draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-19.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds
Internet-Draft IPSw Internet-Draft IPSw
Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended status: Standard Track sn3rd Intended status: Standard Track sn3rd
Expires: January 22, 2017 S. Kent Expires: July 3, 2017 S. Kent
BBN BBN
July 21, 2016 December 30, 2016
A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-18 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-19
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec
is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 6 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 6
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI . . 8 3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI . . 8
4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE)
certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec. Such certificates are
protocol (BGPsec). Such certificates are termed "BGPsec Router termed "BGPsec Router Certificates". The holder of the private key
Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a associated with a BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send
BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route secure route advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es)
advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the named in the certificate. A router holding the private key is
certificate. A router holding the private key is authorized to send authorized to send route advertisements (to its peers) identifying
route advertisements (to its peers) that contain one or more of the the router's ASN as the source of the advertisements. A key property
specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key provided by BGPsec is that every AS along the AS PATH can verify that
property provided by BGPsec is that every AS along the AS PATH can the other ASes along the path have authorized the advertisement of
verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH).
This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
[RFC5280]; thus this document updates [RFC6487]. It establishes [RFC5280]; thus this document updates [RFC6487]. It establishes
requirements imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a requirements imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a
BGPsec Router Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for BGPsec Router Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for
certificate fields and extensions for the certificate to be valid in certificate fields and extensions for the certificate to be valid in
this context. This document also profiles the certification requests this context. This document also profiles the certification requests
used to acquire BGPsec Router Certificates. Finally, this document used to acquire BGPsec Router Certificates. Finally, this document
specifies the Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation specifies the Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation
procedures for these certificates. procedures for these certificates.
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
2. Describing Resources in Certificates 2. Describing Resources in Certificates
Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the
products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification
Authority (CA) certificate to each Regional Internet Registry (RIR). Authority (CA) certificate to each Regional Internet Registry (RIR).
The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service
Providers (ISP). The ISP in turn issues EE Certificates to itself to Provider (ISP). The ISP in turn issues EE Certificates to itself to
enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects. The CA also enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects. The CA
generate. The CA also generates Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). also generates Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). These CA and EE
These CA and EE certificates are referred to as "Resource certificates are referred to as "Resource Certificates", and are
Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] profiled in [RFC6487]. [RFC6480] envisioned using Resource
envisioned using Resource Certificates to enable verification of Certificates to enable verification of Manifests [RFC6486] and Route
Manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and Manifests include
ROAs and Manifests include the Resource Certificates used to verify the Resource Certificates used to verify them.
them.
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
| CA Cert |---| IANA | | CA Cert |---| IANA |
+---------+ +------+ +---------+ +------+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
| CA Cert |---| RIR | | CA Cert |---| RIR |
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
\ \
+---------+ +-----+ +---------+ +-----+
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This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate". The purpose of this referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate". The purpose of this
certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec
Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate
RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and
the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router
Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
[ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to [RFC7935]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to be able to
be able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed with
signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPsec Router
BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests and
Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router Certificate is
Certificate is used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec certificate request
certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a (only CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPsec Update Message
BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers process these).
process these).
This document enumerates only the differences between this profile This document enumerates only the differences between this profile
and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates
are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process
described in [RFC6916]. described in [RFC6916].
3. Updates to [RFC6487] 3. Updates to [RFC6487]
3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields
A BGPsec Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, A BGPsec Router Certificate is consistent with the profile in
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields [RFC6487] as modified by the specifications in this section. As
listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and such, it is a valid X.509 public key certificate and consistent with
only the differences between this profile and the profile in the PKIX profile [RFC5280]. The differences between this profile and
[RFC6487] are specified below. the profile in [RFC6487] are specified in this section.
3.1.1.1. Subject 3.1.1. Subject
This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been
issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed
in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the
only common name encoding options that are supported are only common name encoding options that are supported are
printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it
is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded
as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute
contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID)
encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS
number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the
discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more
than one router (hence the private key is shared among these than one router (hence the private key is shared among these
routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the
discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to
be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPsec be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPsec
Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not
guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each
certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name
that is unique within that context. that is unique to that CA context.
3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info
Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].
3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints
BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension
must not be present, as per [RFC6487]. must not be present, as per [RFC6487].
3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage
BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
extension. As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked extension. As specified in [RFC6487] this extension must be marked
as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router
Certificates: Certificates:
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be
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If included, id-kp-bgpsec-router MUST be present (see Section If included, id-kp-bgpsec-router MUST be present (see Section
3.1). If included, the CA MUST honor the request for id-kp- 3.1). If included, the CA MUST honor the request for id-kp-
bgpsec-router. bgpsec-router.
o The Subject Information Access extension: o The Subject Information Access extension:
If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the request to include the If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the request to include the
extension. extension.
o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field is specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. algs].
o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr-
bgpsec-algs]. bgpsec-algs].
3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation
The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is
identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
[RFC6487] (and any RFC that updates this procedure), but using the [RFC6487] (and any RFC that updates this procedure), as modified
constraints applied come from this specification. For example, in below. For example, in step 3: "The certificate contains all field
step 3: "the certificate contains all the field that must be present" that must be present" - refers to the fields that are required by
- refers to the fields that are required by this specification. this specification.
The differences are as follows: The differences are as follows:
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec Router EKU o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec Router EKU
defined in Section 3.1.3.2. defined in Section 3.1.3.2.
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource
extension. extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier
Delegation extension. Delegation extension.
o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the subjectPublicKeyInfo
Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr- described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs].
rfc6485bis].
NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are found NOTE: BGPsec RPs will need to support the algorithms in [ID.sidr-
in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms specified in bgpsec-algs], which are used to validate BGPsec signatures, as well
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] are different. BGPsec as the algorithms in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis], which are needed to
RPs will need to support algorithms that are used to validate BGPsec validate signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and
signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to validate RPKI CRLs.
signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI
CRLs.
3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI 3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI
As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec route As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec route
certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification
of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec protocol.
Security protocol (BGPsec).
The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used
multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the
BGPsec_Path Attribute Signature Segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. BGPsec_Path Attribute Signature Segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol].
I.e., the BGPsec router certificate is used to validate multiple I.e., the BGPsec router certificate is used to validate multiple
signatures. signatures.
BGPsec router certificates are stored in the issuing CA's repository, BGPsec router certificates are stored in the issuing CA's repository,
where a repository following RFC6481 MUST use a .cer filename where a repository following RFC6481 MUST use a .cer filename
extension for the certificate file. extension for the certificate file.
4. Design Notes 4. Design Notes
The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. As a Certificate profile as specified in [RFC7935]. As a result, many of
result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that
design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is were taken in that prior work. The reader is referred to [RFC6484]
referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices. for a fuller discussion of those choices.
CAs are required by the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] to issue CAs are required by the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] to issue
properly formed BGPsec Router Certificates regardless of what is properly formed BGPsec Router Certificates regardless of what is
present in the certification request so there is some flexibility present in the certification request so there is some flexibility
permitted in the certificate requests: permitted in the certificate requests:
o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore, o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore,
requests to issue a CA certificate result in EE certificates; requests to issue a CA certificate result in EE certificates;
o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore, o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore,
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result in certificates with neither of these values; result in certificates with neither of these values;
o BGPsec Router Certificates always include the BGPsec Rouer EKU o BGPsec Router Certificates always include the BGPsec Rouer EKU
value; therefore, request without the value result in certificates value; therefore, request without the value result in certificates
with the value; and, with the value; and,
o BGPsec Router Certificates never include the Subject Information o BGPsec Router Certificates never include the Subject Information
Access extension; therefore, request with this extension result in Access extension; therefore, request with this extension result in
certificates without the extension. certificates without the extension.
Note that this behavior is similar to the CA including the AS Note that this behavior is similar to the CA including the AS
Resource Identifier Delegation extension in issued BGPsec Router Resource Identifier Delegation extension in issued BGPsec Router
Certificates despite the fact it is not present in the request. Certificates despite the fact it is not present in the request.
5. Implementation Considerations 5. Implementation Considerations
This document permits the operator to include a list of ASNs in a This document permits the operator to include a list of ASNs in a
BGPsec Router Certificate. In that case, the router certificate would BGPsec Router Certificate. In that case, the router certificate would
become invalid if any one of the ASNs is removed from any superior CA become invalid if any one of the ASNs is removed from any superior CA
certificate along the path to a trust anchor. Operators could choose certificate along the path to a trust anchor. Operators could choose
to avoid this possibility by issuing a separate BGPsec Router to avoid this possibility by issuing a separate BGPsec Router
Certificate for each distinct ASN, so that the router certificates Certificate for each distinct ASN, so that the router certificates
for ASNs that are retained in the superior CA certificate would for ASNs that are retained in the superior CA certificate would
remain valid. remain valid.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply.
A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in
[RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a [RFC6487], because the cryptographic algorithms used are different.
RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the appropriate Validation Consequently, a RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the
constraint. appropriate Validation constraint.
A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to
validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of
Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential
security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to
a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment
hierarchy. hierarchy.
Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two
key identifiers extension included in BGPsec certificates. However key identifier extensions included in BGPsec certificates. However
as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required
property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key
identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are possible and if identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are unlikely, but they are
detected an operator should be alerted. possible and if detected an operator should be alerted. A subject
key identifier collision might cause the incorrect certificate to be
selected from the cache, resulting in a failed signature validation.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry
for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes
from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id- from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id-
mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in
Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned
before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA
allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in
those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor. those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor.
skipping to change at page 10, line 18 skipping to change at page 10, line 17
Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for
PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned
before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA
allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in
those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor. those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor.
8. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In
addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were addition, the efforts of Matt Lepinski were instrumental in preparing
instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to this work. Additionally, we'd like to thank Rob Austein, Roque
thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Richard Hansen, Geoff Huston, Gagliano, Richard Hansen, Geoff Huston, David Mandelberg, Sandra
David Mandelberg, Sandra Murphy, and Sam Weiller for their reviews Murphy, and Sam Weiller for their reviews and comments.
and comments.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc- 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
skipping to change at page 10, line 49 skipping to change at page 10, line 47
Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI
10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc- 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc4271>. editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI
10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc- 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc6487>. editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key [RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key
(CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, DOI 10.17487/RFC6818, January Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, August
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6818>. 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
[ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] G. Huston and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec
Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Protocol Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol,
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in- work-in-progress.
progress.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, &
Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in- Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in-
progress. progress.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006, RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
[RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
skipping to change at page 12, line 10 skipping to change at page 12, line 12
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>. 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
[ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in-
progress.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
-- IMPORTS NOTHING -- -- IMPORTS NOTHING --
-- OID Arc -- -- OID Arc --
id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
-- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage -- -- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage --
id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
END END
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Mark Reynolds Mark Reynolds
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