draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] S. Turner Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended Status: Standards Track IECA Intended Status: Standards Track IECA
Expires: June 7, 2012 S. Kent Expires: September 27, 2012 S. Kent
BBN BBN
December 5, 2011 March 26, 2012
A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
skipping to change at page 1, line 35 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the
private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on
behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of
certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path
validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore, validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore,
this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (draft- this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC
ietf-sidr-res-cert-profile). 6487).
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 7, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
skipping to change at page 2, line 39 skipping to change at page 2, line 37
Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a
BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route
advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS named in the advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS named in the
certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to
its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain the specified AS its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain the specified AS
number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key property number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key property
that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can
verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the
advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
This document is a profile of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], which is a This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
profile of [RFC5280], and it updates [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. It [RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements
establishes requirements imposed on a Resource Certificate that is imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router
used as a BGPSEC Router Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and
certificate fields and extensions for the certificate to be valid in extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This
this context. This document also profiles the Certificate Revocation document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and
List (CRL) and certification requests. Finally, this document certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying
specifies the Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures.
procedures.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], "BGPSEC Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr- [RFC6487], "BGPSEC Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol],
bgpsec-protocol], "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security
"BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating
Validating the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4"
with BGP-4" [RFC5492]. [RFC5492].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
2. Describing Resources in Certificates 2. Describing Resources in Certificates
Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the
products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification
Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in
turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Providers (ISP). turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Providers (ISP).
The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as
well as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource well as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource
Certificates", and are profiled in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. The Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480]
[ID.sidr-arch] envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate Manifests
Manifests [ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] and Route Origin Authorizations [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and
(ROAs) [ID.sidr-rpki-roa-format]. ROAs and Manifests also include Manifests also include the Resource Certificates used to sign them.
the Resource Certificates used to sign them.
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
| CA Cert |---| IANA | | CA Cert |---| IANA |
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
| CA Cert |---| RIR | | CA Cert |---| RIR |
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
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| | +----------+ | | +----------+
+----+ | +---| Manifest | +----+ | +---| Manifest |
+-| EE |---+ +----------+ +-| EE |---+ +----------+
| +----+ | +----+
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 1 Figure 1
This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
referred to as a "BGPSEC Router Certificate". The purpose of this referred to as a "BGPSEC Router Certificate". The purpose of this
certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
appropriate uses defined within [ID.sidr-cp]. The issuance of BGPSEC appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPSEC
Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]). Further, the algorithms specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate
used to generate RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router Certificates and
Certificates and the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPSEC Router
BGPSEC Router Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
specified in [ID.sidr-rpki-algs]). The only impact is that the RPKI [RFC6485]). The only impact is that the RPKI CAs will need to be
CAs will need to be able to process a profiled certificate request able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed
(see Section 5) signed with algorithms found in [ID.turner-sidr- with algorithms found in [ID.turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of
bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPSEC Router Certificates in no way BGPSEC Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process
affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests and ROAs because the public Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPSEC Router
key found in the BGPSEC Router Certificate is only ever used to Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC
verify the signature on the BGPSEC certificate request (only CAs certificate request (only CAs process these), another BGPSEC Router
process these), another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only BGPSEC Certificate (only BGPSEC routers process these), and the signature on
routers process these), and the signature on a BGPSEC Update Message a BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers process these). routers process these).
Only the differences between this profile and the profile in Only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router [RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE
Certificates are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in
process described in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility].
3. Updates to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] 3. Updates to [RFC6487]
3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields 3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. This profile is also based on [ID.sidr-res- listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and
cert-profile] and only the differences between this profile and the only the differences between this profile and the profile in
profile in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] are listed. [RFC6487] are listed.
3.1.1.1 Subject 3.1.1.1 Subject
This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
issued. Consistent with [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], only two issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed
attributes are allowed in the Subject field: common name and serial in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the
number. Moreover, the only common name encoding options that are only common name encoding options that are supported are
supported are printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it
Certificates, it is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
contain the literal string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded
[RFC3779] encoded as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute
number attribute contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID)
the router ID) encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same certificate is
certificate is issued to more than one router (hence the private key issued to more than one router (hence the private key is shared among
is shared among these routers), the choice of the router ID used in these routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at
this name is at the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not
are not guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject
Subject name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this convention also
convention also is not guaranteed to be unique across different is not guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However,
issuers. However, each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject
contain a Subject name that is unique within that context. name that is unique within that context.
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info
Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent, The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent,
if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where
explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a
conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate. conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate.
3.1.3.1. Extended Key Usage 3.1.3.1. Extended Key Usage
BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
extension. As specified, in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] this extension. As specified, in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked
extension MUST be marked as non-critical. This document defines one as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPSEC Router
EKU for BGPSEC Router Certificates: Certificates:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be
present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId
values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of
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RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router
EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in
[RFC5280]. [RFC5280].
3.1.3.2. Subject Information Access 3.1.3.2. Subject Information Access
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be
omitted. omitted.
3.1.3.3. IP Resources 3.1.3.3. IP Resources
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be
omitted. omitted.
3.1.3.4. AS Resources 3.1.3.4. AS Resources
Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource
Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST
extension MUST include exactly one AS number, and the "inherit" include exactly one AS number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be
element MUST NOT be specified. specified.
3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile 3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile
Refer to section 6 of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. The only Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this
differences between this profile and the profile in [ID.sidr-res- profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are:
cert-profile] are:
o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA
MUST honor the request; MUST honor the request;
o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and,
o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr-
bgpsec-algs]. bgpsec-algs].
3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation 3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation
The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is
identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] except that where "this specification" [RFC6487] except that where "this specification" refers to [RFC6487]
refers to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] in that profile in this profile in that profile in this profile "this specification" is this
"this specification" is this document. document.
The differences are as follows: The differences are as follows:
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in
Section 3.9.5. Section 3.9.5.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource
extension. extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
Delegation extension. Delegation extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key o BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key
Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr- Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [RFC6485].
rpki-algs].
NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPSEC routers are NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPSEC routers are
found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms
specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rpki-algs] are specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [RFC6485] are different.
different. BGPSEC RPs will need to support algorithms that are BGPSEC RPs will need to support algorithms that are needed to
needed to validate BGPSEC signatures as well as the algorithms validate BGPSEC signatures as well as the algorithms that are
that are needed to validate signatures on BGPSEC certificates, needed to validate signatures on BGPSEC certificates, RPKI CA
RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI CRLs. certificates, and RPKI CRLs.
4. Design Notes 4. Design Notes
The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]. As a Certificate profile as specified in [RFC6485]. As a result, many of
result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that
design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is were taken in that prior work. The reader is referred to [RFC6484]
referred to [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] for a fuller discussion of for a fuller discussion of those choices.
those choices.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] apply. The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply.
A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], because the algorithm suite is different. [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a
Consequently, a RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent
correspondent validation. validation.
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [ID.sidr- A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
arch] to encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC
BGPSEC security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature-
Signature-Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr- Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-
bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure
binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with the RPKI binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with the RPKI
allocation/assignment hierarchy. allocation/assignment hierarchy.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
None. None.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
skipping to change at page 8, line 24 skipping to change at page 8, line 23
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border
Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs, work-in-progress. RFC 6485, February 2012.
[ID.sidr-rpki-algs] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs, work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms,
Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
algs, work-in-progress. algs, work-in-progress.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, January 2006. RFC 4272, January 2006.
[RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008.
[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009.
[ID.sidr-cp] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R., Watro, [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
"Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)", Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
draft-ietf-sidr-cp, work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-arch] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-rpki-roa-format] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", draft- Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
ietf-sidr-roa-format, work-in-progress (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.
[ID.sidr-rpki-manifests] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests, work-in- (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.
progress.
[ID.sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner,
"Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr- "Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr-
algorithm-agility, work-in-progress. algorithm-agility, work-in-progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
progress. progress.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
skipping to change at page 10, line 4 skipping to change at page 9, line 44
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) }
-- BGPSEC Router Extended Key Usage -- -- BGPSEC Router Extended Key Usage --
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD }
END END
Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate
Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request
Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request
Appendix D. Change Log Appendix D. Change Log
Please delete this section prior to publication. Please delete this section prior to publication.
D.1 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.1 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-00 profiles-02
Updated references.
D.2 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-01
Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1.
D.2 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.3 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-00 profiles-00
Added this change log. Added this change log.
Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms
in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs.
Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier
Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779.
D.3 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 D.4 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02
Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the
procedures defined in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. procedures defined in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility].
Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC
certificates will not pass RPKI validation [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] certificates will not pass RPKI validation [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile]
and that keying off the EKU will help tremendously. and that keying off the EKU will help tremendously.
D.4 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 D.5 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01
Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI
certificates. certificates.
Removed sections and text that was already in [ID.sidr-res-cert- Removed sections and text that was already in [ID.sidr-res-cert-
profile]. This will make it easier for reviewers to figure out what profile]. This will make it easier for reviewers to figure out what
is different. is different.
Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language.
 End of changes. 38 change blocks. 
124 lines changed or deleted 119 lines changed or added

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