draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-03.txt 
SIDR S. Kent SIDR S. Kent
Internet-Draft BBN Technologies Internet-Draft BBN Technologies
Intended status: Informational D. Ma Intended status: Informational D. Ma
Expires: February 5, 2017 ZDNS Expires: March 16, 2017 ZDNS
August 4, 2016 September 12, 2016
Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager
in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-02 draft-ietf-sidr-adverse-actions-03
Abstract Abstract
This document analyzes actions by or against a CA or independent This document analyzes actions by or against a CA or independent
repository manager in the RPKI that can adversely affect the Internet repository manager in the RPKI that can adversely affect the Internet
Number Resources (INRs) associated with that CA or its subordinate Number Resources (INRs) associated with that CA or its subordinate
CAs. The analysis is based on examination of the data items in the CAs. The analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR
RPKI repository, as controlled by a CA (or independent repository holder. The analysis is based on examination of the data items in
manager) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs). The analysis is the RPKI repository, as controlled by a CA (or independent repository
performed from the perspective of an affected INR holder. The manager) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs). The analysis does not
analysis does not purport to be comprehensive; it does represent an purport to be comprehensive; it does represent an orderly way to
orderly way to analyze a number of ways that errors by or attacks analyze a number of ways that errors by or attacks against a CA or
against a CA or repository manager can affect the RPKI and routing repository manager can affect the RPKI and routing decisions based on
decisions based on RPKI data. RPKI data.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 5, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 29 skipping to change at page 2, line 29
2. Analysis of RPKI Repository Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Analysis of RPKI Repository Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. CA Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2. Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3. Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.4. ROA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5. Ghostbusters Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.5. Ghostbusters Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6. Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.6. Router Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3. Analysis of Actions Relative to Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 18 3. Analysis of Actions Relative to Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1. Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.1. Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2. Scenario B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2. Scenario B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3. Scenario C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.3. Scenario C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4. Scenario D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3.4. Scenario D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In the context of this document, any change to the Resource Public In the context of this document, any change to the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] that diminishes the set of Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] that diminishes the set of
Internet Numeric Resources (INRs) associated with an INR holder, and Internet Numeric Resources (INRs) associated with an INR holder, and
that is contrary to the holder's wishes, is termed "adverse". An that is contrary to the holder's wishes, is termed "adverse". This
analysis is done from the perspective of an affected INR holder. An
action that results in an adverse charge (as defined above), may be action that results in an adverse charge (as defined above), may be
the result of an attack on a CA [RFC7132], an error by a CA, or an the result of an attack on a CA [RFC7132], an error by a CA, or an
error by or an attack on a repository operator. Note that the CA error by or an attack on a repository operator. Note that the CA
that allocated the affected INRs may be acting in accordance with that allocated the affected INRs may be acting in accordance with
established policy, and thus the change may be contractually established policy, and thus the change may be contractually
justified, even though viewed as adverse by the INR holder. This justified, even though viewed as adverse by the INR holder. This
document examines the implications of adverse actions with respect to document examines the implications of adverse actions within the RPKI
INRs irrespective of the cause of the actions. with respect to INRs irrespective of the cause of the actions.
Additionally, when a ROA or router certificate is created that Additionally, when a ROA or router certificate is created that
"competes" with an existing ROA or router certificate (respectively), "competes" with an existing ROA or router certificate (respectively),
the creation of the new ROA or router certificate may be adverse. (A the creation of the new ROA or router certificate may be adverse. (A
newer ROA competes with an older ROA if the newer ROA points to a newer ROA competes with an older ROA if the newer ROA points to a
different ASN, contains the same or a more specific prefix, and is different ASN, contains the same or a more specific prefix, and is
issued by a different CA. A newer router certificate competes with issued by a different CA. A newer router certificate competes with
an older router certificate if the newer one contains the same ASN a an older router certificate if the newer one contains the same ASN a
different public key, and is issued by a different CA.) Note that different public key, and is issued by a different CA.) Note that
transferring resources, or changing of upstream providers may yield transferring resources, or changing of upstream providers may yield
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remedial action when a mistake or an attack is detected, so the remedial action when a mistake or an attack is detected, so the
effects are similar in these cases. If a CA has been legally effects are similar in these cases. If a CA has been legally
compelled to effect an adverse change, remediation will likely not be compelled to effect an adverse change, remediation will likely not be
swift.) swift.)
This document analyzes the various types of actions by a CA (or This document analyzes the various types of actions by a CA (or
independent repository operator) that can adversely affect the INRs independent repository operator) that can adversely affect the INRs
associated with that CA, as well as the INRs of subordinate CAs. The associated with that CA, as well as the INRs of subordinate CAs. The
analysis is based on examination of the data items in the RPKI analysis is based on examination of the data items in the RPKI
repository, as controlled by a CA (or independent repository repository, as controlled by a CA (or independent repository
operator) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs). The analysis is done operator) and fetched by Relying Parties (RPs).
from the perspective of an affected INR holder.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Analysis of RPKI Repository Objects 2. Analysis of RPKI Repository Objects
This section enumerates the RPKI repository system objects and This section enumerates the RPKI repository system objects and
skipping to change at page 22, line 43 skipping to change at page 22, line 51
June 2016. June 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016. profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-17 (work Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-18 (work
in progress), June 2016. in progress), August 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
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