Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group                    M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft                                                      IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved)                                    S. Turner
Intended status: BCP                                                IECA
Expires: April 16, May 5, 2016                                             S. Kent
                                                        October 14,
                                                        November 2, 2015

               A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
        Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests


   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   the purposes of supporting used
   to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
   known as BGPsec.  BGP is a critical component the standard for inter-domain routing in the proper
   operation of
   Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet as a whole.  The together. BGPsec protocol
   is under
   development being developed as a one component to address of a solution that addresses the
   requirement to provide security for the BGP protocol. BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to design a
   protocol for
   provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
   cryptographic primitives.  The end-entity (EE) certificates specified
   by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System).
   Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing certificate.
   These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS
   Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous
   System (AS) or ASes.  The extension.  An EE certificate of this type
   asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are
   authorized to send out emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the
   AS(es) specified AS(es). in the certificate.  This document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the
   format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP)
   certificate path validation procedures.  The procedures for these EE certificates.
   This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the
   RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487).

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   ( in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1  BGPsec Router Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.2.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields .  6  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6  Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . .  6  IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6  AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile  . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix B.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 14

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
   certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
   Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security
   (BGPsec) protocol.
   protocol (BGPsec).  Such certificates are termed "BGPsec Router
   Certificates".  The holder of the private key associated with a
   BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route
   advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the
   certificate.  That is, a  A router holding the private key may send is authorized to
   its BGP peers, send
   route advertisements (to its peers) that contain one or more of the
   specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute.  A key
   property that provided by BGPsec will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can
   verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the
   advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).

   This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
   [RFC5280], and it updates
   [RFC5280]; thus this document [RFC6487].  It establishes requirements
   imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPsec Router
   Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and
   extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context.  This
   document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and certification requests. requests used to acquire
   BGPsec Router Certificates.  Finally, this document specifies the
   Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures. procedures for these

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
   [RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol],
   "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security
   Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating
   the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4"

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in

2.  Describing Resources in Certificates

   Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the
   products generated by RPKI entities.  IANA issues a Certification
   Authority (CA) certificate to a each Regional Internet Registries Registry (RIR).
   The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service
   Providers (ISP). The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) EE Certificates to itself as well
   as to
   enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects. The CA also
   generate.  The CA also generates CRLs.  These CA and EE certificates
   are referred to as "Resource Certificates", and are profiled in
   [RFC6487].  The [RFC6480] envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate
   enable verification of Manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin
   Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].  ROAs and Manifests also include the
   Resource Certificates used to sign verify them.

                +---------+   +------+
                | CA Cert |---| IANA |
                +---------+   +------+
                      +---------+   +-----+
                      | CA Cert |---| RIR |
                      +---------+   +-----+
                             +---------+   +-----+
                             | CA Cert |---| ISP |
                             +---------+   +-----+
                              / |            | |
                   +-----+   /  |            | |   +-----+
                   | CRL |--+   |            | +---| ROA |
                   +-----+      |            |     +-----+
                                |            |   +----------+
                       +----+   |            +---| Manifest |
                     +-| EE |---+                +----------+
                     | +----+
                                Figure 1

   This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
   referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate".  The purpose of this
   certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
   appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484].  The issuance of BGPsec
   Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
   CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
   specified in [RFC6487]).  Further, the algorithms used to generate
   RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and
   the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router
   Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
   [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]).  The only impact is that the RPKI CAs will need to
   be able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5)
   signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].  The use of
   BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process
   Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router
   Certificate is only ever used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec
   certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a
   BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers
   process these).


   This document enumerates only the differences between this profile
   and the profile in
   [RFC6487] are listed. [RFC6487].  Note that BGPsec Router Certificates
   are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process
   described in [RFC6916].

3.  Updates to [RFC6487]

3.1  BGPsec Router Certificate Fields

   A BGPsec Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate,
   consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
   listed in this section.  This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and
   only the differences between this profile and the profile in
   [RFC6487] are listed. specified below.  Subject

   This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
   issued.  Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed
   in the Subject field: common name and serial number.  Moreover, the
   only common name encoding options that are supported are
   printableString and UTF8String.  For BGPsec Router Certificates, it
   is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
   string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded
   as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute
   contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID)
   encoded as eight hexadecimal digits.  If there is more than one AS
   number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the
   discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more
   than one router (hence the private key is shared among these
   routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the
   discretion of the Issuer.  Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to
   be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPsec
   Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not
   guaranteed to be unique across different issuers.  However, each
   certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name
   that is unique within that context.

3.1.2.  Subject Public Key Info

   Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].

3.1.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields  Basic Constraints

   BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension
   must not be present, as per [RFC6487].  Extended Key Usage

   BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
   extension.  As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked
   as non-critical.  This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router

     id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
          security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

     id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }

   Relying Parties

   A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be
   present in a BGPsec Router Certificate. Certificate it receives.  If multiple
   KeyPurposeId values are included, the relying parties BGPsec routers need not
   recognize all of them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is
   present.  BGPsec
   RPs routers MUST reject certificates that do not contain
   the BGPsec Router EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage
   OID defined in [RFC5280].  Subject Information Access

   This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be
   omitted.  IP Resources

   This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be
   omitted.  AS Resources

   Each BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource
   Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of
   [RFC6487].  The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST
   include one or more AS numbers, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be

3.2.  BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile

   Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487].  The only differences between this
   profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are:

    o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA
      MUST honor the request;

    o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in
      [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and,

    o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr-

3.3.  BGPsec Router Certificate Validation

   The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is
   identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
   [RFC6487].  The exception is that
   [RFC6487], but using the constraints applied come from this specification (e.g.,
   specification.  For example, in step 3: the "the certificate contains all
   the field that must be present present" - refers to the fields that are
   required by this specification). specification.

   The differences are as follows:

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec EKU defined in

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource

    o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
      Delegation extension.

    o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key
      Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr-

   NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are found
   in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].  Currently, the algorithms specified in
   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] are different.  BGPsec
   RPs will need to support algorithms that are needed used to validate BGPsec
   signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to validate
   signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI

4.  Design Notes

   The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
   Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis].  As a
   result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the
   design choices that were taken in that prior work.  The reader is
   referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices.

5.  Security Considerations

   The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply.

   A BGPsec certificate Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
   [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a
   RP needs to identify the EKU before applying to determine the correspondent
   validation. appropriate Validation

   A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
   encompass routers.  It is a building block of the larger BGPsec
   security protocol and is used to
   validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-
   Segment Signature-Segment origination of
   Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-
   protocol]. [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].  Thus its essential
   security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to
   a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment

   Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two
   key identifiers extension included in BGPsec certificates.  However
   as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required
   property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key
   identifiers.  Regardless, hash collisions are possible and if
   detected the an operator should be alerted.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry
   for PKIX.  One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes
   from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id-
   mod-bgpsec-eku).  The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in
   Section and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for
   PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry.  These OIDs were assigned
   before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA.  No IANA
   allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in
   those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor.

7.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
   Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on.  In
   addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were
   instrumental in preparing this work.  Additionally, we'd like to
   thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, Geoff Huston, Richard Hansen,
   David Mandelberg Mandelberg, and Sam Weiller for their reviews and comments.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
             Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border
             Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
             Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
             X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.

   [RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key
             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
             (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, January 2013.

   [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] G. Huston, Huston and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for
             Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key
             Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in-progress. work-in-

   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, &
             Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in-

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
             RFC 4272, January 2006.

   [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
             Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008.

   [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
             with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009.

   [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
             Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.

   [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
             Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.

   [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
             Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012.

   [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
             "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.

   [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
             Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013.

   [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]  Lepinksi, M., "BGPsec Protocol
             Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) }



     -- EXPORTS ALL --


     -- OID Arc --

     id-kp  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {
       iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) }

     -- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage --

     id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }


Appendix B.  Change Log

   Please delete this section prior to publication.

   B.0 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Minor modifications to address WGLC comments.

   B.1 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-11 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Added security consideration to address SKI collisions.  Also updated
   the IANA considerations section.


   B.2 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-10 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Removed text in s3.1.3. Consistently used BGPsec to refer to BGP
   Security. Fixed typos. Refer to RFC6485bis instead of RFC6485.
   Included OIDs.


   B.3.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-09 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Updated dates.


   B.4.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-08 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Editorial fixes for the sake of brevity.


   B.5.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Fixed section numbering.


   B.6.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate.  Updated
   reference to RFC 6916.


   B.7.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Keep alive version.


   B.8.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Keep alive version.


   B.9.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only
   BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are
   only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another
   certificate only the PDUs that are signed.

   Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only
   ever EE certs.


   B.10.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Updated s3.3 to clarify restrictions on path validation procedures
   are in this specification (1st para was reworded).

   Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom).


   B.11.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Updated references.


   B.12.  Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1.


   B.13.  Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki-

   Added this change log.

   Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms
   in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
   rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs.

   Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier
   Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779.


   B.14.  Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02
   Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the
   procedures defined in [RFC6916].

   Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC
   certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying
   off the EKU will help tremendously.


   B.15.  Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01

   Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI

   Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will
   make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different.

   Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language.

   Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the
   certificate is the last number in the AS path information of each BGP
   UPDATE message.  Moved to [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].

Authors' Addresses

   Mark Reynolds
   Island Peak Software
   328 Virginia Road
   Concord, MA 01742


   Sean Turner
   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031



   Stephen Kent
   Raytheon BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA 02138