Secure Shell Working Group                                   J. Schlyter
Internet-Draft                                      Carlstedt Research &                                                   OpenSSH
Expires: October 1, 2003                                      Technology March 5, 2004                                        W. Griffin
                                         Network Associates Laboratories
                                                           April 2,
                                                       September 5, 2003

           Using DNS to securely publish Securely Publish SSH key fingerprints
                      draft-ietf-secsh-dns-04.txt Key Fingerprints

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   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.


   This document describes a method to verify SSH host keys using
   DNSSEC. The document defines a new DNS resource record that contains
   a standard SSH key fingerprint.

Table of Contents

   1.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.    SSH Host Key Verification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.1   Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.2   Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.3   Fingerprint Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.4   Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.    The SSHFP Resource Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.1   The SSHFP RDATA Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4  5
   3.1.1 Algorithm Number Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.1.2 Fingerprint Type Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.1.3 Fingerprint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.2   Presentation Format of the SSHFP RR  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.    Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.    IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
         Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
         Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
         Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8  9
   A.    Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
         Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 10

1. Introduction

   The SSH [5] [6] protocol provides secure remote login and other secure
   network services over an insecure network.  The security of the
   connection relies on the server authenticating itself to the client.

   Server authentication client
   as well as the user authenticating itself to the server.

   If a connection is normally done by presenting established to a server whose public key is not
   already known to the client, a fingerprint of an unknown public the key is presented to
   the user for verification.  If the user decides that the fingerprint
   is correct and accepts the key, the key is saved locally and used for
   verification for all following connections. While some
   security-conscious users verify the fingerprint out-of-band before
   accepting the key, many users blindly
   accepts accept the presented key.

   The method described here can provide out-of-band verification by
   looking up a fingerprint of the server public key in the DNS [1][2]
   and using DNSSEC [4] [5] to verify the lookup.

   In order to distribute the fingerprint using DNS, this document
   defines a new DNS resource record record, "SSHFP", to carry the fingerprint.

   Basic understanding of the DNS system [1][2] and the DNS security
   extensions [4] [5] is assumed by this document.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3].

2. SSH Host Key Verification

2.1 Method

   Upon connection to a SSH server, the SSH client MAY look up the SSHFP
   resource record(s) for the host it is connecting to.  If the
   algorithm and fingerprint of the key received from the SSH server
   match the algorithm and fingerprint of one of the SSHFP resource
   record(s) returned from DNS, the client MAY accept the identity of
   the server.

2.2 Implementation Notes

   Client implementors SHOULD provide a configurable policy used to
   select the order of methods used to verify a host key. This document
   defines one method: Fingerprint storage in DNS. Another method
   defined in the SSH Architecture [5] [6] uses local files to store keys
   for comparison. Other methods that could be defined in the future
   might include storing fingerprints in LDAP or other databases. A
   configurable policy will allow administrators to determine which
   methods they want to use and in what order the methods should be
   prioritized. This will allow administrators to determine how much
   trust they want to place in the different methods.

   One specific scenario for having a configurable policy is where
   clients do not use fully qualified host names to connect to servers.
   In this scenario, the implementation SHOULD verify the host key
   against a local database before verifying the key via the fingerprint
   returned from DNS. This would help prevent an attacker from injecting
   a DNS search path into the local resolver and forcing the client to
   connect to a different host.

2.3 Fingerprint Matching

   The public key and the SSHFP resource record are matched together by
   comparing algorithm number and fingerprint.

      The public key algorithm and the SSHFP algorithm number MUST

      A message digest of the public key, using the message digest
      algorithm specified in the SSHFP fingerprint type, MUST match the
      SSH FP
      SSHFP fingerprint.

2.4 Authentication

   A public key verified using this method MUST only NOT be trusted if the
   SSHFP resource record (RR) used for verification was not
   authenticated by a trusted SIG RR.

   Clients that do validate the DNSSEC signatures themselves SHOULD use
   standard DNSSEC validation procedures.

   Clients that do not validate the DNSSEC signatures themselves MUST
   use a secure transport, e.g. TSIG [8], [9], SIG(0) [9] [10] or IPsec [7], [8],
   between themselves and the entity performing the signature

3. The SSHFP Resource Record

   The SSHFP resource record (RR) is used to store a fingerprint of a
   SSH public host key that is associated with a Domain Name System
   (DNS) name.

   The RR type code for the SSHFP RR is TBA.

3.1 The SSHFP RDATA Format

   The RDATA for a SSHFP RR consists of an algorithm number, fingerprint
   type and the fingerprint of the public host key.

         1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
         0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
         |   algorithm   |    fp type    |                               /
         +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               /
         /                                                               /
         /                          fingerprint                          /
         /                                                               /

3.1.1 Algorithm Number Specification

   This algorithm number octet describes the algorithm of the public
   key.  The following values are assigned:

          Value    Algorithm name
          -----    --------------
          0        reserved
          1        RSA
          2        DSS

   Reserving other types requires IETF consensus. consensus [4].

3.1.2 Fingerprint Type Specification

   The fingerprint type octet describes the message-digest algorithm
   used to calculate the fingerprint of the public key.  The following
   values are assigned:

          Value    Fingerprint type
          -----    ----------------
          0        reserved
          1        SHA-1

   Reserving other types requires IETF consensus. consensus [4].

   For interoperability reasons, as few fingerprint types as possible
   should be reserved.  The only reason to reserve additional types is
   to increase security.

3.1.3 Fingerprint
   The fingerprint is calculated over the public key blob as described
   in [6]. [7].

   The message-digest algorithm is presumed to produce an opaque octet
   string output which is placed as-is in the RDATA fingerprint field.

3.2 Presentation Format of the SSHFP RR

   The RDATA of the presentation format of the SSHFP resource record
   consists of two numbers (algorithm and fingerprint type) followed by
   the fingerprint itself presented in hex, e.g:

         host.example.  SSHFP 2 1 123456789abcdef67890123456789abcdef67890

   The use of mnemonics instead of numbers is not allowed.

4. Security Considerations

   Currently, the amount of trust a user can realistically place in a
   server key is proportional to the amount of attention paid to
   verifying that the public key presented actually corresponds to the
   private key of the server. If a user accepts a key without verifying
   the fingerprint with something learned through a secured channel, the
   connection is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.

   The approach suggested here shifts the burden of key checking from
   each user of a machine to the key checking performed by the
   administrator of the DNS recursive server used to resolve the host
   information.  Hopefully, by reducing the number of times that keys
   need to be verified by hand, each verification is performed more
   completely.  Furthermore, by requiring an administrator do the
   checking, the result may be more reliable than placing this task in
   the hands of an application user.

   The overall security of using SSHFP for SSH host key verification is
   dependent on the security policies of the SSH host administrator and
   DNS zone administrator (in transferring the fingerprint), detailed
   aspects of how verification is done in the SSH
   implementations. implementation, and in
   the client's diligence in accessing the DNS in a secure manner.

   One such aspect is in which order fingerprints are looked up (e.g.
   first checking local file and then SSHFP).  We note that in addition
   to protecting the first-time transfer of host keys, SSHFP can
   optionally be used for stronger host key protection.

      If SSHFP is checked first, new SSH host keys may be distributed by
      replacing the corresponding SSHFP in DNS.

      If SSH host key verification can be configured to require SSHFP,
      we can implement
      SSH host key revocation can be implemented by removing the
      corresponding SSHFP from DNS.

   As stated in Section 2.2, we recommend that SSH implementors provide
   a policy mechanism to control the order of methods used for host key
   verification. One specific scenario for having a configurable policy
   is where clients use unqualified host names to connect to servers. In
   this case, we recommend that SSH implementations check the host key
   against a local database before verifying the key via the fingerprint
   returned from DNS. This would help prevent an attacker from injecting
   a DNS search path into the local resolver and forcing the client to
   connect to a different host.

   A different approach to solve the DNS search path issue would be for
   clients to use a trusted DNS search path, i.e., one not acquired
   through DHCP or other autoconfiguration mechanisms. Since there is no
   way with current DNS lookup APIs to tell whether a search path is
   from a trusted source, the entire client system would need to be
   configured with this trusted DNS search path.

   Another dependency is on the implementation of DNSSEC itself.  As
   stated in Section 2.4, we mandate the use of secure methods for
   lookup and that SSHFP RRs are authenticated by trusted SIG RRs.  This
   is especially important if SSHFP is to be used as a basis for host
   key rollover and/or revocation, as described above.

   Since DNSSEC only protects the integrity of the host key fingerprint
   after it is signed by the DNS zone administrator, the fingerprint
   must be transferred securely from the SSH host administrator to the
   DNS zone administrator.  This could be done manually between the
   administrators or automatically using secure DNS dynamic update [10] [11]
   between the SSH server and the nameserver.  We note that this is no
   different from other key enrollment situations, e.g. a client sending
   a certificate request to a certificate authority for signing.

5. IANA Considerations

   IANA needs to allocate a RR type code for SSHFP from the standard RR
   type space (type 44 requested).

   IANA needs to open a new registry for the SSHFP RR type for public
   key algorithms.  Defined types are:

         0 is reserved
         1 is RSA
         2 is DSA

    Adding new reservations requires IETF consensus. consensus [4].

   IANA needs to open a new registry for the SSHFP RR type for
   fingerprint types.  Defined types are:

         0 is reserved
         1 is SHA-1

    Adding new reservations requires IETF consensus. consensus [4].

Normative References

   [1]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
        13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [2]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
        specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [3]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [4]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
        Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.

   [5]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
        2535, March 1999.

   [5]  Rinne, T.,

   [6]  Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M., Rinne, T. and S.
        Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture", draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-13
        draft-ietf-secsh-architecture-14 (work in progress), September 2002.

   [6]  Rinne, T., July 2003.

   [7]  Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M. M., Rinne, T. and S.
        Lehtinen, "SSH Transport Layer Protocol",
        draft-ietf-secsh-transport-16 (work in progress), September
        2002. July 2003.

Informational References


   [8]   Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N. and R. Glenn, "IP Security Document
         Roadmap", RFC 2411, November 1998.


   [9]   Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B. Wellington,
         "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)", RFC
         2845, May 2000.


   [10]  Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (
         SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.


   [11]  Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
         Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

Authors' Addresses

   Jakob Schlyter
   Carlstedt Research & Technology
   Stora Badhusgatan 18-20
   Goteborg  SE-411 21
   812 23rd Avenue SE
   Calgary, Alberta  T2G 1N8


   Wesley Griffin
   Network Associates Laboratories
   15204 Omega
   7075 Samuel Morse Drive Suite 300
   Columbia, MD  20850  21046


Appendix A. Acknowledgements

   The authors gratefully acknowledges, acknowledge, in no particular order, the
   contributions of the following persons:

      Martin Fredriksson

      Olafur Gudmundsson

      Edward Lewis

      Bill Sommerfeld

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