draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-12.txt   draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-13.txt 
RATS Working Group G. C. Fedorkow, Ed. RATS Working Group G. C. Fedorkow, Ed.
Internet-Draft Juniper Networks, Inc. Internet-Draft Juniper Networks, Inc.
Intended status: Informational E. Voit Intended status: Informational E. Voit
Expires: 27 August 2022 Cisco Expires: 2 September 2022 Cisco
J. Fitzgerald-McKay J. Fitzgerald-McKay
National Security Agency National Security Agency
23 February 2022 1 March 2022
TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification
draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-12 draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-13
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the
integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that
contain Trusted Platform Modules [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], as defined by contain Trusted Platform Modules [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], as defined by
the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)), or equivalent hardware
implementations that include the protected capabilities, as provided
by TPMs.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 August 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 September 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5. Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) . . . 6 1.5. Description of Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) . . . 6
1.6. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.6. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.7. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.7. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.7.1. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.7.1. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM . . . . 10 2.1. RIV Software Configuration Attestation using TPM . . . . 9
2.1.1. What Does RIV Attest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1.1. What Does RIV Attest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2. Notes on PCR Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1.2. Notes on PCR Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. RIV Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.2. RIV Keying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. RIV Information Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.3. RIV Information Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4. RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.4. RIV Simplifying Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1. Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs) . . . . . . . . 19 2.4.1. Reference Integrity Manifests (RIMs) . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2. Attestation Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.4.2. Attestation Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Standards Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. Standards Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1. Prerequisites for RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1. Prerequisites for RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.1. Unique Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.1. Unique Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.2. Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.3. Appraisal Policy for Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.1.3. Appraisal Policy for Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2. Reference Model for Challenge-Response . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2. Reference Model for Challenge-Response . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1. Transport and Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.2.1. Transport and Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3. Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.3. Centralized vs Peer-to-Peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1. Keys Used in RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.1. Keys Used in RIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2. Prevention of Spoofing and Person-in-the-Middle 5.2. Prevention of Spoofing and Person-in-the-Middle
Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.3. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.4. Owner-Signed Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.4. Owner-Signed Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.5. Other Factors for Trustworthy Operation . . . . . . . . . 31 5.5. Other Factors for Trustworthy Operation . . . . . . . . . 30
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 9. Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.1. Using a TPM for Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 9.1. Using a TPM for Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.2. Root of Trust for Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 9.2. Root of Trust for Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.3. Layering Model for Network Equipment Attester and 9.3. Layering Model for Network Equipment Attester and
Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9.4. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 9.4. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
There are many aspects to consider in fielding a trusted computing There are many aspects to consider in fielding a trusted computing
device, from operating systems to applications. Mechanisms to prove device, from operating systems to applications. Mechanisms to prove
skipping to change at page 3, line 38 skipping to change at page 3, line 34
[I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]. However, these documents do not [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]. However, these documents do not
provide sufficient guidance for network equipment vendors and provide sufficient guidance for network equipment vendors and
operators to design, build, and deploy interoperable devices. operators to design, build, and deploy interoperable devices.
The intent of this document is to provide such guidance. It does The intent of this document is to provide such guidance. It does
this by outlining the Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) problem, this by outlining the Remote Integrity Verification (RIV) problem,
and then identifies elements that are necessary to get the complete, and then identifies elements that are necessary to get the complete,
scalable attestation procedure working with commercial networking scalable attestation procedure working with commercial networking
products such as routers, switches and firewalls. An underlying products such as routers, switches and firewalls. An underlying
assumption will be the availability within the device of a Trusted assumption will be the availability within the device of a Trusted
Platform Module [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0] compliant cryptoprocessor to Platform Module [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0] compatible cryptoprocessor to
enable the trustworthy remote assessment of the device's software and enable the trustworthy remote assessment of the device's software and
hardware. hardware.
1.1. Requirements notation 1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
skipping to change at page 9, line 32 skipping to change at page 9, line 5
* This solution is for use in non-privacy-preserving applications * This solution is for use in non-privacy-preserving applications
(for example, networking, Industrial IoT), avoiding the need for a (for example, networking, Industrial IoT), avoiding the need for a
Privacy Certificate Authority (also called an Attestation CA) for Privacy Certificate Authority (also called an Attestation CA) for
attestation keys [AK-Enrollment] or TCG Platform Certificates attestation keys [AK-Enrollment] or TCG Platform Certificates
[Platform-Certificates]. [Platform-Certificates].
* This document assumes network protocols that are common in network * This document assumes network protocols that are common in network
equipment such as YANG [RFC7950] and NETCONF [RFC6241], but not equipment such as YANG [RFC7950] and NETCONF [RFC6241], but not
generally used in other applications. generally used in other applications.
* The approach outlined in this document mandates the use of a * The approach outlined in this document mandates the use of a TPM
compliant TPM [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0]. [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], or a compatible cryptoprocessor.
1.7.1. Out of Scope 1.7.1. Out of Scope
* Run-Time Attestation: The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture * Run-Time Attestation: The Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture
[IMA] attests each process launched after a device is started (and [IMA] attests each process launched after a device is started (and
is in scope for RIV in general), but continuous run-time is in scope for RIV in general), but continuous run-time
attestation of Linux or other multi-threaded operating system attestation of Linux or other multi-threaded operating system
processes after the OS has started considerably expands the scope processes after the OS has started considerably expands the scope
of the problem. Many researchers are working on that problem, but of the problem. Many researchers are working on that problem, but
this document defers the problem of continuous, in-memory run-time this document defers the problem of continuous, in-memory run-time
skipping to change at page 39, line 6 skipping to change at page 38, line 47
| results and figure out what it means. | | | results and figure out what it means. | |
-------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 7: Component Status Figure 7: Component Status
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[Canonical-Event-Log] [Canonical-Event-Log]
Trusted Computing Group, "DRAFT Canonical Event Log Format Trusted Computing Group, "Canonical Event Log Format
Version: 1.0, Revision: .30", December 2020, Version 1.0 Revision .41, February 25, 2022", December
<https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf>. canonical-event-log-format/>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/ 15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>. draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra] [I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra]
Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Bhandari, S., Voit, E., Sulzen, Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Bhandari, S., Voit, E., Sulzen,
B., (Frank), L. X., Laffey, T., and G. C. Fedorkow, "A B., (Frank), L. X., Laffey, T., and G. C. Fedorkow, "A
YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
Attestation Procedures using TPMs", Work in Progress, Attestation Procedures using TPMs", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-13, 2 Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-15, 28
February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft- February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-13.txt>. ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-15.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid] [I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]
Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D. Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", Work Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-20, 26 in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-20, 26
January 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf- January 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
sacm-coswid-20.txt>. sacm-coswid-20.txt>.
[IEEE-802-1AR] [IEEE-802-1AR]
Seaman, M., "802.1AR-2018 - IEEE Standard for Local and Seaman, M., "802.1AR-2018 - IEEE Standard for Local and
Metropolitan Area Networks - Secure Device Identity, IEEE Metropolitan Area Networks - Secure Device Identity, IEEE
Computer Society", August 2018. Computer Society", August 2018.
[IMA] dsafford, kds_etu, mzohar, reinersailer, and serge_hallyn, [IMA] dsafford, kds_etu, mzohar, reinersailer, and serge_hallyn,
"Integrity Measurement Architecture", June 2019, "Integrity Measurement Architecture", June 2019,
<https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/>. <https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home/>.
[PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0] [PC-Client-BIOS-TPM-2.0]
Trusted Computing Group, "PC Client Specific Platform Trusted Computing Group, "PC Client Specific Platform
Firmware Profile Specification Family "2.0", Level 00 Firmware Profile Specification Family "2.0", Level 00
Revision 1.05", May 2021, Revision 1.05 Revision 23, May 7, 2021", May 2021,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>. specific-platform-firmware-profile-specification/>.
[PC-Client-EFI-TPM-1.2] [PC-Client-EFI-TPM-1.2]
Trusted Computing Group, "TCG EFI Platform Specification Trusted Computing Group, "TCG EFI Platform Specification
for TPM Family 1.1 or 1.2, Specification Version 1.22, for TPM Family 1.1 or 1.2, Specification Version 1.22,
Revision 15", January 2014, Revision 15", January 2014,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-efi- <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-efi-
platform-specification/>. platform-specification/>.
[PC-Client-RIM] [PC-Client-RIM]
Trusted Computing Group, "TCG PC Client Reference Trusted Computing Group, "TCG PC Client Reference
Integrity Manifest Specification, v1.04", December 2019, Integrity Manifest Specification, v1.04, Nov 4, 2020",
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ December 2019,
TCG_PC_Client_RIM_r1p04_pub.pdf>. <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-pc-client-
reference-integrity-manifest-specification/>.
[Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0] [Platform-DevID-TPM-2.0]
Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity
and Attestation, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 2", and Attestation, Specification Version 1.0, Revision 2",
September 2020, September 2020,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-2-0-keys- <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-2-0-keys-
for-device-identity-and-attestation/>. for-device-identity-and-attestation/>.
[Platform-ID-TPM-1.2] [Platform-ID-TPM-1.2]
Trusted Computing Group, "TPM Keys for Platform Identity Trusted Computing Group, "TPM Keys for Platform Identity
skipping to change at page 41, line 10 skipping to change at page 41, line 6
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RIM] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Reference Integrity Manifest [RIM] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Reference Integrity Manifest
(RIM) Information Model, v1.0, r0.16", June 2019, (RIM) Information Model, v1.0, Revision 0.16, Nov 12,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2020", June 2019,
TCG_RIM_Model_v1p01_r0p16_pub.pdf>. <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-reference-
integrity-manifest-rim-information-model/>.
[SWID] The International Organization for Standardization/ [SWID] The International Organization for Standardization/
International Electrotechnical Commission, "Information International Electrotechnical Commission, "Information
Technology Software Asset Management Part 2: Software Technology Software Asset Management Part 2: Software
Identification Tag, ISO/IEC 19770-2", October 2015, Identification Tag, ISO/IEC 19770-2", October 2015,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/65666.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/65666.html>.
[TAP] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Trusted Attestation Protocol [TAP] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Trusted Attestation Protocol
(TAP) Information Model for TPM Families 1.2 and 2.0 and (TAP) Information Model for TPM Families 1.2 and 2.0 and
DICE Family 1.0, Version 1.0, Revision 0.36", October DICE Family 1.0, Version 1.0, Revision 0.36", October
skipping to change at page 42, line 15 skipping to change at page 42, line 15
[I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda] [I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda]
Fuchs, A., Birkholz, H., McDonald, I. E., and C. Bormann, Fuchs, A., Birkholz, H., McDonald, I. E., and C. Bormann,
"Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation", Work in "Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-06, 12 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-06, 12
January 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft- January 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
birkholz-rats-tuda-06.txt>. birkholz-rats-tuda-06.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-eat] [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]
Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., and J. O'Donoghue, "The Entity Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., and J. O'Donoghue, "The Entity
Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet- Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-11, 24 October 2021, Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-12, 24 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-eat- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-eat-
11.txt>. 12.txt>.
[I-D.richardson-rats-usecases] [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]
Richardson, M., Wallace, C., and W. Pan, "Use cases for Richardson, M., Wallace, C., and W. Pan, "Use cases for
Remote Attestation common encodings", Work in Progress, Remote Attestation common encodings", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-rats-usecases-08, 2 Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-rats-usecases-08, 2
November 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft- November 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
richardson-rats-usecases-08.txt>. richardson-rats-usecases-08.txt>.
[IEEE-802.1AE] [IEEE-802.1AE]
Seaman, M., "802.1AE MAC Security (MACsec)", 2018, Seaman, M., "802.1AE MAC Security (MACsec)", 2018,
 End of changes. 25 change blocks. 
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