level token.  This top-level token using the profile claim
   described in Section 3.20.

   A profile can apply to Attestation Evidence or to Attestation Results
   or both.

7.1.  Format of a Profile Document

   A profile document doesn't must
   have to at least one submodule that is a detached digest.  This top-
   level token may be in any particular format. either CBOR or JSON-encoded.  It may be simple text, something more formal a CWT, or
   JWT but not a combination.

   In some cases CDDL DEB.  It may also be created that replaces CDDL in this or other
   document to express some profile requirements.  For example, future-defined token type.
   The same mechanism for distinguishing the type for nested token
   submodules is used here.

   The second part is a map/object containing the detached Claims-Sets
   corresponding to
   require the altitude data item detached digests in the location claim, CDDL can full token.  When the
   DEB is CBOR-encoded, each Claims-Set is wrapped in a byte string.
   When the DEB is JSON-encoded, each Claims-Set is base64url encoded.
   All the detached Claims-Sets MUST be
   written that replicates encoded in the location claim with same format as
   the altitude no
   longer optional.

7.2.  List DEB.  No mixing of Profile Issues

   The following encoding formats is allowed for the Claims-
   Sets in a list DEB.

   For CBOR-encoded DEBs, tag TBD602 can be used to identify it.  The
   normal rules apply for use or non-use of EAT, CWT, UCCS, JWS, UJCS, COSE, JOSE and
   CBOR options that a profile should address.

7.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or both

   The profile should indicate whether the token format should be CBOR,
   JSON, both or even some other encoding.  If some other encoding, a
   specification for how the CDDL described here tag.  When it is serialized in that
   encoding sent as a
   submodule, it is necessary.

   This should be addressed for the top-level token and for any nested
   tokens.  For example, always sent as a profile might require all nested tokens tag to be
   of distinguish it from the same encoding
   other types of the top level token.

7.2.2.  CBOR Map and Array Encoding nested tokens.

   The profile should indicate whether definite-length arrays/maps,
   indefinite-length arrays/maps or both digests of the detached claims sets are allowed.  A good default is
   to allow only definite-length arrays/maps.

   An alternate associated with detached
   Claims-Sets by label/name.  It is up to allow both definite and indefinite-length arrays/
   maps.  The decoder should accept either.  Encoders that need to fit
   on very small hardware or be actually implement in hardware can use
   indefinite-length encoding.

   This applies to individual EAT claims, CWT and COSE parts the constructor of the
   implementation.

7.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding

   The profile should indicate whether definite-length strings,
   indefinite-length strings or both are allowed.  A good default is
   detached EAT bundle to
   allow ensure the names uniquely identify the
   detachedclaims sets.  Since the names are used only definite-length strings.  As with map and array encoding,
   allowing indefinite-length strings in the detached
   EAT bundle, they can be beneficial for some smaller
   implementations.

7.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization

   The profile should indicate whether encoders must use preferred
   serialization.  The profile should indicate whether decoders must
   accept non-preferred serialization.

7.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection

   COSE very short, perhaps one byte.

   DEB-Messages = DEB-Tagged-Message / DEB-Untagged-Message

   DEB-Tagged-Message   = #6.TBD(DEB-Untagged-Message)
   DEB-Untagged-Message = Detached-EAT-Bundle

   Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
       main-token : Nested-Token,
       detached-claims-sets: {
           + tstr => JC<json-wrapped-claims-set,
                        cbor-wrapped-claims-set>
       }
   ]

   json-wrapped-claims-set = base64-url-text

   cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set

6.  Endorsements and Verification Keys

   The Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs the
   cryptographic part of an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE/
   JOSE have signature).  This section describes several options for signed, MACed and encrypted
   messages.  EAT/CWT has the option ways to have no protection using UCCS
   and JOSE has a NULL protection option.  It identify the
   verification key.  There is possible to implement
   no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then encrypt and so on.  All
   combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, CWT, UCCS and UJCS are
   allowed by EAT. not one standard method.

   The profile should list the protections that must verification key itself may be supported by all
   decoders implementing the profile.  The encoders them must implement a subset public key, a symmetric key or
   something complicated in the case of a scheme like Direct Anonymous
   Attestation (DAA).

   RATS Architecture [RATS.Architecture] describes what is listed for the decoders, perhaps only one.

   Implementations may choose called an
   Endorsement.  This is an input to sign or MAC before encryption so the Verifier that is usually the implementation layer doing
   basis of the signing or MACing can be trust placed in an EAT and the
   smallest. Attester that generated
   it.  It is often easier to make smaller implementations more
   secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware.  The may contain the public key
   material for a verification of the signature or MAC is a private key, while
   on the EAT.  It may contain Reference Values to which EAT claims are
   compared as part of the verification process.  It may contain implied
   claims, those that are passed on to the Relying Party in Attestation
   Results.

   There is not yet any standard format(s) for
   encryption it an Endorsement.  One
   format that may be used for an Endorsement is likely to an X.509 certificate.
   Endorsement data like Reference Values and implied claims can be a
   carried in X.509 v3 extensions.  In this use, the public key.  The key for encryption
   requires less protection.

7.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms

   The profile document should list in the COSE algorithms that a Verifier
   must implement.  The Attester will select one
   X.509 certificate becomes the verification key, so identification of them.  Since there
   the Endorsement is no negotiation, also identification of the Verifier should implement all algorithms
   listed verification key.

   The verification key identification and establishment of trust in the profile.  If detached submodules are used,
   EAT and the COSE
   algorithms allowed for their digests should attester may also be in by some other means than an
   Endorsement.

   For the profile.

7.2.7.  DEB Support

   A Detatched EAT Bundle Section 5 is components (Attester, Verifier, Relying Party,...) of a special case message that
   particular end-end attestation system to reliably interoperate, its
   definition should specify how the verification key is identified.
   Usually, this will
   not often be used.  A in the profile may prohibit its use.

7.2.8.  Verification Key document for a particular
   attestation system.

6.1.  Identification

   Section Section 6 describes Methods

   Following is a number list of possible methods for identifying a
   verification key.  The profile document should specify one of these
   or key identification.  A
   specific attestation system may employ any one of these or one that is not described.
   listed here.

   The ones described in this document following assumes Endorsements are only roughly described.  The profile document should go into the
   full detail.

7.2.9.  Endorsement Identification

   Similar to, X.509 certificates or perhaps the same as Verification Key Identification,
   the profile may wish to specify how
   equivalent and thus does not mention or define any identifier for
   Endorsements are to be
   identified.  However note that in other formats.  If such an Endorsement Identification is
   optional, where as key identification format is not.

7.2.10.  Freshness

   Just about every use case
   created, new identifiers for them will require some means also need to be created.

6.1.1.  COSE/JWS Key ID

   The COSE standard header parameter for Key ID (kid) may be used.  See
   [RFC8152] and [RFC7515]

   COSE leaves the semantics of knowing the EAT
   is recent enough and not key ID open-ended.  It could be a replay
   record locator in a database, a hash of a public key, an old token. input to a
   KDF, an authority key identifier (AKI) for an X.509 certificate or
   other.  The profile document should describe how freshness is achieved.  The section on Freshness
   in [RATS.Architecture] describes some of specify what the possible solutions to
   achieve this.

7.2.11.  Required Claims

   The profile can list claims whose absence results in Verification
   failure.

7.2.12.  Prohibited Claims key ID's
   semantics are.

6.1.2.  JWS and COSE X.509 Header Parameters

   COSE X.509 [COSE.X509.Draft] and JSON Web Siganture [RFC7515] define
   several header parameters (x5t, x5u,...) for referencing or carrying
   X.509 certificates any of which may be used.

   The profile can list claims whose presence results in Verification
   failure.

7.2.13.  Additional Claims

   The profile X.509 certificate may describe entirely new claims.  These claims can be
   required or optional.

7.2.14.  Refined Claim Definition

   The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims.  For
   example, it may require altitude in an Endorsement and thus carrying
   additional input to the location claim, or it Verifier.  It may
   require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13.

7.2.15.  CBOR Tags just an X.509
   certificate, not an Endorsement.  The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or
   not.  Similarly, the profile should specify whether the token should
   be a UCCS tag or not.

   When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE
   tags same header parameters are used or not.  Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used
   in a CWT tag.

   Often a tag both cases.  It is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying
   protocol identifies up to the object as an EAT.

7.2.16.  Manifests attestation system design and Software Evidence Claims

   The profile should specify which formats are allowed for the
   manifests and software evidence claims.  The profile may also go on
   Verifier to say which parts determine which.

6.1.3.  CBOR Certificate COSE Header Parameters

   Compressed X.509 and options of these formats CBOR Native certificates are used, allowed and
   prohibited.

8.  Encoding and Collected CDDL

   An EAT is fundamentally defined using CDDL.  This document specifies
   how to encode the CDDL in CBOR or JSON.  Since by CBOR can express some
   things that JSON can't (e.g., tags) or that
   Certificates [CBOR.Cert.Draft].  These are expressed differently
   (e.g., labels) there is some CDDL that is specific to the encoding
   format.

8.1.  Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT semantically compatible
   with X.509 and JWT

   CDDL was not therefore can be used as an equivalent to define CWT or JWT.  It was not available at X.509 as
   described above.

   These are identified by their own header parameters (c5t, c5u,...).

6.1.4.  Claim-Based Key Identification

   For some attestation systems, a claim may be re-used as a key
   identifier.  For example, the
   time.

   This document defines CDDL for both CWT UEID uniquely identifies the entity and JWT as
   therefore can work well as UCCS. a key identifier or Endorsement
   identifier.

   This document does not change has the encoding or semantics of anything advantage that key identification requires no additional
   bytes in a CWT or JWT.

   A Claims-Set is the central data structure for EAT, CWT, JWT EAT and
   UCCS.  It holds all makes the claims and EAT smaller.

   This has the disadvantage that the unverified EAT must be
   substantially decoded to obtain the identifier since the identifier
   is in the structure COSE/JOSE payload, not in the headers.

6.2.  Other Considerations

   In all cases there must be some way that the verification key is secured
   by signing
   itself verified or other means.  It is not possible determined to define EAT, CWT,
   JWT or UCCS in CDDL without it. be trustworthy.  The CDDL definition of Claims-Set
   here key
   identification itself is applicable to EAT, CWT, JWT and UCCS. never enough.  This document specifies how to encode will always be by some
   out-of-band mechanism that is not described here.  For example, the
   Verifier may be configured with a Claims-Set in CBOR root certificate or JSON.

   With a master key by
   the exception of nested tokens and some other externally defined
   structures (e.g., SWIDs) Verifier system administrator.

   Often an entire Claims-Set X.509 certificate or an Endorsement carries more than just
   the verification key.  For example, an X.509 certificate might have
   key usage constraints and an Endorsement might have Reference Values.
   When this is the case, the key identifier must be in encoded in either CBOR or JSON, never a mixture.

   CDDL for protected
   header or in the seven claims defined by [RFC8392] and [RFC7519] payload such that it is
   included here.

8.2.  Encoding Data Types cryptographically bound to
   the EAT.  This makes use of is in line with the types defined requirements in [RFC8610] Appendix D, Standard
   Prelude.

8.2.1.  Common Data Types

   time-int section 6 on Key
   Identification in JSON Web Signature [RFC7515].

7.  Profiles

   This EAT specification does not gaurantee that implementations of it
   will interoperate.  The variability in this specification is identical
   necessary to accommodate the epoch-based time, but disallows
   floating-point representation.

   Unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not widely varying use cases.  An EAT
   profile narrows the URI tag defined in
   [RFC8949].  They are just text strings that contain specification for a URI.

   string-or-uri = tstr

   time-int = #6.1(int)

8.2.2.  JSON Interoperability

   JSON should specific use case.  An ideal
   EAT profile will guarantee interoperability.

   The profile can be encoded per [RFC8610] Appendix E.  In addition, the
   following CDDL types are encoded named in JSON as follows:

   o  bstr - must be base64url encoded

   o  time - must be encoded as NumericDate as the token using the profile claim
   described section 2 in Section 4.3.3.

   A profile can apply to Attestation Evidence or to Attestation Results
   or both.

7.1.  Format of
      [RFC7519].

   o  string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
      section 2 of [RFC7519].

   o  uri - must be a URI [RFC3986].

   o  oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted-
      decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1").

8.2.3.  Labels

   Map labels, including Claims-Keys and Claim-Names, and enumerated-
   type values are always integers when encoding in CBOR and strings
   when encoding in JSON.  There is an exception Profile Document

   A profile document doesn't have to this for naming
   submodules and detached claims sets be in any particular format.  It
   may be simple text, something more formal or a DEB.  These are strings in
   CBOR.

   The combination.

   In some cases CDDL may be created that replaces CDDL in most cases gives both the integer label and the string
   label as it is not convenient this or other
   document to have conditional CDDL for such.

8.3.  CBOR Interoperability

   CBOR allows data items express some profile requirements.  For example, to be serialized
   require the altitude data item in more than one form.  If the sender uses a form location claim, CDDL can be
   written that replicates the receiver can't decode, there will not
   be interoperability.

   This specification gives location claim with the altitude no blanket requirements to narrow CBOR
   serialization for all uses
   longer optional.

7.2.  List of EAT.  This allows individual uses to
   tailor serialization to the environment.  It also may result in EAT
   implementations that don't interoperate.

   One way to guarantee interoperability Profile Issues

   The following is to clearly specify CBOR
   serialization in a profile document.  See Section 7 for a list of
   serialization issues EAT, CWT, JWS, COSE, JOSE and CBOR options
   that a profile should be addressed.

   EAT will be commonly used where the entity generating the attestation
   is constrained and the receiver/Verifier address.

7.2.1.  Use of JSON, CBOR or both

   The profile should indicate whether the attestation is token format should be CBOR,
   JSON, both or even some other encoding.  If some other encoding, a
   capacious server.  Following
   specification for how the CDDL described here is a set of serialization requirements serialized in that work well
   encoding is necessary.

   This should be addressed for that use case the top-level token and are guaranteed for any nested
   tokens.  For example, a profile might require all nested tokens to interoperate.
   Use be
   of this serialization is recommended where possible, but not
   required.  An EAT profile may just reference the following section
   rather than spell out serialization details.

8.3.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization

   o  Preferred serialization described in section 4.1 same encoding of [RFC8949] the top level token.

7.2.2.  CBOR Map and Array Encoding

   The profile should indicate whether definite-length arrays/maps,
   indefinite-length arrays/maps or both are allowed.  A good default is
      not required.
   to allow only definite-length arrays/maps.

   An alternate is to allow both definite and indefinite-length arrays/
   maps.  The EAT decoder must should accept all forms of number
      serialization.  The EAT encoder may either.  Encoders that need to fit
   on very small hardware or be actually implement in hardware can use any form it wishes.

   o  The
   indefinite-length encoding.

   This applies to individual EAT decoder must accept indefinite length arrays claims, CWT and maps as
      described in section 3.2.2 COSE parts of [RFC8949]. the
   implementation.

7.2.3.  CBOR String Encoding

   The EAT encoder may use
      indefinite length arrays and maps if it wishes.

   o profile should indicate whether definite-length strings,
   indefinite-length strings or both are allowed.  A good default is to
   allow only definite-length strings.  As with map and array encoding,
   allowing indefinite-length strings can be beneficial for some smaller
   implementations.

7.2.4.  CBOR Preferred Serialization

   The EAT decoder profile should indicate whether encoders must accept indefinite length strings as described
      in section 3.2.3 of [RFC8949]. use preferred
   serialization.  The EAT encoder profile should indicate whether decoders must
   accept non-preferred serialization.

7.2.5.  COSE/JOSE Protection

   COSE and JOSE have several options for signed, MACed and encrypted
   messages.  JWT may use indefinite
      length strings if it wishes.

   o  Sorting of maps by key the JOSE NULL protection option.  It is not required.
   possible to implement no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then
   encrypt and so on.  All combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, and
   CWT are allowed by EAT.

   The EAT decoder profile should list the protections that must not
      rely on sorting.

   o  Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 be supported by all
   decoders implementing the profile.  The encoders them must implement
   a subset of [RFC8949] what is
      not required.

   o  Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must listed for the decoders, perhaps only one.

   Implementations may choose to sign or MAC before encryption so that
   the implementation layer doing the signing or MACing can be
      followed. the
   smallest.  It is often easier to make smaller implementations more
   secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware.  The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels key
   material for a signature or invalid UTF-8 strings.

8.4.  Collected Common CDDL

Claims-Set = {
    * $$claims-set-claims,
    * Claim-Label .feature "extended-label" => MAC is a private key, while for
   encryption it is likely to be a public key.  The key for encryption
   requires less protection.

7.2.6.  COSE/JOSE Algorithms

   The profile document should list the COSE algorithms that a Verifier
   must implement.  The Attester will select one of them.  Since there
   is no negotiation, the Verifier should implement all algorithms
   listed in the profile.  If detached submodules are used, the COSE
   algorithms allowed for their digests should also be in the profile.

7.2.7.  DEB Support

   A Detatched EAT Bundle Section 5 is a special case message that will
   not often be used.  A profile may prohibit its use.

7.2.8.  Verification Key Identification

   Section Section 6 describes a number of methods for identifying a
   verification key.  The profile document should specify one of these
   or one that is not described.  The ones described in this document
   are only roughly described.  The profile document should go into the
   full detail.

7.2.9.  Endorsement Identification

   Similar to, or perhaps the same as Verification Key Identification,
   the profile may wish to specify how Endorsements are to be
   identified.  However note that Endorsement Identification is
   optional, where as key identification is not.

7.2.10.  Freshness

   Just about every use case will require some means of knowing the EAT
   is recent enough and not a replay of an old token.  The profile
   should describe how freshness is achieved.  The section on Freshness
   in [RATS.Architecture] describes some of the possible solutions to
   achieve this.

7.2.11.  Required Claims

   The profile can list claims whose absence results in Verification
   failure.

7.2.12.  Prohibited Claims

   The profile can list claims whose presence results in Verification
   failure.

7.2.13.  Additional Claims

   The profile may describe entirely new claims.  These claims can be
   required or optional.

7.2.14.  Refined Claim Definition

   The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims.  For
   example, it may require altitude in the location claim, or it may
   require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13.

7.2.15.  CBOR Tags

   The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or
   not.

   When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE
   tags are used or not.  Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used
   in a CWT tag.

   Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying
   protocol identifies the object as an EAT.

7.2.16.  Manifests and Software Evidence Claims

   The profile should specify which formats are allowed for the
   manifests and software evidence claims.  The profile may also go on
   to say which parts and options of these formats are used, allowed and
   prohibited.

8.  Encoding and Collected CDDL

   An EAT is fundamentally defined using CDDL.  This document specifies
   how to encode the CDDL in CBOR or JSON.  Since CBOR can express some
   things that JSON can't (e.g., tags) or that are expressed differently
   (e.g., labels) there is some CDDL that is specific to the encoding
   format.

8.1.  Claims-Set and CDDL for CWT and JWT

   CDDL was not used to define CWT or JWT.  It was not available at the
   time.

   This document defines CDDL for both CWT and JWT.  This document does
   not change the encoding or semantics of anything in a CWT or JWT.

   A Claims-Set is the central data structure for EAT, CWT and JWT.  It
   holds all the claims and is the structure that is secured by signing
   or other means.  It is not possible to define EAT, CWT, or JWT in
   CDDL without it.  The CDDL definition of Claims-Set here is
   applicable to EAT, CWT and JWT.

   This document specifies how to encode a Claims-Set in CBOR or JSON.

   With the exception of nested tokens and some other externally defined
   structures (e.g., SWIDs) an entire Claims-Set must be in encoded in
   either CBOR or JSON, never a mixture.

   CDDL for the seven claims defined by [RFC8392] and [RFC7519] is
   included here.

8.2.  Encoding Data Types

   This makes use of the types defined in [RFC8610] Appendix D, Standard
   Prelude.

8.2.1.  Common Data Types

   time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows
   floating-point representation.

   The OID encoding from [RFC9090] is used without the tag number in
   CBOR-encoded tokens.  In JSON tokens OIDs are a text string in the
   common form of "nn.nn.nn...".

   Unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not the URI tag defined in
   [RFC8949].  They are just text strings that contain a URI.

   time-int = #6.1(int)

   binary-data = JC< base64-url-text, bstr>

   base64-url-text = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

   general-oid = JC< json-oid, ~oid >

   json-oid = tstr .regexp "[0-9\.]+"

   general-uri = JC< text, ~uri >

8.2.2.  JSON Interoperability

   JSON should be encoded per [RFC8610] Appendix E.  In addition, the
   following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows:

   o  bstr - must be base64url encoded
   o  time - must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of
      [RFC7519].

   o  string-or-uri - must be encoded as StringOrURI as described
      section 2 of [RFC7519].

   o  uri - must be a URI [RFC3986].

   o  oid - encoded as a string using the well established dotted-
      decimal notation (e.g., the text "1.2.250.1").

   The CDDL generic "JC< >" is used in most places where there is a
   variance between CBOR and JSON.  The first argument is the CDDL for
   JSON and the second is CDDL for CBOR.

8.2.3.  Labels

   Map labels, including Claims-Keys and Claim-Names, and enumerated-
   type values are always integers when encoding in CBOR and strings
   when encoding in JSON.  There is an exception to this for naming
   submodules and detached claims sets in a DEB.  These are strings in
   CBOR.

   The CDDL in most cases gives both the integer label and the string
   label as it is not convenient to have conditional CDDL for such.

8.3.  CBOR Interoperability

   CBOR allows data items to be serialized in more than one form.  If
   the sender uses a form that the receiver can't decode, there will not
   be interoperability.

   This specification gives no blanket requirements to narrow CBOR
   serialization for all uses of EAT.  This allows individual uses to
   tailor serialization to the environment.  It also may result in EAT
   implementations that don't interoperate.

   One way to guarantee interoperability is to clearly specify CBOR
   serialization in a profile document.  See Section 7 for a list of
   serialization issues that should be addressed.

   EAT will be commonly used where the entity generating the attestation
   is constrained and the receiver/Verifier of the attestation is a
   capacious server.  Following is a set of serialization requirements
   that work well for that use case and are guaranteed to interoperate.
   Use of this serialization is recommended where possible, but not
   required.  An EAT profile may just reference the following section
   rather than spell out serialization details.

8.3.1.  EAT Constrained Device Serialization

   o  Preferred serialization described in section 4.1 of [RFC8949] is
      not required.  The EAT decoder must accept all forms of number
      serialization.  The EAT encoder may use any
}

Claim-Label form it wishes.

   o  The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length arrays and maps as
      described in section 3.2.2 of [RFC8949].  The EAT encoder may use
      indefinite length arrays and maps if it wishes.

   o  The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length strings as described
      in section 3.2.3 of [RFC8949].  The EAT encoder may use indefinite
      length strings if it wishes.

   o  Sorting of maps by key is not required.  The EAT decoder must not
      rely on sorting.

   o  Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 of [RFC8949] is
      not required.

   o  Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of [RFC8949] must be
      followed.  The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels
      or invalid UTF-8 strings.

8.4.  Collected CDDL

8.4.1.  Payload CDDL

   This CDDL defines all the EAT Claims that are added to the main
   definition of a Claim-Set in Appendix D.  Claims-Set is the payload
   for CWT, JWT and potentially other token types.  This is for both
   CBOR and JSON.  When there is variation between CBOR and JSON, the
   JC<> CDDL generic defined in Appendix D.

   This CDDL uses, but doesn't define Nested-Token because its
   definition varies between CBOR and JSON and the JC<> generic can't be
   used to define it.  Nested-Token is the one place that that a CBOR
   token can be nested inside a JSON token and vice versa.  Nested-Token
   is defined in the following sections.

  time-int = int / text
string-or-uri #6.1(int)

  binary-data = JC< base64-url-text, bstr>

  base64-url-text = tstr

time-int .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

  general-oid = #6.1(int)
$$claims-set-claims //= (iss-label => text)
$$claims-set-claims //= (sub-label => text)
$$claims-set-claims //= (aud-label => text)
$$claims-set-claims //= (exp-label => ~time)
$$claims-set-claims //= (nbf-label => ~time)
$$claims-set-claims //= (iat-label => ~time)

$$claims-set-claims JC< json-oid, ~oid >
  json-oid = tstr .regexp "[0-9\.]+"

  general-uri = JC< text, ~uri >

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
      (nonce-label => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ])

  nonce-type = JC< tstr .size (10..74), bstr .size (8..64)
$$claims-set-claims (8..64)>

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (ueid-label => ueid-type)

  ueid-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (12..44) , bstr .size (7..33)
$$claims-set-claims (7..33)>

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sueids-label => sueids-type)

  sueids-type = {
      + tstr => ueid-type
  }

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
      oemid-label => oemid-pen / oemid-ieee / oemid-random
  )

  oemid-pen = int

  oemid-ieee = JC<oemid-ieee-json, oemid-ieee-cbor>
  oemid-ieee-cbor = bstr .size 3
  oemid-ieee-json = base64-url-text .size 4

  oemid-random = JC<oemid-random-json, oemid-random-cbor>
  oemid-random-cbor = bstr .size 16

$$claims-set-claims //= (
    oemid-label =>
        oemid-random / oemid-ieee / oemid-pen
)
$$claims-set-claims
  oemid-random-json = base64-url-text .size 24

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //=  (
      hardware-version-label => hardware-version-type
  )

  hardware-version-type = [
      version:  tstr,
      ? scheme:  $version-scheme
  ]
hardware-model-type = bytes .size (1..32)

$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
      hardware-model-label => hardware-model-type
  )
$$claims-set-claims
  hardware-model-type = JC<base64-url-text .size (4..44),
                           bytes .size (1..32)>

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( sw-name-label => tstr )
$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (sw-version-label => sw-version-type)

  sw-version-type = [
      version:  tstr,  tstr
      ? scheme:  $version-scheme ; As defined by CoSWID
  ]
$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //=
      ( security-level-label =>
        security-level-cbor-type /
        security-level-json-type
)

security-level-cbor-type = &(
    unrestricted: 1,
    restricted: 2,
    secure-restricted: 3,
    hardware: 4 security-level-type )

security-level-json-type

  security-level-type =
    "unrestricted" /
    "restricted" unrestricted /
    "secure-restricted"
                        restricted /
    "hardware"
$$claims-set-claims
                        hardware

  unrestricted       = JC< "unrestricted",      1>
  restricted         = JC< "restricted",        2>
  hardware           = JC< "hardware",          3>

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (secure-boot-label => bool)
$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( debug-status-label =>
        debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type
)

debug-status-cbor-type = &(
    enabled: 0,
    disabled: 1,
    disabled-since-boot: 2,
    disabled-permanently: 3,
    disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4 debug-status-type )

debug-status-json-type

  debug-status-type =
    "enabled" ds-enabled /
    "disabled"
                      disabled /
    "disabled-since-boot"
                      disabled-since-boot /
    "disabled-permanently"
                      disabled-permanently /
    "disabled-fully-and-permanently"
$$claims-set-claims
                      disabled-fully-and-permanently

  ds-enabled                     = JC< "enabled", 0 >
  disabled                       = JC< "disabled", 1 >
  disabled-since-boot            = JC< "disabled-since-boot", 2 >
  disabled-permanently           = JC< "disabled-permanently", 3 >
  disabled-fully-and-permanently = JC< "disabled-fully-and-permanently",
                                        4 >

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (location-label => location-type)

  location-type = {
      latitude => number,
      longitude => number,
      ? altitude => number,
      ? accuracy => number,
      ? altitude-accuracy => number,
      ? heading => number,
      ? speed => number,
      ? timestamp => ~time-int,
      ? age => uint
  }

  latitude          = JC< "latitude",          1 / "latitude" >
  longitude         = JC< "longitude",         2 / "longitude" >
  altitude          = JC< "altitude",          3 / "altitude" >
  accuracy          = JC< "accuracy",          4 / "accuracy" >
  altitude-accuracy = JC< "altitude-accuracy", 5 / "altitude-accuracy" >
  heading           = JC< "heading",           6 / "heading" >
  speed             = JC< "speed",             7 / "speed" >
  timestamp         = JC< "timestamp",         8 / "timestamp" >
  age               = JC< "age",               9 / "age"
$$claims-set-claims >

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (uptime-label => uint)
$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //=  (boot-seed-label => bytes)
$$claims-set-claims binary-data)

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (odometer-label => uint)
$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( intended-use-label =>
        intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type
)
intended-use-cbor-type = &(
    generic: 1,
    registration: 2,
    provisioning: 3,
    csr: 4,
    pop: 5 intended-use-type )

intended-use-json-type

  intended-use-type =
    "generic" generic /
    "registration"
                      registration /
    "provisioning"
                      provisioning /
    "csr"
                      csr /
    "pop"
$$claims-set-claims
                      pop

  generic      = JC< "generic",      1 >
  registration = JC< "registration", 2 >
  provisioning = JC< "provisioning", 3 >
  csr          = JC< "csr",          4 >
  pop          = JC< "pop",          5 >

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
      dloas-label => [ + dloa-type ]
  )

  dloa-type = [
      dloa_registrar: ~uri general-uri
      dloa_platform_label: text
      ? dloa_application_label: text
  ]
$$claims-set-claims

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (profile-label => ~uri general-uri / ~oid)
$$claims-set-claims general-oid)
  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
      manifests-label => manifests-type
  )

  manifests-type = [+ $$manifest-formats]

coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx manifest-format]

  manifest-format = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>

$$manifest-formats [
      content-type:   uint,
      content-format: JC< $$manifest-body-json,
                          $$manifest-body-cbor >
  ]

  $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor untagged-coswid
  $$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text

  $$manifest-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag-xx$$claims-set-claims SUIT_Envelope
  $$manifest-body-json /= base64-url-text

  suit-directive-process-dependency = 19

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (
      swevidence-label => swevidence-type
  )

  swevidence-type = [+ $$swevidence-formats]

coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag swevidence-format]

  swevidence-format = tagged-coswid<concise-swid-tag>
$$swevidence-formats [
      content-type:   uint,
      content-format: JC< $$swevidence-body-json,
                          $$swevidence-body-cbor >
  ]

  $$swevidence-body-cbor /= bytes .cbor coswid-that-is-a-cbor-tag
$$claims-set-claims untagged-coswid
  $$swevidence-body-json /= base64-url-text

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (swresults-label (
      measurement-results-label =>
          [ + swresult-type ])

verification-result-cbor-type = &(
    verification-not-run: 1,
    verification-indeterminate: 2,
    verification-failed: 3,
    fully-verified: 4,
    partially-verified: 5, measurement-results-group ] )

verification-result-json-type

  measurement-results-group =
    "verification-not-run" [
      measurement-system: tstr,
      measruement-results: [ + individual-result ]
  ]

  individual-result = [
      results-id: tstr /
    "verification-indeterminate" binary-data,
      result:     result-type,

  ]

  result-type = comparison-successful /
    "verification-failed"
                comparison-fail /
    "fully-verified"
                comparison-not-run /
    "partially-verified"

verification-objective-cbor-type
                measurement-absent

  comparison-successful    = &(
    all: 1,
    firmware: 2,
    kernel: 3,
    privileged: 4,
    system-libs: 5,
    partial: 6,
)

verification-objective-json-type JC< "success",       1 >
  comparison-fail          =
    "all" /
    "firmware" /
    "kernel" /
    "privileged" /
    "system-libs" /
    "partial"

swresult-type JC< "fail",          2 >
  comparison-not-run       = [
    verification-system: tstr,
    objective: verification-objective-cbor-type /
        verification-objective-json-type,
    result: verification-result-cbor-type /
        verification-result-json-type,
    ? objective-name: tstr
]
$$claims-set-claims JC< "not-run",       3 >
  measurement-absent       = JC< "absent",        4 >

  $$Claims-Set-Claims //= (submods-label => { + text => Submodule })

  Submodule = Claims-Set / Nested-Token / Detached-Submodule-Digest

  Detached-Submodule-Digest = [
     algorithm : int / : JC< text, int >
     digest    : bstr binary-data
  ]

  DEB-Messages = DEB-Tagged-Message / DEB-Untagged-Message

  DEB-Tagged-Message   = #6.TBD(DEB-Untagged-Message)
  DEB-Untagged-Message = Detached-EAT-Bundle

  Detached-EAT-Bundle = [
      main-token : Nested-Token,
      detached-claims-sets: {
          + tstr => cbor-wrapped-claims-set / json-wrapped-claims-set JC<json-wrapped-claims-set,
                       cbor-wrapped-claims-set>
      }
  ]

  json-wrapped-claims-set = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+" base64-url-text

  cbor-wrapped-claims-set = bstr .cbor Claims-Set

8.5.  Collected CDDL for CBOR

   CBOR-Token = Tagged-CBOR-Token / Untagged-CBOR-Token

   Tagged-CBOR-Token  = CWT-Tagged-Message
   Tagged-CBOR-Token /= UCCS-Tagged-Message
   Tagged-CBOR-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message

   Untagged-CBOR-Token  = CWT-Untagged-Message
   Untagged-CBOR-Token /= UCCS-Untagged-Message
   Untagged-CBOR-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message

   CWT-Tagged-Message = COSE_Tagged_Message
   CWT-Untagged-Message = COSE_Untagged_Message

   UCCS-Message = UCCS-Tagged-Message / UCCS-Untagged-Message

   UCCS-Tagged-Message = #6.601(UCCS-Untagged-Message)

   UCCS-Untagged-Message = Claims-Set

   DEB-Tagged-Message = #6.602(DEB-Untagged-Message)

   DEB-Untagged-Message = Detached-EAT-Bundle

   Nested-Token =
       tstr / ; A JSON-encoded Nested-Token (see json-nested-token.cddl)
       bstr .cbor Tagged-CBOR-Token

   iss-label = 1
   sub-label = 2
   aud-label = 3
   exp-label = 4
   nbf-label = 5
   iat-label = 6
   cti-label = 7nonce-label

  nonce-label            = JC< "eat_nonce",  10 >
  ueid-label             = JC< "ueid",       256 >
  sueids-label           = JC< "sueids",     257 >
  oemid-label            = JC< "oemid",      258 >
  hardware-model-label   = JC< "hwmodel",    259 >
  hardware-version-label = JC< "hwvers",     260 >
  secure-boot-label      = JC< "secboot",    262 >
  debug-status-label     = JC< "dbgstat",    263 >
  location-label         = JC< "location",   264 >
  profile-label          = 265 JC< "eat_profile",265 >
  submods-label          = JC< "submods",    266 >

  security-level-label   = <TBD> JC< "seclevel",   TBD >
  uptime-label           = <TBD> JC< "uptime",     TBD >
  boot-seed-label        = <TB>
   odometer-label = <TBD> JC< "bootseed",   TBD >
  intended-use-label     = <TBD> JC< "intuse",     TBD >
  dloas-label            = <TBD> JC< "dloas",      TBD >
  sw-name-label          = <TBD> JC< "swname",     TBD >
  sw-version-label       = <TBD> JC< "swversion",  TBD >
  manifests-label        = <TBD> JC< "manifests",  TBD >
  swevidence-label       = <TBD>
   swresults-label JC< "swevidence", TBD >
  measurement-results-label = <TBD>

8.6.  Collected JC< "measres" , TBD >
  odometer-label         = JC< "odometer",   TBD >

8.4.2.  CBOR-Specific CDDL for JSON

JWT-Message

   EAT-CBOR-Token = text .regexp [A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+

UJCS-Message $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token / $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token

   $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= CWT-Tagged-Message
   $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token /= DEB-Tagged-Message

   $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= CWT-Untagged-Message
   $$EAT-CBOR-Untagged-Token /= DEB-Untagged-Message

   Nested-Token = Claims-Set CBOR-Nested-Token

   CBOR-Nested-Token =
       JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token /
       CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token

   CBOR-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = bstr .cbor $$EAT-CBOR-Tagged-Token

   JSON-Token-Inside-CBOR-Token = tstr

8.4.3.  JSON-Specific CDDL

   EAT-JSON-Token = $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats

   $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= JWT-Message
   $$EAT-JSON-Token-Formats /= DEB-Untagged-Message

   Nested-Token = JSON-Nested-Token

   JSON-Nested-Token = [
      type : "JWT" / "CBOR" / "UJCS" / "DEB",
      nested-token : JWT-Message /
                  B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token /
                  DEB-JSON-Message
                     CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token /
                  UJCS-Message
                     Detached-EAT-Bundle
   ]

B64URL-Tagged-CBOR-Token = tstr .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"
iss-label = "iss"
sub-label = "sub"
aud-label = "aud"
exp-label

   CBOR-Token-Inside-JSON-Token = "exp"
nbf-label = "nbf"
iat-label = "iat"
cti-label = "cti"nonce-label /= "nonce"

ueid-label /= "ueid"
sueids-label /= "sueids"
oemid-label /= "oemid"
hardware-model-label /= "hwmodel"
hardware-version-label /= "hwversion"
security-level-label /= "seclevel"
secure-boot-label /= "secboot"
debug-status-label /= "dbgstat"
location-label /= "location"
profile-label /= "eat-profile"
uptime-label /= "uptime"
boot-seed-label /= "bootseed"
odometer-label /= "odometer"
intended-use-label /= "intuse"
dloas-label /= "dloas"
sw-name-label /= "swname"
sw-version-label /= "swversion"
manifests-label /= "manifests"
swevidence-label /= "swevidence"
swresults-label /= "swresults"
submods-label /= "submods"

latitude /= "lat"
longitude /= "long"
altitude /= "alt"
accuracy /= "accry"
altitude-accuracy /= "alt-accry"
heading /= "heading"
speed /= "speed" base64-url-text

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Reuse of CBOR and JSON Web Token (CWT and JWT) Claims Registries

   Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT and JWT so
   the CWT and JWT Claims Registries, [IANA.CWT.Claims] and
   [IANA.JWT.Claims], are re used.  No new IANA registry is created.

   All EAT claims defined in this document are placed in both
   registries.  All new EAT claims defined subsequently should be placed
   in both registries.

9.2.  Claim Characteristics

   The following is design guidance for creating new EAT claims,
   particularly those to be registered with IANA.

   Much of this guidance is generic and could also be considered when
   designing new CWT or JWT claims.

9.2.1.  Interoperability and Relying Party Orientation

   It is a broad goal that EATs can be processed by Relying Parties in a
   general way regardless of the type, manufacturer or technology of the
   device from which they originate.  It is a goal that there be
   general-purpose verification implementations that can verify tokens
   for large numbers of use cases with special cases and configurations
   for different device types.  This is a goal of interoperability of
   the semantics of claims themselves, not just of the signing, encoding
   and serialization formats.

   This is a lofty goal and difficult to achieve broadly requiring
   careful definition of claims in a technology neutral way.  Sometimes
   it will be difficult to design a claim that can represent the
   semantics of data from very different device types.  However, the
   goal remains even when difficult.

9.2.2.  Operating System and Technology Neutral

   Claims should be defined such that they are not specific to an
   operating system.  They should be applicable to multiple large high-
   level operating systems from different vendors.  They should also be
   applicable to multiple small embedded operating systems from multiple
   vendors and everything in between.

   Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a SW
   environment or programming language.

   Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a chip or
   particular hardware.  For example, they should not just be the
   contents of some HW status register as it is unlikely that the same
   HW status register with the same bits exists on a chip of a different
   manufacturer.

   The boot and debug state claims in this document are an example of a
   claim that has been defined in this neutral way.

9.2.3.  Security Level Neutral

   Many use cases will have EATs generated by some of the most secure
   hardware and software that exists.  Secure Elements and smart cards
   are examples of this.  However, EAT is intended for use in low-
   security use cases the same as high-security use case.  For example,
   an app on a mobile device may generate EATs on its own.

   Claims should be defined and registered on the basis of whether they
   are useful and interoperable, not based on security level.  In
   particular, there should be no exclusion of claims because they are
   just used only in low-security environments.

9.2.4.  Reuse of Extant Data Formats

   Where possible, claims should use already standardized data items,
   identifiers and formats.  This takes advantage of the expertise put
   into creating those formats and improves interoperability.

   Often extant claims will not be defined in an encoding or
   serialization format used by EAT.  It is preferred to define a CBOR
   and JSON format for them so that EAT implementations do not require a
   plethora of encoders and decoders for serialization formats.

   In some cases, it may be better to use the encoding and serialization
   as is.  For example, signed X.509 certificates and CRLs can be
   carried as-is in a byte string.  This retains interoperability with
   the extensive infrastructure for creating and processing X.509
   certificates and CRLs.

9.2.5.  Proprietary Claims

   EAT allows the definition and use of proprietary claims.

   For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with
   proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service
   offered by that device manufacturer.  This is a supported use case.

   In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious
   way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general
   standardized claims is preferred.

9.3.  Claims Registered by This Document

   This specification adds the following values to the "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry established by [RFC7519] and the "CBOR Web Token
   Claims Registry" established by [RFC8392].  Each entry below is an
   addition to both registries (except for the nonce claim which is
   already registered for JWT, but not registered for CWT).

   The "Claim Description", "Change Controller" and "Specification
   Documents" are common and equivalent for the JWT and CWT registries.
   The "Claim Key" and "Claim Value Types(s)" are for the CWT registry
   only.  The "Claim Name" is as defined for the CWT registry, not the
   JWT registry.  The "JWT Claim Name" is equivalent to the "Claim Name"
   in the JWT registry.

9.3.1.  Claims for Early Assignment

   RFC Editor: in the final publication this section should be combined
   with the following section as it will no longer be necessary to
   distinguish claims with early assignment.  Also, the following
   paragraph should be removed.

   The claims in this section have been (requested for / given) early
   assignment according to [RFC7120].  They have been assigned values
   and registered before final publication of this document.  While
   their semantics is not expected to change in final publication, it is
   possible that they will.  The JWT Claim Names and CWT Claim Keys are
   not expected to change.

   In draft -06 an early allocation was described.  The processing of
   that early allocation was never correctly completed.  This early
   allocation assigns different numbers for the CBOR claim labels.  This
   early allocation will presumably complete correctly

   o  Claim Name: Nonce

   o  Claim Description: Nonce

   o  JWT Claim Name: "nonce" (already registered for JWT)

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 10)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): [OpenIDConnectCore], *this document*

   o  Claim Name: UEID

   o  Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID

   o  JWT Claim Name: "ueid"

   o  CWT Claim Key: TBD (requested value 256)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: SUEIDs

   o  Claim Description: Semi-permanent UEIDs

   o  JWT Claim Name: "sueids"

   o  CWT Claim Key: TBD (requested value 257)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Hardware OEMID

   o  Claim Description: Hardware OEM ID

   o  JWT Claim Name: "oemid"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested (requeste value 258)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string or integer

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Hardware Model

   o  Claim Description: Model identifier for hardware

   o  JWT Claim Name: "hwmodel"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 259)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): byte string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Hardware Version

   o  Claim Description: Hardware Version Identifier

   o  JWT Claim Name: "hwversion"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 260)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): array

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Secure Boot

   o  Claim Description: Indicate whether the boot was secure
   o  JWT Claim Name: "secboot"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 262) 262

   o  Claim Value Type(s): Boolean

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Debug Status

   o  Claim Description: Indicate status of debug facilities

   o  JWT Claim Name: "dbgstat"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 263) 263

   o  Claim Value Type(s): integer or string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Location

   o  Claim Description: The geographic location

   o  JWT Claim Name: "location"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 264)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Profile

   o  Claim Description: Indicates the EAT profile followed

   o  JWT Claim Name: "eat_profile"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 265)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): URI or OID
   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Submodules Section

   o  Claim Description: The section containing submodules

   o  JWT Claim Name: "submods"

   o  Claim Key: TBD (requested value 266)

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

9.3.2.  To be Assigned Claims

   (Early assignment is NOT requested for these claims.  Implementers
   should be aware they may change)

   o  Claim Name: Security Level

   o  Claim Description: Characterization of the security of an Attester
      or submodule

   o  JWT Claim Name: "seclevel"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): integer or string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Uptime

   o  Claim Description: Uptime

   o  JWT Claim Name: "uptime"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): unsigned integer
   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Boot Seed

   o  Claim Description: Identifies a boot cycle

   o  JWT Claim Name: "bootseed"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): bytes

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: Intended Use

   o  Claim Description: Indicates intended use of the EAT

   o  JWT Claim Name: "intuse"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): integer or string

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: DLOAs

   o  Claim Description: Certifications received as Digital Letters of
      Approval

   o  JWT Claim Name: "dloas"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): array

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: SW Name
   o  Claim Description: The name of the SW running in the entity

   o  JWT Claim Name: "swname"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: SW Version

   o  Claim Description: The version of SW running in the entity

   o  JWT Claim Name: "swversion"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): map

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: SW Manifests

   o  Claim Description: Manifests describing the SW installed on the
      entity

   o  JWT Claim Name: "manifests"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): array

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: SW Evidence

   o  Claim Description: Measurements of the SW, memory configuration
      and such on the entity

   o  JWT Claim Name: "swevidence"
   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): array

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

   o  Claim Name: SW Measurment Results

   o  Claim Description: The results of comparing SW measurements to
      reference values

   o  JWT Claim Name: "swresults"

   o  Claim Key: TBD

   o  Claim Value Type(s): array

   o  Change Controller: IESG

   o  Specification Document(s): *this document*

9.3.3.  Version Schemes Registered by this Document

   IANA is requested to register a new value in the "Software Tag
   Version Scheme Values" established by [CoSWID].

   The new value is a version scheme a 13-digit European Article Number
   [EAN-13].  An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article Number
   or most commonly as a bar code.  This version scheme is the ASCII
   text representation of EAN-13 digits, the same ones often printed
   with a bar code.  This version scheme must comply with the EAN
   allocation and assignment rules.  For example, this requires the
   manufacturer to obtain a manufacture code from GS1.

              +-------+---------------------+---------------+
              | Index | Version Scheme Name | Specification |
              +-------+---------------------+---------------+
              | 5     | ean-13              | This document |
              +-------+---------------------+---------------+

9.3.4.  UEID URN Registered by this Document

   IANA is requested to register the following new subtypes in the "DEV
   URN Subtypes" registry under "Device Identification".  See [RFC9039].

   +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
   | Subtype | Description                             | Reference     |
   +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
   | ueid    | Universal Entity Identifier             | This document |
   | sueid   | Semi-permanent Universal Entity         | This document |
   |         | Identifier                              |               |
   +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+

9.3.5.  Tag for Detached EAT Bundle

   In the registry [IANA.cbor-tags], IANA is requested to allocate the
   following tag from the FCFS space, with the present document as the
   specification reference.

          +--------+------------+-------------------------------+
          | Tag    | Data Items | Semantics                     |
          +--------+------------+-------------------------------+
          | TBD602 | array      | Detached EAT Bundle Section 5 |
          +--------+------------+-------------------------------+

10.  Privacy Considerations

   Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and
   therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-
   preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT.
   Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT's
   provided to unauthenticated consumers.

10.1.  UEID and SUEID Privacy Considerations

   A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving.  Any set of Relying Parties
   that receives tokens that happen to be from a particular entity will
   be able to know the tokens are all from the same entity and be able
   to track it.

   Thus, in many usage situations UEID violates governmental privacy
   regulation.  In other usage situations a UEID will not be allowed for
   certain products like browsers that give privacy for the end user.
   It will often be the case that tokens will not have a UEID for these
   reasons.

   An SUEID is also usually not privacy-preserving.  In some cases it
   may have fewer privacy issues than a UEID depending on when and how
   and when it is generated.

   There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put
   UEIDs and SUEIDs in tokens:

   o  The entity obtains explicit permission from the user of the entity
      to use the UEID/SUEID.  This may be through a prompt.  It may also
      be through a license agreement.  For example, agreements for some
      online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a
      UEID/SUEID.

   o  The UEID/SUEID is used only in a particular context or particular
      use case.  It is used only by one Relying Party.

   o  The entity authenticates the Relying Party and generates a derived
      UEID/SUEID just for that particular Relying Party.  For example,
      the Relying Party could prove their identity cryptographically to
      the entity, then the entity generates a UEID just for that Relying
      Party by hashing a proofed Relying Party ID with the main entity
      UEID/SUEID.

   Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in
   multiple UEIDs and SUEIDs per entity.  Each UEID/SUEID is used in a
   different context, use case or system on the entity.  However, from
   the view of the Relying Party, there is just one UEID and it is still
   globally universal across manufacturers.

10.2.  Location Privacy Considerations

   Geographic location is most always considered personally identifiable
   information.  Implementers should consider laws and regulations
   governing the transmission of location data from end user devices to
   servers and services.  Implementers should consider using location
   management facilities offered by the operating system on the entity
   generating the attestation.  For example, many mobile phones prompt
   the user for permission when before sending location data.

10.3.  Replay Protection and Privacy

   EAT offers 2 primary mechanisms for token replay protection (also
   sometimes known as token "freshness"): the cti/jti claim and the
   nonce claim.  The cti/jti claim in a CWT/JWT is a field that may be
   optionally included in the EAT and is in general derived on the same
   device in which the entity is instantiated.  The nonce claim is based
   on a value that is usually derived remotely (outside of the entity).
   These claims can be used to extract and convey personally-identifying
   information either inadvertently or by intention.  For instance, an
   implementor may choose a cti that is equivalent to a username
   associated with the device (e.g., account login).  If the token is
   inspected by a 3rd-party then this information could be used to
   identify the source of the token or an account associated with the
   token (e.g., if the account name is used to derive the nonce).  In
   order to avoid the conveyance of privacy-related information in
   either the cti/jti or nonce claims, these fields should be derived
   using a salt that originates from a true and reliable random number
   generator or any other source of randomness that would still meet the
   target system requirements for replay protection.

11.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations provided in Section 8 of [RFC8392] and
   Section 11 of [RFC7519] apply to EAT in its CWT and JWT form,
   respectively.  In addition, implementors should consider the
   following.

11.1.  Key Provisioning

   Private key material can be used to sign and/or encrypt the EAT, or
   can be used to derive the keys used for signing and/or encryption.
   In some instances, the manufacturer of the entity may create the key
   material separately and provision the key material in the entity
   itself.  The manfuacturer of any entity that is capable of producing
   an EAT should take care to ensure that any private key material be
   suitably protected prior to provisioning the key material in the
   entity itself.  This can require creation of key material in an
   enclave (see [RFC4949] for definition of "enclave"), secure
   transmission of the key material from the enclave to the entity using
   an appropriate protocol, and persistence of the private key material
   in some form of secure storage to which (preferably) only the entity
   has access.

11.1.1.  Transmission of Key Material

   Regarding transmission of key material from the enclave to the
   entity, the key material may pass through one or more intermediaries.
   Therefore some form of protection ("key wrapping") may be necessary.
   The transmission itself may be performed electronically, but can also
   be done by human courier.  In the latter case, there should be
   minimal to no exposure of the key material to the human (e.g.
   encrypted portable memory).  Moreover, the human should transport the
   key material directly from the secure enclave where it was created to
   a destination secure enclave where it can be provisioned.

11.2.  Transport Security

   As stated in Section 8 of [RFC8392], "The security of the CWT relies
   upon on the protections offered by COSE".  Similar considerations
   apply to EAT when sent as a CWT.  However, EAT introduces the concept
   of a nonce to protect against replay.  Since an EAT may be created by
   an entity that may not support the same type of transport security as
   the consumer of the EAT, intermediaries may be required to bridge
   communications between the entity and consumer.  As a result, it is
   RECOMMENDED that both the consumer create a nonce, and the entity
   leverage the nonce along with COSE mechanisms for encryption and/or
   signing to create the EAT.

   Similar considerations apply to the use of EAT as a JWT.  Although
   the security of a JWT leverages the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and
   JSON Web Signature (JWS) specifications, it is still recommended to
   make use of the EAT nonce.

11.3.  Multiple EAT Consumers

   In many cases, more than one EAT consumer may be required to fully
   verify the entity attestation.  Examples include individual consumers
   for nested EATs, or consumers for individual claims with an EAT.
   When multiple consumers are required for verification of an EAT, it
   is important to minimize information exposure to each consumer.  In
   addition, the communication between multiple consumers should be
   secure.

   For instance, consider the example of an encrypted and signed EAT
   with multiple claims.  A consumer may receive the EAT (denoted as the
   "receiving consumer"), decrypt its payload, verify its signature, but
   then pass specific subsets of claims to other consumers for
   evaluation ("downstream consumers").  Since any COSE encryption will
   be removed by the receiving consumer, the communication of claim
   subsets to any downstream consumer should leverage a secure protocol
   (e.g.one that uses transport-layer security, i.e. TLS),

   However, assume the EAT of the previous example is hierarchical and
   each claim subset for a downstream consumer is created in the form of
   a nested EAT.  Then transport security between the receiving and
   downstream consumers is not strictly required.  Nevertheless,
   downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to
   the EAT they are consuming.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [CoSWID]   Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
              Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", draft-
              ietf-sacm-coswid-20
              ietf-sacm-coswid-21 (work in progress), January March 2022.

   [DLOA]     "Digital Letter of Approval", November 2015,
              <https://globalplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
              GPC_DigitalLetterOfApproval_v1.0.pdf>.

   [EAN-13]   GS1, "International Article Number - EAN/UPC barcodes",
              2019, <https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>.

   [FIDO.AROE]
              The FIDO Alliance, "FIDO Authenticator Allowed Restricted
              Operating Environments List", November 2020,
              <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-security-
              requirements/fido-authenticator-allowed-restricted-
              operating-environments-list-v1.2-fd-20201102.html>.

   [IANA.cbor-tags]
              "IANA CBOR Tags Registry", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags/cbor-
              tags.xhtml>.

   [IANA.CWT.Claims]
              IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.

   [IANA.JWT.Claims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token (JWT) Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.

   [OpenIDConnectCore]
              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., Medeiros, B. D., and
              C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
              errata set 1", November 2014,
              <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.

   [PEN]      "Private Enterprise Number (PEN) Request", n.d.,
              <https://pen.iana.org/pen/PenApplication.page>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7516]  Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
              RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8392]  Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
              "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
              May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [RFC8747]  Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
              Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

   [RFC9090]  Bormann, C., "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)
              Tags for Object Identifiers", RFC 9090,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9090, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9090>.

   [ThreeGPP.IMEI]
              3GPP, "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical
              Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering,
              addressing and identification", 2019,
              <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
              SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.

   [UCCS.Draft]
              Birkholz, H., O'Donoghue, J., Cam-Winget, N., and C.
              Bormann, "A CBOR Tag for Unprotected CWT Claims Sets",
              draft-ietf-rats-uccs-02 (work in progress), January 2022. Numbering,
              addressing and identification", 2019,
              <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
              SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=729>.

   [WGS84]    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), "WORLD
              GEODETIC SYSTEM 1984, NGA.STND.0036_1.0.0_WGS84", July
              2014, <https://earth-info.nga.mil/php/
              download.php?file=coord-wgs84>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [BirthdayAttack]
              "Birthday attack",
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack.>.

   [CBOR.Cert.Draft]
              Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Hoeglund, J., and
              M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509
              Certificates)", draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-03 (work
              in progress), January 2022.

   [Common.Criteria]
              "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
              Evaluation", April 2017,
              <https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/>.

   [COSE.X509.Draft]
              Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Header parameters for carrying and referencing X.509
              certificates", draft-ietf-cose-x509-08 (work in progress),
              December 2020.

   [FIPS-140]
              National Institue of Standards, "Security Requirements for
              Cryptographic Modules", May 2001,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/
              final>.

   [IEEE.802-2001]
              "IEEE Standard For Local And Metropolitan Area Networks
              Overview And Architecture", 2007,
              <https://webstore.ansi.org/standards/ieee/
              ieee8022001r2007>.

   [IEEE.802.1AR]
              "IEEE Standard, "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier"",
              December 2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
              standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

   [IEEE.RA]  "IEEE Registration Authority",
              <https://standards.ieee.org/products-services/regauth/
              index.html>.

   [OUI.Guide]
              "Guidelines for Use of Extended Unique Identifier (EUI),
              Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), and Company ID
              (CID)", August 2017,
              <https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-
              standards/standards/web/documents/tutorials/eui.pdf>.

   [OUI.Lookup]
              "IEEE Registration Authority Assignments",
              <https://regauth.standards.ieee.org/standards-ra-web/pub/
              view.html#registries>.

   [RATS.Architecture]
              Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture",
              draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15 (work in progress),
              February 2022.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.

   [RFC4422]  Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
              Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4422>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC7120]  Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
              Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, DOI 10.17487/RFC7120, January
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7120>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9039]  Arkko, J., Jennings, C., and Z. Shelby, "Uniform Resource
              Names Z. Shelby, "Uniform Resource
              Names for Device Identifiers", RFC 9039,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9039, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9039>.

   [W3C.GeoLoc]
              Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
              2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
              geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.

Appendix A.  Examples

   Most examples are shown as just a Claims-Set that would be a payload
   for a CWT, JWT, DEB or future token types.  It is shown this way
   because the payload is all the claims, the most interesting part and
   showing full tokens makes it harder to show the claims.

   Some examples of full tokens are also given.

   WARNING: These examples use tag and label numbers not yet assigned by
   IANA.

A.1.  Payload Examples

A.1.1.  Simple TEE Attestation

   This is a simple attestation of a TEE that includes a manifest that
   is a payload CoSWID to describe the TEE's software.

   / This is an EAT payload that describes a simple TEE. /

   {
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted /
       / secure-boot /    262: true,
       / debug-status /   263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
       / manfests /       273: [
                              [
                                  121, / CoAP Content ID. A     /
                                       / made up one until one  /
                                       / is assigned for CoSWID /

                                  / This is byte-string wrapped      /
                                  / payload CoSWID. It gives the TEE /
                                  / software name, the version and   /
                                  / the  name of the file it is in.  /
                                  / {0: "3a24",                      /
                                  /  12: 1,                          /
                                  /   1: "Acme TEE OS",              /
                                  /  13: "3.1.4",                    /
                                  /   2: [{31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 1}, /
                                  /       {31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 2}], /
                                  /   6: {                           /
                                  /       17: {                      /
                                  /           24: "acme_tee_3.exe"   /
                                  /       }                          /
                                  /    }                             /
                                  /  }                               /
                                  h' a60064336132340c01016b
                                     41636d6520544545204f530d65332e31
                                     2e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545
                                     204f53182101a2181f6b41636d652054
                                     4545204f5318210206a111a118186e61
                                     636d655f7465655f332e657865'
                               ]
                           ]
   }
   / A payload CoSWID created by the SW vendor. All this really does /
   / is name the TEE SW, its version and lists the one file that     /
   / makes up the TEE. /

   1398229316({
       / Unique CoSWID ID /    0: "3a24",
       / tag-version /        12: 1,
       / software-name /       1: "Acme TEE OS",
       / software-version /   13: "3.1.4",
       / entity /              2: [
                                      {
           / entity-name /                31: "Acme TEE OS",
           / role        /                33: 1 / tag-creator /
                                      },
                                      {
           / entity-name /                31: "Acme TEE OS",
           / role        /                33: 2 / software-creator /
                                      }
                                  ],
       / payload /                6: {
           / ...file /                17: {
               / ...fs-name /             24: "acme_tee_3.exe"
                                      }
                                  }
   })

A.1.2.  Submodules for Board and Device Identifiers", RFC 9039,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9039, June 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9039>.

   [W3C.GeoLoc]
              Worldwide Web Consortium, "Geolocation API Specification
              2nd Edition", January 2018, <https://www.w3.org/TR/
              geolocation-API/#coordinates_interface>.

Appendix A.  Examples

   These examples are either UCCS, shown as CBOR diagnostic, or UJCS
   messages.  Full CWT
/ This example shows use of submodules to give information  /
/ about the chip, board and JWT examples overall device.                 /
/                                                           /
/ The main attestation is associated with signing the chip with the /
/ CPU and encryption are
   not given.

   All UCCS examples can be running the payload of a CWT.  To do so, they must
   be converted from main OS. It is what has the keys and  /
/ produces the UCCS message to token.                                       /
/                                                           /
/ The board is made by a Claims-Set, which different vendor than the chip.    /
/ Perhaps it is achieve some generic IoT board.                     /
/                                                           /
/ The device is some specific appliance that is made by "removing" a   /
/ different vendor than either the tag.

   UJCS messages can be directly used chip or the board.       /
/                                                           /
/ Here the board and device submodules aren't the typical   /
/ target environments as described by the payload of RATS architecture /
/ document, but they are a JWT.

   WARNING: These examples valid use tag and label numbers not yet assigned of submodules.         /

{
    / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
    / UEID /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
    / HW OEM ID /      258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID /
    / HW Model ID /    259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8'
                              / Hash of chip model name /,
    / HW Version /     260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipartnumeric version /
    / SW Name /        271: "Acme OS",
    / SW Version /     272: ["3.5.5", 1],
    / secure-boot /    262: true,
    / debug-status /   263: 3, / permanent-disable  /
    / timestamp (iat) /  6: 1526542894,
    / security-level / 261: 2, / restricted OS /
    / submods / 266: {
        / A submodule to hold some claims about the circuit board /
        "board" :  {
            / HW OEM ID /   258: h'9bef8787eba13e2c8f6e7cb4b1f4619a',
            / HW Model ID / 259: h'ee80f5a66c1fb9742999a8fdab930893'
                                      / Hash of board module name /,
            / HW Version /  260: ["2.0a", 2] / multipartnumeric+suffix /
        },

        / A submodule to hold claims about the overall device /
        "device" :  {
            / HW OEM ID /   258: 61234, / PEN Format OEM ID /
            / HW Version /  260: ["4012345123456", 5] / EAN-13 format (barcode) /
        }
    }
}
A.1.3.  EAT Produced by
   IANA.

A.1.  Simple TEE Attestation Hardware Block

   / This is a simple attestation an example of a TEE that includes a manifest that
   is token produced by a payload CoSWID HW block            /
   / purpose-built for attestation.  Only the nonce claim changes    /
   / from one attestation to describe the TEE's software. next as the rest  either come       /
   / directly from the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory /
   / (e.g. a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte  /
   / UEID). /

   {
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / UEID /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / OEMID /          258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
       / security-level / 261: 3, / hardware level security /
       / secure-boot /    262: true,
       / debug-status /   263: 3, / disabled-permanently /
       / HW version /     260: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric /
   }

A.1.4.  Key / Key Store Attestation
   / This is a UCCS an EAT payload that describes a simple TEE. /

   601({

   {
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / security-level / 261: 3, 2, / secure-restricted restricted /
       / secure-boot /    262: true,
       / debug-status /   263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
       / manfests /       273: [
                              [
                                  121, / CoAP Content ID. A     /
                                       / made up one until one  /
                                       / is assigned for CoSWID /

                                  / This is byte-string wrapped      /
                                  / payload CoSWID. It gives the TEE /
                                  / software name, the version and   /
                                  / the  name of the file it is in.  /
                                  / {0: "3a24",                      /
                                  /  12: 1,                          /
                                  /   1: "Acme TEE OS",              /
                                  /  13: "3.1.4",                    /
                                  /   2: [{31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 1}, /
                                  /       {31: "Acme TEE OS", 33: 2}], /
                                  /   6: {                           /
                                  /       17: {                      /
                                  /           24: "acme_tee_3.exe"   /
                                  /       }                          /
                                  /    }                             /
                                  /  }                               /
                                  h' da53574944a60064336132340c01016b a60064336132340c01016b
                                     41636d6520544545204f530d65332e31
                                     2e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545
                                     204f53182101a2181f6b41636d652054
                                     4545204f5318210206a111a118186e61
                                     636d655f7465655f332e657865'
                               ]
   })
                           ]
   }
   / A payload CoSWID created by the SW vendor. All this really does /
   / is name the TEE SW, its version and lists the one file that     /
   / makes up the TEE. /

   1398229316({
       / Unique CoSWID ID /    0: "3a24",
       / tag-version /        12: 1,
       / software-name /       1: "Acme TEE OS",
       / software-version /   13: "3.1.4",
       / entity /              2: [
                                      {
           / entity-name /                31: "Acme TEE OS",
           / role        /                33: 1 / tag-creator /
                                      },
                                      {
           / entity-name /                31: "Acme TEE OS",
           / role        /                33: 2 / software-creator /
                                      }
                                  ],
       / payload /                6: {
           / ...file /                17: {
               / ...fs-name /             24: "acme_tee_3.exe"
                                      }
                                  }
   })

A.2.

A.1.5.  Submodules for Board and Device
/ This example shows use of submodules to give information  /
/ about the chip, board and overall device.                 /
/                                                           /
/ The main attestation is associated with the chip with the /
/ CPU and running the main OS. It is what has the keys and  /
/ produces the token.                                       /
/                                                           /
/ The board is made by a different vendor than the chip.    /
/ Perhaps it is some generic IoT board.                     /
/                                                           /
/ The device is some specific appliance that is made by a   /
/ different vendor than either the chip or the board.       /
/                                                           /
/ Here the board and device submodules aren't the typical   /
/ target environments as described by the RATS architecture /
/ document, but they are a valid use of submodules.         /

{
    / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
    / UEID /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
    / HW OEM ID /      258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID /
    / HW Model ID /    259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8'
                              / Hash of chip model name /,
    / HW Version /     260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipartnumeric version /
    / SW Name /        271: "Acme OS",
    / SW Version /     272: ["3.5.5", 1],
    / secure-boot /    262: true,
    / debug-status /   263: 3, / permanent-disable  /
    / timestamp (iat) /  6: 1526542894,
    / security-level / 261: 3, 2, / secure restricted OS /
    / submods / 266: {
        / A submodule to hold some claims about the circuit board /
        "board" :  {
            / HW OEM ID /   258: h'9bef8787eba13e2c8f6e7cb4b1f4619a',
            / HW Model ID / 259: h'ee80f5a66c1fb9742999a8fdab930893'
                                      / Hash of board module name /,
            / HW Version /  260: ["2.0a", 2] / multipartnumeric+suffix /
        },

        / A submodule to hold claims about the overall device /
        "device" :  {
            / HW OEM ID /   258: 61234, / PEN Format OEM ID /
            / HW Version HW Version /  260: ["4012345123456", 5] / EAN-13 format (barcode) /
        }
    }
}
A.1.6.  EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block

   / This is an example of a token produced by a HW block            /
   / purpose-built for attestation.  Only the nonce claim changes    /
   / from one attestation to the next as the rest  either come       /
   / directly from the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory /
   / (e.g. a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte  /
   / UEID). /

   {
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / UEID /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / OEMID /          258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
       / security-level / 261: 3, / hardware level security /
       / secure-boot /    262: true,
       / debug-status /   263: 3, / disabled-permanently /
       / HW version /     260: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric /
   }

A.1.7.  Key / Key Store Attestation

   / This is an attestation of a public key and the key store     /
   / implementation that protects and manages it. The key store   /
   / implementation is in a security-oriented execution           /
   / environment separate from the high-level OS, for example a   /
   / TEE. The key store is the Attester.                          /
   /                                                              /
   / There is some attestation of the high-level OS, just version /
   / and boot & debug status. It is a Claims-Set submodule because/
   / it has lower security level than the key store. The key      /
   / store's implementation has access to info about the HLOS, so /
   / it is able to include it.                                    /  260: ["4012345123456", 5]
   / EAN-13 format (barcode)                                                              /
        }
    }
}
A.3.  EAT Produced by Attestation Hardware Block
   / This is A key and an example indication of a token produced by a HW block            /
   / purpose-built for attestation.  Only the nonce claim changes user authentication given to  /
   / from one attestation allow access to the next as the rest  either come key is given. The labels for these are   /
   / directly from in the hardware or from one-time-programmable memory private space since this is just a hypothetical       /
   / (e.g. example, not part of a fuse). 47 bytes encoded in CBOR (8 byte nonce, 16 byte standard protocol.                    /
   / UEID).                                                              /

   601({
   / This is similar to Android Key Attestation.                  /

   {
       / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / UEID /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / OEMID /          258: 64242, / Private Enterprise Number /
       / security-level / 261: 4, 2, / hardware level security restricted /
       / secure-boot /    262: true,
       / debug-status /   263: 3, / disabled-permanently /
       / HW version /     260: [ "3.1", 1 ] / Type is multipartnumeric /
   })

A.4.  Detached EAT Bundle

   In this DEB main token is produced by a HW attestation block.  The
   detached Claims-Set is produced by a TEE and is largely identical to
   the Simple TEE examples above.  The TEE digests its Claims-Set and
   feeds that digest to the HW block.

   In a better example the attestation produced by the HW block would be
   a CWT and thus signed and secured by the HW block.  Since the
   signature covers the digest from the TEE that Claims-Set is also
   secured.

   The DEB itself can be assembled by untrusted SW. 2, / This is a detached EAT bundle (DEB) tag. disabled-since-boot /

   602([
       / First part is a full EAT token with claims like nonce and manifests /      273: [

                                   [ 121, / CoAP Content ID. A      /
                                          / made up one until one   /
                                          / UEID. Most importantly, it includes a submodule that is a assigned for CoSWID  /
                                     h'a600683762623334383766
                                       0c000169436172626f6e6974650d6331
                                       2e320e0102a2181f75496e6475737472
                                       69616c204175746f6d6174696f6e1821
                                       02'
                                    ]
                                    / detached digest which Above is the hash of the "TEE" claims set an encoded CoSWID     /
                                    / in with the next section. following data        /
                                    /   SW Name: "Carbonite"         /
                                    / This token here is in UCCS format (unsigned). In a more   SW Vers: "1.2"               /
                                    / realistic example, it would be a signed CWT.   SW Creator:                  /
                                    /      "Industrial Automation"   /
                               ],
       / expiration /       4: 1634324274, / 2021-10-15T18:57:54Z /
       / creation time /    6: 1634317080, /
       h'd90259a80a48948f8860d13a463e190100500198
       f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea19010219faf2
       19010504190106f5190107031901048263332e31
       0119010aa163544545822f5820e5cf95fd24fab7
       1446742dd58d43dae178e55fe2b94291a9291082
       ffc2635a0b', 2021-10-15T16:58:00Z /
                      -80000 : "fingerprint",
                      -80001 : { / The key -- A CBOR-encoded byte-string wrapped EAT claims-set. It COSE_Key  /
                   / contains claims suitable for a TEE kty /
          "TEE" : h'a50a48948f8860d13a463e19010503190106f519
                    01070219011181585dda53574944a60064336132
                    340c01016b41636d6520544545204f530d65332e
                    312e340282a2181f6b41636d6520544545204f53
                    182101a2181f6b41636d6520544545204f531821
                    0206a111a118186e61636d655f7465655f332e65
                    7865'
       }
    ])       1: 2, / This example contains submodule that is a detached digest, EC2, eliptic curve with x & y /
                   / which is the hash of a Claims-Set convey outside this token. kid /       2: h'36675c206f96236c3f51f54637b94ced',
                   / Other than that is curve /    -1: 2, / curve is the other example of a token from an P-256 /
                   / attestation HW block x-coord /  -2: h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a
                                      10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c08551d',
                   / y-coord /  -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3d
                                      c9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c'
                },

       / submods /        266 : {
                              "HLOS" : { / submod for high-level OS /

   601({
            / nonce /             10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
              / UEID security-level /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea', 261: 1, / OEMID unrestricted /          258: 64242,
              / Private Enterprise Number secure-boot /    262: true,
              / security-level manifests / 261: 4,      273: [
                                   [ 121, / hardware level security CoAP Content ID. A      /
                                          / secure-boot made up one until one   /    262: true,
                                          / debug-status is assigned for CoSWID  /   263: 3,
                                       h'a600687337
                                         6537346b78380c000168
                                         44726f6964204f530d65
                                         52322e44320e0302a218
                                         1F75496E647573747269
                                         616c204175746f6d6174
                                         696f6e182102'
                                     ]
                                     / disabled-permanently Above is an encoded CoSWID /
                                     / hw version with the following data:   /     260: [ "3.1", 1 ],
                                     / multipartnumeric   SW Name: "Droid OS"      /
                                     / submods/         266: {
                                   "TEE": [   SW Vers: "R2.D2"         / detached digest submod
                                     /
                                       -16,   SW Creator:              / SHA-256
                                     /
                                       h'e5cf95fd24fab7144674
                                         2dd58d43dae178e55fe2
                                         b94291a9291082ffc2635
                                         a0b'     "Industrial Automation"/
                                  ]
                              }
   })

A.5.  Key / Key Store Attestation

   /
                          }
   }

A.1.8.  SW Measurements of an IoT Device

   This is an attestation of a public key and the key store     /
   / implementation simple token that protects might be for and manages it. IoT device.  It includes
   CoSWID format measurments of the SW.  The key store   /
   / implementation CoSWID is in a security-oriented execution           /
   / environment separate from byte-string
   wrapped in the high-level OS, token and also shown in diagnostic form.

  / This EAT payload is for example an IoT device with a TEE. The attestation /
  / is produced by the TEE. The key store There is a submodule for the Attester.                          /
   / IoT OS (the  /
  / There is some attestation main OS of the high-level OS, just version IoT device that is not as secure as the TEE). The  /
  / and boot & debug status. It is a Claims-Set submodule because/
   / it has lower security level than contains claims for the key store. IoT OS. The key TEE also measures   /
  / store's implementation has access to info about the HLOS, so / IoT OS and puts the measurements in the submodule.            / it is able to include it.

  {
      / nonce /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
      / security-level / A key and an indication of the user authentication given to 261: 2, / restricted / allow access to the key is given. The labels for these are
      / secure-boot / in the private space since this is just a hypothetical    262: true,
      / debug-status / example, not part of a standard protocol.   263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
      / OEMID / This is similar to Android Key Attestation.          258: h'8945ad', /

   601({ IEEE CID based / nonce
      /           10: h'948f8860d13a463e', UEID /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
      / sumods /         266: {
                              "OS" : {
          / security-level /     261: 3, 2, / secure-restricted restricted /
          / secure-boot /        262: true,
          / debug-status /       263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
          / manifests swevidence /      273:         274: [
                                   h'da53574944a600683762623334383766
                                     0c000169436172626f6e6974650d6331
                                     2e320e0102a2181f75496e6475737472
                                     69616c204175746f6d6174696f6e1821
                                     02'
                                     [
                                         121, / CoAP Content ID. A     /
                                              / made up one until one  /
                                              / Above is an encoded assigned for CoSWID /

                                      / with This is a byte-string wrapped /
                                      / evidence CoSWID. It has       /
                                      / hashes of the following data main files of   /
                                      /   SW Name: "Carbonite" the IoT OS.  /
                                      h'a600663463613234350c
                                        17016d41636d6520522d496f542d4f
                                        530d65332e312e3402a2181f724163
                                        6d6520426173652041747465737465
                                        7218210103a11183a318187161636d
                                        655f725f696f745f6f732e65786514
                                        1a0044b349078201582005f6b327c1
                                        73b4192bd2c3ec248a292215eab456
                                        611bf7a783e25c1782479905a31818
                                        6d7265736f75726365732e72736314
                                        1a000c38b10782015820c142b9aba4
                                        280c4bb8c75f716a43c99526694caa
                                        be529571f5569bb7dc542f98a31818
                                        6a636f6d6d6f6e2e6c6962141a0023
                                        3d3b0782015820a6a9dcdfb3884da5
                                        f884e4e1e8e8629958c2dbc7027414
                                        43a913e34de9333be6'
                                      ]
                                  ]
                              }
                          }
  }

   / An evidence CoSWID created for the "Acme R-IoT-OS" created by /   SW Vers: "1.2"
   / the "Acme Base Attester" (both fictious names).  It provides  /
   / measurements of the SW Creator: (other than the attester SW) on the    /
   /      "Industrial Automation" device. /
                               ],

   1398229316({
       / expiration Unique CoSWID ID /       4: 1634324274,    0: "4ca245",
       / 2021-10-15T18:57:54Z tag-version /        12: 23, / creation time Attester-maintained counter /    6: 1634317080,
       / 2021-10-15T16:58:00Z software-name /
                      -80000 : "fingerprint",
                      -80001 :       1: "Acme R-IoT-OS",
       / software-version /   13: "3.1.4",
       / entity /              2: {
           / The key -- A COSE_Key entity-name /        31: "Acme Base Attester",
           / kty role        /       1: 2,        33: 1 / EC2, eliptic curve with x & y tag-creator /
                               },
       / evidence /            3: {
           / ...file /             17: [
                                       {
               / kid ...fs-name /       2: h'36675c206f96236c3f51f54637b94ced',              24: "acme_r_iot_os.exe",
               / curve ...size    /    -1: 2,              20: 4502345,
               / curve is P-256 ...hash    /               7: [
                                                1, / x-coord SHA-256 /  -2: h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a
                                      10aaa375e1bb5b5de108de439c08551d',
                                                h'05f6b327c173b419
                                                  2bd2c3ec248a2922
                                                  15eab456611bf7a7
                                                  83e25c1782479905'
                                            ]
                                       },
                                       {
               / y-coord ...fs-name /  -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3d
                                      c9ba860af7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c'
                },              24: "resources.rsc",
               / submods ...size    /        266 : {
                              "HLOS" : {              20: 800945,
               / submod for high-level OS ...hash    /               7: [
                                                 1, / nonce SHA-256 /             10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
                                                h'c142b9aba4280c4b
                                                  b8c75f716a43c995
                                                  26694caabe529571
                                                  f5569bb7dc542f98'
                                            ]
                                       },
                                       {
               / security-level ...fs-name / 261: 1,              24: "common.lib",
               / unrestricted ...size    /              20: 2309435,
               / secure-boot ...hash    /    262: true,               7: [
                                                1, / manifests SHA-256 /      273:
                                                h'a6a9dcdfb3884da5
                                                  f884e4e1e8e86299
                                                  58c2dbc702741443
                                                  a913e34de9333be6'
                                            ]
                                       }
                                   ]
                               }
   })

A.1.9.  Attestation Results in JSON format

   This is a JSON-format payload that might be the output of a Verifier
   that evaluated the IoT Attestation example immediately above.

   This particular Verifier knows enough about the TEE Attester to be
   able to pass claims like security level directly through to the
   Relying Party.  The Verifier also knows the Reference Values for the
   measured SW components and is able to check them.  It informs the
   Relying Party that they were correct in the swresults claim.
   "Trustus Verifications" is the name of the services that verifies the
   SW component measurements.

   {
       "eat_nonce" : "jkd8KL-8=Qlzg4",
       "seclevel" : "restricted",
       "secboot" :  true,
       "dbgstat" :  "disabled-since-boot",
       "oemid" :    "iUWt",
       "ueid" :     "AZj1Ck_2wFhhyIYNE6Y4",
       "swname" :   "Acme R-IoT-OS",
       "swversion" : [
                                       h'da53574944a600687337
                                         6537346b78380c000168
                                         44726f6964204f530d65
                                         52322e44320e0302a218
                                         1F75496E647573747269
                                         616c204175746f6d6174
                                         696f6e182102'
               "3.1.4"
           ],
       "measres" : [
           [
               "Trustus Measurements",
               [
                   [ "all" , "success" ]
               ]
          ]
       ]
   }

A.1.10.  JSON-encoded Token with Sumodules
{
    "eat_nonce": "lI-IYNE6Rj6O",
    "ueid":     "AJj1Ck_2wFhhyIYNE6Y46g==",
    "secboot":  true,
    "dbgstat":  "disabled-permanently",
    "iat":      1526542894,
    "seclevel": "restricted",
    "submods": {
        "Android App Foo" :  {
            "seclevel": "unrestricted"
        },

        "Secure Element Eat" : [
            "CBOR",
            "2D3ShEOhASagWGaoCkiUj4hg0TpGPhkBAFABmPUKT_bAWGHIhg0TpjjqGQECGfryGQEFBBkBBvUZAQcDGQEEgmMzLjEBGQEKoWNURUWCL1gg5c-V_ST6txRGdC3VjUPa4XjlX-K5QpGpKRCC_8JjWgtYQPaQywOIZ3-mJKN3X9fLxOhAnsmBa-MvpHRzOw-Ywn-67bvJljuctezAPD41s6_At7NbSV3qwJlxIuqGfwe41es="
        ],

        "Linux Android": {
            "seclevel": "unrestricted"
        },

        "Subsystem J": [
            "JWT",
            "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJKLUF0dGVzdGVyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjUxNzc0ODY4LCJleHAiOm51bGwsImF1ZCI6IiIsInN1YiI6IiJ9.gjw4nFMhLpJUuPXvMPzK1GMjhyJq2vWXg1416XKszwQ"
        ]
    }
}

A.2.  Full Token Examples

A.2.1.  Basic CWT Example

   This is a simple ECDSA signed CWT-format token.

   / Above This is an encoded CoSWID a full CWT-format token with a very simple payloal. /
   / with The main structure visible here is that of the following data: COSE_Sign1.  /

   61( 18( [
       h'A10126',                           /   SW Name: "Droid OS" protected headers  /
       {},                           /   SW Vers: "R2.D2" empty unprotected headers /
       h'A20B46024A6B0978DE0A49000102030405060708',    /   SW Creator: payload /
       h'9B9B2F5E470000F6A20C8A4157B5763FC45BE759
         9A5334028517768C21AFFB845A56AB557E0C8973
         A07417391243A79C478562D285612E292C622162
         AB233787'                                   / signature /     "Industrial Automation"/
   ]
                              }
                          }
   })

A.6.  SW Measurements of an IoT Device

   This ) )

A.2.2.  Detached EAT Bundle

   In this DEB main token is produced by a simple token that might be for HW attestation block.  The
   detached Claims-Set is produced by a TEE and IoT device.  It includes
   CoSWID format measurments of is largely identical to
   the SW. Simple TEE examples above.  The CoSWID is in byte-string
   wrapped in TEE digests its Claims-Set and
   feeds that digest to the token HW block.

   In a better example the attestation produced by the HW block would be
   a CWT and thus signed and secured by the HW block.  Since the
   signature covers the digest from the TEE that Claims-Set is also shown in diagnostic form.
   secured.

   The DEB itself can be assembled by untrusted SW.

/ This EAT UCCS is for an IoT device with a TEE. The attestation detached EAT bundle (DEB) tag.  /
/ is produced by Note that 602, the TEE. There is tag identifying a submodule for the IoT OS (the DEB is not yet registered with IANA /

602([

    / main OS of the IoT device that First part is not as secure as the TEE). The a full EAT token with claims like nonce and /
    / UEID. Most importantly, it includes a submodule contains claims for the IoT OS. The TEE also measures that is a /
    / detached digest which is the IoT OS and puts hash of the measurements "TEE" claims set /
    / in the submodule. next section. The COSE payload follows:            /

   601({
    / nonce { /
    /      10: h'948f8860d13a463e', h'948F8860D13A463E', / security-level
    / 261: 3,     256: h'0198F50A4FF6C05861C8860D13A638EA', / secure-restricted
    /     258: 64242, /
    / secure-boot     261: 4,  /
    /     262: true, / debug-status
    /     263: 2, / disabled-since-boot /
       / OEMID 3, /          258: h'8945ad',
    / IEEE CID based     260: ["3.1", 1], /
    / UEID     266: { /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
    / sumods         "TEE": [ /         266: {
                               "OS" : {
    / security-level             -16, /     261: 2,
    / restricted              h'E5CF95FD24FAB71446742DD58D43DAE1 /
    / secure-boot                78E55FE2B94291A9291082FFC2635A0B' /        262: true,
    / debug-status         ] /       263: 2,
    / disabled-since-boot     } /
    / swevidence   }  /         274: [
    h'D83DD28443A10126A05866A80A48948F8860D13A463E1901
      00500198F50A4FF6C05861C8860D13A638EA19010219FAF2
      19010504190106F5190107031901048263332E310119010A
      A163544545822F5820E5CF95FD24FAB71446742DD58D43DA
      E178E55FE2B94291A9291082FFC2635A0B5840F690CB0388
      677FA624A3775FD7CBC4E8409EC9816BE32FA474733B0F98
      C27FBAEDBBC9963B9CB5ECC03C3E35B3AFC0B7B35B495DEA
      C0997122EA867F07B8D5EB',
    {
       / This is a A CBOR-encoded byte-string wrapped /
                                       / evidence CoSWID. EAT claims-set. It has       /
                                       / hashes of the main files of /
       / the IoT OS. contains claims suitable for a TEE                    /
                                       h'da53574944a600663463613234350c
                                         17016d41636d6520522d496f542d4f
                                         530d65332e312e3402a2181f724163
                                         6d6520426173652041747465737465
                                         7218210103a11183a318187161636d
                                         655f725f696f745f6f732e65786514
                                         1a0044b349078201582005f6b327c1
                                         73b4192bd2c3ec248a292215eab456
                                         611bf7a783e25c1782479905a31818
                                         6d7265736f75726365732e72736314
                                         1a000c38b10782015820c142b9aba4
                                         280c4bb8c75f716a43c99526694caa
                                         be529571f5569bb7dc542f98a31818
                                         6a636f6d6d6f6e2e6c6962141a0023
                                         3d3b0782015820a6a9dcdfb3884da5
                                         f884e4e1e8e8629958c2dbc7027414
                                         43a913e34de9333be6'
                                   ]
                               }
       "TEE" : h'a50a48948f8860d13a463e19010503190106
                 f519010702190111818218795858a6006433
                 6132340c01016b41636d6520544545204f53
                 0d65332e312e340282a2181f6b41636d6520
                 544545204f53182101a2181f6b41636d6520
                 544545204f5318210206a111a118186e6163
                 6d655f7465655f332e657865'
    }
   })
 ])
   / An evidence CoSWID created for the "Acme R-IoT-OS" created by This example contains submodule that is a detached digest,   /
   / which is the "Acme Base Attester" (both fictious names).  It provides hash of a Claims-Set convey outside this token. /
   / measurements of the SW (other Other than that is is the attester SW) on the    /
   / device. /

   1398229316({
       / Unique CoSWID ID /    0: "4ca245",
       / tag-version /        12: 23, / Attester-maintained counter /
       / software-name /       1: "Acme R-IoT-OS",
       / software-version /   13: "3.1.4",
       / entity /              2: {
           / entity-name /        31: "Acme Base Attester",
           / role        /        33: 1 / tag-creator /
                               },
       / evidence other example of a token from an   /            3: {
   / ...file attestation HW block                                         /             17: [

   {
       / ...fs-name nonce /              24: "acme_r_iot_os.exe",           10: h'948f8860d13a463e',
       / ...size UEID /              20: 4502345,           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
       / ...hash OEMID /               7: [
                                                1,          258: 64242, / SHA-256 Private Enterprise Number /
                                                h'05f6b327c173b419
                                                  2bd2c3ec248a2922
                                                  15eab456611bf7a7
                                                  83e25c1782479905'
                                            ]
                                       },
                                       {
       / ...fs-name security-level /              24: "resources.rsc", 261: 3, / ...size hardware level security /              20: 800945,
       / ...hash secure-boot /               7: [
                                                 1,    262: true,
       / SHA-256 debug-status /
                                                h'c142b9aba4280c4b
                                                  b8c75f716a43c995
                                                  26694caabe529571
                                                  f5569bb7dc542f98'
                                            ]
                                       },
                                       {   263: 3, / ...fs-name disabled-permanently /              24: "common.lib",
       / ...size hw version /              20: 2309435,     260: [ "3.1", 1 ], / ...hash multipartnumeric /               7:
       / submods/         266: {
                                   "TEE": [
                                                1, / detached digest submod /
                                       -16, / SHA-256 /
                                                h'a6a9dcdfb3884da5
                                                  f884e4e1e8e86299
                                                  58c2dbc702741443
                                                  a913e34de9333be6'
                                       h'e5cf95fd24fab7144674
                                         2dd58d43dae178e55fe2
                                         b94291a9291082ffc2635
                                         a0b'
                                   ]
                               }
                                   ]
   }
   })

A.7.  Attestation Results in JSON format

   This is a UJCS format token that might be the output of a Verifier
   that evaluated the IoT Attestation example immediately above.

   This particular Verifier knows enough about the TEE Attester to be
   able to pass claims like security level directly through to the
   Relying Party.  The Verifier also knows the Reference Values for the
   measured SW components and is able to check them.  It informs the
   Relying Party that they were correct in the swresults claim.
   "Trustus Verifications" is the name of the services that verifies the
   SW component measurements.

   This UJCS is identical to

A.2.3.  JSON-encoded Claims-Set that could be a JWT
   payload.

   {
       "nonce" : "lI+IYNE6Rj4=",
       "seclevel" : "secure-restricted",
       "secboot" : true,
       "dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot",
       "OEMID" : "iUWt",
       "UEID" : "AZj1Ck/2wFhhyIYNE6Y4",
       "submods" : {
           "seclevel" : "restricted",
           "secboot" : true,
           "dbgstat" : "disabled-since-boot",
           "swname" : "Acme R-IoT-OS",
           "sw-version" : [
               "3.1.4"
           ],
           "swresults" : Detached EAT Bundle

   In this bundle there are two detached Claims-Sets, "CS1" and "CS2".
   The JWT at the start of the bundle has detached signature submodules
   with hashes of "CS1" and "CS2".  TODO: make the JWT actually be
   correct verifiable JWT.

[
    [
                   "Trustus Verifications",
                   "all",
                   "fully-verified"
               ]
          ] "JWT",
      "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJKLUF0dGVzdGVyIiwiaWF0IjoxNjUxNzc0ODY4LCJleHAiOm51bGwsImF1ZCI6IiIsInN1YiI6IiJ9.gjw4nFMhLpJUuPXvMPzK1GMjhyJq2vWXg1416XKszwQ"
    ],
    {
        "Audio Subsystem Claims": "ewogICAgICAgICAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAgICAgImxJK0lZTkU2Umo2TyIsCiAgICAgICAgICAgICJpYXQiOiAgICAgIDE1MjY1NDI4OTQKICAgICAgICAgfQo=",
        "Graphics Subsystem Claims": "ewogICAgICAgICAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAgICJsSStJWU5FNlJqNk8iLAogICAgICAgICAgICAiaWF0IjogICAgIDE1MjY1NDI4OTQKICAgICAgICB9"
    }
]

Appendix B.  UEID Design Rationale
B.1.  Collision Probability

   This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of
   UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of
   entities in a particular entity management database.

   Three different sized databases are considered.  The number of
   devices per person roughly models non-personal devices such as
   traffic lights, devices in stores they shop in, facilities they work
   in and so on, even considering individual light bulbs.  A device may
   have individually attested subsystems, for example parts of a car or
   a mobile phone.  It is assumed that the largest database will have at
   most 10% of the world's population of devices.  Note that databases
   that handle more than a trillion records exist today.

   The trillion-record database size models an easy-to-imagine reality
   over the next decades.  The quadrillion-record database is roughly at
   the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated.
   The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving
   nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird.
   It is included to round out the analysis.

   Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and
   are not individually connected to the network.  They may be connected
   to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on.  This is
   not the same problem as sizing IP addresses.

   +---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
   | People  | Devices /  | Subsystems / | Database   | Database Size  |
   |         | Person     | Device       | Portion    |                |
   +---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+
   | 10      | 100        | 10           | 10%        | trillion       |
   | billion |            |              |            | (10^12)        |
   | 10      | 100,000    | 10           | 10%        | quadrillion    |
   | billion |            |              |            | (10^15)        |
   | 100     | 1,000,000  | 10           | 10%        | 100            |
   | billion |            |              |            | quadrillion    |
   |         |            |              |            | (10^17)        |
   +---------+------------+--------------+------------+----------------+

   This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the
   number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of
   people.  It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where
   collisions of the output of hash functions are considered.

   The proper formula for the collision calculation is
      p = 1 - e^{-k^2/(2n)}

      p   Collision Probability
      n   Total possible population
      k   Actual population

   However, for the very large values involved here, this formula
   requires floating point precision higher than commonly available in
   calculators and SW so this simple approximation is used.  See
   [BirthdayAttack].

      p = k^2 / 2n

   For this calculation:

      p  Collision Probability
      n  Total population based on number of bits in UEID
      k  Population in a database

   +----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Database Size        | 128-bit UEID | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
   +----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+
   | trillion (10^12)     | 2 * 10^-15   | 8 * 10^-35   | 5 * 10^-55   |
   | quadrillion (10^15)  | 2 * 10^-09   | 8 * 10^-29   | 5 * 10^-49   |
   | 100 quadrillion      | 2 * 10^-05   | 8 * 10^-25   | 5 * 10^-45   |
   | (10^17)              |              |              |              |
   +----------------------+--------------+--------------+--------------+

   Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one
   year's operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size
   is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year.
   For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states
   per year.  Each of those states has the above calculated probability
   of a collision.

   This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of
   the database is completely independent from the previous state.  In
   reality this is unlikely as state changes will be the addition or
   deletion of a few records.

   The following tables gives the time interval until there is a
   probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number
   of states per year as the number of records in the database.

     t = 1 / ((k / 10) * p)

     t  Time until a collision
     p  Collision probability for UEID size
     k  Database size

   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | Database Size       | 128-bit UEID  | 192-bit UEID | 256-bit UEID |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+
   | trillion (10^12)    | 60,000 years  | 10^24 years  | 10^44 years  |
   | quadrillion (10^15) | 8 seconds     | 10^14 years  | 10^34 years  |
   | 100 quadrillion     | 8             | 10^11 years  | 10^31 years  |
   | (10^17)             | microseconds  |              |              |
   +---------------------+---------------+--------------+--------------+

   Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement
   that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits.

   There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record
   databases are not expected in the near future and because this time-
   to-collision calculation is a very worst case.  A future update of
   the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a
   requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs.

B.2.  No Use of UUID

   A UEID is not a UUID [RFC4122] by conscious choice for the following
   reasons.

   UUIDs are limited to 128 bits which may not be enough for some future
   use cases.

   Today, cryptographic-quality random numbers are available from common
   CPUs and hardware.  This hardware was introduced between 2010 and
   2015.  Operating systems and cryptographic libraries give access to
   this hardware.  Consequently, there is little need for
   implementations to construct such random values from multiple sources
   on their own.

   Version 4 UUIDs do allow for use of such cryptographic-quality random
   numbers, but do so by mapping into the overall UUID structure of time
   and clock values.  This structure is of no value here yet adds
   complexity.  It also slightly reduces the number of actual bits with
   entropy.

   UUIDs seem to have been designed for scenarios where the implementor
   does not have full control over the environment and uniqueness has to
   be constructed from identifiers at hand.  UEID takes the view that
   hardware, software and/or manufacturing process directly implement
   UEID in a simple and direct way.  It takes the view that
   cryptographic quality random number generators are readily available
   as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware.

Appendix C.  EAT Relation to IEEE.802.1AR Secure Device Identity (DevID)

   This section describes several distinct ways in which an IEEE IDevID
   [IEEE.802.1AR] relates to EAT, particularly to UEID and SUEID.

   [IEEE.802.1AR] orients around the definition of an implementation
   called a "DevID Module."  It describes how IDevIDs and LDevIDs are
   stored, protected and accessed using a DevID Module.  A particular
   level of defense against attack that should be achieved to be a DevID
   is defined.  The intent is that IDevIDs and LDevIDs are used with an
   open set of network protocols for authentication and such.  In these
   protocols the DevID secret is used to sign a nonce or similar to
   proof the association of the DevID certificates with the device.

   By contrast, EAT defines network protocol for proving trustworthiness
   to a Relying Party, the very thing that is not defined in
   [IEEE.802.1AR].  Nor does not give details on how keys, data and such
   are stored protected and accessed.  EAT is intended to work with a
   variety of different on-device implementations ranging from minimal
   protection of assets to the highest levels of asset protection.  It
   does not define any particular level of defense against attack,
   instead providing a set of security considerations.

   EAT and DevID can be viewed as complimentary when used together or as
   competing to provide a device identity service.

C.1.  DevID Used With EAT

   As just described, EAT defines a network protocol and [IEEE.802.1AR]
   doesn't.  Vice versa, EAT doesn't define a an device implementation
   and DevID does.

   Hence, EAT can be the network protocol that a DevID is used with.
   The DevID secret becomes the attestation key used to sign EATs.  The
   DevID and its certificate chain become the Endorsement sent to the
   Verifier.

   In this case the EAT and the DevID are likely to both provide a
   device identifier (e.g. a serial number).  In the EAT it is the UEID
   (or SUEID).  In the DevID (used as an endorsement), it is a device
   serial number included in the subject field of the DevID certificate.
   It is probably a good idea in this use for them to be the same serial
   number or for the UEID to be a hash of the DevID serial number.

C.2.  How EAT Provides an Equivalent Secure Device Identity

   The UEID, SUEID and other claims like OEM ID are equivalent to the
   secure device identity put into the subject field of a DevID
   certificate.  These EAT claims can represent all the same fields and
   values that can be put in a DevID certificate subject.  EAT
   explicitly and carefully defines a variety of useful claims.

   EAT secures the conveyance of these claims by having them signed on
   the device by the attestation key when the EAT is generated.  EAT
   also signs the nonce that gives freshness at this time.  Since these
   claims are signed for every EAT generated, they can include things
   that vary over time like GPS location.

   DevID secures the device identity fields by having them signed by the
   manufacturer of the device sign them into a certificate.  That
   certificate is created once during the manufacturing of the device
   and never changes so the fields cannot change.

   So in one case the signing of the identity happens on the device and
   the other in a manufacturing facility, but in both cases the signing
   of the nonce that proves the binding to the actual device happens on
   the device.

   While EAT does not specify how the signing keys, signature process
   and storage of the identity values should be secured against attack, identity values should be secured against attack,
   an EAT implementation may have equal defenses against attack.  One
   reason EAT uses CBOR is because it is simple enough that a basic EAT
   implementation can be constructed entirely in hardware.  This allows
   EAT to be implemented with the strongest defenses possible.

C.3.  An X.509 Format EAT

   It is possible to define a way to encode EAT claims in an X.509
   certificate.  For example, the EAT claims might be mapped to X.509 v3
   extensions.  It is even possible to stuff a whole CBOR-encoded
   unsigned EAT token into a X.509 certificate.

   If that X.509 certificate is an IDevID or LDevID, this becomes
   another way to use EAT and DevID together.

   Note that the DevID must still be used with an authentication
   protocol that has a nonce or equivalent.  The EAT here is not being
   used as the protocol to interact with the rely party.

C.4.  Device Identifier Permanence

   In terms of permanence, an IDevID is similar to a UEID in that they
   do not change over the life of the device.  They cease to exist only
   when the device is destroyed.

   An SUEID is similar to an LDevID.  They change on device life-cycle
   events.

   [IEEE.802.1AR] describes much of this permanence as resistant to
   attacks that seek to change the ID.  IDevID permanence can be
   described this way because [IEEE.802.1AR] is oriented around the
   definition of an EAT implementation may have equal defenses with a particular level of defense
   against attack.  One
   reason

   EAT uses CBOR is because it is simple enough not defined around a particular implementation and must work
   on a range of devices that have a basic range of defenses against attack.
   EAT
   implementation can thus can't be constructed entirely defined permanence in hardware.  This allows
   EAT terms of defense against
   attack.  EAT's definition of permanence is in terms of operations and
   device lifecycle.

Appendix D.  CDDL for CWT and JWT

   [RFC8392] was published before CDDL was available and thus is
   specified in prose, not CDDL.  Following is CDDL specifying CWT as it
   is needed to be implemented with complete this specification.  This CDDL also covers the strongest defenses possible.

C.3.  An X.509 Format EAT

   It
   Claims-Set for JWT.

   This however is possible to define NOT a way to encode EAT claims normative or standard definition of CWT or JWT
   in an X.509
   certificate.  For example, CDDL.  The prose in CWT and JWT remain the EAT claims might be mapped to X.509 v3
   extensions.  It is even possible to stuff a whole CBOR-encoded
   unsigned EAT token into a X.509 certificate.

   If that X.509 certificate normative definition.

   ; This is an IDevID replicated from draft-ietf-rats-uccs

   Claims-Set = {
       * $$Claims-Set-Claims
       * Claim-Label .feature "extended-claims-label" => any
   }
   Claim-Label = int / text
   string-or-uri = text

   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( iss-claim-label => string-or-uri  )
   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( sub-claim-label => string-or-uri  )
   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( aud-claim-label => string-or-uri  )
   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( exp-claim-label => ~time )
   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( nbf-claim-label => ~time )
   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( iat-claim-label => ~time )
   $$Claims-Set-Claims //= ( cti-claim-label => bytes )

   iss-claim-label = JC<"iss", 1>
   sub-claim-label = JC<"sub", 2>
   aud-claim-label = JC<"aud", 3>
   exp-claim-label = JC<"exp", 4>
   nbf-claim-label = JC<"nbf", 5>
   iat-claim-label = JC<"iat", 6>
   cti-claim-label = CBOR-ONLY<7>  ; jti in JWT: different name and text

   JSON-ONLY<J> = J .feature "json"
   CBOR-ONLY<C> = C .feature "cbor"

   ; Be sure to have cddl 0.8.29 or LDevID, higher for this becomes
   another way to use EAT and DevID together.

   Note that the DevID must still be used with an authentication
   protocol that has work
   JC<J,C> = JSON-ONLY<J> / CBOR-ONLY<C>

; A JWT message is either a nonce JWS or equivalent.  The EAT here is not being
   used as the protocol to interact JWE in compact serialization form
; with the rely party.

C.4.  Device Identifier Permanence

   In terms payload a Claims-Set. Compact serialization is the
; protected headers, payload and signature, each b64url encoded and
; separated by a ".". This CDDL simply matches top-level syntax of permanence, an IDevID of
; a JWS or JWE since it is similar not possible to a UEID do more in CDDL.

JWT-Message = text .regexp "[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+"

; Note that they
   do not change over the life payload of the device.  They cease to exist only
   when the device a JWT is destroyed.

   An SUEID defined in claims-set.cddl. That
; definition is similar to an LDevID.  They change on device life-cycle
   events.

   [IEEE.802.1AR] describes much of this permanence as resistant to
   attacks that seek common to change the ID.  IDevID permanence can be
   described this way because [IEEE.802.1AR] CBOR and JSON.

   ; This is oriented around the
   definition of an implementation with some CDDL describing a particular CWT at the top level of defense
   against attack.

   EAT This is
   ; not defined around a particular implementation and must work
   on a range of devices that have a range of defenses against attack.
   EAT thus can't be defined permanence in terms of defense against
   attack.  EAT's normative. RFC 8392 is the normative definition of permanence CWT.

   CWT-Messages = CWT-Tagged-Message / CWT-Untagged-Message

   ; The payload of the COSE_Message is in terms always a Claims-Set

   ; The contents of operations and
   device lifecycle. a CWT Tag must always be a COSE tag
   CWT-Tagged-Message = #6.61(COSE_Tagged_Message)

   ; An untagged CWT may be a COSE tag or not
   CWT-Untagged-Message = COSE_Messages

Appendix D. E.  Changes from Previous Drafts

   The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts.
   This list is non-authoritative.  It is meant to help reviewers see
   the significant differences.

D.1.

E.1.  From draft-rats-eat-01

   o  Added UEID design rationale appendix

D.2.

E.2.  From draft-mandyam-rats-eat-00

   This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but
   no new claims have been added.

   o  Separate information and data model using CDDL.

   o  Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT

   o  Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims

D.3.

E.3.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-01

   o  Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim

   o  Minor spelling and other fixes

   o  Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim

D.4.

E.4.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-02

   o  Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type

   o  UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256.

   o  Added appendix justifying UEID design and size.

   o  Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named
      and there can be more tha one of them

   o  Lots of fixes to the CDDL

   o  Added security considerations

D.5.

E.5.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-03

   o  Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims

   o  Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans

D.6.

E.6.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-04

   o  Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string

   o  CDDL cleaned up some more

   o  CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs

   o  CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped

   o  Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa

   o  Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens

   o  Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens

   o  Add section on key inclusion

   o  Add hardware version claims

   o  Collected CDDL is now filled in.  Other CDDL corrections.

   o  Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not
      extensible

   o  Security level claim is not extensible

   o  Improve specification of location claim and added a location
      privacy section

   o  Add intended use claim

D.7.

E.7.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-05

   o  CDDL format issues resolved

   o  Corrected reference to Location Privacy section

D.8.

E.8.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-06

   o  Added boot-seed claim

   o  Rework CBOR interoperability section

   o  Added profiles claim and section

D.9.

E.9.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-07

   o  Filled in IANA and other sections for possible preassignment of
      Claim Keys for well understood claims

D.10.

E.10.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-08

   o  Change profile claim to be either a URL or an OID rather than a
      test string

D.11.

E.11.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-09

   o  Add SUEIDs

   o  Add appendix comparing IDevID to EAT

   o  Added section on use for Evidence and Attestation Results

   o  Fill in the key ID and endorsements identificaiton section

   o  Remove origination claim as it is replaced by key IDs and
      endorsements

   o  Added manifests and software evidence claims

   o  Add string labels non-claim labels for use with JSON (e.g. labels
      for members of location claim)

   o  EAN-13 HW versions are no longer a separate claim.  Now they are
      folded in as a CoSWID version scheme.

D.12.

E.12.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-10

   o  Hardware version is made into an array of two rather than two
      claims

   o  Corrections and wording improvements for security levels claim

   o  Add swresults claim

   o  Add dloas claim - Digitial Letter of Approvals, a list of
      certifications

   o  CDDL for each claim no longer in a separate sub section

   o  Consistent use of terminology from RATS architecture document

   o  Consistent use of terminology from CWT and JWT documents

   o  Remove operating model and procedures; refer to CWT, JWT and RATS
      architecture instead

   o  Some reorganization of Section 1

   o  Moved a few references, including RATS Architecture, to
      informative.

   o  Add detached submodule digests and detached eat bundles (DEBs)

   o  New simpler and more universal scheme for identifying the encoding
      of a nested token

   o  Made clear that CBOR and JSON are only mixed when nesting a token
      in another token

   o  Clearly separate CDDL for JSON and CBOR-specific data items

   o  Define UJCS (unsigned JWTs)

   o  Add CDDL for a general Claims-Set used by UCCS, UJCS, CWT, JWT and
      EAT

   o  Top level CDDL for CWT correctly refers to COSE

   o  OEM ID is specifically for HW, not for SW

   o  HW OEM ID can now be a PEN

   o  HW OEM ID can now be a 128-bit random number
   o  Expand the examples section

   o  Add software and version claims as easy / JSON alternative to
      CoSWID

D.13.

E.13.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-11

   o  Add HW model claim

   o  Change reference for CBOR OID draft to RFC 9090

   o  Correct the iat claim in some examples

   o  Make HW Version just one claim rather than 3 (device, board and
      chip)

   o  Remove CDDL comments from CDDL blocks

   o  More clearly define "entity" and use it more broadly, particularly
      instead of "device"

   o  Re do early allocation of CBOR labels since last one didn't
      complete correctly

   o  Lots of rewording and tightening up of section 1

   o  Lots of wording improvements in section 3, particularly better use
      of normative language

   o  Improve wording in submodules section, particularly how to
      distinguish types when decoding

   o  Remove security-level from early allocation

   o  Add boot odometer claim

   o  Add privacy considerations for replay protection

E.14.  From draft-ietf-rats-eat-12

   o  Make use of the JC<> generic to express CDDL for both JSON and
      CBOR

   o  Reorganize claims into 4 sections, particularly claims about the
      entity and about the token

   o  Nonce wording - say nonce is required and other improvements
   o  Clarify relationship of claims in evidence to results when
      forwarding

   o  Clarify manufacturer switching UEID types

   o  Add new section on the top-level token type that has CBOR-specific
      and JSON-specific CDDL since the top-level can't be handled with
      JC<>

   o  Remove definition of UCCS and UJCS, replacing it with a CDDL
      socket and mention of future token types

   o  Split the examples into payload and top level tokens since UCCS
      can't be used for examples any more (It was nice because you could
      see the payload claims in it easily, where you can't with CWT)

   o  DEB tag number is TBD rather than hard coded

   o  Add appendix with non-normative CDDL for a Claims-Set, CWT and JWT

   o  (Large reorganization of the document build and example
      verification makefile)

   o  Use CoAP content format ID to distinguish manifest and evidence
      formats instead of CBOR tag

   o  Added more examples, both CBOR and JSON

   o  All CDDL is validating against all examples

   o  Unassigned IANA requests are clearly TBD in the document (and have
      real values as is necessary in the example validation process)

   o  Improve security-level claim

   o  swresults claim is now measurement results claim

   o  substantial redesign of measurement results claim

Authors' Addresses

   Laurence Lundblade
   Security Theory LLC

   EMail: lgl@securitytheory.com
   Giridhar Mandyam
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, California
   USA

   Phone: +1 858 651 7200
   EMail: mandyam@qti.qualcomm.com

   Jeremy O'Donoghue
   Qualcomm Technologies Inc.
   279 Farnborough Road
   Farnborough  GU14 7LS
   United Kingdom

   Phone: +44 1252 363189
   EMail: jodonogh@qti.qualcomm.com