draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-16.txt   draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-17.txt 
RATS Working Group H. Birkholz RATS Working Group H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft M. Eckel Internet-Draft M. Eckel
Intended status: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT Intended status: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT
Expires: 3 September 2022 S. Bhandari Expires: 17 September 2022 S. Bhandari
ThoughtSpot ThoughtSpot
E. Voit E. Voit
B. Sulzen B. Sulzen
Cisco Cisco
L. Xia L. Xia
Huawei Huawei
T. Laffey T. Laffey
HPE HPE
G. Fedorkow G. Fedorkow
Juniper Juniper
2 March 2022 16 March 2022
A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation
Procedures using TPMs Procedures using TPMs
draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-16 draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-17
Abstract Abstract
This document defines YANG RPCs and a small number of configuration This document defines YANG RPCs and a few configuration nodes
nodes required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity
measurements from a device, following the operational context defined measurements from a device, following the operational context defined
in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification. in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification.
Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPCs, Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPCs,
originating from one or more roots of trust for measurement (RTMs). originating from one or more roots of trust for measurement (RTMs).
The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well
as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware
implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided
by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the
device components of the composite device the YANG server is running device components of the composite device the YANG server is running
on. on.
skipping to change at page 2, line 10 skipping to change at page 2, line 10
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 September 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 September 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures . . . 3 2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures . . . 3
2.1. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) . . . . . . 56
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs . . . . . . . . 57
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document is based on the general terminology defined in the This document is based on the general terminology defined in the
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and uses the operational context defined [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and uses the operational context defined
in [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] as well as the in [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] as well as the
interaction model and information elements defined in interaction model and information elements defined in
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. The currently [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. The currently
supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the Trusted Platform supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] and [TPM2.0] as specified by the Trusted Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] and [TPM2.0] as specified by the Trusted
Computing Group (TCG). One or more TPMs embedded in the components Computing Group (TCG). One TPM, or multiple TPMs in the case of a
of a Composite Device are required in order to use the YANG module Composite Device, are required in order to use the YANG module
defined in this document. A TPM is used as a root of trust for defined in this document. Each TPM is used as a root of trust for
reporting (RTR) in order to retrieve attestation Evidence from a storage (RTS) in order to store system security measurement Evidence.
composite device (_TPM Quote_ primitive operation). Additionally, it And each TPM is used as a root of trust for reporting (RTR) in order
is used as a root of trust for storage (RTS) in order to retain to retrieve attestation Evidence. This is done by using a YANG RPC
shielded secrets and store system measurements using a folding hash to request a quote which exposes a rolling hash the security
function (_TPM PCR Extend_ primitive operation). measurements held internally within the TPM.
Specific terms imported from [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and used in Specific terms imported from [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and used in
this document include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence. this document include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence.
Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document
include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK), Local include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK),
Attestation Key (LAK). Attestation Identity Key (AIK), Local Attestation Key (LAK).
1.1. Requirements notation 1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures 2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures
One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides
attestation evidence via the YANG module defined in this document. attestation evidence via the YANG module defined in this document.
The ietf-basic-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite The ietf-tpm-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite
device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the
Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture], and the corresponding challenge- [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture], and the corresponding challenge-
response interaction model defined in the response interaction model defined in the
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] document. A fresh nonce [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] document. A fresh nonce
with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be supplied with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be supplied
by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with
respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running
the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay
attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each
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2.1. YANG Modules 2.1. YANG Modules
In this section the several YANG modules are defined. In this section the several YANG modules are defined.
2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' 2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation'
This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang', This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang',
[RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] with prefix [RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] with prefix
'ks', and 'ietf-tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'. 'ks', and 'ietf-tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'.
Additionally references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933], Additionally, references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933],
[TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key], [TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key],
[TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [ima-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type] and [TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [ima-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type], as
[netequip-boot-log]. well as Appendix A and Appendix B.
2.1.1.1. Features 2.1.1.1. Features
This module supports the following features: This module supports the following features:
* 'TPMs': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support * 'mtpm': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support
remote attestation. This feature is applicable in cases where remote attestation. For example, this feature could be used in
multiple line cards are present, each with its own TPM. cases where multiple line cards are present, each with its own
TPM.
* 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/ * 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/
UEFI event logs. [bios-log] UEFI event logs. [bios-log]
* 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event * 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event
logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA). logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA
[ima-log] [ima-log]). Also see Appendix A.
* 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval * 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval
of netequip boot event logs. [netequip-boot-log] of netequip boot event logs. See Appendix A and Appendix B.
2.1.1.2. Identities 2.1.1.2. Identities
This module supports the following types of attestation event logs: This module supports the following types of attestation event logs:
'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'. 'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.
2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) 2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)
In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation
procedures are defined. procedures are defined.
2.1.1.3.1. 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation' 2.1.1.3.1. 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation'
This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_ This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the
feature 'TPMs' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
provided, all TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A provided, all TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A
YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows: YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
+---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:TPM12}? +---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm12}?
+---w input +---w input
| +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge | +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge
| +---w pcr-index* pcr | +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w nonce-value binary | +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref {tpm:TPMs}? | +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
+--ro output | {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro tpm12-attestation-response* [] +--ro output
+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref +--ro tpm12-attestation-response* []
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary
2.1.1.3.2. 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation' 2.1.1.3.2. 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation'
This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_ This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the
feature 'TPMs' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
provided, all TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A provided, all TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A
YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows: YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
+---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:TPM20}? +---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm20}?
+---w input +---w input
| +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge | +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge
| +---w nonce-value binary | +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* [] | +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* []
| | +---w TPM20-hash-algo? identityref | | +---w tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
| | +---w pcr-index* tpm:pcr | | +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref {tpm:TPMs}? | +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
| {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro output +--ro output
+--ro tpm20-attestation-response* [] +--ro tpm20-attestation-response* []
+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref +--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
+--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary +--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary
+--ro quote-signature? binary +--ro quote-signature? binary
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro unsigned-pcr-values* [] +--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
+--ro TPM20-hash-algo? identityref +--ro tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
+--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index] +--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]
+--ro pcr-index pcr +--ro pcr-index pcr
+--ro pcr-value? binary +--ro pcr-value? binary
An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256 An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256
bank could look like the following: bank could look like the following:
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<tpm20-challenge-response-attestation> <tpm20-challenge-response-attestation>
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
skipping to change at page 7, line 13 skipping to change at page 7, line 13
</rpc-reply> </rpc-reply>
2.1.1.4. 'log-retrieval' 2.1.1.4. 'log-retrieval'
This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the evidence which was extended This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the evidence which was extended
into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as
follows: follows:
+---x log-retrieval +---x log-retrieval
+---w input +---w input
| +---w log-selector* []
| | +---w name* string
| | +---w (index-type)?
| | | +--:(last-entry)
| | | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
| | | +--:(index)
| | | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
| | | +--:(timestamp)
| | | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time
| | +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16
| +---w log-type identityref | +---w log-type identityref
| +---w log-selector* []
| +---w name* string
| +---w (index-type)?
| | +--:(last-entry)
| | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
| | +--:(index)
| | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
| | +--:(timestamp)
| | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time
| +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16
+--ro output +--ro output
+--ro system-event-logs +--ro system-event-logs
+--ro node-data* [] +--ro node-data* []
+--ro name? string +--ro name? string
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro log-result +--ro log-result
+--ro (attested_event_log_type) +--ro (attested_event_log_type)
+--:(bios) {bios}? +--:(bios) {bios}?
| +--ro bios-event-logs | +--ro bios-event-logs
| +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number] | +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint32 | +--ro event-number uint32
| +--ro event-type? uint32 | +--ro event-type? uint32
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr | +--ro pcr-index? pcr
| +--ro digest-list* [] | +--ro digest-list* []
| | +--ro hash-algo? identityref | | +--ro hash-algo? identityref
| | +--ro digest* binary | | +--ro digest* binary
| +--ro event-size? uint32 | +--ro event-size? uint32
| +--ro event-data* uint8 | +--ro event-data* binary
+--:(ima) {ima}? +--:(ima) {ima}?
| +--ro ima-event-logs | +--ro ima-event-logs
| +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number] | +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint64 | +--ro event-number uint64
| +--ro ima-template? string | +--ro ima-template? string
| +--ro filename-hint? string | +--ro filename-hint? string
| +--ro filedata-hash? binary | +--ro filedata-hash? binary
| +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string | +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string | +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash? binary | +--ro template-hash? binary
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+--ro signature? binary +--ro signature? binary
2.1.1.5. Data Nodes 2.1.1.5. Data Nodes
This section provides a high level description of the data nodes This section provides a high level description of the data nodes
containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG
model. For more details, please see the YANG model itself in model. For more details, please see the YANG model itself in
Figure 1. Figure 1.
Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of
information relating to a device's TPM(s). information relating to remote attestation for a device. This
includes specific device TPM(s), the compute nodes (such as line
cards) on which the TPM(s) reside, and the algorithms supported
across the platform.
Container 'tpms': Provides configuration and operational details for Container 'tpms': Provides configuration and operational details for
each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which
may be quoted, certificates which are associated with that TPM, may be quoted, certificates which are associated with that TPM,
and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates
which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is
associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the
certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified. certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified.
+--rw tpms +--rw tpms
+--rw tpm* [name] +--rw tpm* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--ro hardware-based? boolean +--ro hardware-based boolean
+--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}? +--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro path? string +--ro path? string
+--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:tpms}? +--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro manufacturer? string +--ro manufacturer? string
+--rw firmware-version identityref +--rw firmware-version identityref
+--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref +--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref
+--rw tpm12-pcrs* pcr +--rw tpm12-pcrs* pcr
+--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo] +--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo]
| +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref | +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref
| +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr | +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr
+--ro status enumeration +--ro status enumeration
+--rw certificates +--rw certificates
+--rw certificate* [name] +--rw certificate* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--rw keystore-ref? leafref +--rw keystore-ref? leafref {ks:asymmetric-keys}?
+--rw type? enumeration +--rw type? enumeration
container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash
algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. This algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. This
allows an operator to limit algorithms available for use by RPCs to allows an operator to limit algorithms available for use by RPCs to
just a desired set from the universe of all allowed hash algorithms just a desired set from the universe of all allowed hash algorithms
by the TCG. by the TCG.
+--rw attester-supported-algos +--rw attester-supported-algos
+--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref +--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref
+--rw tpm12-hash* identityref +--rw tpm12-hash* identityref
+--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref +--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref
+--rw tpm20-hash* identityref +--rw tpm20-hash* identityref
container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM
supported, this container maintains the set of information related to supported, this container maintains the set of information related to
the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows each the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows each
specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs. specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs.
+--rw compute-nodes {tpm:TPMs}? +--rw compute-nodes {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro compute-node* [node-id] +--ro compute-node* [node-id]
+--ro node-id string +--ro node-id string
+--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}? +--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro node-name? string +--ro node-name? string
+--ro node-location? string +--ro node-location? string
2.1.1.6. YANG Module 2.1.1.6. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2022-02-16.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2022-03-15.yang"
module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation { module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation {
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation";
prefix tpm; prefix tpm;
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang; prefix yang;
} }
import ietf-hardware { import ietf-hardware {
prefix hw; prefix hw;
} }
skipping to change at page 11, line 12 skipping to change at page 11, line 12
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here."; they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2022-03-02 { revision 2022-03-15 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
Attestation Procedures using TPMs"; Attestation Procedures using TPMs";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/*****************/ /*****************/
feature tpms { feature mtpm {
description description
"The device supports the remote attestation of multiple "The device supports the remote attestation of multiple
TPM based cryptoprocessors."; TPM based cryptoprocessors.";
} }
feature bios { feature bios {
description description
"The device supports the bios logs."; "The device supports the bios logs.";
reference reference
"bios-log: "bios-log:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
Section 9.4.5.2"; Section 9.4.5.2";
} }
feature ima { feature ima {
description description
"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs. "The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.
Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes
the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get
hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for
one example of such an encoding."; one example of such an encoding.";
reference reference
"ima-log: "ima-log:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf Section 4.3"; TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3";
} }
feature netequip_boot { feature netequip_boot {
description description
"The device supports the netequip_boot logs."; "The device supports the netequip_boot logs.";
reference reference
"netequip-boot-log: "netequip-boot-log:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy"; https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Typedefs */ /* Typedefs */
/*****************/ /*****************/
typedef pcr { typedef pcr {
type uint8 { type uint8 {
range "0..31"; range "0..31";
} }
description description
"Valid index number for a PCR. At this point 0-31 is viable."; "Valid index number for a PCR. A {{TPM2.0}} compliant PCR index
extends from 0-31. At this time a typical TPM would have no
more than 32 PCRS.";
} }
typedef compute-node-ref { typedef compute-node-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes" path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes"
+ "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-name"; + "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-name";
} }
description description
"This type is used to reference a hardware node. It is quite "This type is used to reference a hardware node. Note that an
possible this leafref will eventually point to another YANG implementer might include an alternative leafref pointing to a
module's node."; different YANG module node specifying hardware structures.";
} }
typedef certificate-name-ref { typedef certificate-name-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm" path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm"
+ "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name"; + "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name";
} }
description description
"A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate."; "A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate.";
} }
skipping to change at page 13, line 43 skipping to change at page 13, line 44
leaf tpm20-hash-algo { leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos' must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' { + '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
} }
default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256"; default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256";
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This "The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM2.0 PCR. This
must be one of those supported by a platform."; must be one of those supported by a platform.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-hash-algo { grouping tpm12-hash-algo {
description description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs."; "The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs.";
leaf tpm12-hash-algo { leaf tpm12-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos' must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' { + '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";
} }
default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1"; default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";
description description
skipping to change at page 14, line 13 skipping to change at page 14, line 16
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos' must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' { + '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";
} }
default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1"; default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This "The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This
MUST be one of those supported by a platform. This assumes MUST be one of those supported by a platform.";
that an algorithm other than SHA1 can be supported on some
TPM1.2 cryptoprocessor variant.";
} }
} }
grouping nonce { grouping nonce {
description description
"A random number intended to be used once to show freshness "A random number intended to guarantee freshness and for use
and to allow the detection of replay attacks."; as part of a replay-detection mechanism.";
leaf nonce-value { leaf nonce-value {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A cryptographically generated random number which should "A cryptographically generated random number which should
not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random
number generation function. The random number MUST be number generation function. The random number MUST be
derived from an entropy source external to the Attester. derived from an entropy source external to the Attester.
Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256 Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256
binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer
binary are sent, this nonce object will be padded binary digits are sent, this nonce object will be padded
with leading zeros any in Quotes returned from the TPM. with leading zeros within Quotes returned from the TPM.
Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed
to the most significant binary digits."; to the most significant binary digits.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-pcr-selection { grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {
description description
"A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its "A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its
individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC). individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).
The corresponding selection filter is represented in this The corresponding selection filter is represented in this
grouping. grouping.";
Requesting a PCR value that is not in scope of the AC used,
detailed exposure via error msg should be avoided.";
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. At the moment this is limited "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection
to 32. In addition, any selection of PCRs MUST verify that of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a
the set of PCRs requested are a subset the set of PCRs subset the set of PCRs exposed by in the leaf-list
exposed by in the leaf-list /tpm:rats-support-structures /tpm:rats-support-structures
/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs"; /tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
} }
} }
grouping tpm20-pcr-selection { grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {
description description
"A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed "A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed
together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection
list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in
this grouping."; this grouping.";
skipping to change at page 16, line 21 skipping to change at page 16, line 19
grouping tpm-name { grouping tpm-name {
description description
"A unique TPM on a device."; "A unique TPM on a device.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device."; "Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm-name-selector {
description
"One or more TPM on a device.";
leaf-list name {
type string;
config false;
description
"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this object
exists, a selection should pull only the objects related to
these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all qualifying TPMs that
are 'hardware-based' equals true on the device are selected.";
}
}
grouping node-uptime { grouping node-uptime {
description description
"Uptime in seconds of the node."; "Uptime in seconds of the node.";
leaf up-time { leaf up-time {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data"; "Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data";
} }
} }
skipping to change at page 18, line 10 skipping to change at page 17, line 42
"PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with "PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with
the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple
PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not
necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the
minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last
received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier
reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a
single PCR has changed? single PCR has changed?
To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR
values, the Attester can provide these individual values via values, the Attester can provide these individual values via
'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to the 'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to
what has previously been validated, it is possible for a what has previously been validated, it is possible for a
Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating
significant processing. There should never be a result where
an unsigned PCR value is actually that that within a quote. significant processing. Note that there should never be a
result where an unsigned PCR value differs from what may be
reconstructed from the within the PCR quote and the event logs.
If there is a difference, a signed result which has been If there is a difference, a signed result which has been
verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive."; verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive.";
uses tpm20-hash-algo; uses tpm20-hash-algo;
list pcr-values { list pcr-values {
key "pcr-index"; key "pcr-index";
description description
"List of one PCR bank."; "List of one PCR bank.";
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
skipping to change at page 19, line 4 skipping to change at page 18, line 38
"Identifier for type of log to be retrieved."; "Identifier for type of log to be retrieved.";
leaf log-type { leaf log-type {
type identityref { type identityref {
base attested_event_log_type; base attested_event_log_type;
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"The corresponding measurement log type identity."; "The corresponding measurement log type identity.";
} }
} }
grouping boot-event-log { grouping boot-event-log {
description description
"Defines a specific instance of an event log entry "Defines a specific instance of an event log entry
and corresponding to the information used to and corresponding to the information used to
extend the PCR"; extend the PCR";
leaf event-number { leaf event-number {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Unique event number of this event"; "Unique event number of this event which monotonically
increases. The maximum event number should not be
reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number
supported.";
} }
leaf event-type { leaf event-type {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"BIOS Log Event Type: "BIOS Log Event Type:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1"; TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";
} }
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended"; "Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
} }
list digest-list { list digest-list {
description description
"Hash of event data"; "Hash of event data";
leaf hash-algo { leaf hash-algo {
skipping to change at page 19, line 50 skipping to change at page 19, line 40
"The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the "The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the
'hash-algo' against 'event data'."; 'hash-algo' against 'event data'.";
} }
} }
leaf event-size { leaf event-size {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Size of the event data"; "Size of the event data";
} }
leaf-list event-data { leaf-list event-data {
type uint8; type binary;
description description
"The event data size determined by event-size"; "The event data size determined by event-size. For more
see ";
} }
} }
grouping bios-event-log { grouping bios-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI."; "Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";
list bios-event-entry { list bios-event-entry {
key event-number; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of TCG described event log "Ordered list of TCG described event log
that extended the PCRs in the order they that extended the PCRs in the order they
were logged"; were logged";
uses boot-event-log; uses boot-event-log;
} }
} }
grouping ima-event { grouping ima-event {
description description
"Defines an hash log extend event for IMA measurements"; "Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements";
reference reference
"ima-log: "ima-log:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf Section 4.3"; TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3";
leaf event-number { leaf event-number {
type uint64; type uint64;
description description
"Unique number for this event for sequencing"; "Unique event number of this event which monotonically
increases. The maximum event number should not be
reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number
supported.";
} }
leaf ima-template { leaf ima-template {
type string; type string;
description description
"Name of the template used for event logs "Name of the template used for event logs
for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig"; for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig";
} }
leaf filename-hint { leaf filename-hint {
type string; type string;
description description
"File that was measured"; "File that was measured";
} }
leaf filedata-hash { leaf filedata-hash {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Hash of filedata"; "Hash of filedata as updated based upon the
filedata-hash-algorithm";
} }
leaf filedata-hash-algorithm { leaf filedata-hash-algorithm {
type string; type string;
description description
"Algorithm used for filedata-hash"; "Algorithm used for filedata-hash";
} }
leaf template-hash-algorithm { leaf template-hash-algorithm {
type string; type string;
description description
"Algorithm used for template-hash"; "Algorithm used for template-hash";
skipping to change at page 21, line 22 skipping to change at page 21, line 19
"hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)"; "hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";
} }
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended"; "Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
} }
leaf signature { leaf signature {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The file signature"; "Digital file signature which provides a
fingerprint for the file being measured.";
} }
} }
grouping ima-event-log { grouping ima-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by IMA."; "Measurement log created by IMA.";
list ima-event-entry { list ima-event-entry {
key event-number; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number"; "Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number";
uses ima-event; uses ima-event;
} }
} }
grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log { grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network "Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network
Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In
contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log
includes every measurable event from an Attester, including includes every measurable event from an Attester, including
the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope
of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS
events and IMA events."; events and IMA events.";
list boot-event-entry { list boot-event-entry {
key event-number; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs "Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs
by event-number, using the IMA event format."; by event-number, using the IMA event format.";
uses ima-event; uses ima-event;
} }
} }
grouping event-logs { grouping event-logs {
description description
"A selector for the log and its type."; "A selector for the log and its type.";
choice attested_event_log_type { choice attested_event_log_type {
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Event log type determines the event logs content."; "Event log type determines the event logs content.";
case bios { case bios {
if-feature "bios"; if-feature "bios";
skipping to change at page 23, line 16 skipping to change at page 23, line 15
input { input {
container tpm12-attestation-challenge { container tpm12-attestation-challenge {
description description
"This container includes every information element defined "This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 1.2 structure definitions"; TPM 1.2 structure definitions";
uses tpm12-pcr-selection; uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
uses nonce; uses nonce;
leaf-list certificate-name { leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:tpms"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']" + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/" + "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" { + "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
error-message "Not an available TPM1.2 AIK certificate."; error-message "Not an available TPM1.2 AIK certificate.";
} }
description description
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the "When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with these certificate(s)."; TPMs associated with these certificate(s).";
skipping to change at page 23, line 51 skipping to change at page 23, line 50
uses tpm12-attestation; uses tpm12-attestation;
} }
} }
} }
rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation { rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
description description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG
module to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices, module is used to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,
e.g. smart NICs, is still a TODO."; e.g. smart NICs, is not covered.";
input { input {
container tpm20-attestation-challenge { container tpm20-attestation-challenge {
description description
"This container includes every information element defined "This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 2.0 structure definitions"; TPM 2.0 structure definitions";
uses nonce; uses nonce;
uses tpm20-pcr-selection; uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
leaf-list certificate-name { leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:tpms"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']" + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/" + "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" { + "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate."; error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate.";
} }
description description
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the "When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with the certificates."; TPMs associated with the certificates.";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
list tpm20-attestation-response { list tpm20-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name"; unique "certificate-name";
description description
"The binary output of TPM2b_Quote in one TPM chip of the "The binary output of TPM2b_Quote from one TPM of the
node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure
including a length, encapsulated in a signature"; including a length, encapsulated in a signature";
uses certificate-name-ref { uses certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation."; "Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation.";
} }
uses tpm20-attestation; uses tpm20-attestation;
} }
} }
} }
rpc log-retrieval { rpc log-retrieval {
description description
"Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing "Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing
the last line received. The number of lines returned can be the last line received. The number of lines returned can be
limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented."; limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.";
input { input {
uses log-identifier;
list log-selector { list log-selector {
description description
"Selection of log entries to be reported."; "Only log entries which meet all the selection criteria provided
uses tpm-name-selector; are to be returned by the RPC output.";
leaf-list name {
type string;
description
"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this object
exists, a selection should pull only the objects related to
these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all qualifying TPMs that
are 'hardware-based' equals true on the device are selected.";
}
choice index-type { choice index-type {
description description
"Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp."; "Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp.";
case last-entry { case last-entry {
description description
"The last entry of the log already retrieved."; "The last entry of the log already retrieved.";
leaf last-entry-value { leaf last-entry-value {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Content of an log event which matches 1:1 with a "Content of a log event which matches 1:1 with a
unique event record contained within the log. Log unique event record contained within the log. Log
entries subsequent to this will be passed to the entries after this will be passed to the
requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique, requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique,
this MUST return an error."; this MUST return an error.";
} }
} }
case index { case index {
description description
"Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or "Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or
zero."; zero.";
leaf last-index-number { leaf last-index-number {
type uint64; type uint64;
description description
"The last numeric index number of a log entry. "The last numeric index number of a log entry.
Zero means to start at the beginning of the log. Zero means to start at the beginning of the log.
Entries subsequent to this will be passed to the Entries after this will be passed to the
requester."; requester.";
} }
} }
case timestamp { case timestamp {
leaf timestamp { leaf timestamp {
type yang:date-and-time; type yang:date-and-time;
description description
"Timestamp from which to start the extraction. The "Timestamp from which to start the extraction. The
next log entry subsequent to this timestamp is to next log entry after this timestamp is to
be sent."; be sent.";
} }
description description
"Timestamp from which to start the extraction."; "Timestamp from which to start the extraction.";
} }
} }
leaf log-entry-quantity { leaf log-entry-quantity {
type uint16; type uint16;
description description
"The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it "The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it
means all of them."; means all of them.";
} }
} }
uses log-identifier;
} }
output { output {
container system-event-logs { container system-event-logs {
description description
"The requested data of the measurement event logs"; "The requested data of the measurement event logs";
list node-data { list node-data {
unique "name"; unique "name";
description description
"Event logs of a node in a distributed system "Event logs of a node in a distributed system
identified by the node name"; identified by the node name";
skipping to change at page 26, line 40 skipping to change at page 26, line 47
/**************************************/ /**************************************/
/* Config & Oper accessible nodes */ /* Config & Oper accessible nodes */
/**************************************/ /**************************************/
container rats-support-structures { container rats-support-structures {
description description
"The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying "The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying
parties to discover the information necessary to use the parties to discover the information necessary to use the
remote attestation RPCs appropriately."; remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";
container compute-nodes { container compute-nodes {
if-feature "tpm:tpms"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
description description
"Holds the set device subsystems/components in this composite "Holds the set of device subsystems/components in this
device that support TPM operations."; composite device that support TPM operations.";
list compute-node { list compute-node {
key "node-id"; key "node-id";
unique "node-name";
config false; config false;
min-elements 2; min-elements 2;
description description
"A component within this composite device which "A component within this composite device which
supports TPM operations."; supports TPM operations.";
leaf node-id { leaf node-id {
type string; type string;
description description
"ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number."; "ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number.";
} }
skipping to change at page 27, line 44 skipping to change at page 28, line 4
list tpm { list tpm {
key "name"; key "name";
unique "path"; unique "path";
description description
"A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS "A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS
can be conducted with."; can be conducted with.";
uses tpm-name; uses tpm-name;
leaf hardware-based { leaf hardware-based {
type boolean; type boolean;
config false; config false;
mandatory true;
description description
"Answers the question: is this TPM is a hardware based "System generated indication of whether this is a
TPM?"; hardware based TPM.";
} }
leaf physical-index { leaf physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib"; if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 { type int32 {
range "1..2147483647"; range "1..2147483647";
} }
config false; config false;
description description
"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM."; "The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
reference reference
"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex"; "RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
} }
leaf path { leaf path {
type string; type string;
config false; config false;
skipping to change at page 28, line 16 skipping to change at page 28, line 24
config false; config false;
description description
"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM."; "The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
reference reference
"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex"; "RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
} }
leaf path { leaf path {
type string; type string;
config false; config false;
description description
"Path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change across "Device path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change
reboots."; across reboots.";
} }
leaf compute-node { leaf compute-node {
if-feature "tpm:tpms"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type compute-node-ref; type compute-node-ref;
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM."; "Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM.";
} }
leaf manufacturer { leaf manufacturer {
type string; type string;
config false; config false;
description description
skipping to change at page 29, line 28 skipping to change at page 29, line 37
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo { leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures' must '/tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos' + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' { + '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
"This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme actively being used to hash a "The hash scheme actively being used to hash a
one or more TPM2.0 PCRs."; one or more TPM2.0 PCRs.";
} }
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type tpm:pcr; type tpm:pcr;
description description
"Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted."; "Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted.";
} }
} }
leaf status { leaf status {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum operational { enum operational {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"The TPM currently is currently running normally and "The TPM currently is running normally and
is ready to accept and process TPM quotes."; is ready to accept and process TPM quotes.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Arch: "TPM2.0-Arch:
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.07-2014-03-13.pdf https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf
Section 12"; Section 12";
} }
enum non-operational { enum non-operational {
value 1; value 1;
description description
"TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which "TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which
precludes the processing of TPM quotes."; precludes the processing of TPM quotes.";
} }
} }
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
skipping to change at page 30, line 21 skipping to change at page 30, line 29
} }
} }
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"TPM chip self-test status."; "TPM chip self-test status.";
} }
container certificates { container certificates {
description description
"The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates "The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates
and AK certificates."; and Attestation Key certificates.";
list certificate { list certificate {
key "name"; key "name";
description description
"Three types of certificates can be accessed via "Three types of certificates can be accessed via
this statement, including Initial Attestation this statement, including Initial Attestation
Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or
Endorsement Key Certificate."; Endorsement Key Certificate.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate "An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate
associated within key within a TPM."; associated within key within a TPM.";
} }
leaf keystore-ref { leaf keystore-ref {
if-feature "ks:asymmetric-keys";
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
+ "/ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name"; + "/ks:name";
} }
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate of an "A reference to a specific certificate of an
asymmetric key in the Keystore."; asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
} }
leaf type { leaf type {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum endorsement-certificate { enum endorsement-certificate {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type."; "Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
skipping to change at page 31, line 4 skipping to change at page 31, line 15
} }
leaf type { leaf type {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum endorsement-certificate { enum endorsement-certificate {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type."; "Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf
Section 3.11"; Section 3.11";
} }
enum initial-attestation-certificate { enum initial-attestation-certificate {
value 1; value 1;
description description
"Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type."; "Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf
Section 3.2"; Section 3.2";
} }
enum local-attestation-certificate { enum local-attestation-certificate {
value 2; value 2;
description description
"Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type."; "Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf
Section 3.2"; Section 3.2";
} }
} }
description description
"Function supported by this certificate from within the "Function supported by this certificate from within the
TPM."; TPM.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
skipping to change at page 32, line 42 skipping to change at page 33, line 11
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
Figure 1 Figure 1
2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' 2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs'
This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of
[TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a [TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a
separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other
YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific
references to [RFC7748], [ISO-IEC-9797-1], [ISO-IEC-9797-2], references to [RFC2104], [RFC8017], [ISO-IEC-9797-1],
[ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3], [ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-9797-2], [ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3],
[ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3], [IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3],
[IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202], [NIST-SP800-38C], [IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202],
[NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F], [NIST-SP800-56A], [NIST-SP800-38C], [NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F],
[NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], [ima-log], and [netequip-boot-log] [NIST-SP800-56A], [NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], [ima-log], as well as
exist within the YANG Model. Appendix A and Appendix B exist within the YANG Model.
2.1.2.1. Features 2.1.2.1. Features
There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'. There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'.
Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor
supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an
Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be
available on an Attester. available on an Attester.
2.1.2.2. Identities 2.1.2.2. Identities
There are three types of identities in this model: There are three types of identities in this model:
1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these 1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these
include: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing', include: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing',
'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and 'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and
'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2 'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2
of [TCG-Algos]. of [TCG-Algos].
2. API specifications for TPMs: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20' 2. API specifications for TPM types: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'
3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what 3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what
cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of
API specification. It is not required that an implementation of API specification. It is not required that an implementation of
a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of
each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of
[TCG-Algos]. [TCG-Algos].
2.1.2.3. YANG Module 2.1.2.3. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-03-09.yang"
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-02-16.yang"
module ietf-tcg-algs { module ietf-tcg-algs {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs";
prefix taa; prefix taa;
organization organization
"IETF RATS Working Group"; "IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/> "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>"; Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";
description description
"This module defines a identities for asymmetric algorithms. "This module defines identities for asymmetric algorithms.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved. as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
skipping to change at page 34, line 21 skipping to change at page 34, line 37
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here."; capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2022-02-16 { revision 2022-03-09 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote "RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
Attestation Procedures using TPMs"; Attestation Procedures using TPMs";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/*****************/ /*****************/
skipping to change at page 34, line 48 skipping to change at page 35, line 16
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf";
} }
feature tpm20 { feature tpm20 {
description description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API "This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch: Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.07-2014-03-13.pdf"; TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Identities */ /* Identities */
/*****************/ /*****************/
identity asymmetric { identity asymmetric {
description description
"A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and "A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and
private key."; private key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2, "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2,
http://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub"; tcg-algorithm-registry/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub";
} }
identity symmetric { identity symmetric {
description description
"A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key."; "A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
} }
identity hash { identity hash {
skipping to change at page 36, line 32 skipping to change at page 36, line 49
identity tpm12 { identity tpm12 {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base cryptoprocessor; base cryptoprocessor;
description description
"Supportable by a TPM1.2."; "Supportable by a TPM1.2.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Structures: "TPM1.2-Structures:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, page 18"; TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
} }
identity tpm20 { identity tpm20 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base cryptoprocessor; base cryptoprocessor;
description description
"Supportable by a TPM2."; "Supportable by a TPM2.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf";
The TCG Algorithm Registry. Table 9";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSA { identity TPM_ALG_RSA {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"RSA algorithm"; "RSA algorithm";
skipping to change at page 37, line 32 skipping to change at page 37, line 48
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base hash; base hash;
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
description description
"SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic "SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic
protection. However it is still useful for hash algorithms protection. However, it is still useful for hash algorithms
where protection is not required."; where protection is not required.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_HMAC { identity TPM_ALG_HMAC {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm"; "Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2014. ALG_ID: 0x0005"; ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2104. ALG_ID: 0x0005";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_AES {
identity TPM_ALG_AES {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The AES algorithm with various key sizes"; "The AES algorithm with various key sizes";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006";
} }
skipping to change at page 38, line 41 skipping to change at page 39, line 9
base hash; base hash;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These "An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These
may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may
also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor
encrypting."; encrypting.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
ALG_ID: 0x0008"; ALG_ID: 0x0008";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_XOR { identity TPM_ALG_XOR {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The XOR encryption algorithm."; "The XOR encryption algorithm.";
reference reference
skipping to change at page 39, line 19 skipping to change at page 39, line 35
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 256 algorithm"; "The SHA 256 algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 384 algorithm"; "The SHA 384 algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 512 algorithm"; "The SHA 512 algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_NULL { identity TPM_ALG_NULL {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
description description
"NULL algorithm"; "NULL algorithm";
skipping to change at page 40, line 22 skipping to change at page 40, line 39
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM4 { identity TPM_ALG_SM4 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"SM4 symmetric block cipher"; "SM4 symmetric block cipher";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0013"; ALG_ID: 0x0013";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA { identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2 (RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)"; "RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2
(RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSAES { identity TPM_ALG_RSAES {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)"; "RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS { identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)"; "Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)";
reference reference
skipping to change at page 41, line 46 skipping to change at page 42, line 16
identity TPM_ALG_ECDH { identity TPM_ALG_ECDH {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base method; base method;
description description
"Secret sharing using ECC"; "Secret sharing using ECC";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-56A and RFC 7748. ALG_ID: 0x0019"; NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x0019";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA { identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base anonymous_signing; base anonymous_signing;
description description
"Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme"; "Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme";
skipping to change at page 42, line 27 skipping to change at page 42, line 45
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
base method; base method;
description description
"SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based, "SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based,
signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange
protocol"; protocol";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001B"; ALG_ID: 0x001B";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR { identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature"; "Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001C"; ALG_ID: 0x001C";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV { identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base method; base method;
description description
"Two-phase elliptic-curve key"; "Two-phase elliptic-curve key";
reference reference
skipping to change at page 43, line 20 skipping to change at page 43, line 37
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"Concatenation key derivation function"; "Concatenation key derivation function";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1. NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1.
ALG_ID: 0x0020"; ALG_ID: 0x0020";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 { identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"Key derivation function"; "Key derivation function";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021"; IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021";
} }
skipping to change at page 44, line 4 skipping to change at page 44, line 21
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"Prime field ECC"; "Prime field ECC";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023"; ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER { identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric;
description description
"Object type for a symmetric block cipher"; "Object type for a symmetric block cipher";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025"; TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA { identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The Camellia algorithm"; "The Camellia algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm"; "ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027"; NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
} }
skipping to change at page 46, line 22 skipping to change at page 46, line 39
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Cipher Feedback mode"; "Cipher Feedback mode";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECB { identity TPM_ALG_ECB {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Electronic Codebook mode"; "Electronic Codebook mode";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CCM { identity TPM_ALG_CCM {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication "Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication
Code (CCM)"; Code (CCM)";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050"; NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_GCM { identity TPM_ALG_GCM {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
skipping to change at page 47, line 38 skipping to change at page 48, line 8
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)"; "AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_EAX { identity TPM_ALG_EAX {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Authenticated-Encryption Mode"; "Authenticated-Encryption Mode";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054";
skipping to change at page 48, line 18 skipping to change at page 48, line 36
description description
"Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)"; "Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060"; RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060";
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by
ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang. However the full definition of "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang". However the full definition of
Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG
specifications. specifications.
3. IANA Considerations 3. IANA Considerations
This document registers the following namespace URIs in the This document registers the following namespace URIs in the
[xml-registry] as per [RFC3688]: [xml-registry] as per [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
skipping to change at page 49, line 32 skipping to change at page 49, line 50
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_) in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability: as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:
Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1 Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1
2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing', 2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing',
and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are
not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the
equipment vendor. equipment vendor. A vendor should restrict the ability to
configure unsupported algorithms.
Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown
as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore it should not be as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore, it should not be
possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the
configuration. configuration.
'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction 'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction
which are not being extended by system software. This could which are not being extended by system software. This could
unnecessarily use TPM resources. unnecessarily use TPM resources.
'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which 'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which
does not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within does not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within
the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0 the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0
respectively. respectively. In such a case, calls to an RPC requesting this
specific certificate could result in either no response or a
response for an unexpected TPM.
RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': It must be verified that RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC
the certificate is for an active AIK, i.e., the certificate response must verify that the certificate is for an active AIK,
provided is able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2. i.e., the certificate has been confirmed by a third party as being
able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.
RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': It must be verified that RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC
the certificate is for an active AK, i.e., the quote signature response must verify that the certificate is for an active AK,
associated with RPC response has been generated by an entity i.e., the private key confirmation of the quote signature within
legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted TPM 2.0. the RPC response has been confirmed by a third party to belong to
an entity legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted
TPM 2.0.
RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the
attester could require significant system resources and create a attester could require significant system resources and create a
denial of service. denial of service.
Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that
specific versions of software and configurations of endpoints that specific versions of software and configurations of endpoints that
could identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore RPCs could identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore, RPCs
should be protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny- should be protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny-
all to limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized all to limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized
Verifiers. Verifiers.
For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when
selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of
[TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered [TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered
legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate
available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic
research before selecting an algorithm for use. research before selecting an algorithm for use.
5. Change Log 5. References
5.1. Normative References
Changes from version 08 to version 09:
* AD Review comments
Changes from version 08 to version 09:
* Minor formatting tweaks for shepherd. IANA registered.
Changes from version 05 to version 06:
* More YANG Dr comments covered
Changes from version 04 to version 05:
* YANG Dr comments covered
Changes from version 03 to version 04:
* TPM1.2 Quote1 eliminated
* YANG model simplifications so redundant info isn't exposed
Changes from version 02 to version 03:
* moved to tcg-algs
* cleaned up model to eliminate sources of errors
* removed key establishment RPC
* added lots of XPATH which must all be scrubbed still
* Descriptive text added on model contents.
Changes from version 01 to version 02:
* Extracted Crypto-types into a separate YANG file
* Mades the algorithms explicit, not strings
* Hash Algo as key the selected TPM2 PCRs
* PCR numbers are their own type
* Eliminated nested keys for node-id plus tpm-name
* Eliminated TPM-Name of "ALL"
* Added TPM-Path
Changes from version 00 to version 01:
* Addressed author's comments
* Extended complementary details about attestation-certificates
* Relabeled chunk-size to log-entry-quantity
* Relabeled location with compute-node or tpm-name where appropriate
* Added a valid entity-mib physical-index to compute-node and tpm-
name to map it back to hardware inventory
* Relabeled name to tpm_name
* Removed event-string in last-entry
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification, [bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
Section 9.4.5.2", n.d., Section 9.4.5.2", n.d.,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C
lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
>. >.
[BIOS-Log-Event-Type] [BIOS-Log-Event-Type]
"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification",
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp- n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>. content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-23, Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-24,
14 December 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft- 7 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
ietf-netconf-keystore-23.txt>. netconf-keystore-24.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/ 15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>. draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest]
Fedorkow, G., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "TPM- Fedorkow, G., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "TPM-
skipping to change at page 53, line 35 skipping to change at page 52, line 35
[ISO-IEC-9797-1] [ISO-IEC-9797-1]
"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC "Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC
9797-1:2011", n.d., 9797-1:2011", n.d.,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/50375.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/50375.html>.
[ISO-IEC-9797-2] [ISO-IEC-9797-2]
"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC "Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC
9797-2:2011", n.d., 9797-2:2011", n.d.,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/51618.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/51618.html>.
[netequip-boot-log]
"IMA Policy Kernel Documentation", n.d.,
<https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/
ima_policy>.
[NIST-PUB-FIPS-202] [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202]
"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable- "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
Output Functions", n.d., Output Functions", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/
final>. final>.
[NIST-SP800-108] [NIST-SP800-108]
"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions", n.d., Functions", n.d.,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/ <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
skipping to change at page 54, line 29 skipping to change at page 53, line 23
Methods for Key Wrapping", n.d., Methods for Key Wrapping", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38f/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38f/
final>. final>.
[NIST-SP800-56A] [NIST-SP800-56A]
"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", n.d., Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", n.d.,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev- <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-
3/final>. 3/final>.
[RFC2014] Weinrib, A. and J. Postel, "IRTF Research Group Guidelines [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
and Procedures", BCP 8, RFC 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC2014, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
October 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2014>. DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
skipping to change at page 55, line 18 skipping to change at page 54, line 14
[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M. [RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.
Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933, Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6933>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6933>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
skipping to change at page 56, line 31 skipping to change at page 55, line 26
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>. Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>.
[TPM2.0] TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013, [TPM2.0] TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library- <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-
specification/>. specification/>.
[TPM2.0-Arch] [TPM2.0-Arch]
"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture", "Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture",
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp- n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture- content/uploads/
01.07-2014-03-13.pdf>. TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf>.
[TPM2.0-Key] [TPM2.0-Key]
TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation, TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation,
Rev10", 14 April 2021, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/ Rev12", 8 October 2021,
wp-content/uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf>. <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-and-
Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf>.
[TPM2.0-Structures] [TPM2.0-Structures]
"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures", "Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures",
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp- n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf>. content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf>.
[xml-registry] [UEFI-Secure-Boot]
"IETF XML Registry", n.d., "Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml- Specification Version 2.9 (March 2021), Section 32.1
registry.xhtml>. (Secure Boot)", n.d.,
<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/
[yang-parameters] UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf>.
"YANG Parameters", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/yang-
parameters.xhtml>.
6.2. Informative References 5.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]
Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference
Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures", Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats- Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-
reference-interaction-models-05, 26 January 2022, reference-interaction-models-05, 26 January 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats- <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-
reference-interaction-models-05.txt>. reference-interaction-models-05.txt>.
[IMA-Kernel-Source]
"Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel
Sourcecode", n.d., <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob
/df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9/security/
integrity/ima/>.
[NIST-915121] [NIST-915121]
"True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is "True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is
important for information security", n.d., important for information security", n.d.,
<https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/ <https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/
get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121>. get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121>.
[xml-registry]
"IETF XML Registry", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml-
registry.xhtml>.
[yang-parameters]
"YANG Parameters", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/yang-
parameters.xhtml>.
Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
IMA extends the principles of Measured Boot [TPM2.0-Arch] and Secure
Boot [UEFI-Secure-Boot] to the Linux operating system, applying it to
operating system applications and files. IMA has been part of the
Linux integrity subsystem of the Linux kernel since 2009 (kernel
version 2.6.30). The IMA mechanism represented by the YANG module in
this specification is rooted in the kernel version 5.16
[IMA-Kernel-Source]. IMA enables the protection of system integrity
by collecting (commonly referred to as measuring) and storing
measurements (called Claims in the context of IETF RATS) of files
before execution so that these measurements can be used later, at
system runtime, in remote attestation procedures. IMA acts in
support of the appraisal of Evidence (which includes measurement
Claims) by leveraging reference integrity measurements stored in
extended file attributes.
In support of the appraisal of Evidence, IMA maintains an ordered
list of measurements in kernel-space, the Stored Measurement Log
(SML), for all files that have been measured before execution since
the operating system was started. Although IMA can be used without a
TPM, it is typically used in conjunction with a TPM to anchor the
integrity of the SML in a hardware-protected secure storage location,
i.e., Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) provided by TPMs. IMA
provides the SML in both binary and ASCII representations in the
Linux security file system _securityfs_ ("/sys/kernel/security/
ima/").
IMA templates define the format of the SML, i.e., which fields are
included in a log record. Examples are file path, file hash, user
ID, group ID, file signature, and extended file attributes. IMA
comes with a set of predefined template formats and also allows a
custom format, i.e., a format consisting of template fields supported
by IMA. Template usage is typically determined by boot arguments
passed to the kernel. Alternatively, the format can also be hard-
compiled into custom kernels. IMA templates and fields are
extensible in the kernel source code. As a result, more template
fields can be added in the future.
IMA policies define which files are measured using the IMA policy
language. Built-in policies can be passed as boot arguments to the
kernel. Custom IMA policies can be defined once during runtime or be
hard-compiled into a custom kernel. If no policy is defined, no
measurements are taken and IMA is effectively disabled.
Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs
Network equipment can generally implement similar IMA-protected
functions to generate measurements (Claims) about the boot process of
a device and enable corresponding remote attestation. Network
Equipment Boot Logs combine the measurement and logging of boot
components and operating system components (executables and files)
into a single log file in identical IMA format.
During the boot process of the network device, i.e., from BIOS to the
end of the operating system and user-space, all files executed during
this process can be measured and logged in the order of their
execution. When the Verifier initiates a remote attestation process
(e.g., challenge-response remote attestation as defined in this
document), the network equipment takes on the role of an Attester and
can convey to the Verifier Claims that comprise the measurement log
as well as the corresponding PCR values (Evidence) of a TPM.
The verifier can appraise the integrity (compliance with the
Reference Values) of each executed file by comparing its measured
value with the Reference Value. Based on the execution order, the
Verifier can compute a PCR reference value (by replaying the log) and
compare it to the Measurement Log Claims obtained in conjunction with
the PCR Evidence to assess their trustworthiness with respect to an
intended operational state.
Not only during the operating system loading phase, even during the
BIOS boot phase, network equipment usually executes multiple
components. With this measurement log mechanism, network equipment
can take on the role of an Attester, proving to the Verifier the
trustworthiness of its boot process. Using the measurement log,
Verifiers can precisely identify mismatching log entries to infer
potentially tampered components.
This mechanism also supports scenarios that modify files on the
Attester and are executed during the boot phase (e.g., updating/
patching) by simply updating the appropriate Reference Values in
Reference Integrity Manifests that inform Verifiers about how an
Attester is composed.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Henk Birkholz Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75 Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt 64295 Darmstadt
Germany Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Michael Eckel Michael Eckel
Fraunhofer SIT Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75 Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt 64295 Darmstadt
Germany Germany
Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de
Shwetha Bhandari Shwetha Bhandari
ThoughtSpot ThoughtSpot
Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
Eric Voit Eric Voit
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: evoit@cisco.com Email: evoit@cisco.com
Bill Sulzen Bill Sulzen
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: bsulzen@cisco.com Email: bsulzen@cisco.com
Liang Xia (Frank) Liang Xia (Frank)
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District 101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing Nanjing
Jiangsu, 210012 Jiangsu, 210012
China China
Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
Tom Laffey Tom Laffey
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com
Guy C. Fedorkow Guy C. Fedorkow
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive 10 Technology Park Drive
Westford Westford
Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
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