Network Working Group                                         L. Dunbar
Internet Draft                                                 A. Malis
Intended status: Informational                                   Huawei                                Futurewei
Expires: September 25, December 19, 2019                                C. Jacquenet
                                                                  Orange
                                                         March 25,
                                                          June 19, 2019

           Gap Analysis of Interconnecting Underlay with Dynamic Networks to Hybrid Cloud Overlay
                draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-01 DCs
                draft-ietf-rtgwg-net2cloud-gap-analysis-02

Abstract

   This document analyzes the technological gaps when using SD-WAN to
   dynamically interconnect workloads & apps and applications hosted in
           rd        various locations,
   especially 3  party cloud data centers when the network service providers do
   not have or have limited physical infrastructure to reach the
   locations [Net2Cloud-problem]. centers.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 25, December 19, 2019.

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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................2
   2. Conventions used in this document..............................3
   3. Gap Analysis of C-PEs WAN Ports Registration...................4 Port Registration....................4
   4. Gap Analysis in aggregating Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths.......5 paths.......................5
      4.1. Gap analysis Key Control Plane Components of SD-WAN....................6
      4.2. Using BGP for SD-WAN......................6
      4.2. Gaps in preventing Tunnel-Encap....................................7
      4.3. SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN.........................................9
      4.4. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports.....9 ports............10
   5. Gap analysis of CPEs not directly connected to VPN PEs........10 PEs........................10
      5.1. Gap Analysis of Floating PEs to connect to Remote CPEs...12 CPEs...................13
      5.2. NAT Traversal............................................12 Traversal............................................13
      5.3. Complication Complexity of using BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via
      Internet......................................................12
      Internet......................................................13
      5.4. Designated Forwarder to the remote edges.................13 edges.................14
      5.5. Traffic Path Management..................................14 Management..................................15
   6. Manageability Considerations..................................14 Considerations..................................15
   7. Security Considerations.......................................14 Considerations.......................................15
   8. IANA Considerations...........................................15 Considerations...........................................16
   9. References....................................................15 References....................................................16
      9.1. Normative References.....................................15 References.....................................16
      9.2. Informative References...................................15 References...................................16
   10. Acknowledgments..............................................16 Acknowledgments..............................................17

1. Introduction

   [Net2Cloud-Problem] describes the problems that enterprises face
   today in transitioning their IT infrastructure to support digital
   economy, such as connecting enterprises' branch offices to dynamic
   workloads in different Cloud DCs.

   This document analyzes the technological gaps to interconnect
   dynamic workloads & apps hosted in various locations and in Cloud
   DCs cloud data centers that the
   enterprise's VPN service provider may not own/operate or may be
   unable to provide the enterprise with the required connectivity to
   access
   these such locations. When enterprise' VPN service providers have insufficient
   bandwidth to reach a location, SD-WAN techniques can be used to
   aggregate bandwidth of multiple networks, such as MPLS VPNs, VPNs or the
   Public Internet, Internet to achieve better performance and visibility. performance. This document
   primarily focuses on the technological gaps of SD-WAN. raised by using SD-WAN
   techniques to connect enterprise premises to cloud data centers
   operated by third parties.

   For ease the sake of description, readability, a SD-WAN edge, a SD-WAN end-point, endpoint, C-PE,
   or CPE are used interchangeably throughout this document. However,
   each term has some minor emphasis, especially when used in other
   related documents:

     . SD-WAN Edge: could include multiple devices (virtual or
        physical);
     . SD-WAN endpoint: to refer to a  WAN port of SD-WAN devices or a
        single SD-WAN device;
     . C-PE: more for provider owned SD-WAN edge, e.g. for SECURE-
        EVPN's PE based VPN, when PE is the edge node of SD-WAN;
     . CPE: more for enterprise owned SD-WAN edge.

2. Conventions used in this document

   Cloud DC:   Third party Data Centers that usually host applications
               and workload owned by different organizations or
               tenants.

   Controller: Used interchangeably with SD-WAN controller to manage
               SD-WAN overlay path creation/deletion and monitor the
               path conditions between sites.

   CPE-Based VPN: Virtual Private Network designed and deployed from
               CPEs. This is to differentiate from most commonly used
               PE-based VPNs a la RFC 4364.

   OnPrem:     On Premises data centers and branch offices

   SD-WAN:     Software Defined Wide Area Network, "SDWAN" "SD-WAN" refers to
               the solutions of pooling WAN bandwidth from multiple
               underlay networks to get better WAN bandwidth
               management, visibility & control. When the underlay is a
               private network, traffic can traverse may be forwarded without any
               additional encryption; when the underlay networks are
               public, such as the Internet, some traffic needs to be
               encrypted when
               traversing passing through (depending on user-provided user-
               provided policies).

3. Gap Analysis of C-PEs WAN Ports Port Registration

   The SD-WAN WG stemmed out from ONUG (Open Network User Group) in
   2014 and was the placeholder to define SD-WAN as a means to
   aggregate multiple underlay networks between any two points.

   SD-WAN technology has emerged as an on-demand technology means to dynamically and securely
   interconnect the OnPrem branches with the workloads instantiated in
   Cloud DCs that do not connect have direct connectivity to BGP/MPLS VPN PEs
   or have very limited bandwidth.

   Some SD-WAN networks use the NHRP protocol [RFC2332] to register WAN
   ports of SD-WAN edges with a "Controller" (or NHRP server), which
   then has the ability to map a private VPN address to a public IP
   address of the destination node. DSVPN [DSVPN] or DMVPN [DMVPN] are
   used to establish tunnels between WAN ports of SD-WAN edge nodes.

   NHRP was originally intended for ATM address resolution, and as a
   result, it misses many attributes that are necessary for dynamic
   endpoint C-PE registration to the controller, such as:

   - Interworking with the MPLS VPN control plane. A SD-WAN edge can
     have some ports facing the MPLS VPN network over which packets can
     be sent
     natively forwarded without any encryption and some ports facing the
     public Internet over which sensitive traffic needs to be encrypted
     before being sent.

   - Scalability. Scalability: NHRP/DSVPN/DMVPN works fine with small numbers of
     edge nodes. When a network has more than 100 nodes, the protocol
     does these
     protocols do not work scale well.
   - NHRP does not have the IPsec attributes, which are needed for
     peers to build Security Associations over the public internet.
   - NHRP messages do not have any field to encode the C-PE supported
     encapsulation types, such as IPsec-GRE or IPsec-VxLAN,. IPsec-VxLAN.
   - NHRP messages do not have any field to encode C-PE Location
     identifiers, such as Site Identifier, System ID, and/or Port ID.
   - NHRP messages do not have any field to describe the gateway(s) to
     which the C-PE is attached. When a C-PE is instantiated in a Cloud
     DC, to establish connection to the C-PE, it is necessary to know
     the Cloud DC operator's Gateway desirable for C-PE's owner to which be informed of how/where
     the CPE C-PE is attached.
   - NHRP messages do not have any field to describe C-PE's NAT
     properties if the C-PE is using private addresses, such as the NAT
     type, Private address, Public address, Private port, Public port,
     etc.

   [BGP-SDWAN-PORT] describes how to use BGP for SD-WAN edge nodes use BGP to register
   their WAN ports properties to the SD-WAN controller, which then disseminates
   propagates the information to other SD-WAN edge nodes that are
   authenticated before the SD-WAN controller and the other SD-WAN
   edge nodes can authorized to communicate with them.

4. Gap Analysis in aggregating Aggregating VPN paths and Internet paths

   Most likely, enterprises (especially the largest ones) already have
   their CPEs interconnected by providers' VPNs, based upon VPN
   techniques such as EVPN, L2VPN, or L3VPN. The VPN can be PE-based or
   CPE-based. The commonly used PE-based VPNs have CPE directly
   attached to PEs, therefore the communication between CPEs & and PEs is
   considered as secure. MP-BGP is used to learn & distribute routes
   among CPEs, even though sometimes routes among CPEs are statically
   configured.
   configured on the CPEs.

   To aggregate paths over the Internet and paths over the VPN, the C-
   PEs need to have some WAN ports connected to the PEs of the VPNs and
   other WAN ports connected to the Internet. It is necessary for the
   CPEs to use a protocol so that they can register the WAN port
   properties with their SD-WAN Controller(s): this information
   conditions the establishment and the maintenance of IPsec SA
   associations among relevant C-PEs.

   If

   When using NHRP for registration purposes, C-PEs need to participate
   in run two
   separate control planes: EVPN&BGP for CPE-based VPNs VPNs, and NHRP &
   DSVPN/DMVPN for ports connected to the Internet. Two separate
   control planes not only add complexity to C-PEs, but also increase
   operational cost.
                                       +---+
                        +--------------|RR |----------+
                       /  Untrusted    +-+-+           \
                      /                                 \
                     /                                   \
     +----+  +---------+  packets encrypted over     +------+  +----+
     | TN3|--|         A1-----+ Untrusted    +------ B1     |--| TN1|
     +----+  | C-PE    A2-\                          | C-PE |  +----+
     +----+  |  A      A3--+--+              +---+---B2  B  |  +----+
     | TN2|--|         |   |PE+--------------+PE |---B3     |--| TN3|
     +----+  +---------+   +--+   trusted    +---+   +------+  +----+
                              |      WAN     |
     +----+  +---------+   +--+   packets    +---+   +------+  +----+
     | TN1|--|         C1--|PE| go natively  |PE |-- D1     |--| TN1|
     +----+  | C-PE    C2--+--+ without encry+---+   | C-PE |  +----+
             |  C      |      +--------------+       |  D   |
             |         |                             |      |
     +----+  |         C3--|  without encrypt over   |      |  +----+
     | TN2|--|         C4--+---- Untrusted  --+------D2     |--| TN2|
     +----+  +---------+                             +------+  +----+
       Figure 1: CPEs interconnected by VPN paths and Internet Paths

 4.1. Gap analysis Key Control Plane Components of Using BGP for SD-WAN

   This section analyzes the gaps of using BGP to control SD-WAN.

   As described in [BGP-SDWAN-Usage], the SD-WAN Overlay Control Plane
   has three distinct aspects: properties:

     - SD-WAN node's WAN Ports Port Property registration to the SD-WAN
        Controller.
          o It is to To inform the SD-WAN controller and potential authorized peers of
             the WAN ports property port properties of the C-PE [SDWAN-Port]. When the
             WAN ports are using assigned private addresses, this step can
             register the type of NAT that translate translates private addresses
             into public ones.

     - Controller Facilitated facilitated IPsec SA management and NAT information
        distribution
          o It is for SD-WAN controller to facilitate or manage the
             IPsec configuration and peer authentication for all IPsec
             tunnels terminated at the SDWAN SD-WAN nodes.

     - Establishing and Managing the topology and reachability for
        services attached to the client ports of SD-WAN nodes.
          o This is for the overlay layer's route distribution, so
             that a C-PE can populate its overlay routing table with
             entries that identify the next hop for reaching a specific
             route/service attached to remote nodes. [SECURE-EVPN]
             describes EVPN and other options.

 4.2. Using BGP Tunnel-Encap

   RFC5512 and [Tunnel-Encap] describe methods for endpoints to construct BGP UPDATE
   messages that advertise endpoints' tunnel information encapsulation capability
   and trigger tunnel establishment. the respective attached client routes, so that the peers that
   receive of the BGP UPDATE can establish appropriate tunnels with the
   endpoints for the aforementioined routes. RFC5512 & [Tunnel-Encap] use uses the Endpoint
   Address that subTLV, whereas [Tunnel-Encap] uses Remote Endpoint Address
   subTLV to indicates address of the tunnel endpoint which can be an
   IPv4 or an IPv6 address, and the address. There are Tunnel Encapsulation attribute
   subTLVs to indicate different the supported encapsulation formats, types, such as
   L2TPv3, GRE, VxLAN, IP-in-IP, etc. There are sub-TLVs to describe the detailed
   tunnel information for each of the encapsulation types.

   [Tunnel-Encap] removed SAFI =7 (which was specified by RFC5512) for
   distributing encapsulation tunnel information. [Tunnel-Encap]
   requires that tunnels need to be associated with routes.

   There is also the Color sub-TLV to describe customer-specified
   information about the tunnels (which can be creatively used for SD-
   WAN).

   Here are some of the gaps using [Tunnel-Encap] to control SD-WAN:

   - Lacking C-PE WAN Port Property Registration functionality
   - Lacking IPsec Tunnel type SD-WAN
   Tunnels:

   - [Tunnel-Encap] has Remote Address SubTLV, but does not doesn't have any
     field to indicate the Tunnel originating interface, as defined in
     RFC5512. functionality that would help the
     C-PE to register its WAN Port properties.
   - The mechanisms described by [Tunnel-Encap] cannot be effectively
     used for A SD-WAN overlay network because tunnel, e.g. IPsec-based, requires a SD-WAN Tunnel can be
     established negotiation between Internet-facing WAN ports of two C-Pes. This
     the tunnel's end points for supported encryption algorithms and
     tunnel needs to be established types before data arrival because it can be properly established, whereas
     [Tunnel-Encap]  only allow the announcement of one endpoint's
     supported encapsulation capabilities for specific attached routes
     and no negotiation between tunnel end points is needed. The
     establishment of a SD-WAN tunnel can fail, e.g., in case the two end-points
     endpoints support different encryption algorithms.
   - Client traffic can either That is why a
     SD-WAN tunnel needs to be forwarded through the MPLS network
     natively without any encryption for better performance, or through established and maintained independently
     from advertising client routes attached to the Internet-facing ports with IPsec encryption. edge node.
   - [Tunnel-Encap] requires all tunnels updates are associated with
     routes. There can be many client routes associated with the SD-WAN
     IPsec tunnel between two C-PE's Internet-facing C-PEs' WAN ports, but ports; the corresponding
     destination prefixes (as announced by the aforementioned routes) can
     may also be reached over through the VPN underlay
     natively without any
     encryption. A more realistic approach to separate
     IPsec SA SD-WAN tunnel
     management from client routes association with IPsec. the SD-WAN tunnels.
   - When SD-WAN tunnel and clients routes are separate, the SD-WAN
     Tunnel establishment may not have routes associated.
     There is a suggestion on using a "Fake Route" for a SD-WAN node to
     use [Tunnel-Encap] to advertise its SD-WAN tunnel end-points
     properties. However, using "Fake Route" can raise some design
     complexity for large SD-WAN networks with many tunnels. For
     example, for a SD-WAN network with hundreds of nodes, with each
     node having many ports & many end-points endpoints to establish SD-WAN
     tunnels with their corresponding peers, the node would need as
     many "fake addresses". For large SD-WAN networks (such as those
     comprised of more than 10000 nodes), each node might need 10's
     thousands of "fake addresses", which is very difficult to manage
     and needs requires lots of configuration tasks to get the nodes provisioned. properly
     set up.
   - Does [Tunnel-Encap] does not have any field to carry detailed
     information about the remote C-PE, such as Site-ID, System-ID,
     Port-ID
   - [Tunnel-Encap] Does not have any field to express carry IPsec attributes
     for the SD-WAN edge nodes to establish IPsec Security Associations
     with others.
   - Does It does not have any proper way for two peer CPEs to
     negotiate IPsec
     keys, keys either, based on the configuration sent by
     the Controller.
   - Does [Tunnel-Encap] does not have any field to indicate the UDP NAT
     private address <-> public address mapping
   - C-PEs tend to communicate with a subset of the other C-PEs, not
     all the C-PEs need to form be connected through a mesh connections. topology.
     Without any BGP extension, many nodes can get dumped with too much
     information coming from other nodes that they never need to
     communicate with.

4.3. SECURE-L3VPN/EVPN

    [SECURE-L3VPN] describes how to extend the RFC4364 BGP/MPLS VPN [RFC4364]
   capabilities to allow some PEs to connect to other PEs via public
   networks. [SECURE-L3VPN] introduces the concept of Red Interface &
   Black Interface on those used by PEs, where the RED interfaces are used to
   forward traffic into the VPN, and the Black Interfaces are used
   between WAN ports over through which only IPsec-protected packets are
   forwarded to the Internet or to other backbone network are sent thereby
   eliminating the need for MPLS transport in the backbone.

   [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes PEs terminate MPLS packets, and use using MPLS over IPsec when sending
   traffic through the Black Interfaces.

   [SECURE-EVPN] describes a solution where point-to-multipoint BGP
   signaling is used in the control plane for SDWAN Scenario #1. It
   relies upon a BGP cluster design to facilitate the key and policy
   exchange among PE devices to create private pair-wise IPsec Security
   Associations without IKEv2 point-to-point signaling or any other
   direct peer-to-peer session establishment messages.

   Both [SECURE-L3VPN] and [SECURE-EVPN] are useful, however, they both
   miss the aspects of aggregating VPN and Internet underlays. In
   summary:

   - These documents do not address the scenario of C-PE having some
     ports facing VPN PEs and other ports facing the Internet.

   -
   - The [SECURE-L3VPN] assumes that a CPE "registers" with the RR.
     However, it does not say how. It assumes that the remote CPEs are
     pre-configured with the IPsec SA manually. In SD-WAN, Zero Touch
     Provisioning is expected. Manual configuration is not an option,
     given the dimensioning figures but also
     as it contradicts the purpose objectives of SD-WAN to automate
     configuration tasks.
   - For RR communication with CPEs, C-PEs, this draft only mentions IPsec.
     Missing TLS/DTLS.
   - The draft assumes that CPEs C-PEs and RR are connected with an IPsec
     tunnel. With zero touch provisioning, we need an automatic way to
     synchronize the IPsec SAs between CPE C-PEs and RR. The draft assumes:

          A CPE must also be provisioned with whatever additional
          information is needed in order to set up an IPsec SA with
          each of the red RRs

   - IPsec requires periodic refreshment of the keys. The draft does
     not provide any information about how to synchronize the
     refreshment among multiple nodes.
   - IPsec usually sends configuration parameters to two endpoints only
     and lets these endpoints negotiate the key. Let us assume that the
     RR is responsible for creating the key for all endpoints: When one
     endpoint is compromised, all other connections will be impacted.

 4.2. Gaps in preventing

4.4. Preventing attacks from Internet-facing ports

   When C-PEs have Internet-facing ports, additional security risks are
   raised.

   To mitigate security risks, in addition to requiring Anti-DDoS
   features on C-PEs, it is necessary for CPEs to support means to
   determine whether traffic sent by remote peers is legitimate to
   prevent spoofing attacks.

5. Gap analysis of CPEs not directly connected to VPN PEs

   Because of the ephemeral property of the selected Cloud DCs, an
   enterprise or its network service provider may not have direct
   connections to the Cloud DCs that are used for hosting the
   enterprise's specific workloads/Apps. Under those circumstances, SD-
   WAN is a very flexible choice to interconnect the enterprise on-
   premises data centers & branch offices to its desired Cloud DCs.

   However, SD-WAN paths established over the public Internet can have
   unpredictable performance, especially over long distances and across
   operators' domains. Therefore, it is highly desirable to place steer as
   much as possible the portion of SD-WAN paths over service provider
   VPN (e.g., enterprise's existing VPN) that have guaranteed SLA to
   minimize the
   distance/segments distance or the number of segments over the public
   Internet.

   MEF Cloud Service Architecture [MEF-Cloud] also describes a use case
   of network operators that  use uses SD-WAN over LTE or the public
   Internet for last mile access where the VPN service providers cannot
   necessarily provide the required physical infrastructure.

   Under those scenarios, one or two of the SD-WAN endpoints may not be
   directly attached to the PEs of a VPN Domain.

   When using SD-WAN to connect the enterprise's existing sites with
   the workloads hosted in Cloud DC, DCs, the corresponding CPEs have to be
   upgraded to support SD-WAN.  If the workloads hosted in Cloud DCs
   need to be connected to many sites, the upgrade process can be very
   expensive.

   [Net2Cloud-Problem] describes a hybrid network approach that
   integrates SD-WAN with traditional MPLS-based VPNs, to extend the
   existing MPLS-based VPNs to the Cloud DC Workloads over the access
   paths that are not under the VPN provider's control. To make it work
   properly, a small number of the PEs of the MPLS VPN can be
   designated to connect to the remote workloads via SD-WAN secure
   IPsec tunnels.  Those designated PEs are shown as fPE (floating PE
   or smart PE) in Figure 3. Once the secure IPsec tunnels are
   established, the workloads hosted in Cloud DC DCs can be reached by the
   enterprise's VPN without upgrading all of the enterprise's existing
   CPEs. The only CPE that needs to support SD-WAN would be a
   virtualized CPE instantiated within the cloud DC.

   +--------+                                             +--------+
   | Host-a +--+                                     +----| Host-b |
   |        |  |                                    (')   |        |
   +--------+  |           +-----------+           (   )  +--------+
               |  +-+--+  ++-+        ++-+  +--+-+  (_)
               |  | CPE|--|PE|        |PE+--+ CPE|   |
               +--|    |  |  |        |  |  |    |---+
                  +-+--+  ++-+        ++-+  +----+
                   /       |           |
                  /        |  MPLS   +-+---+    +--+-++--------+
          +------+-+       | Network |fPE-1|    |CPE || Host   |
          | Host   |       |         |     |- --|    ||   d    |
          |   c    |       +-----+   +-+---+    +--+-++--------+
          +--------+       |fPE-2|-----+
                           +---+-+    (|)
                              (|)     (|) SD-WAN
                              (|)     (|) over any access
                              +=\======+=========+
                             //   \    | Cloud DC \\
                            //      \ ++-----+       \\
                                      +Remote|
                                      |  CPE |
                                      +-+----+
                            ----+-------+-------+-----
                                |               |
                            +---+----+      +---+----+
                            | Remote |      | Remote |
                            | App-1  |      | App-2  |
                            +--------+      +--------+

                    Figure 3: VPN Extension to Cloud DC

   In Figure 3, the optimal Cloud DC to host the workloads (due to (as a
   function of the proximity, capacity, pricing, or other criteria
   chosen by the enterprises) does not have a direct connection to the
   PEs of the MPLS VPN that interconnects the enterprise's existing
   sites.

5.1. Gap Analysis of Floating PEs to connect to Remote CPEs

   To extend MPLS VPNs to remote CPEs, it is necessary to establish
   secure tunnels (such as IPsec tunnels) between the Floating PEs and
   the remote CPEs.

   Gap:

   Even though a set of PEs can be manually selected to act as the
   floating PEs for a specific cloud data center, there are no standard
   protocols for those PEs to interact with the remote CPEs (most
   likely virtualized) instantiated in the third party cloud data
   centers (such as exchanging performance or route information).

   When there is more than one fPE available for use (as there should
   be for resiliency purposes or the ability to support multiple cloud
   DCs geographically scattered), it is not straightforward to
   designate an egress fPE to remote CPEs based on applications.  There
   is too much applications' traffic traversing PEs, and it is not
   feasible for PEs to recognize applications from the payload of
   packets.

5.2. NAT Traversal

   Most cloud

   Cloud DCs that only assign private IPv4 addresses to the
   instantiated
   workloads. Therefore, workloads assume that traffic to/from the workload
   usually needs to traverse NATs.
   A SD-WAN edge node can solicit a STUN (Session Traversal of UDP
   Through Network Address Translation RFC 3489) Server to get the NAT
   property, the public IP address and the Public Port number so that
   such information can be communicated to pass
   to the relevant peers.

5.3. Complication Complexity of using BGP between PEs and remote CPEs via Internet

   Even though an EBGP (external BGP) Multi-hop design can be used to
   connect peers that are not directly connected to each other, there
   are still some complications/gaps complications in extending BGP from MPLS VPN PEs to
   remote CPEs via any access paths path (e.g., Internet).

   The path between the remote CPEs and VPN PE can PEs that maintain VPN
   routes may very well traverse untrusted nodes.

   EBGP Multi-hop design requires static configuration on both peers.
   To use EBGP between a PE and remote CPEs, the PE has to be manually
   configured with the "next-hop" set to the IP address of the CPEs.
   When remote CPEs, especially remote virtualized CPEs are dynamically
   instantiated or removed, the configuration of Multi-Hop EBGP on the
   PE has to be changed accordingly.

   Gap:

     Egress peering engineering (EPE) is not enough. sufficient. Running BGP on
     virtualized CPEs in Cloud DC DCs requires GRE tunnels being to be
     established first, which in turn requires the remote CPEs to support
     address and key management for the remote CPEs. capabilities. RFC 7024 (Virtual Hub &
     Spoke) and Hierarchical VPN is do not enough.

     Also support the required
     properties.

     Also, there is a need for a mechanism to automatically trigger
     configuration changes on PEs when remote CPEs' are instantiated or
     moved (leading to an IP address change) or deleted.

     EBGP Multi-hop design does not include a security mechanism by
     default. The PE and remote CPEs need secure communication channels
     when connecting via the public Internet.

   Remote CPEs, if instantiated in Cloud DCs, might have to traverse
   NATs to reach PE. PEs. It is not clear how BGP can be used between
   devices outside located beyond the NAT and the entities devices located behind the
   NAT. It is not clear how to configure the Next Hop on the PEs to
   reach private IPv4 addresses.

5.4. Designated Forwarder to the remote edges

   Among the multiple floating PEs that are available for reachable from a remote
   CPE, multicast traffic sent by the remote CPE towards the MPLS VPN
   can be forwarded back to the remote CPE due to the PE receiving the
   multicast data frame packets forwarding the multicast/broadcast frame to other
   PEs that in turn send to all attached CPEs. This process may cause
   traffic loops.

   Therefore, it is necessary to designate one floating PE as the CPE's
   Designated Forwarder, similar to TRILL's Appointed Forwarders
   [RFC6325].

   Gap: the

   MPLS VPN does VPNs do not have features like TRILL's Appointed Forwarders.

5.5. Traffic Path Management

   When there are multiple floating PEs that have established IPsec
   tunnels with the remote CPE, the remote CPE can forward outbound
   traffic to the Designated Forwarder PE, which in turn forwards
   traffic to egress PEs and then to the final destinations. However,
   it is not straightforward for the egress PE to send back the return
   traffic to the Designated Forwarder PE.

   Example of Return Path management using Figure 3 above.

   - fPE-1 is DF for communication between App-1 <-> Host-a due to
   latency, pricing or other criteria.
   - fPE-2 is DF for communication between App-1 <-> Host-b.

6. Manageability Considerations

     Zero touch provisioning of SD-WAN edge nodes is expected in should be a major
     feature of SD-WAN
     deployment. deployments. It is necessary for a newly powered
     up SD-WAN edge node to establish a secure connection (by means of
     TLS, DTLS, etc.) with its controller.

7. Security Considerations

     The intention of this draft is to identify the gaps in current and
     proposed SD-WAN approaches that can address requirements
     identified in [Net2Cloud-problem].

     Several of these approaches have gaps in meeting enterprise
     security requirements when tunneling their traffic over the
     Internet, since this is the purpose of SD-WAN. See the individual
     sections above for further discussion of these security gaps.

8. IANA Considerations

   This document requires no IANA actions. RFC Editor: Please remove
   this section before publication.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

9.2. Informative References

   [RFC8192] S. Hares, et al, "Interface to Network Security Functions
             (I2NSF) Problem Statement and Use Cases", July 2017

   [RFC5521] P. Mohapatra, E. Rosen, "The BGP Encapsulation Subsequent
             Address Family Identifier (SAFI) and the BGP Tunnel
             Encapsulation Attribute", April 2009.

   [BGP-SDWAN-PORT]L. Dunbar, et al, "Subsequent Address Family
             Indicator for SDWAN Ports", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-port-
             safi-00, Work-in-progress, March 2019.

   [BGP-SDWAN-Usage] L. Dunbar, et al, "Framework of Using BGP for
             SDWAN Overlay Networks", draft-dunbar-idr-sdwan-framework-
             00, work-in-progress, Feb 2019.

   [Tunnel-Encap]E. Rosen, et al, "The BGP Tunnel Encapsulation
             Attribute", draft-ietf-idr-tunnel-encaps-10, July 2018.

   [SECURE-EVPN A. Sajassi, et al, draft-sajassi-bess-secure-evpn-01,
             work in progress, March 2019.

   [SECURE-L3VPN] E. Rosen, "Provide Secure Layer L3VPNs over Public
             Infrastructure", draft-rosen-bess-secure-l3vpn-00, work-
             in-progress, July 2018

   [DMVPN] Dynamic Multi-point VPN:
             https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/dynamic-
             multipoint-vpn-dmvpn/index.html

   [DSVPN] Dynamic Smart VPN:
             http://forum.huawei.com/enterprise/en/thread-390771-1-
             1.html

   [ITU-T-X1036] ITU-T Recommendation X.1036, "Framework for creation,
             storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for
             network security", Nov 2007.

    [Net2Cloud-Problem] L. Dunbar and A. Malis, "Seamless Interconnect
             Underlay to Cloud Overlay Problem Statement", draft-dm-
             net2cloud-problem-statement-02, June 2018

10. Acknowledgments

   Acknowledgements to xxx for his review and contributions.

   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.

Authors' Addresses

   Linda Dunbar
   Huawei
   Futurewei
   Email: Linda.Dunbar@huawei.com ldunbar@futurewei.com

   Andrew G. Malis
   Huawei
   Futurewei
   Email: agmalis@gmail.com

   Christian Jacquenet
   Orange
   Rennes, 35000
   France
   Email: Christian.jacquenet@orange.com