draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-16.txt		draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-17.txt
	RATS Working Group H. Birkholz		RATS Working Group H. Birkholz
	Internet-Draft M. Eckel		Internet-Draft M. Eckel
	Intended status: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT		Intended status: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT
	Expires: 3 September 2022 S. Bhandari		Expires: 17 September 2022 S. Bhandari
	ThoughtSpot		ThoughtSpot
	E. Voit		E. Voit
	B. Sulzen		B. Sulzen
	Cisco		Cisco
	L. Xia		L. Xia
	Huawei		Huawei
	T. Laffey		T. Laffey
	HPE		HPE
	G. Fedorkow		G. Fedorkow
	Juniper		Juniper
	2 March 2022		16 March 2022
	A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation		A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation
	Procedures using TPMs		Procedures using TPMs
	draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-16		draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-17
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines YANG RPCs and a small number of configuration		This document defines YANG RPCs and a few configuration nodes
	nodes required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity		required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity
	measurements from a device, following the operational context defined		measurements from a device, following the operational context defined
	in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification.		in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification.
	Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPCs,		Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPCs,
	originating from one or more roots of trust for measurement (RTMs).		originating from one or more roots of trust for measurement (RTMs).
	The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well		The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well
	as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware		as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware
	implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided		implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided
	by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the		by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the
	device components of the composite device the YANG server is running		device components of the composite device the YANG server is running
	on.		on.
	skipping to change at page 2, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 10 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 September 2022.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 September 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
	license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.		license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as		extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
	described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are		as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
	provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.		provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures . . . 3		2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures . . . 3
	2.1. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.1. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48		3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
	5. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50		5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
	6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
	6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51		5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
	6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57		Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) . . . . . . 56
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57		Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs . . . . . . . . 57
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document is based on the general terminology defined in the		This document is based on the general terminology defined in the
	[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and uses the operational context defined		[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and uses the operational context defined
	in [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] as well as the		in [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] as well as the
	interaction model and information elements defined in		interaction model and information elements defined in
	[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. The currently		[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. The currently
	supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the Trusted Platform		supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the Trusted Platform
	Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] and [TPM2.0] as specified by the Trusted		Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] and [TPM2.0] as specified by the Trusted
	Computing Group (TCG). One or more TPMs embedded in the components		Computing Group (TCG). One TPM, or multiple TPMs in the case of a
	of a Composite Device are required in order to use the YANG module		Composite Device, are required in order to use the YANG module
	defined in this document. A TPM is used as a root of trust for		defined in this document. Each TPM is used as a root of trust for
	reporting (RTR) in order to retrieve attestation Evidence from a		storage (RTS) in order to store system security measurement Evidence.
	composite device (_TPM Quote_ primitive operation). Additionally, it		And each TPM is used as a root of trust for reporting (RTR) in order
	is used as a root of trust for storage (RTS) in order to retain		to retrieve attestation Evidence. This is done by using a YANG RPC
	shielded secrets and store system measurements using a folding hash		to request a quote which exposes a rolling hash the security
	function (_TPM PCR Extend_ primitive operation).		measurements held internally within the TPM.
	Specific terms imported from [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and used in		Specific terms imported from [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] and used in
	this document include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence.		this document include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence.
	Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document		Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document
	include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK), Local		include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK),
	Attestation Key (LAK).		Attestation Identity Key (AIK), Local Attestation Key (LAK).
	1.1. Requirements notation		1.1. Requirements notation
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures		2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures
	One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides		One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides
	attestation evidence via the YANG module defined in this document.		attestation evidence via the YANG module defined in this document.
	The ietf-basic-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite		The ietf-tpm-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite
	device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the		device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the
	Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture		Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture
	[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture], and the corresponding challenge-		[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture], and the corresponding challenge-
	response interaction model defined in the		response interaction model defined in the
	[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] document. A fresh nonce		[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] document. A fresh nonce
	with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be supplied		with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be supplied
	by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with		by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with
	respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running		respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running
	the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay		the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay
	attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each		attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each
	skipping to change at page 4, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 10 ¶
	2.1. YANG Modules		2.1. YANG Modules
	In this section the several YANG modules are defined.		In this section the several YANG modules are defined.
	2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation'		2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation'
	This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang',		This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang',
	[RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] with prefix		[RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] with prefix
	'ks', and 'ietf-tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'.		'ks', and 'ietf-tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'.
	Additionally references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933],		Additionally, references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933],
	[TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key],		[TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key],
	[TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [ima-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type] and		[TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [ima-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type], as
	[netequip-boot-log].		well as Appendix A and Appendix B.
	2.1.1.1. Features		2.1.1.1. Features
	This module supports the following features:		This module supports the following features:
	* 'TPMs': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support		* 'mtpm': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support
	remote attestation. This feature is applicable in cases where		remote attestation. For example, this feature could be used in
	multiple line cards are present, each with its own TPM.		cases where multiple line cards are present, each with its own
			TPM.
	* 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/		* 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/
	UEFI event logs. [bios-log]		UEFI event logs. [bios-log]
	* 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event		* 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event
	logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA).		logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA
	[ima-log]		[ima-log]). Also see Appendix A.
	* 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval		* 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval
	of netequip boot event logs. [netequip-boot-log]		of netequip boot event logs. See Appendix A and Appendix B.
	2.1.1.2. Identities		2.1.1.2. Identities
	This module supports the following types of attestation event logs:		This module supports the following types of attestation event logs:
	'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.		'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.
	2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)		2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)
	In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation		In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation
	procedures are defined.		procedures are defined.
	2.1.1.3.1. 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation'		2.1.1.3.1. 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation'
	This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_		This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
	operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the		operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the
	feature 'TPMs' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not		feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
	provided, all TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A		provided, all TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A
	YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:		YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
	+---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:TPM12}?		+---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm12}?
	+---w input		+---w input
	| +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge		| +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge
	| +---w pcr-index* pcr		| +---w pcr-index* pcr
	| +---w nonce-value binary		| +---w nonce-value binary
	| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref {tpm:TPMs}?		| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
	+--ro output		| {tpm:mtpm}?
	+--ro tpm12-attestation-response* []		+--ro output
	+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref		+--ro tpm12-attestation-response* []
	+--ro up-time? uint32		+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
	+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary		+--ro up-time? uint32
			+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary
	2.1.1.3.2. 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation'		2.1.1.3.2. 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation'
	This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_		This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
	operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the		operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the
	feature 'TPMs' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not		feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
	provided, all TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A		provided, all TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A
	YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:		YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
	+---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:TPM20}?		+---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm20}?
	+---w input		+---w input
	| +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge		| +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge
	| +---w nonce-value binary		| +---w nonce-value binary
	| +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* []		| +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* []
	| | +---w TPM20-hash-algo? identityref		| | +---w tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
	| | +---w pcr-index* tpm:pcr		| | +---w pcr-index* pcr
	| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref {tpm:TPMs}?		| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
			| {tpm:mtpm}?
	+--ro output		+--ro output
	+--ro tpm20-attestation-response* []		+--ro tpm20-attestation-response* []
	+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref		+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
	+--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary		+--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary
	+--ro quote-signature? binary		+--ro quote-signature? binary
	+--ro up-time? uint32		+--ro up-time? uint32
	+--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []		+--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
	+--ro TPM20-hash-algo? identityref		+--ro tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
	+--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]		+--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]
	+--ro pcr-index pcr		+--ro pcr-index pcr
	+--ro pcr-value? binary		+--ro pcr-value? binary
	An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256		An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256
	bank could look like the following:		bank could look like the following:
	<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">		<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
	<tpm20-challenge-response-attestation>		<tpm20-challenge-response-attestation>
	xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">		xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
	skipping to change at page 7, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 13 ¶
	</rpc-reply>		</rpc-reply>
	2.1.1.4. 'log-retrieval'		2.1.1.4. 'log-retrieval'
	This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the evidence which was extended		This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the evidence which was extended
	into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as		into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as
	follows:		follows:
	+---x log-retrieval		+---x log-retrieval
	+---w input		+---w input
	| +---w log-selector* []
	| | +---w name* string
	| | +---w (index-type)?
	| | | +--:(last-entry)
	| | | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
	| | | +--:(index)
	| | | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
	| | | +--:(timestamp)
	| | | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time
	| | +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16
	| +---w log-type identityref		| +---w log-type identityref
			| +---w log-selector* []
			| +---w name* string
			| +---w (index-type)?
			| | +--:(last-entry)
			| | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
			| | +--:(index)
			| | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
			| | +--:(timestamp)
			| | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time
			| +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16
	+--ro output		+--ro output
	+--ro system-event-logs		+--ro system-event-logs
	+--ro node-data* []		+--ro node-data* []
	+--ro name? string		+--ro name? string
	+--ro up-time? uint32		+--ro up-time? uint32
	+--ro log-result		+--ro log-result
	+--ro (attested_event_log_type)		+--ro (attested_event_log_type)
	+--:(bios) {bios}?		+--:(bios) {bios}?
	| +--ro bios-event-logs		| +--ro bios-event-logs
	| +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]		| +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]
	| +--ro event-number uint32		| +--ro event-number uint32
	| +--ro event-type? uint32		| +--ro event-type? uint32
	| +--ro pcr-index? pcr		| +--ro pcr-index? pcr
	| +--ro digest-list* []		| +--ro digest-list* []
	| | +--ro hash-algo? identityref		| | +--ro hash-algo? identityref
	| | +--ro digest* binary		| | +--ro digest* binary
	| +--ro event-size? uint32		| +--ro event-size? uint32
	| +--ro event-data* uint8		| +--ro event-data* binary
	+--:(ima) {ima}?		+--:(ima) {ima}?
	| +--ro ima-event-logs		| +--ro ima-event-logs
	| +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]		| +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]
	| +--ro event-number uint64		| +--ro event-number uint64
	| +--ro ima-template? string		| +--ro ima-template? string
	| +--ro filename-hint? string		| +--ro filename-hint? string
	| +--ro filedata-hash? binary		| +--ro filedata-hash? binary
	| +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string		| +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
	| +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string		| +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
	| +--ro template-hash? binary		| +--ro template-hash? binary
	skipping to change at page 8, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 26 ¶
	+--ro signature? binary		+--ro signature? binary
	2.1.1.5. Data Nodes		2.1.1.5. Data Nodes
	This section provides a high level description of the data nodes		This section provides a high level description of the data nodes
	containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG		containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG
	model. For more details, please see the YANG model itself in		model. For more details, please see the YANG model itself in
	Figure 1.		Figure 1.
	Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of		Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of
	information relating to a device's TPM(s).		information relating to remote attestation for a device. This
			includes specific device TPM(s), the compute nodes (such as line
			cards) on which the TPM(s) reside, and the algorithms supported
			across the platform.
	Container 'tpms': Provides configuration and operational details for		Container 'tpms': Provides configuration and operational details for
	each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which		each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which
	may be quoted, certificates which are associated with that TPM,		may be quoted, certificates which are associated with that TPM,
	and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates		and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates
	which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is		which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is
	associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the		associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the
	certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified.		certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified.
	+--rw tpms		+--rw tpms
	+--rw tpm* [name]		+--rw tpm* [name]
	+--rw name string		+--rw name string
	+--ro hardware-based? boolean		+--ro hardware-based boolean
	+--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?		+--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
	+--ro path? string		+--ro path? string
	+--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:tpms}?		+--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:mtpm}?
	+--ro manufacturer? string		+--ro manufacturer? string
	+--rw firmware-version identityref		+--rw firmware-version identityref
	+--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref		+--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref
	+--rw tpm12-pcrs* pcr		+--rw tpm12-pcrs* pcr
	+--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo]		+--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo]
	| +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref		| +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref
	| +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr		| +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr
	+--ro status enumeration		+--ro status enumeration
	+--rw certificates		+--rw certificates
	+--rw certificate* [name]		+--rw certificate* [name]
	+--rw name string		+--rw name string
	+--rw keystore-ref? leafref		+--rw keystore-ref? leafref {ks:asymmetric-keys}?
	+--rw type? enumeration		+--rw type? enumeration
	container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash		container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash
	algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. This		algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. This
	allows an operator to limit algorithms available for use by RPCs to		allows an operator to limit algorithms available for use by RPCs to
	just a desired set from the universe of all allowed hash algorithms		just a desired set from the universe of all allowed hash algorithms
	by the TCG.		by the TCG.
	+--rw attester-supported-algos		+--rw attester-supported-algos
	+--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref		+--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref
	+--rw tpm12-hash* identityref		+--rw tpm12-hash* identityref
	+--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref		+--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref
	+--rw tpm20-hash* identityref		+--rw tpm20-hash* identityref
	container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM		container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM
	supported, this container maintains the set of information related to		supported, this container maintains the set of information related to
	the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows each		the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows each
	specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs.		specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs.
	+--rw compute-nodes {tpm:TPMs}?		+--rw compute-nodes {tpm:mtpm}?
	+--ro compute-node* [node-id]		+--ro compute-node* [node-id]
	+--ro node-id string		+--ro node-id string
	+--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?		+--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
	+--ro node-name? string		+--ro node-name? string
	+--ro node-location? string		+--ro node-location? string
	2.1.1.6. YANG Module		2.1.1.6. YANG Module
	<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2022-02-16.yang"		<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2022-03-15.yang"
	module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation {		module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation {
	namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation";		namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation";
	prefix tpm;		prefix tpm;
	import ietf-yang-types {		import ietf-yang-types {
	prefix yang;		prefix yang;
	}		}
	import ietf-hardware {		import ietf-hardware {
	prefix hw;		prefix hw;
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 11, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 12 ¶
	This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX		This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
	(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC		(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
	itself for full legal notices.		itself for full legal notices.
	The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL		The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
	NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',		NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
	'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as		'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
	described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,		described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
	they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";		they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
	revision 2022-03-02 {		revision 2022-03-15 {
	description		description
	"Initial version";		"Initial version";
	reference		reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote		"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
	Attestation Procedures using TPMs";		Attestation Procedures using TPMs";
	}		}
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	/* Features */		/* Features */
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	feature tpms {		feature mtpm {
	description		description
	"The device supports the remote attestation of multiple		"The device supports the remote attestation of multiple
	TPM based cryptoprocessors.";		TPM based cryptoprocessors.";
	}		}
	feature bios {		feature bios {
	description		description
	"The device supports the bios logs.";		"The device supports the bios logs.";
	reference		reference
	"bios-log:		"bios-log:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf		PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
	Section 9.4.5.2";		Section 9.4.5.2";
	}		}
	feature ima {		feature ima {
	description		description
	"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.		"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.
	Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes		Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes
	the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get		the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get
	hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for		hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for
	one example of such an encoding.";		one example of such an encoding.";
	reference		reference
	"ima-log:		"ima-log:
	https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf Section 4.3";		TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3";
	}		}
	feature netequip_boot {		feature netequip_boot {
	description		description
	"The device supports the netequip_boot logs.";		"The device supports the netequip_boot logs.";
	reference		reference
	"netequip-boot-log:		"netequip-boot-log:
	https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy";		https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy";
	}		}
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	/* Typedefs */		/* Typedefs */
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	typedef pcr {		typedef pcr {
	type uint8 {		type uint8 {
	range "0..31";		range "0..31";
	}		}
	description		description
	"Valid index number for a PCR. At this point 0-31 is viable.";		"Valid index number for a PCR. A {{TPM2.0}} compliant PCR index
			extends from 0-31. At this time a typical TPM would have no
			more than 32 PCRS.";
	}		}
	typedef compute-node-ref {		typedef compute-node-ref {
	type leafref {		type leafref {
	path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes"		path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes"
	+ "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-name";		+ "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-name";
	}		}
	description		description
	"This type is used to reference a hardware node. It is quite		"This type is used to reference a hardware node. Note that an
	possible this leafref will eventually point to another YANG		implementer might include an alternative leafref pointing to a
	module's node.";		different YANG module node specifying hardware structures.";
	}		}
	typedef certificate-name-ref {		typedef certificate-name-ref {
	type leafref {		type leafref {
	path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm"		path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm"
	+ "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name";		+ "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name";
	}		}
	description		description
	"A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate.";		"A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate.";
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 13, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 44 ¶
	leaf tpm20-hash-algo {		leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
	type identityref {		type identityref {
	base taa:hash;		base taa:hash;
	}		}
	must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'		must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
	+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {		+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
	error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";		error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
	}		}
	default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256";		default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256";
	description		description
	"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This		"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM2.0 PCR. This
	must be one of those supported by a platform.";		must be one of those supported by a platform.";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping tpm12-hash-algo {		grouping tpm12-hash-algo {
	description		description
	"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs.";		"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs.";
	leaf tpm12-hash-algo {		leaf tpm12-hash-algo {
	type identityref {		type identityref {
	base taa:hash;		base taa:hash;
	}		}
	must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'		must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
	+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {		+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
	error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";		error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";
	}		}
	default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";		default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";
	description		description
	skipping to change at page 14, line 13 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 16 ¶
	type identityref {		type identityref {
	base taa:hash;		base taa:hash;
	}		}
	must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'		must '/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
	+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {		+ '/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
	error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";		error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo";
	}		}
	default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";		default "taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1";
	description		description
	"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This		"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This
	MUST be one of those supported by a platform. This assumes		MUST be one of those supported by a platform.";
	that an algorithm other than SHA1 can be supported on some
	TPM1.2 cryptoprocessor variant.";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping nonce {		grouping nonce {
	description		description
	"A random number intended to be used once to show freshness		"A random number intended to guarantee freshness and for use
	and to allow the detection of replay attacks.";		as part of a replay-detection mechanism.";
	leaf nonce-value {		leaf nonce-value {
	type binary;		type binary;
	mandatory true;		mandatory true;
	description		description
	"A cryptographically generated random number which should		"A cryptographically generated random number which should
	not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random		not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random
	number generation function. The random number MUST be		number generation function. The random number MUST be
	derived from an entropy source external to the Attester.		derived from an entropy source external to the Attester.
	Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256		Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256
	binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer		binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer
	binary are sent, this nonce object will be padded		binary digits are sent, this nonce object will be padded
	with leading zeros any in Quotes returned from the TPM.		with leading zeros within Quotes returned from the TPM.
	Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed		Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed
	to the most significant binary digits.";		to the most significant binary digits.";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {		grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {
	description		description
	"A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its		"A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its
	individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).		individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).
	The corresponding selection filter is represented in this		The corresponding selection filter is represented in this
	grouping.		grouping.";
	Requesting a PCR value that is not in scope of the AC used,
	detailed exposure via error msg should be avoided.";
	leaf-list pcr-index {		leaf-list pcr-index {
	type pcr;		type pcr;
	description		description
	"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. At the moment this is limited		"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection
	to 32. In addition, any selection of PCRs MUST verify that		of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a
	the set of PCRs requested are a subset the set of PCRs		subset the set of PCRs exposed by in the leaf-list
	exposed by in the leaf-list /tpm:rats-support-structures		/tpm:rats-support-structures
	/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";		/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {		grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {
	description		description
	"A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed		"A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed
	together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection		together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection
	list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in		list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in
	this grouping.";		this grouping.";
	skipping to change at page 16, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 16, line 19 ¶
	grouping tpm-name {		grouping tpm-name {
	description		description
	"A unique TPM on a device.";		"A unique TPM on a device.";
	leaf name {		leaf name {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device.";		"Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device.";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping tpm-name-selector {
	description
	"One or more TPM on a device.";
	leaf-list name {
	type string;
	config false;
	description
	"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this object
	exists, a selection should pull only the objects related to
	these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all qualifying TPMs that
	are 'hardware-based' equals true on the device are selected.";
	}
	}
	grouping node-uptime {		grouping node-uptime {
	description		description
	"Uptime in seconds of the node.";		"Uptime in seconds of the node.";
	leaf up-time {		leaf up-time {
	type uint32;		type uint32;
	description		description
	"Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data";		"Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data";
	}		}
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 18, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 42 ¶
	"PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with		"PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with
	the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple		the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple
	PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not		PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not
	necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the		necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the
	minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last		minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last
	received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier		received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier
	reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a		reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a
	single PCR has changed?		single PCR has changed?
	To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR		To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR
	values, the Attester can provide these individual values via		values, the Attester can provide these individual values via
	'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to the		'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to
	what has previously been validated, it is possible for a		what has previously been validated, it is possible for a
	Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating		Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating
	significant processing. There should never be a result where
	an unsigned PCR value is actually that that within a quote.		significant processing. Note that there should never be a
			result where an unsigned PCR value differs from what may be
			reconstructed from the within the PCR quote and the event logs.
	If there is a difference, a signed result which has been		If there is a difference, a signed result which has been
	verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive.";		verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive.";
	uses tpm20-hash-algo;		uses tpm20-hash-algo;
	list pcr-values {		list pcr-values {
	key "pcr-index";		key "pcr-index";
	description		description
	"List of one PCR bank.";		"List of one PCR bank.";
	leaf pcr-index {		leaf pcr-index {
	type pcr;		type pcr;
	description		description
	skipping to change at page 19, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 18, line 38 ¶
	"Identifier for type of log to be retrieved.";		"Identifier for type of log to be retrieved.";
	leaf log-type {		leaf log-type {
	type identityref {		type identityref {
	base attested_event_log_type;		base attested_event_log_type;
	}		}
	mandatory true;		mandatory true;
	description		description
	"The corresponding measurement log type identity.";		"The corresponding measurement log type identity.";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping boot-event-log {		grouping boot-event-log {
	description		description
	"Defines a specific instance of an event log entry		"Defines a specific instance of an event log entry
	and corresponding to the information used to		and corresponding to the information used to
	extend the PCR";		extend the PCR";
	leaf event-number {		leaf event-number {
	type uint32;		type uint32;
	description		description
	"Unique event number of this event";		"Unique event number of this event which monotonically
			increases. The maximum event number should not be
			reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number
			supported.";
	}		}
	leaf event-type {		leaf event-type {
	type uint32;		type uint32;
	description		description
	"BIOS Log Event Type:		"BIOS Log Event Type:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";		TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";
	}		}
	leaf pcr-index {		leaf pcr-index {
	type pcr;		type pcr;
	description		description
	"Defines the PCR index that this event extended";		"Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
	}		}
	list digest-list {		list digest-list {
	description		description
	"Hash of event data";		"Hash of event data";
	leaf hash-algo {		leaf hash-algo {
	skipping to change at page 19, line 50 ¶		skipping to change at page 19, line 40 ¶
	"The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the		"The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the
	'hash-algo' against 'event data'.";		'hash-algo' against 'event data'.";
	}		}
	}		}
	leaf event-size {		leaf event-size {
	type uint32;		type uint32;
	description		description
	"Size of the event data";		"Size of the event data";
	}		}
	leaf-list event-data {		leaf-list event-data {
	type uint8;		type binary;
	description		description
	"The event data size determined by event-size";		"The event data size determined by event-size. For more
			see ";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping bios-event-log {		grouping bios-event-log {
	description		description
	"Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";		"Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";
	list bios-event-entry {		list bios-event-entry {
	key event-number;		key "event-number";
	description		description
	"Ordered list of TCG described event log		"Ordered list of TCG described event log
	that extended the PCRs in the order they		that extended the PCRs in the order they
	were logged";		were logged";
	uses boot-event-log;		uses boot-event-log;
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping ima-event {		grouping ima-event {
	description		description
	"Defines an hash log extend event for IMA measurements";		"Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements";
	reference		reference
	"ima-log:		"ima-log:
	https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p30_13feb2021.pdf Section 4.3";		TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3";
	leaf event-number {		leaf event-number {
	type uint64;		type uint64;
	description		description
	"Unique number for this event for sequencing";		"Unique event number of this event which monotonically
			increases. The maximum event number should not be
			reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number
			supported.";
	}		}
	leaf ima-template {		leaf ima-template {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"Name of the template used for event logs		"Name of the template used for event logs
	for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig";		for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig";
	}		}
	leaf filename-hint {		leaf filename-hint {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"File that was measured";		"File that was measured";
	}		}
	leaf filedata-hash {		leaf filedata-hash {
	type binary;		type binary;
	description		description
	"Hash of filedata";		"Hash of filedata as updated based upon the
			filedata-hash-algorithm";
	}		}
	leaf filedata-hash-algorithm {		leaf filedata-hash-algorithm {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"Algorithm used for filedata-hash";		"Algorithm used for filedata-hash";
	}		}
	leaf template-hash-algorithm {		leaf template-hash-algorithm {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"Algorithm used for template-hash";		"Algorithm used for template-hash";
	skipping to change at page 21, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 21, line 19 ¶
	"hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";		"hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";
	}		}
	leaf pcr-index {		leaf pcr-index {
	type pcr;		type pcr;
	description		description
	"Defines the PCR index that this event extended";		"Defines the PCR index that this event extended";
	}		}
	leaf signature {		leaf signature {
	type binary;		type binary;
	description		description
	"The file signature";		"Digital file signature which provides a
			fingerprint for the file being measured.";
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping ima-event-log {		grouping ima-event-log {
	description		description
	"Measurement log created by IMA.";		"Measurement log created by IMA.";
	list ima-event-entry {		list ima-event-entry {
	key event-number;		key "event-number";
	description		description
	"Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number";		"Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number";
	uses ima-event;		uses ima-event;
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log {		grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log {
	description		description
	"Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network		"Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network
	Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In		Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In
	contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log		contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log
	includes every measurable event from an Attester, including		includes every measurable event from an Attester, including
	the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope		the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope
	of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS		of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS
	events and IMA events.";		events and IMA events.";
	list boot-event-entry {		list boot-event-entry {
	key event-number;		key "event-number";
	description		description
	"Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs		"Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs
	by event-number, using the IMA event format.";		by event-number, using the IMA event format.";
	uses ima-event;		uses ima-event;
	}		}
	}		}
	grouping event-logs {		grouping event-logs {
	description		description
	"A selector for the log and its type.";		"A selector for the log and its type.";
	choice attested_event_log_type {		choice attested_event_log_type {
	mandatory true;		mandatory true;
	description		description
	"Event log type determines the event logs content.";		"Event log type determines the event logs content.";
	case bios {		case bios {
	if-feature "bios";		if-feature "bios";
	skipping to change at page 23, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 15 ¶
	input {		input {
	container tpm12-attestation-challenge {		container tpm12-attestation-challenge {
	description		description
	"This container includes every information element defined		"This container includes every information element defined
	in the reference challenge-response interaction model for		in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
	remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on		remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
	TPM 1.2 structure definitions";		TPM 1.2 structure definitions";
	uses tpm12-pcr-selection;		uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
	uses nonce;		uses nonce;
	leaf-list certificate-name {		leaf-list certificate-name {
	if-feature "tpm:tpms";		if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
	type certificate-name-ref;		type certificate-name-ref;
	must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"		must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
	+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"		+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"
	+ "/tpm:certificates/"		+ "/tpm:certificates/"
	+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {		+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
	error-message "Not an available TPM1.2 AIK certificate.";		error-message "Not an available TPM1.2 AIK certificate.";
	}		}
	description		description
	"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the		"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
	TPMs associated with these certificate(s).";		TPMs associated with these certificate(s).";
	skipping to change at page 23, line 51 ¶		skipping to change at page 23, line 50 ¶
	uses tpm12-attestation;		uses tpm12-attestation;
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {		rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
	if-feature "taa:tpm20";		if-feature "taa:tpm20";
	description		description
	"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the		"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
	managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG		managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG
	module to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,		module is used to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,
	e.g. smart NICs, is still a TODO.";		e.g. smart NICs, is not covered.";
	input {		input {
	container tpm20-attestation-challenge {		container tpm20-attestation-challenge {
	description		description
	"This container includes every information element defined		"This container includes every information element defined
	in the reference challenge-response interaction model for		in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
	remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on		remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
	TPM 2.0 structure definitions";		TPM 2.0 structure definitions";
	uses nonce;		uses nonce;
	uses tpm20-pcr-selection;		uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
	leaf-list certificate-name {		leaf-list certificate-name {
	if-feature "tpm:tpms";		if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
	type certificate-name-ref;		type certificate-name-ref;
	must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"		must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
	+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"		+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"
	+ "/tpm:certificates/"		+ "/tpm:certificates/"
	+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {		+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
	error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate.";		error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate.";
	}		}
	description		description
	"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the		"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
	TPMs associated with the certificates.";		TPMs associated with the certificates.";
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	output {		output {
	list tpm20-attestation-response {		list tpm20-attestation-response {
	unique "certificate-name";		unique "certificate-name";
	description		description
	"The binary output of TPM2b_Quote in one TPM chip of the		"The binary output of TPM2b_Quote from one TPM of the
	node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure		node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure
	including a length, encapsulated in a signature";		including a length, encapsulated in a signature";
	uses certificate-name-ref {		uses certificate-name-ref {
	description		description
	"Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation.";		"Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation.";
	}		}
	uses tpm20-attestation;		uses tpm20-attestation;
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	rpc log-retrieval {		rpc log-retrieval {
	description		description
	"Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing		"Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing
	the last line received. The number of lines returned can be		the last line received. The number of lines returned can be
	limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.";		limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.";
	input {		input {
			uses log-identifier;
	list log-selector {		list log-selector {
	description		description
	"Selection of log entries to be reported.";		"Only log entries which meet all the selection criteria provided
	uses tpm-name-selector;		are to be returned by the RPC output.";
			leaf-list name {
			type string;
			description
			"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this object
			exists, a selection should pull only the objects related to
			these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all qualifying TPMs that
			are 'hardware-based' equals true on the device are selected.";
			}
	choice index-type {		choice index-type {
	description		description
	"Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp.";		"Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp.";
	case last-entry {		case last-entry {
	description		description
	"The last entry of the log already retrieved.";		"The last entry of the log already retrieved.";
	leaf last-entry-value {		leaf last-entry-value {
	type binary;		type binary;
	description		description
	"Content of an log event which matches 1:1 with a		"Content of a log event which matches 1:1 with a
	unique event record contained within the log. Log		unique event record contained within the log. Log
	entries subsequent to this will be passed to the		entries after this will be passed to the
	requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique,		requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique,
	this MUST return an error.";		this MUST return an error.";
	}		}
	}		}
	case index {		case index {
	description		description
	"Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or		"Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or
	zero.";		zero.";
	leaf last-index-number {		leaf last-index-number {
	type uint64;		type uint64;
	description		description
	"The last numeric index number of a log entry.		"The last numeric index number of a log entry.
	Zero means to start at the beginning of the log.		Zero means to start at the beginning of the log.
	Entries subsequent to this will be passed to the		Entries after this will be passed to the
	requester.";		requester.";
	}		}
	}		}
	case timestamp {		case timestamp {
	leaf timestamp {		leaf timestamp {
	type yang:date-and-time;		type yang:date-and-time;
	description		description
	"Timestamp from which to start the extraction. The		"Timestamp from which to start the extraction. The
	next log entry subsequent to this timestamp is to		next log entry after this timestamp is to
	be sent.";		be sent.";
	}		}
	description		description
	"Timestamp from which to start the extraction.";		"Timestamp from which to start the extraction.";
	}		}
	}		}
	leaf log-entry-quantity {		leaf log-entry-quantity {
	type uint16;		type uint16;
	description		description
	"The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it		"The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it
	means all of them.";		means all of them.";
	}		}
	}		}
	uses log-identifier;
	}		}
	output {		output {
	container system-event-logs {		container system-event-logs {
	description		description
	"The requested data of the measurement event logs";		"The requested data of the measurement event logs";
	list node-data {		list node-data {
	unique "name";		unique "name";
	description		description
	"Event logs of a node in a distributed system		"Event logs of a node in a distributed system
	identified by the node name";		identified by the node name";
	skipping to change at page 26, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 26, line 47 ¶
	/**************************************/		/**************************************/
	/* Config & Oper accessible nodes */		/* Config & Oper accessible nodes */
	/**************************************/		/**************************************/
	container rats-support-structures {		container rats-support-structures {
	description		description
	"The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying		"The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying
	parties to discover the information necessary to use the		parties to discover the information necessary to use the
	remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";		remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";
	container compute-nodes {		container compute-nodes {
	if-feature "tpm:tpms";		if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
	description		description
	"Holds the set device subsystems/components in this composite		"Holds the set of device subsystems/components in this
	device that support TPM operations.";		composite device that support TPM operations.";
	list compute-node {		list compute-node {
	key "node-id";		key "node-id";
			unique "node-name";
	config false;		config false;
	min-elements 2;		min-elements 2;
	description		description
	"A component within this composite device which		"A component within this composite device which
	supports TPM operations.";		supports TPM operations.";
	leaf node-id {		leaf node-id {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number.";		"ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number.";
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 27, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 4 ¶
	list tpm {		list tpm {
	key "name";		key "name";
	unique "path";		unique "path";
	description		description
	"A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS		"A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS
	can be conducted with.";		can be conducted with.";
	uses tpm-name;		uses tpm-name;
	leaf hardware-based {		leaf hardware-based {
	type boolean;		type boolean;
	config false;		config false;
			mandatory true;
	description		description
	"Answers the question: is this TPM is a hardware based		"System generated indication of whether this is a
	TPM?";		hardware based TPM.";
	}		}
	leaf physical-index {		leaf physical-index {
	if-feature "hw:entity-mib";		if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
	type int32 {		type int32 {
	range "1..2147483647";		range "1..2147483647";
	}		}
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";		"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
	reference		reference
	"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";		"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
	}		}
	leaf path {		leaf path {
	type string;		type string;
	config false;		config false;
	skipping to change at page 28, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 24 ¶
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";		"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
	reference		reference
	"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";		"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
	}		}
	leaf path {		leaf path {
	type string;		type string;
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	"Path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change across		"Device path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change
	reboots.";		across reboots.";
	}		}
	leaf compute-node {		leaf compute-node {
	if-feature "tpm:tpms";		if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
	type compute-node-ref;		type compute-node-ref;
	config false;		config false;
	mandatory true;		mandatory true;
	description		description
	"Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM.";		"Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM.";
	}		}
	leaf manufacturer {		leaf manufacturer {
	type string;		type string;
	config false;		config false;
	description		description
	skipping to change at page 29, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 29, line 37 ¶
	"TPM2.0-Structures:		"TPM2.0-Structures:
	https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7";		TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7";
	leaf tpm20-hash-algo {		leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
	type identityref {		type identityref {
	base taa:hash;		base taa:hash;
	}		}
	must '/tpm:rats-support-structures'		must '/tpm:rats-support-structures'
	+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos'		+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
	+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {		+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
	error-message		error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
	"This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo";
	}		}
	description		description
	"The hash scheme actively being used to hash a		"The hash scheme actively being used to hash a
	one or more TPM2.0 PCRs.";		one or more TPM2.0 PCRs.";
	}		}
	leaf-list pcr-index {		leaf-list pcr-index {
	type tpm:pcr;		type tpm:pcr;
	description		description
	"Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted.";		"Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted.";
	}		}
	}		}
	leaf status {		leaf status {
	type enumeration {		type enumeration {
	enum operational {		enum operational {
	value 0;		value 0;
	description		description
	"The TPM currently is currently running normally and		"The TPM currently is running normally and
	is ready to accept and process TPM quotes.";		is ready to accept and process TPM quotes.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM2.0-Arch:		"TPM2.0-Arch:
	TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.07-2014-03-13.pdf		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
			TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf
	Section 12";		Section 12";
	}		}
	enum non-operational {		enum non-operational {
	value 1;		value 1;
	description		description
	"TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which		"TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which
	precludes the processing of TPM quotes.";		precludes the processing of TPM quotes.";
	}		}
	}		}
	config false;		config false;
	mandatory true;		mandatory true;
	skipping to change at page 30, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 30, line 29 ¶
	}		}
	}		}
	config false;		config false;
	mandatory true;		mandatory true;
	description		description
	"TPM chip self-test status.";		"TPM chip self-test status.";
	}		}
	container certificates {		container certificates {
	description		description
	"The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates		"The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates
	and AK certificates.";		and Attestation Key certificates.";
	list certificate {		list certificate {
	key "name";		key "name";
	description		description
	"Three types of certificates can be accessed via		"Three types of certificates can be accessed via
	this statement, including Initial Attestation		this statement, including Initial Attestation
	Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or		Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or
	Endorsement Key Certificate.";		Endorsement Key Certificate.";
	leaf name {		leaf name {
	type string;		type string;
	description		description
	"An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate		"An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate
	associated within key within a TPM.";		associated within key within a TPM.";
	}		}
	leaf keystore-ref {		leaf keystore-ref {
			if-feature "ks:asymmetric-keys";
	type leafref {		type leafref {
	path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"		path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key"
	+ "/ks:certificates/ks:certificate/ks:name";		+ "/ks:name";
	}		}
	description		description
	"A reference to a specific certificate of an		"A reference to a specific certificate of an
	asymmetric key in the Keystore.";		asymmetric key in the Keystore.";
	}		}
	leaf type {		leaf type {
	type enumeration {		type enumeration {
	enum endorsement-certificate {		enum endorsement-certificate {
	value 0;		value 0;
	description		description
	"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";		"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM2.0-Key:		"TPM2.0-Key:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
	skipping to change at page 31, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 31, line 15 ¶
	}		}
	leaf type {		leaf type {
	type enumeration {		type enumeration {
	enum endorsement-certificate {		enum endorsement-certificate {
	value 0;		value 0;
	description		description
	"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";		"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM2.0-Key:		"TPM2.0-Key:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
	uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf		uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
			and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf
	Section 3.11";		Section 3.11";
	}		}
	enum initial-attestation-certificate {		enum initial-attestation-certificate {
	value 1;		value 1;
	description		description
	"Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type.";		"Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM2.0-Key:		"TPM2.0-Key:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
	uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf		uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
			and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf
	Section 3.2";		Section 3.2";
	}		}
	enum local-attestation-certificate {		enum local-attestation-certificate {
	value 2;		value 2;
	description		description
	"Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type.";		"Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM2.0-Key:		"TPM2.0-Key:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
	uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf		uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
			and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf
	Section 3.2";		Section 3.2";
	}		}
	}		}
	description		description
	"Function supported by this certificate from within the		"Function supported by this certificate from within the
	TPM.";		TPM.";
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 32, line 42 ¶		skipping to change at page 33, line 11 ¶
	<CODE ENDS>		<CODE ENDS>
	Figure 1		Figure 1
	2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs'		2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs'
	This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of		This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of
	[TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a		[TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a
	separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other		separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other
	YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific		YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific
	references to [RFC7748], [ISO-IEC-9797-1], [ISO-IEC-9797-2],		references to [RFC2104], [RFC8017], [ISO-IEC-9797-1],
	[ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3], [ISO-IEC-14888-3],		[ISO-IEC-9797-2], [ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3],
	[ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3], [IEEE-Std-1363-2000],		[ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3],
	[IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202], [NIST-SP800-38C],		[IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202],
	[NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F], [NIST-SP800-56A],		[NIST-SP800-38C], [NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F],
	[NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], [ima-log], and [netequip-boot-log]		[NIST-SP800-56A], [NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], [ima-log], as well as
	exist within the YANG Model.		Appendix A and Appendix B exist within the YANG Model.
	2.1.2.1. Features		2.1.2.1. Features
	There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'.		There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'.
	Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor		Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor
	supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an		supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an
	Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be		Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be
	available on an Attester.		available on an Attester.
	2.1.2.2. Identities		2.1.2.2. Identities
	There are three types of identities in this model:		There are three types of identities in this model:
	1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these		1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these
	include: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing',		include: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing',
	'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and		'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and
	'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2		'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2
	of [TCG-Algos].		of [TCG-Algos].
	2. API specifications for TPMs: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'		2. API specifications for TPM types: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'
	3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what		3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what
	cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of		cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of
	API specification. It is not required that an implementation of		API specification. It is not required that an implementation of
	a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of		a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of
	each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of		each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of
	[TCG-Algos].		[TCG-Algos].
	2.1.2.3. YANG Module		2.1.2.3. YANG Module
			<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-03-09.yang"
	<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-02-16.yang"
	module ietf-tcg-algs {		module ietf-tcg-algs {
	yang-version 1.1;		yang-version 1.1;
	namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs";		namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs";
	prefix taa;		prefix taa;
	organization		organization
	"IETF RATS Working Group";		"IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
	contact		contact
	"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>		"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
	WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>		WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
	Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";		Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";
	description		description
	"This module defines a identities for asymmetric algorithms.		"This module defines identities for asymmetric algorithms.
	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified		Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
	as authors of the code. All rights reserved.		as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
	Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with		Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
	or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and		or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
	subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified		subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
	BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's		BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
	Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
	This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX		This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
	(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC		(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
	itself for full legal notices.		itself for full legal notices.
	The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',		The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
	skipping to change at page 34, line 21 ¶		skipping to change at page 34, line 37 ¶
	This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX		This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
	(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC		(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
	itself for full legal notices.		itself for full legal notices.
	The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',		The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
	'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',		'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
	'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document		'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
	are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)		are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
	(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all		(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.";		capitals, as shown here.";
	revision 2022-02-16 {		revision 2022-03-09 {
	description		description
	"Initial version";		"Initial version";
	reference		reference
	"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote		"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote
	Attestation Procedures using TPMs";		Attestation Procedures using TPMs";
	}		}
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	/* Features */		/* Features */
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	skipping to change at page 34, line 48 ¶		skipping to change at page 35, line 16 ¶
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
	Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf";		Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf";
	}		}
	feature tpm20 {		feature tpm20 {
	description		description
	"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API		"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
	as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library		as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library
	Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch:		Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-01.07-2014-03-13.pdf";		TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf";
	}		}
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	/* Identities */		/* Identities */
	/*****************/		/*****************/
	identity asymmetric {		identity asymmetric {
	description		description
	"A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and		"A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and
	private key.";		private key.";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2,		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2,
	http://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tcg-algorithm-registry/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
	TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub";		tcg-algorithm-registry/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub";
	}		}
	identity symmetric {		identity symmetric {
	description		description
	"A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key.";		"A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key.";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2";
	}		}
	identity hash {		identity hash {
	skipping to change at page 36, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 36, line 49 ¶
	identity tpm12 {		identity tpm12 {
	if-feature "tpm12";		if-feature "tpm12";
	base cryptoprocessor;		base cryptoprocessor;
	description		description
	"Supportable by a TPM1.2.";		"Supportable by a TPM1.2.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM1.2-Structures:		"TPM1.2-Structures:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf		TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
	TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, page 18";		TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
	}		}
	identity tpm20 {		identity tpm20 {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base cryptoprocessor;		base cryptoprocessor;
	description		description
	"Supportable by a TPM2.";		"Supportable by a TPM2.";
	reference		reference
	"TPM2.0-Structures:		"TPM2.0-Structures:
	https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/		https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
	TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf		TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf";
	The TCG Algorithm Registry. Table 9";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_RSA {		identity TPM_ALG_RSA {
	if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";		if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
	base tpm12;		base tpm12;
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base object_type;		base object_type;
	description		description
	"RSA algorithm";		"RSA algorithm";
	skipping to change at page 37, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 37, line 48 ¶
	ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003";		ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 {		identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 {
	if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";		if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
	base hash;		base hash;
	base tpm12;		base tpm12;
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	description		description
	"SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic		"SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic
	protection. However it is still useful for hash algorithms		protection. However, it is still useful for hash algorithms
	where protection is not required.";		where protection is not required.";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004";		ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_HMAC {		identity TPM_ALG_HMAC {
	if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";		if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
	base tpm12;		base tpm12;
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	base signing;		base signing;
	description		description
	"Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm";		"Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
	ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2014. ALG_ID: 0x0005";		ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2104. ALG_ID: 0x0005";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_AES {
			identity TPM_ALG_AES {
	if-feature "tpm12";		if-feature "tpm12";
	base tpm12;		base tpm12;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	description		description
	"The AES algorithm with various key sizes";		"The AES algorithm with various key sizes";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
	ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006";		ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006";
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 38, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 39, line 9 ¶
	base hash;		base hash;
	base object_type;		base object_type;
	description		description
	"An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These		"An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These
	may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may		may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may
	also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor		also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor
	encrypting.";		encrypting.";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3,
	ALG_ID: 0x0008";		ALG_ID: 0x0008";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_XOR {		identity TPM_ALG_XOR {
	if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";		if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
	base tpm12;		base tpm12;
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	description		description
	"The XOR encryption algorithm.";		"The XOR encryption algorithm.";
	reference		reference
	skipping to change at page 39, line 19 ¶		skipping to change at page 39, line 35 ¶
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	description		description
	"The SHA 256 algorithm";		"The SHA 256 algorithm";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B";		ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 {		identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	description		description
	"The SHA 384 algorithm";		"The SHA 384 algorithm";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C";		ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 {		identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	description		description
	"The SHA 512 algorithm";		"The SHA 512 algorithm";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D";		ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_NULL {		identity TPM_ALG_NULL {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	description		description
	"NULL algorithm";		"NULL algorithm";
	skipping to change at page 40, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 40, line 39 ¶
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_SM4 {		identity TPM_ALG_SM4 {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	description		description
	"SM4 symmetric block cipher";		"SM4 symmetric block cipher";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
	ALG_ID: 0x0013";		ALG_ID: 0x0013";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA {		identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	description		description
	"Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2 (RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)";		"RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2
			(RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014";		RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_RSAES {		identity TPM_ALG_RSAES {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	description		description
	"Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)";		"RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2
			(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015";		RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS {		identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	description		description
	"Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)";		"Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)";
	reference		reference
	skipping to change at page 41, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 42, line 16 ¶
	identity TPM_ALG_ECDH {		identity TPM_ALG_ECDH {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base method;		base method;
	description		description
	"Secret sharing using ECC";		"Secret sharing using ECC";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	NIST SP800-56A and RFC 7748. ALG_ID: 0x0019";		NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x0019";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA {		identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	base anonymous_signing;		base anonymous_signing;
	description		description
	"Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme";		"Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme";
	skipping to change at page 42, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 42, line 45 ¶
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	base method;		base method;
	description		description
	"SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based,		"SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based,
	signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange		signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange
	protocol";		protocol";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
	ALG_ID: 0x001B";		ALG_ID: 0x001B";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR {		identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	description		description
	"Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature";		"Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3.
	ALG_ID: 0x001C";		ALG_ID: 0x001C";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV {		identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base method;		base method;
	description		description
	"Two-phase elliptic-curve key";		"Two-phase elliptic-curve key";
	reference		reference
	skipping to change at page 43, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 43, line 37 ¶
	base hash;		base hash;
	base method;		base method;
	description		description
	"Concatenation key derivation function";		"Concatenation key derivation function";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1.		NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1.
	ALG_ID: 0x0020";		ALG_ID: 0x0020";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 {		identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	base method;		base method;
	description		description
	"Key derivation function";		"Key derivation function";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021";		IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021";
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 44, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 44, line 21 ¶
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base asymmetric;		base asymmetric;
	base object_type;		base object_type;
	description		description
	"Prime field ECC";		"Prime field ECC";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023";		ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER {		identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
			base symmetric;
	description		description
	"Object type for a symmetric block cipher";		"Object type for a symmetric block cipher";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025";		TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA {		identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	description		description
	"The Camellia algorithm";		"The Camellia algorithm";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026";		ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {		identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base hash;		base hash;
	description		description
	"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm";		"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";		NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
	}		}
	skipping to change at page 46, line 22 ¶		skipping to change at page 46, line 39 ¶
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	description		description
	"Cipher Feedback mode";		"Cipher Feedback mode";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043";		ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_ECB {		identity TPM_ALG_ECB {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	description		description
	"Electronic Codebook mode";		"Electronic Codebook mode";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044";		ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_CCM {		identity TPM_ALG_CCM {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	description		description
	"Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication		"Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication
	Code (CCM)";		Code (CCM)";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050";		NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_GCM {		identity TPM_ALG_GCM {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	skipping to change at page 47, line 38 ¶		skipping to change at page 48, line 8 ¶
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	description		description
	"AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)";		"AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053";		NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053";
	}		}
	identity TPM_ALG_EAX {		identity TPM_ALG_EAX {
	if-feature "tpm20";		if-feature "tpm20";
	base tpm20;		base tpm20;
	base symmetric;		base symmetric;
	base signing;		base signing;
	base encryption_mode;		base encryption_mode;
	description		description
	"Authenticated-Encryption Mode";		"Authenticated-Encryption Mode";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054";		NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054";
	skipping to change at page 48, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 48, line 36 ¶
	description		description
	"Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)";		"Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)";
	reference		reference
	"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and		"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
	RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060";		RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060";
	}		}
	}		}
	<CODE ENDS>		<CODE ENDS>
	Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by		Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by
	ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang. However the full definition of		"ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang". However the full definition of
	Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG		Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG
	specifications.		specifications.
	3. IANA Considerations		3. IANA Considerations
	This document registers the following namespace URIs in the		This document registers the following namespace URIs in the
	[xml-registry] as per [RFC3688]:		[xml-registry] as per [RFC3688]:
	URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation		URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
	skipping to change at page 49, line 32 ¶		skipping to change at page 49, line 50 ¶
	default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable		default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
	in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_)		in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_)
	to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative		to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
	effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes		effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
	as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:		as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:
	Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1		Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1
	2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing',		2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing',
	and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are		and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are
	not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the		not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the
	equipment vendor.		equipment vendor. A vendor should restrict the ability to
			configure unsupported algorithms.
	Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown		Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown
	as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore it should not be		as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore, it should not be
	possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the		possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the
	configuration.		configuration.
	'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction		'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction
	which are not being extended by system software. This could		which are not being extended by system software. This could
	unnecessarily use TPM resources.		unnecessarily use TPM resources.
	'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which		'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which
	does not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within		does not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within
	the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0		the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0
	respectively.		respectively. In such a case, calls to an RPC requesting this
			specific certificate could result in either no response or a
			response for an unexpected TPM.
	RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': It must be verified that		RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC
	the certificate is for an active AIK, i.e., the certificate		response must verify that the certificate is for an active AIK,
	provided is able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.		i.e., the certificate has been confirmed by a third party as being
			able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.
	RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': It must be verified that		RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC
	the certificate is for an active AK, i.e., the quote signature		response must verify that the certificate is for an active AK,
	associated with RPC response has been generated by an entity		i.e., the private key confirmation of the quote signature within
	legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted TPM 2.0.		the RPC response has been confirmed by a third party to belong to
			an entity legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted
			TPM 2.0.
	RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the		RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the
	attester could require significant system resources and create a		attester could require significant system resources and create a
	denial of service.		denial of service.
	Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that		Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that
	specific versions of software and configurations of endpoints that		specific versions of software and configurations of endpoints that
	could identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore RPCs		could identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore, RPCs
	should be protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny-		should be protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny-
	all to limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized		all to limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized
	Verifiers.		Verifiers.
	For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when		For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when
	selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of		selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of
	[TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered		[TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered
	legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate		legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate
	available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic		available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic
	research before selecting an algorithm for use.		research before selecting an algorithm for use.
	5. Change Log		5. References
			5.1. Normative References
	Changes from version 08 to version 09:
	* AD Review comments
	Changes from version 08 to version 09:
	* Minor formatting tweaks for shepherd. IANA registered.
	Changes from version 05 to version 06:
	* More YANG Dr comments covered
	Changes from version 04 to version 05:
	* YANG Dr comments covered
	Changes from version 03 to version 04:
	* TPM1.2 Quote1 eliminated
	* YANG model simplifications so redundant info isn't exposed
	Changes from version 02 to version 03:
	* moved to tcg-algs
	* cleaned up model to eliminate sources of errors
	* removed key establishment RPC
	* added lots of XPATH which must all be scrubbed still
	* Descriptive text added on model contents.
	Changes from version 01 to version 02:
	* Extracted Crypto-types into a separate YANG file
	* Mades the algorithms explicit, not strings
	* Hash Algo as key the selected TPM2 PCRs
	* PCR numbers are their own type
	* Eliminated nested keys for node-id plus tpm-name
	* Eliminated TPM-Name of "ALL"
	* Added TPM-Path
	Changes from version 00 to version 01:
	* Addressed author's comments
	* Extended complementary details about attestation-certificates
	* Relabeled chunk-size to log-entry-quantity
	* Relabeled location with compute-node or tpm-name where appropriate
	* Added a valid entity-mib physical-index to compute-node and tpm-
	name to map it back to hardware inventory
	* Relabeled name to tpm_name
	* Removed event-string in last-entry
	6. References
	6.1. Normative References
	[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,		[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
	Section 9.4.5.2", n.d.,		Section 9.4.5.2", n.d.,
	<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C		<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C
	lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf		lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
	>.		>.
	[BIOS-Log-Event-Type]		[BIOS-Log-Event-Type]
	"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification",		"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification",
	n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-		n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
	content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>.		content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>.
	[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]		[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
	Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in		Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
	Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-23,		Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-24,
	14 December 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-		7 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
	ietf-netconf-keystore-23.txt>.		netconf-keystore-24.txt>.
	[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]		[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
	Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and		Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
	W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work		W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
	in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-		in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
	15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/		15, 8 February 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
	draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>.		draft-ietf-rats-architecture-15.txt>.
	[I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest]		[I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest]
	Fedorkow, G., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "TPM-		Fedorkow, G., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "TPM-
	skipping to change at page 53, line 35 ¶		skipping to change at page 52, line 35 ¶
	[ISO-IEC-9797-1]		[ISO-IEC-9797-1]
	"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC		"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC
	9797-1:2011", n.d.,		9797-1:2011", n.d.,
	<https://www.iso.org/standard/50375.html>.		<https://www.iso.org/standard/50375.html>.
	[ISO-IEC-9797-2]		[ISO-IEC-9797-2]
	"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC		"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC
	9797-2:2011", n.d.,		9797-2:2011", n.d.,
	<https://www.iso.org/standard/51618.html>.		<https://www.iso.org/standard/51618.html>.
	[netequip-boot-log]
	"IMA Policy Kernel Documentation", n.d.,
	<https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/ABI/testing/
	ima_policy>.
	[NIST-PUB-FIPS-202]		[NIST-PUB-FIPS-202]
	"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-		"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-
	Output Functions", n.d.,		Output Functions", n.d.,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/		<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/
	final>.		final>.
	[NIST-SP800-108]		[NIST-SP800-108]
	"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom		"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
	Functions", n.d.,		Functions", n.d.,
	<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/		<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
	skipping to change at page 54, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 53, line 23 ¶
	Methods for Key Wrapping", n.d.,		Methods for Key Wrapping", n.d.,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38f/		<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38f/
	final>.		final>.
	[NIST-SP800-56A]		[NIST-SP800-56A]
	"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes		"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes
	Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", n.d.,		Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", n.d.,
	<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-		<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-
	3/final>.		3/final>.
	[RFC2014] Weinrib, A. and J. Postel, "IRTF Research Group Guidelines		[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
	and Procedures", BCP 8, RFC 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC2014,		Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
	October 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2014>.		DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,		[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,		DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
	skipping to change at page 55, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 54, line 14 ¶
	[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.		[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.
	Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933,		Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6933>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6933>.
	[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",		[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
	RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,		RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
	[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
	for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
	2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
	[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,		[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
	"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",		"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
	RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,		RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
	[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital		[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
	Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,		Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,		DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
	skipping to change at page 56, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 55, line 26 ¶
	<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-		<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
	Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>.		Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>.
	[TPM2.0] TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013,		[TPM2.0] TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013,
	<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-		<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-
	specification/>.		specification/>.
	[TPM2.0-Arch]		[TPM2.0-Arch]
	"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture",		"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture",
	n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-		n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
	content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-		content/uploads/
	01.07-2014-03-13.pdf>.		TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf>.
	[TPM2.0-Key]		[TPM2.0-Key]
	TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation,		TCG, ., "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation,
	Rev10", 14 April 2021, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/		Rev12", 8 October 2021,
	wp-content/uploads/TCG_IWG_DevID_v1r2_02dec2020.pdf>.		<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
			2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-and-
			Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf>.
	[TPM2.0-Structures]		[TPM2.0-Structures]
	"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures",		"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures",
	n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-		n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
	content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf>.		content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf>.
	[xml-registry]		[UEFI-Secure-Boot]
	"IETF XML Registry", n.d.,		"Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml-		Specification Version 2.9 (March 2021), Section 32.1
	registry.xhtml>.		(Secure Boot)", n.d.,
			<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/
	[yang-parameters]		UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf>.
	"YANG Parameters", n.d.,
	<https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/yang-
	parameters.xhtml>.
	6.2. Informative References		5.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]		[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]
	Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference		Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference
	Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures",		Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures",
	Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-		Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-
	reference-interaction-models-05, 26 January 2022,		reference-interaction-models-05, 26 January 2022,
	<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-		<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-
	reference-interaction-models-05.txt>.		reference-interaction-models-05.txt>.
			[IMA-Kernel-Source]
			"Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel
			Sourcecode", n.d., <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob
			/df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9/security/
			integrity/ima/>.
	[NIST-915121]		[NIST-915121]
	"True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is		"True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is
	important for information security", n.d.,		important for information security", n.d.,
	<https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/		<https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/
	get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121>.		get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121>.
			[xml-registry]
			"IETF XML Registry", n.d.,
			<https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml-
			registry.xhtml>.
			[yang-parameters]
			"YANG Parameters", n.d.,
			<https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/yang-
			parameters.xhtml>.
			Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
			IMA extends the principles of Measured Boot [TPM2.0-Arch] and Secure
			Boot [UEFI-Secure-Boot] to the Linux operating system, applying it to
			operating system applications and files. IMA has been part of the
			Linux integrity subsystem of the Linux kernel since 2009 (kernel
			version 2.6.30). The IMA mechanism represented by the YANG module in
			this specification is rooted in the kernel version 5.16
			[IMA-Kernel-Source]. IMA enables the protection of system integrity
			by collecting (commonly referred to as measuring) and storing
			measurements (called Claims in the context of IETF RATS) of files
			before execution so that these measurements can be used later, at
			system runtime, in remote attestation procedures. IMA acts in
			support of the appraisal of Evidence (which includes measurement
			Claims) by leveraging reference integrity measurements stored in
			extended file attributes.
			In support of the appraisal of Evidence, IMA maintains an ordered
			list of measurements in kernel-space, the Stored Measurement Log
			(SML), for all files that have been measured before execution since
			the operating system was started. Although IMA can be used without a
			TPM, it is typically used in conjunction with a TPM to anchor the
			integrity of the SML in a hardware-protected secure storage location,
			i.e., Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) provided by TPMs. IMA
			provides the SML in both binary and ASCII representations in the
			Linux security file system _securityfs_ ("/sys/kernel/security/
			ima/").
			IMA templates define the format of the SML, i.e., which fields are
			included in a log record. Examples are file path, file hash, user
			ID, group ID, file signature, and extended file attributes. IMA
			comes with a set of predefined template formats and also allows a
			custom format, i.e., a format consisting of template fields supported
			by IMA. Template usage is typically determined by boot arguments
			passed to the kernel. Alternatively, the format can also be hard-
			compiled into custom kernels. IMA templates and fields are
			extensible in the kernel source code. As a result, more template
			fields can be added in the future.
			IMA policies define which files are measured using the IMA policy
			language. Built-in policies can be passed as boot arguments to the
			kernel. Custom IMA policies can be defined once during runtime or be
			hard-compiled into a custom kernel. If no policy is defined, no
			measurements are taken and IMA is effectively disabled.
			Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs
			Network equipment can generally implement similar IMA-protected
			functions to generate measurements (Claims) about the boot process of
			a device and enable corresponding remote attestation. Network
			Equipment Boot Logs combine the measurement and logging of boot
			components and operating system components (executables and files)
			into a single log file in identical IMA format.
			During the boot process of the network device, i.e., from BIOS to the
			end of the operating system and user-space, all files executed during
			this process can be measured and logged in the order of their
			execution. When the Verifier initiates a remote attestation process
			(e.g., challenge-response remote attestation as defined in this
			document), the network equipment takes on the role of an Attester and
			can convey to the Verifier Claims that comprise the measurement log
			as well as the corresponding PCR values (Evidence) of a TPM.
			The verifier can appraise the integrity (compliance with the
			Reference Values) of each executed file by comparing its measured
			value with the Reference Value. Based on the execution order, the
			Verifier can compute a PCR reference value (by replaying the log) and
			compare it to the Measurement Log Claims obtained in conjunction with
			the PCR Evidence to assess their trustworthiness with respect to an
			intended operational state.
			Not only during the operating system loading phase, even during the
			BIOS boot phase, network equipment usually executes multiple
			components. With this measurement log mechanism, network equipment
			can take on the role of an Attester, proving to the Verifier the
			trustworthiness of its boot process. Using the measurement log,
			Verifiers can precisely identify mismatching log entries to infer
			potentially tampered components.
			This mechanism also supports scenarios that modify files on the
			Attester and are executed during the boot phase (e.g., updating/
			patching) by simply updating the appropriate Reference Values in
			Reference Integrity Manifests that inform Verifiers about how an
			Attester is composed.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Henk Birkholz		Henk Birkholz
	Fraunhofer SIT		Fraunhofer SIT
	Rheinstrasse 75		Rheinstrasse 75
	64295 Darmstadt		64295 Darmstadt
	Germany		Germany
	Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de		Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
	Michael Eckel		Michael Eckel
	Fraunhofer SIT		Fraunhofer SIT
	Rheinstrasse 75		Rheinstrasse 75
	64295 Darmstadt		64295 Darmstadt
	Germany		Germany
	Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de		Email: michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de
	Shwetha Bhandari		Shwetha Bhandari
	ThoughtSpot		ThoughtSpot
	Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
			Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
	Eric Voit		Eric Voit
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	Email: evoit@cisco.com		Email: evoit@cisco.com
	Bill Sulzen		Bill Sulzen
	Cisco Systems		Cisco Systems
	Email: bsulzen@cisco.com		Email: bsulzen@cisco.com
	Liang Xia (Frank)		Liang Xia (Frank)
	Huawei Technologies		Huawei Technologies
	101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District		101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
	Nanjing		Nanjing
	Jiangsu, 210012		Jiangsu, 210012
	China		China
	Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com		Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
	Tom Laffey		Tom Laffey
	Hewlett Packard Enterprise		Hewlett Packard Enterprise
	Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com		Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com
	Guy C. Fedorkow		Guy C. Fedorkow
	Juniper Networks		Juniper Networks
	10 Technology Park Drive		10 Technology Park Drive
	Westford		Westford
	Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net		Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
End of changes. 160 change blocks.
	330 lines changed or deleted		387 lines changed or added
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