draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-08.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds SIDR Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended Status: Standards Track IECA Intended status: Standards Track IECA, Inc.
Expires: September 27, 2014 S. Kent Expires: February 14, 2015 S. Kent
BBN BBN
March 27, 2014 August 13, 2014
A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-08
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths
in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that
protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper
operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under
development as a component to address the requirement to provide development as a component to address the requirement to provide
security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a
protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong
cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified cryptographic primitives. The End-Entity (EE) certificates specified
by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS
Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
System (AS) or ASes. The certificate asserts that the router(s) System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the
holding the private key are authorized to send out secure route private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on
advertisements on behalf of the specified AS(es). This document also behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the
profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of
of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path
path validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore,
therefore, this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC
Profile (RFC 6487). 6487).
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 14, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
skipping to change at page 2, line 29 skipping to change at page 2, line 32
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security
(BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router (BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router
Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a
BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route
advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS named in the
certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to
its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain one or more of the its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain the specified AS
specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key property
property that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can
can verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the
advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
[RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements [RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements
imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router
Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and
extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This
document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and
certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying
Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures. Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
[RFC6487], "BGPSEC Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], [RFC6487], "BGPSEC Protocol Specification"
"A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol], "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-
Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating 4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272],
the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" "Considerations in Validating the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and
[RFC5492]. "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" [RFC5492].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
2. Describing Resources in Certificates 2. Describing Resources in Certificates
Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the
products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification
Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in
turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Providers (ISP). turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Provider (ISP).
The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as well
well as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource
Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480]
envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate Manifests envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate Manifests
[RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and
Manifests also include the Resource Certificates used to sign them. Manifests also include the Resource Certificates used to sign them.
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
| CA Cert |---| IANA | | CA Cert |---| IANA |
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
| CA Cert |---| RIR | | CA Cert |---| RIR |
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
| CA Cert |---| ISP | | CA Cert |---| ISP |
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
/ | | | / | | |
+-----+ / | | | +-----+ +-----+ / | | | +-----+
| CRL |--+ | | +---| ROA | | CRL |--+ | | +---| ROA |
+-----+ | | +-----+ +-----+ | | +-----+
| | +----------+ | | +----------+
+----+ | +---| Manifest | +----+ | +---| Manifest |
+-| EE |---+ +----------+ +-| EE |---+ +----------+
| +----+ | +----+
+-----+ +-----+
Figure 1
Figure 1: RPKI and BGPsec Hierarchies
This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
referred to as a "BGPSEC Router Certificate". The purpose of this referred to as a "BGPSEC Router Certificate". The purpose of this
certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPSEC appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPSEC
Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate
RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router Certificates and RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router Certificates and
the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPSEC Router the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPSEC Router
Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
[RFC6485]). The only impact is that the RPKI CAs will need to be [I-D.ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis]). The only impact is that the RPKI CAs
able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed will need to be able to process a profiled certificate request (see
with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPSEC Section 5) signed with algorithms found in
Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPSEC Router Certificates
and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPSEC Router in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests and ROAs because
Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC the public key found in the BGPSEC Router Certificate is only ever
certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC certificate request (only
BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPSEC Update Message
process these). [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers process these).
Only the differences between this profile and the profile in Only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE [RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE
certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in
[RFC6916]. [RFC6916].
3. Updates to [RFC6487] 3. Updates to RFC 6487
3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields 3.1. BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and
only the differences between this profile and the profile in only the differences between this profile and the profile in
[RFC6487] are listed. [RFC6487] are listed.
3.1.1.1. Subject 3.1.1. Subject
This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed
in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the
only common name encoding options that are supported are only common name encoding options that are supported are
printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it
is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded
as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute
contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID)
encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If more than one certificate
number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the for an AS is issued (i.e., more than one router gets a certificate
discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more for the AS and hence the private key is shared among more than one
than one router (hence the private key is shared among these router), the choice of the router ID used in Subject name is at the
routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the
discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to
be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPSEC be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPSEC
Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not
guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each
certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name
that is unique within that context. that is unique within that context.
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info
Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Refer to section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent, The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent,
if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where
explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a
conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate. conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate.
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints
skipping to change at page 5, line 39 skipping to change at page 6, line 16
BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
extension. As specified, in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked extension. As specified, in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked
as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPSEC Router as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPSEC Router
Certificates: Certificates:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension be
present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId
values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of
them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPSEC them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPSEC
RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router
EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in
[RFC5280]. [RFC5280].
3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be
omitted. absent.
3.1.3.4. IP Resources 3.1.3.4. IP Resources
This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be
omitted. absent.
3.1.3.5. AS Resources 3.1.3.5. AS Resources
Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource
Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of
[RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST
include one or more AS numbers, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be include only one AS number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be
specified. specified.
3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile 3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile
Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this
profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are: profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are:
o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA
MUST honor the request; MUST honor the request;
o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and,
o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- o The attributes field contains the ASN extension with exactly one
bgpsec-algs]. ASN.
o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation 3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation
The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is
identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
[RFC6487]. The exception is that the constraints applied come from [RFC6487]. The exception is that the constraints applied come from
this specification (e.g., in step 3: the certificate contains all the this specification (e.g., in step 3: the certificate contains all the
field that must be present - refers to the fields that are required field that must be present - refers to the fields that are required
by this specification). by this specification).
{spt: should the algorithm fail if there's more than one in the
cert?}
The differences are as follows: The differences are as follows:
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in
Section 3.1.3.1. Section 3.1.3.1.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource
extension. extension.
o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
Delegation extension. Delegation extension and only one AS number.
o BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key o BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key
Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [RFC6485]. Info" described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis].
NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPSEC routers are NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPSEC routers are found
found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms specified
specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [RFC6485] are different. in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [I-D.ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis] are
BGPSEC RPs will need to support algorithms that are needed to different. BGPSEC RPs will need to support algorithms that are
validate BGPSEC signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to validate BGPSEC signatures as well as the algorithms that
needed to validate signatures on BGPSEC certificates, RPKI CA are needed to validate signatures on BGPSEC certificates, RPKI CA
certificates, and RPKI CRLs. certificates, and RPKI CRLs.
4. Design Notes 4. Design Notes
The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
Certificate profile as specified in [RFC6485]. As a result, many of Certificate profile as specified in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis]. As a
the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the
were taken in that prior work. The reader is referred to [RFC6484] design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is
for a fuller discussion of those choices. referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices.
One design choice made by this document is to include one AS number
per certificate. Simplicty is the driving rationale. If a router
supports more than one AS, the router can simply be issued another
certificate though the impact on the router is that additional secure
storage may be needed for additional private keys.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply.
A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in A BGPSEC certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
[RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a
RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent
validation. validation.
A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC
security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature- security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature-
Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec- Segment origination of Signed-Path segments
protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential security
binding of one or more AS numbers to a public key, consistent with function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to a public
the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy. key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
None. None.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In
addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were
instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to
thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, and Geoff Huston for their thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, and
reviews and comments. Rob Austein for their reviews and comments. Finally, we'd like to
thank Russ Housley for assigning us an OID for the ASN.1 module.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-08 (work in
progress), July 2014.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [I-D.ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis]
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for Algorithms
and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis-01 (work in
progress), March 2014.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
RFC 6485, February 2012.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
algs, work-in-progress. 2012.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
RFC 4272, January 2006. Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-
sidr-bgpsec-protocol-09 (work in progress), July 2014.
[RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", RFC
Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. 4272, January 2006.
[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
(RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012. (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013. (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
progress. (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
-- IMPORTS NOTHING -- -- IMPORTS NOTHING --
-- OID Arc -- -- OID Arc --
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) }
-- BGPSEC Router Extended Key Usage -- -- BGPSEC Router Extended Key Usage --
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
END END
Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate
Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request
Appendix D. Change Log Appendix D. Change Log
Please delete this section prior to publication. Please delete this section prior to publication.
D.1. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.1. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-07 profiles-08
Changed references to RFC 6485 to [I-D.ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis] and
added OIDs for ASN.1 module. Certificate and certification request
restricted to contain one ASN.
D.2. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-07
Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate. Updated Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate. Updated
reference to RFC 6916. reference to RFC 6916.
D.2. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-06 profiles-06
Keep alive version. Keep alive version.
D.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-05 profiles-05
Keep alive version. Keep alive version.
D.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.5. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-04 profiles-04
In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only
BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are
only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another
certificate only the PDUs that are signed. certificate only the PDUs that are signed.
Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only
ever EE certs. ever EE certs.
D.5. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.6. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-03 profiles-03
Updated s3.3 to clarifify restrictions on path validation procedures Updated s3.3 to clarify restrictions on path validation procedures
are in this specification (1st para was reworded). are in this specification (1st para was reworded).
Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom). Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom).
D.6. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.7. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-02 profiles-02
Updated references. Updated references.
D.7. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.8. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-01 profiles-01
Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1.
D.8. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- D.9. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-
profiles-00 profiles-00
Added this change log. Added this change log.
Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms
in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in
rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. [RFC6487] for certificates and CRLs.
Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier
Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. Delegation to match what's in [RFC3779].
D.9. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 D.10. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02
Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the
procedures defined in [RFC6916]. procedures defined in [RFC6916].
Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC
certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying
off the EKU will help tremendously. off the EKU will help tremendously.
D.10. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 D.11. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01
Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI
certificates. certificates.
Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will
make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different. make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different.
Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language.
Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the
certificate is the last number in the AS path information of each BGP certificate is the last number in the AS path information of each BGP
UPDATE message. Moved to [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. UPDATE message. Moved to [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mark Reynolds Mark Reynolds
Island Peak Software Island Peak Software
328 Virginia Road 328 Virginia Road
Concord, MA 01742 Concord, MA 01742
USA
Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com
Sean Turner Sean Turner
IECA, Inc. IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 Suite 106
Fairfax, VA 22031 Fairfax, VA 22031
USA USA
EMail: turners@ieca.com Phone: +1-703-628-3180
Email: turners@ieca.com
Steve Kent Steve Kent
Raytheon BBN Technologies Raytheon BBN Technologies
10 Moulton St. 10 Moulton St.
Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138
USA
Email: kent@bbn.com Email: kent@bbn.com
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