draft-ietf-savi-mix-01.txt   draft-ietf-savi-mix-02.txt 
Network Working Group J. Bi SAVI J. Bi
Internet-Draft CERNET Internet-Draft G. Yao
Intended status: Standards Track G. Yao Intended status: Standards Track Tsinghua Univ.
Expires: April 28, 2012 Tsinghua University Expires: October 29, 2012 J. Halpern
J. Halpern Newbridge
Newbridge Networks Inc
E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed. E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed.
Cisco Systems Cisco
October 26, 2011 April 27, 2012
SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario
draft-ietf-savi-mix-01 draft-ietf-savi-mix-02
Abstract Abstract
This document reviews how multiple address discovery methods can This document reviews how multiple address discovery methods can
coexist in a single SAVI device and collisions are resolved when the coexist in a single SAVI device and collisions are resolved when the
same binding entry is discovered by two or more methods. same binding entry is discovered by two or more methods.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 37 skipping to change at page 1, line 36
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 28, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Recommendations for preventing collisions . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Handing binding collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Recommendations for preventing collisions . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Handing binding collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1.1. Basic preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.2. Overwritten preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1.1. Basic preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1.2. Overwritten preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Disscusion on Assumption Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Contributors and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
There are currently several documents [I-D.ietf-savi-fcfs], There are currently several documents [savi-fcfs], [savi-dhcp] and
[I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp] and [I-D.ietf-savi-send] that describe the [savi-send] that describe the different methods by which a switch can
different methods by which a switch can discover and record bindings discover and record bindings between a node's layer3 address and a
between a node's layer3 address and a binding anchor and use that binding anchor and use that binding to perform Source Address
binding to perform Source Address Validation. Each of these Validation. Each of these documents specifies how to learn on-link
documents specifies how to learn on-link addresses, based on the addresses, based on the method used for their assignment,
method used for their assignment, respectively: StateLess respectively: StateLess Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), Dynamic Host
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) and Control Protocol (DHCP) and Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND). Each
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND). Each of these documents describes of these documents describes separately how one particular discovery
separately how one particular discovery method deals with address method deals with address collisions (same address, different
collisions (same address, different anchor). anchor).
While multiple assignment methods can be used in the same layer2 While multiple assignment methods can be used in the same layer2
domain, a SAVI device might have to deal with a mix of binding domain, a SAVI device might have to deal with a mix of binding
discovery methods. The purpose of this document is to provide discovery methods. The purpose of this document is to provide
recommendations to avoid collisions and to review collisions handling recommendations to avoid collisions and to review collisions handling
when two or more such methods come up with competing bindings. when two or more such methods come up with competing bindings.
2. Problem Scope 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [rfc2119].
3. Problem Scope
There are three address assignment methods identified and reviewed in There are three address assignment methods identified and reviewed in
one of the SAVI document: one of the SAVI document:
1. StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC) - reviewed in 1. StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC) - reviewed in
[I-D.ietf-savi-fcfs] [savi-fcfs]
2. Dynamic Host Control Protocol address assignment (DHCP) - 2. Dynamic Host Control Protocol address assignment (DHCP) -
reviewed in [I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp] reviewed in [savi-dhcp]
3. Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) address assignment, reviewed in 3. Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) address assignment, reviewed in
[I-D.ietf-savi-send] [savi-send]
Each address assignment method corresponds to a binding discovery Each address assignment method corresponds to a binding discovery
method: SAVI-FCFS, SAVI-DHCP and SAVI-SeND. In addition, there is a method: SAVI-FCFS, SAVI-DHCP and SAVI-SeND. In addition, there is a
fourth method for installing a bindings on the switch, referred to as fourth method for installing a bindings on the switch, referred to as
"manual". It is based on manual (address or prefix) binding "manual". It is based on manual (address or prefix) binding
configuration and is reviewed in [I-D.ietf-savi-fcfs] and configuration and is reviewed in [savi-fcfs] and [savi-framework].
[I-D.ietf-savi-framework]
All combinations of address assignment methods can coexist within a All combinations of address assignment methods can coexist within a
layer2 domain. A SAVI device will have to implement the layer2 domain. A SAVI device will have to implement the
corresponding SAVI discovery methods (referred to as a "SAVI corresponding SAVI discovery methods (referred to as a "SAVI
solution") to enable Source Address Validation. If more than one solution") to enable Source Address Validation. If more than one
SAVI solution is enabled on a SAVI device, the method is referred to SAVI solution is enabled on a SAVI device, the method is referred to
as "mix address assignment method" in this document. as "mix address assignment method" in this document.
SAVI solutions are independent from each other, each one handling its SAVI solutions are independent from each other, each one handling its
own entries. In the absence of reconciliation, each solution will own entries. In the absence of reconciliation, each solution will
reject packets sourced with an address it did not discovered. To reject packets sourced with an address it did not discovered. To
prevent addresses discovered by one solution to be filtered out by prevent addresses discovered by one solution to be filtered out by
another, the binding table should be shared by all the solutions. another, the binding table should be shared by all the solutions.
However this could create some conflict when the same entry is However this could create some conflict when the same entry is
discovered by two different methods: the purpose of this document is discovered by two different methods: the purpose of this document is
of two folds: provide recommendations and method to avoid conflicts, of two folds: provide recommendations and method to avoid conflicts,
and resolve conflicts if and when they happen. Collisions happening and resolve conflicts if and when they happen. Collisions happening
within a given solution are outside the scope of this document. within a given solution are outside the scope of this document.
3. Recommendations for preventing collisions 4. Recommendations for preventing collisions
If each solution has a dedicated address space, collisions won't If each solution has a dedicated address space, collisions won't
happen. Using non overlapping address space across SAVI solutions is happen. Using non overlapping address space across SAVI solutions is
therefore recommended. To that end, one should: therefore recommended. To that end, one should:
1. DHCP/SLAAC: use non-overlapping prefix for DHCP and SLAAC. Set 1. DHCP/SLAAC: use non-overlapping prefix for DHCP and SLAAC. Set
the A bit in Prefix information option of Router Advertisement the A bit in Prefix information option of Router Advertisement
for SLAAC prefix. And set the M bit in Router Advertisement for for SLAAC prefix. And set the M bit in Router Advertisement for
DHCP prefix. For detail explanations on these bits, refer to DHCP prefix. For detail explanations on these bits, refer to
[RFC4861] [RFC4862]. [rfc4861][rfc4862].
2. SeND/non-SeND: avoid mixed environment (where SeND and non-SeND 2. SeND/non-SeND: avoid mixed environment (where SeND and non-SeND
nodes are deployed) or separate the prefixes announced to SeND nodes are deployed) or separate the prefixes announced to SeND
and non-SenD nodes. One way to separate the prefixes is to have and non-SenD nodes. One way to separate the prefixes is to have
the router()s announcing different (non-overlapping) prefixes to the router(s) announcing different (non-overlapping) prefixes to
SeND and to non-SeND nodes, using unicast Router Advertisements, SeND and to non-SeND nodes, using unicast Router Advertisements,
in response to SeND/non-SeND Router Solicit. in response to SeND/non-SeND Router Solicit.
4. Handing binding collisions 5. Handing binding collisions
In situations where collisions could not be avoided, two cases should In situations where collisions could not be avoided, two cases should
be considered: be considered:
1. The same address is bound on two different binding anchors by 1. The same address is bound on two different binding anchors by
different SAVI solutions. different SAVI solutions.
2. The same address is bound on the same binding anchor by different 2. The same address is bound on the same binding anchor by different
SAVI solutions. SAVI solutions.
4.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors 5.1. Same Address on Different Binding Anchors
This would typically occur in case assignment address spaces could This would typically occur in case assignment address spaces could
not be separated. For instance,overl an address is assigned by SLAAC not be separated. For instance,overl an address is assigned by SLAAC
on node X, installed in the binding table using SAVI-FCFS, anchored on node X, installed in the binding table using SAVI-FCFS, anchored
to "anchor-X". Later, the same address is assigned by DHCP to node to "anchor-X". Later, the same address is assigned by DHCP to node
Y, as a potential candidate in the same binding table, anchored to Y, as a potential candidate in the same binding table, anchored to
"anchor-Y". "anchor-Y".
4.1.1. Basic preference 5.1.1. Basic preference
The SAVI device must decide whom the address should be bound with The SAVI device must decide whom the address should be bound with
(anchor-X or anchor-Y in this example). Current standard documents (anchor-X or anchor-Y in this example). Current standard documents
of address assignment methods have implied the prioritization of address assignment methods have implied the prioritization
relationship (first-come). In the absence of any configuration or relationship (first-come). In the absence of any configuration or
protocol hint (see Section 4.1.2) the SAVI device should choose the protocol hint (see Section 5.1.2) the SAVI device should choose the
first-come entry, whether it was learnt from SLACC, SeND or DHCP. first-come entry, whether it was learnt from SLACC, SeND or DHCP.
4.1.2. Overwritten preference 5.1.2. Overwritten preference
There are two identified exceptions to the general prioritization There are two identified exceptions to the general prioritization
model, one of them being CGA addresses, another one controlled by the model, one of them being CGA addresses, another one controlled by the
configuration of the switch: configuration of the switch:
1. When CGA addresses are used, and a collision is detected, 1. When CGA addresses are used, and a collision is detected,
preference should be given to the anchor that carries the CGA preference should be given to the anchor that carries the CGA
credentials once they are verified, in particular the CGA credentials once they are verified, in particular the CGA
parameters and the RSA options. Note that if an attacker was parameters and the RSA options. Note that if an attacker was
trying to replay CGA credentials, he would then compete on the trying to replay CGA credentials, he would then compete on the
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from "method", the switch should defend the address by responding from "method", the switch should defend the address by responding
to the DAD message. It should not at this point install the to the DAD message. It should not at this point install the
entry into the binding table. It will simply prevent the node to entry into the binding table. It will simply prevent the node to
assign the address, and will de-facto prioritize the configured assign the address, and will de-facto prioritize the configured
anchor or configured assignment method for that address. This is anchor or configured assignment method for that address. This is
especially useful to protect well known bindings such as a static especially useful to protect well known bindings such as a static
address of a server over anybody, even when the server is down. address of a server over anybody, even when the server is down.
It is also a way to give priority to a binding learnt from SAVI- It is also a way to give priority to a binding learnt from SAVI-
DHCP over a binding for the same address, learnt from SAVI-FCFS. DHCP over a binding for the same address, learnt from SAVI-FCFS.
4.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario 5.1.3. Multiple SAVI Device Scenario
A single SAVI device doesn't have the information of all bound A single SAVI device doesn't have the information of all bound
addresses on the perimeter. Therefore it is not enough to lookup addresses on the perimeter. Therefore it is not enough to lookup
local bindings to identify a collision. However, assuming DAD is local bindings to identify a collision. However, assuming DAD is
performed throughout the security perimeter for all addresses performed throughout the security perimeter for all addresses
regardless of the assignment method, then DAD response will inform regardless of the assignment method, then DAD response will inform
all SAVI devices about any collision. In that case, FCFS will apply all SAVI devices about any collision. In that case, FCFS will apply
the same way as in a single switch scenario. If the admin configured the same way as in a single switch scenario. If the admin configured
on one the switches a prefix (or a single static binding) to defend, on one the switches a prefix (or a single static binding) to defend,
the DAD response generated by this switch will also prevent the the DAD response generated by this switch will also prevent the
binding to be installed on other switches of the perimeter. binding to be installed on other switches of the perimeter.
4.2. Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor 5.2. Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor
A binding may be set up on the same binding anchor by multiple A binding may be set up on the same binding anchor by multiple
solutions. Generally, the binding lifetimes of different solutions solutions. For example, if SAVI-FCFS and SAVI-DHCP are both enabled
are different. Potentially, if one solution requires to remove the on one SAVI device, a DHCP address be bound by both SAVI instances.
binding, the node using the address may be taken the use right.
For example, a node performs DAD procedure after being assigned an There is no conflict if the binding is valid in all the solutions.
address from DHCP, then the address will also be bound by SAVI-FCFS. However, the binding lifetimes of different solutions can be
If the SAVI-FCFS lifetime is shorter than DHCP lifetime, when the different. If one SAVI instance changes the state of a binding to
SAVI-FCFS lifetime expires, it will request to remove the binding. invalid on lifetime expires, conflict will happen.
If the binding is removed, the node will not be able to use the
address even the DHCP lease time doesn't expire.
The solution proposed is to keep a binding as long as possible. A The solution proposed is to keep a binding as long as possible. A
binding is kept until it has been required to be removed by all the binding is kept until it has been required to be removed by all the
solutions that ever set up it. solutions that ever set up it.
5. References 6. Disscusion on Assumption Conflict
5.1. Normative References Different assumptions are made as the basis of solutions. The
assumptions of each solution specified which entity is the origin of
the trust. Indeed, the binding between address and binding anchor is
actually the derivative of the assumptions based on the principles of
binding set up. The conflict in identifier field of address is
specified in the above sections. This section specifies the conflict
in prefix field from different assumptions.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate SAVI FCFS and SAVI DHCP trust routers to get the legitimate prefixes
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. for local link; however, only RADV validated by SEND is trusted by
SAVI SEND. In this solution, if any SAVI solution regards a prefix
to be valid, the prefix is valid for the whole mechanism.
5.2. Informative References 7. Security Considerations
[I-D.ietf-savi-dhcp] As described in [savi-framework], this solution cannot strictly
Wu, J., Yao, G., Bi, J., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for prevent spoofing. There are two scenarios in which spoofing can
DHCP", draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-10 (work in progress), still happen:
July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-savi-fcfs] 1. The binding anchor is spoofable. if the binding anchor is
Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS spoofable, e.g., plain MAC address, an attacker can use forged
SAVI: First-Come First-Serve Source-Address Validation for binding anchor to send packet which will not be regarded as
Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", draft-ietf-savi-fcfs-09 spoofing by SAVI device. Indeed, using binding anchor that can
(work in progress), April 2011. be easily spoofed is dangerous. An attacker can use the binding
anchor of another host to perform a lot of DHCP procedures, and
the SAVI device will refuse to set up new binding for the host
whenever the binding number limitation has been reached. Thus,
it is RECOMMENDED to use strong enough binding anchor, e.g.,
switch port, secure association in 802.11ae/af and 802.11i.
[I-D.ietf-savi-framework] 2. The binding anchor is shared by more than one host. If the
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, binding anchor is shared by more than one host, they can spoof
"Source Address Validation Improvement Framework", the addresses of each other. For example, a number of hosts can
draft-ietf-savi-framework-05 (work in progress), attach to the same switch port of a SAVI device through a hub.
July 2011. The SAVI device cannot distinguish packets from different hosts
and thus the spoofing between them will not be detected. This
problem can be solved through not sharing binding anchor between
hosts.
[I-D.ietf-savi-send] 8. IANA Considerations
Bagnulo, M. and A. Garcia-Martinez, "SEND-based Source-
Address Validation Implementation",
draft-ietf-savi-send-06 (work in progress), October 2011.
[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., Note to RFC Editor: This section will have served its purpose if it
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for correctly tells IANA that no new assignments or registries are
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. required, or if those assignments or registries are created during
the RFC publication process. From the authors' perspective, it may
therefore be removed upon publication as an RFC at the RFC Editor's
discretion.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure 9. Acknowledgment
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun and
RFC 3972, March 2005. Jari Arkko for their valuable contributions.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, This document was generated using the xml2rfc tool.
10. References
10.1. Informative References
[rfc2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, Match 1997.
10.2. Normative References
[rfc4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007. September 2007.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless [rfc4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007. Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.
Appendix A. Contributors and Acknowledgments [savi-dhcp]
Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for
DHCP", draft-ietf-savi-dhcp-12 (work in progress),
February 2012.
Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun and [savi-fcfs]
Jari Arkko for their valuable contributions. Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS-
SAVI: First-Come First-Serve Source-Address Validation for
Locally Assigned Addresses", draft-ietf-savi-fcfs-14 (work
in progress), February 2012.
[savi-framework]
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
"Source Address Validation Improvement Framework",
draft-ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress),
December 2011.
[savi-send]
Bagnulo, M. and A. Garcia-Martinez, "SEND-based Source-
Address Validation Implementation",
draft-ietf-savi-send-06 (work in progress), October 2011.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jun Bi Jun Bi
CERNET Tsinghua University
Network Research Center, Tsinghua University Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084 Beijing 100084
China China
Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn Email: junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn
Guang Yao Guang Yao
Tsinghua University Tsinghua University
Network Research Center, Tsinghua University Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084 Beijing 100084
China China
Email: yaoguang.china@gmail.com Email: yaoguang@cernet.edu.cn
Joel M. Halpern Joel M. Halpern
Newbridge Networks Inc Newbridge Networks Inc
Email: jmh@joelhalpern.com Email: jmh@joelhalpern.com
Eric Levy-Abegnoli (editor) Eric Levy-Abegnoli (editor)
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Village d'Entreprises Green Side - 400, Avenue Roumanille Village d'Entreprises Green Side - 400, Avenue Roumanille
Biot-Sophia Antipolis - 06410 Biot-Sophia Antipolis 06410
France France
Email: elevyabe@cisco.com Email: elevyabe@cisco.com
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