draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-04.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-05.txt 
Network Working Group M. Lepinski, Ed. Network Working Group M. Lepinski, Ed.
Internet-Draft BBN Internet-Draft BBN
Intended status: Standards Track July 16, 2012 Intended status: Standards Track September 7, 2012
Expires: January 17, 2013 Expires: March 11, 2013
BGPSEC Protocol Specification BGPSEC Protocol Specification
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-04 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-05
Abstract Abstract
This document describes BGPSEC, an extension to the Border Gateway This document describes BGPSEC, an extension to the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the AS-PATH attribute in Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the AS-PATH attribute in
BGP update messages. BGPSEC is implemented via a new optional non- BGP update messages. BGPSEC is implemented via a new optional non-
transitive BGP path attribute that carries a digital signature transitive BGP path attribute that carries a digital signature
produced by each autonomous system on the AS-PATH. produced by each autonomous system on the AS-PATH.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 17, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. BGPSEC Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. BGPSEC Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The BGPSEC_Path_Signatures Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. The BGPSEC_Path_Signatures Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Secure_Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Secure_Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Additional_Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Additional_Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Signature_Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.3. Signature_Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Generating a BGPSEC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Generating a BGPSEC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Originating a New BGPSEC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1. Originating a New BGPSEC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Propagating a Route Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.2. Propagating a Route Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Reconstructing the AS_Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members . . . . 20
4.4. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members . . . . 19 4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Processing a Received BGPSEC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Processing a Received BGPSEC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Overview of BGPSEC Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Algorithms and Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.2. Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1. Algorithm Suite Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6. Algorithms and Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.2. Extensibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.1. Algorithm Suite Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2. Extensibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1. Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.2. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.1. Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 8.2. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes BGPSEC, a mechanism for providing path This document describes BGPSEC, a mechanism for providing path
security for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] route advertisements. security for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [1] route advertisements.
That is, a BGP speaker who receives a valid BGPSEC update has That is, a BGP speaker who receives a valid BGPSEC update has
cryptographic assurance that the advertised route has the following cryptographic assurance that the advertised route has the following
two properties: two properties:
1. The route was originated by an AS that has been explicitly 1. The route was originated by an AS that has been explicitly
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+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------+
| Additional_Info (variable) | | Additional_Info (variable) |
+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------+
| Sequence of one or two Signature_Blocks (variable) | | Sequence of one or two Signature_Blocks (variable) |
+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------+
The Secure_Path contains AS Path information for the BGPSEC update The Secure_Path contains AS Path information for the BGPSEC update
message. This is logically equivalent to the information that would message. This is logically equivalent to the information that would
be contained in the AS_PATH attribute. A BGPSEC update message be contained in the AS_PATH attribute. A BGPSEC update message
containing the BGPSEC_PATH_SIGNATURES attribute MUST NOT contain the containing the BGPSEC_PATH_SIGNATURES attribute MUST NOT contain the
AS_PATH attribute. The format of the Secure_Path is described below AS_PATH attribute. The path information is used by BGPSEC speakers
in Section 3.1. in the same way that information from the AS_PATH is used by non-
BGPSEC speakers. The format of the Secure_Path is described below in
Section 3.1.
The Additional_Info contains additional signed information about the The Additional_Info contains additional signed information about the
update message. Additional_Info is specified as a type-length-value update message. Additional_Info is specified as a type-length-value
field for future extensibility. However, this specification defines field for future extensibility. However, this specification defines
only a single (null) type of Additional Info which has zero length. only a single (null) type of Additional Info which has zero length.
It is anticipated that future specifications may specify semantics It is anticipated that future specifications may specify semantics
for Info Types other than zero. See Section 3.2 below for more for Info Types other than zero. See Section 3.2 below for more
detail. detail.
The BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute will contain one or two The BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute will contain one or two
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The AS Number is the AS number of the BGP speaker that added this The AS Number is the AS number of the BGP speaker that added this
Secure_Path segment to the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. (See Secure_Path segment to the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. (See
Section 4 for more information on populating this field.) Section 4 for more information on populating this field.)
The pCount field contains the number of repetitions of the associated The pCount field contains the number of repetitions of the associated
autonomous system number that the signature covers. This field autonomous system number that the signature covers. This field
enables a BGPSEC speaker to mimic the semantics of adding multiple enables a BGPSEC speaker to mimic the semantics of adding multiple
copies of their AS to the AS_PATH without requiring the speaker to copies of their AS to the AS_PATH without requiring the speaker to
generate multiple signatures. generate multiple signatures.
The first bit of the Flags field is the Entering_Confed flag. The The first bit of the Flags field is the Confed_Segment flag. The
Entering_Confed flag is set to one in the Secure_Path Segment Confed_Segment flag is set to one to indicate that the BGPSEC speaker
corresponding to the first Autonomous System in a confederation [3]. that constructed this Secure_Path segment is sending the update
(That is, the Secure_Path Segment corresponding to the AS that would message to a peer AS within the same Autonomous System confederation
otherwise have created an AS_Path segment of type AS_Confed_Sequence [3]. (That is, the Confed_Segment flag is set in a BGPSEC update
in a non-BGSPEC update message.) In all other cases the message whenever in a non-BGPSEC update message the BGP speaker's AS
Entering_Confed flag is set to zero. would appear in a AS_PATH segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.) In
all other cases the Confed_Segment flag is set to zero.
The remaining seven bits of the Flags field are reserved for future The remaining seven bits of the Flags field are reserved for future
use. These bits MUST be set to zero by the sender. The receiver use. These bits MUST be set to zero by the sender. The receiver
uses the entire Flags octet to verify the digital signature uses the entire Flags octet to verify the digital signature
(regardless of what value the reserved bits contain), but otherwise (regardless of what value the reserved bits contain), but otherwise
ignores the reserved flags (see Section 4 for sender instructions and ignores the reserved flags (see Section 4 for sender instructions and
Section 5 for receiver validation instructions). Section 5 for receiver validation instructions).
EDITOR'S NOTE: The unused portion of the signed flags field provides EDITOR'S NOTE: The unused portion of the signed flags field provides
the possibility of adding in the future (in a backwards compatible the possibility of adding in the future (in a backwards compatible
fashion) a new feature that requires some per-AS signed bits. For fashion) a new feature that requires some per-AS signed bits. For
example, one could use a couple bits from this flag field to mark example, one could use a couple bits from this flag field to mark
some property of the connection between two ASes. some other property (besides being in the same confederation) of the
connection between two peer ASes.
3.2. Additional_Info 3.2. Additional_Info
Here we provide a detailed description of the Additional_Info in the Here we provide a detailed description of the Additional_Info in the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute.
Additional_Info Additional_Info
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
| Info Type (1 octet) | | Info Type (1 octet) |
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zero specified in this document, the Info Value field is empty (since zero specified in this document, the Info Value field is empty (since
the Info Length field must be zero). the Info Length field must be zero).
Implementations compliant with this specification MUST set the Info Implementations compliant with this specification MUST set the Info
Type to zero in BGPSEC update messages for route advertisements that Type to zero in BGPSEC update messages for route advertisements that
they originate (see Section 4.1 for more details). When an they originate (see Section 4.1 for more details). When an
implementation compliant with this specification receives a BGPSEC implementation compliant with this specification receives a BGPSEC
update message with an Info Type field that it does not understand update message with an Info Type field that it does not understand
(i.e., an Info Type other than zero), the implementation MUST use the (i.e., an Info Type other than zero), the implementation MUST use the
Additional_Info when it verifies digital signatures (as per Section Additional_Info when it verifies digital signatures (as per Section
5.1). However, other than signature verification, the implementation 5.2). However, other than signature verification, the implementation
MUST ignore the Info Value field when it does not understand the Info MUST ignore the Info Value field when it does not understand the Info
Type. Type.
EDITOR'S NOTE: In a previous version of this document there was an EDITOR'S NOTE: In a previous version of this document there was an
Expire Time that was used to provide protection against replay of old Expire Time that was used to provide protection against replay of old
(stale) digital signatures or failure to propagate a withdrawal (stale) digital signatures or failure to propagate a withdrawal
message. This mechanism was removed from the current version of the message. This mechanism was removed from the current version of the
document. Please see the SIDR mailing list for discussions related document. Please see the SIDR mailing list for discussions related
to protection against replay attacks. Depending on the result of to protection against replay attacks. Depending on the result of
discussions within the SIDR working group this Additional Info field discussions within the SIDR working group this Additional Info field
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AS4_Path attribute nor the AS_Path attribute. The information that AS4_Path attribute nor the AS_Path attribute. The information that
would be contained in the AS4_Path (or AS_Path) attribute is instead would be contained in the AS4_Path (or AS_Path) attribute is instead
conveyed in the Secure_Path portion of the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures conveyed in the Secure_Path portion of the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures
attribute. attribute.
Note that the Resource PKI enables the legitimate holder of IP Note that the Resource PKI enables the legitimate holder of IP
address prefix(es) to issue a signed object, called a Route address prefix(es) to issue a signed object, called a Route
Origination Authorization (ROA), that authorizes a given AS to Origination Authorization (ROA), that authorizes a given AS to
originate routes to a given set of prefixes (see [7]). Note that originate routes to a given set of prefixes (see [7]). Note that
validation of a BGPSEC update message will fail (i.e., the validation validation of a BGPSEC update message will fail (i.e., the validation
algorithm, specified in Section 5.1, returns 'Not Good') unless there algorithm, specified in Section 5.2, returns 'Not Good') unless there
exists a valid ROA authorizing the first AS in the Secure_Path exists a valid ROA authorizing the first AS in the Secure_Path
portion of the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute to originate routes portion of the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute to originate routes
to the prefix being advertised. Therefore, a BGPSEC speaker SHOULD to the prefix being advertised. Therefore, a BGPSEC speaker SHOULD
NOT originate a BGPSEC update advertising a route for a given prefix NOT originate a BGPSEC update advertising a route for a given prefix
unless there exists a valid ROA authorizing the BGPSEC speaker's AS unless there exists a valid ROA authorizing the BGPSEC speaker's AS
to originate routes to this prefix. to originate routes to this prefix.
The pCount field of the Secure_Path Segment is typically set to the The pCount field of the Secure_Path Segment is typically set to the
value 1. However, a BGPSEC speaker may set the pCount field to a value 1. However, a BGPSEC speaker may set the pCount field to a
value greater than 1. Setting the pCount field to a value greater value greater than 1. Setting the pCount field to a value greater
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BGPSEC speaker MUST remove the Signature_Block corresponding to the BGPSEC speaker MUST remove the Signature_Block corresponding to the
algorithm suite that it does not understand. If the BGPSEC speaker algorithm suite that it does not understand. If the BGPSEC speaker
does not support the algorithm suites in any of the Signature_Blocks does not support the algorithm suites in any of the Signature_Blocks
contained in the received update message, then the BGPSEC speaker contained in the received update message, then the BGPSEC speaker
MUST NOT propagate the route advertisement with the MUST NOT propagate the route advertisement with the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute (i.e., propagate it as an unsigned BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute (i.e., propagate it as an unsigned
BGP update message). BGP update message).
Note that in the case where there are two Signature_Blocks Note that in the case where there are two Signature_Blocks
(corresponding to different algorithm suites) that the validation (corresponding to different algorithm suites) that the validation
algorithm (see Section 5.1) deems a BGPSEC update message to be algorithm (see Section 5.2) deems a BGPSEC update message to be
'Good' if there is at least one supported algorithm suite (and 'Good' if there is at least one supported algorithm suite (and
corresponding Signature_Block) that is deemed 'Good'. This means corresponding Signature_Block) that is deemed 'Good'. This means
that a 'Good' BGPSEC update message may contain a Signature_Block that a 'Good' BGPSEC update message may contain a Signature_Block
which is not deemed 'Good' (e.g., contains signatures that the BGPSEC which is not deemed 'Good' (e.g., contains signatures that the BGPSEC
does not successfully verify). Nonetheless, such Signature_Blocks does not successfully verify). Nonetheless, such Signature_Blocks
MUST NOT be removed. (See Section 7 for a discussion of the security MUST NOT be removed. (See Section 7 for a discussion of the security
ramifications of this design choice.) ramifications of this design choice.)
For each Signature_Block corresponding to an algorithm suite that the For each Signature_Block corresponding to an algorithm suite that the
BGPSEC speaker does support, the BGPSEC speaker then adds a new BGPSEC speaker does support, the BGPSEC speaker then adds a new
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algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain a digest value. algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain a digest value.
o Apply to this digest value the signature algorithm, (for the o Apply to this digest value the signature algorithm, (for the
algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain the digital algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain the digital
signature. Then populate the Signature Field with this digital signature. Then populate the Signature Field with this digital
signature. signature.
The Signature Length field is populated with the length (in octets) The Signature Length field is populated with the length (in octets)
of the Signature field. of the Signature field.
4.3. Reconstructing the AS_Path Attribute 4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members
EDITOR'S NOTE: This is a place-holder section. Given that BGPSEC
update messages do not contain the AS_Path attribute, this document
needs to include a clearly specified algorithm for reconstructing the
AS_Path attribute from the data in the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures
attribute. (For example, when propagating a path received via BGPSEC
to a non-BGPSEC peer.) This algorithm for reconstructing the AS_Path
will appear in the next version of this document. In essence, the
algorithm is: For each Secure_Path Segment put into the AS_Path
pCount copies of the AS number field of the segment --- and if you
see the Entering_Confed flag is set to one, then add an
AS_Confed_Sequence to the AS_Path.
4.4. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members
Members of autonomous system confederations [3] must additionally Members of autonomous system confederations [3] must additionally
follow the instructions in this section for processing BGPSEC update follow the instructions in this section for processing BGPSEC update
messages. messages.
When a confederation member sends a BGPSEC update message to a peer When a confederation member sends a BGPSEC update message to a peer
who is a member of the same confederation, the confederation member that is a member of the same confederation, the confederation member
puts its (private) Member-AS Number (as opposed to the public AS puts its (private) Member-AS Number (as opposed to the public AS
Confederation Identifier) in the AS Number field of the Secure_Path Confederation Identifier) in the AS Number field of the Secure_Path
Segment that it adds to the BGPSEC update message. Segment that it adds to the BGPSEC update message. Furthermore, when
a confederation member sends a BGPSEC update message to a peer that
is a member of the same confederation, the BGPSEC speaker that
generates the Secure_Path Segment sets the Confed_Segment flag to
one. Note that this means that in a BGPSEC update message, an AS
number appears in a Secure_Path Segment with the Confed_Segment flag
set to one, in precisely those circumstances where the AS number
would appear in a segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE in a non-BGPSEC
update message.
Furthermore, when sending a BGPSEC update message to a peer who is a Within a confederation, the verification of BGPSEC signatures added
member of the same confederation, the first confederation member to by other members of the confederation is optional. If a
add a Secure_Path Segment to a BGPSEC update message sets the confederation chooses to have its members not verify signatures added
Entering_Cofed flag in the Flags field to be one in the Secure_Path by other confederation members, then when sending a BGPSEC update
Segment that it produces. In the case where the route advertisement message to a peer that is a member of the same confederation, the
originates within a confederation, the member AS that originates the confederation MAY set the Signature field within the
route and sends it to a peer is the member AS that sets its Signature_Segment that it generates to be zero (in lieu of
Entering_Confed flag to one. In the case where the route calculating the correct digital signature as described in Sections
advertisement is received from outside the confederation, it is the 4.1 and 4.2). Note that if a confederation chooses not to verify
member AS that receives the route advertisement from a peer outside digital signatures within the confederation, then BGPSEC is able to
the confederation and propagates it to a peer inside the provide no assurances about the integrity of the (private) Member-AS
confederation that sets its Entering_Confed flag to one. Note that Numbers placed in Secure_Path segments where the Confed_Segment flag
this is the same of the confederation member who would have added a is set to one.
new AS_Path segment of type AS_Confed_Sequence to the AS_Path
attribute in a non-BGPSEC update message.
When a confederation member receives a BGPSEC update message from a When a confederation member receives a BGPSEC update message from a
peer within the confederation and propagates it to a peer outside the peer within the confederation and propagates it to a peer outside the
confederation, it must remove all of the Secure_Path Segments added confederation, it must remove all of the Secure_Path Segments added
by confederation members as well as the corresponding Signature by confederation members as well as the corresponding Signature
Segments. To do this, the confederation member propagating the route Segments. To do this, the confederation member propagating the route
outside the confederation does the following: outside the confederation does the following:
o First, search through the Secure_Path, going from most recently o First, starting with the least recently added Secure_Path
added segment to least recently added segment, and find first segments, remove all of the consecutive Secure_Path segments that
Secure_Path Segment with the Entering_Confed flag to set to one. have the Confed_Segment flag set to one. Stop this process once a
(That is, of all the Secure_Path Segments with the Entering_Confed Scure_Path segment is reached which has its Confed_Segment flag
flag set to one, find the one that was most recently added.) set to zero. Keep a count of the number of segments removed in
this fashion.
o Second, remove the Secure_Path Segment found in previous step
along with all more recently added Secure_Path Segments. Keep a
count of the number of segments removed in this fashion.
o Third, starting with the most recently added Signature Segment, o Second, starting with the most recently added Signature Segment,
remove a number of Signature Segments equal to the number of remove a number of Signature Segments equal to the number of
Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step. (That is, Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step. (That is,
remove the K most recently added signature segments, where K is remove the K most recently added signature segments, where K is
the number of Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.) the number of Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.)
o Finally, add a Secure_Path Segment containing, in the AS field, o Finally, add a Secure_Path Segment containing, in the AS field,
the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the
confederation) as well as a corresponding Signature Segment. Note confederation) as well as a corresponding Signature Segment. Note
that all fields other that the AS field are populated as per that all fields other that the AS field are populated as per
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
When validating a received BGPSEC update message, confederation When validating a received BGPSEC update message, confederation
members must make the following adjustment to the algorithm presented members must make the following adjustment to the algorithm presented
in Section 5.1. That is, when a confederation member is processing in Section 5.2. When a confederation member processes (validates) a
(validating) a Signature Segment and its corresponding Secure_Path Signature Segment and its corresponding Secure_Path Segment, the
Segment, the confederation member must note that when a signature is confederation member must note that for a signature produced by a
produced by a BGPSEC speaker outside of a confederation, the Target BGPSEC speaker outside of a confederation, the Target AS will always
AS will always be the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS be the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the
number of the confederation) as opposed to the Member-AS Number. To confederation) as opposed to the Member-AS Number.
handle this case, when processing a current Secure_Path Segment, if
the next most recently added Secure_Path segment has the To handle this case, when a BGPSEC speaker (that is a confederation
Entering_Confed flag set then ,when computing the digest for the member) processes a current Secure_Path Segment that has the
current Secure_Path segment, take the Target AS Number to be the AS Confed_Segment flag set to zero, if the next most recently added
Confederation Identifier of the validating BGPSEC speaker's own Secure_Path segment has the Confed_Segment flag set to one then, when
confederation. (Note that the algorithm in Section 5.1 processes computing the digest for the current Secure_Path segment, the BGPSEC
Secure_Path Segments in order from most recently added to least speaker takes the Target AS Number to be the AS Confederation
recently added, therefore the algorithm encounters the Identifier of the validating BGPSEC speaker's own confederation.
Entering_Confed flag immediately before it encounters the Secure_Path (Note that the algorithm in Section 5.2 processes Secure_Path
segment that requires using the AS Confederation Identifier to Segments in order from most recently added to least recently added,
validate.) therefore this special case will apply to the first Secure_Path
segment that the algorithm encounters that has the Confed_Segment
flag set to one.)
Finally, as discussed above, an AS confederation may optionally
decide that its members will not verify digital signatures added by
members. In such a federation, when a confederation member runs the
algorithm in Section 5.2, when processing a Signature_Segment, the
confederation member first checks whether the Confed_Sequence flag in
the corresponding Secure_Path segment is set to one. If the
Confed_Sequence flag is set to one in the corresponding Secure_Path
segment, the confederation member does not perform any further checks
on the Signature_Segment and immediately moves on to the next
Signature_Segment (and checks its corresponding Secure_Path segment).
Note that as specified in Section 5.2, it is an error for a BGPSEC
speaker to receive a BGPSEC update messages containing a Secure_Path
segment with the Confed_Sequence flag set to one from a peer who is
not a member of the same AS confederation. (Such an error is treated
in exactly the same way as receipt of a non-BGPSEC update message
containing an AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE from a peer that is not a member of
the same AS confederation.)
4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute
BGPSEC update messages do not contain the AS_PATH attribute. Note,
however, that the AS_PATH attribute can be reconstructed from the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. This is necessary in the case
where a route advertisement is received via a BGPSEC update message
and then propagated to a peer via a non-BGPSEC update message. There
may be additional cases where an implementation finds it useful to
perform this reconstruction.
The AS_PATH attribute can be constructed from the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute as follows. Starting with an empty
AS_PATH attribute, process the Secure_Path segments in order from
least-recently added (corresponding to the origin) to most-recently
added. For each Secure_Path segment perform the following steps:
1. If the Confed_Segment flag in the Secure_Path segment is set to
one, then look at the most-recently added segment in the AS_PATH.
* In the case where the AS_PATH is empty or in the case where
the most-recently added segment is of type AS_SEQUENCE then
add (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. This segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE
shall contain a number of elements equal to the pCount field
in the current Secure_Path segment. Each of these elements
shall be the AS number contained in the current Secure_Path
segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment
of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the
Secure_Path segment's AS Number field.)
* In the case where the most recently added segment in the
AS_PATH is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the
segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
current Secure_Path segment. The value of each of these
elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
Secure_Path segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
add X copies of the Secure_Path segment's AS Number field to
the existing AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.)
2. If the Confed_Segment flag in the Secure_Path segment is set to
zero, then look at the most-recently added segment in the
AS_PATH.
* In the case where the AS_PATH is empty then add (prepend to
the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type AS_SEQUENCE. This
segment of type AS_SEQUENCE shall contain a number of elements
equal to the pCount field in the current Secure_Path segment.
Each of these elements shall be the AS number contained in the
current Secure_Path segment. (That is, if the pCount field is
X, then the segment of type AS_SEQUENCE contains X copies of
the Secure_Path segment's AS Number field.)
* In the case where the most recently added segment in the
AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the
segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
current Secure_Path segment. The value of each of these
elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
Secure_Path segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
add X copies of the Secure_Path segment's AS Number field to
the existing AS_SEQUENCE.)
5. Processing a Received BGPSEC Update 5. Processing a Received BGPSEC Update
Upon receiving a BGPSEC update message from an external (eBGP) peer,
a BGPSEC speaker SHOULD validate the message to determine the
authenticity of the AS PATH information contained in the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. Section 5.1 provides an overview
of BGPSEC validation and Section 5.2 provides a specific algorithm
for performing such validation. (Note that an implementation need
not follow the specific algorithm in Section 5.2 as long as the input
output behavior of the validation is identical to that of the
algorithm in Section 5.2.) During exceptional conditions (e.g., the
BGPSEC speaker receives an incredibly large number of update messages
at once) a BGPSEC speaker MAY defer validation of incoming BGPSEC
update messages. The treatment of such BGPSEC update messages, whose
validation has been deferred, is a matter of local policy.
Implementations that support such deferment of validation MUST
perform validation of these messages as soon as possible (i.e., as
soon as resources are available to perform validation) and MUST re-
run best path selection once the validation status of such update
messages is known.
BGPSEC update messages do not contain an AS_PATH attribute.
Therefore, a BGPSEC speaker MUST utilize the AS path information in
the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute in all cases where it would
otherwise use the AS path information in the AS_PATH attribute. The
only exception to this rule is when AS path information must be
updated in order to propagate a route to a peer (in which case the
BGPSEC speaker follows the instructions in Section 4). Section 4.4
provides an algorithm for constructing an AS_PATH attribute from a
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. Whenever the use of AS path
information is called for (e.g., loop detection, or use of AS path
length in best path selection) the externally visible behavior of the
implementation shall be the same as if the implementation had run the
algorithm in Section 4.4 and used the resulting AS_PATH attribute as
it would for a non-BGPSEC update message. However, in practice, it
is expected that most implementations will not actually run the
algorithm from Section 4.4, and will instead transform the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute directly into some internal
representation of AS path.
Many signature algorithms are non-deterministic. That is, many
signature algorithms will produce different signatures each time they
are run (even when they are signing the same data with the same key).
Therefore, if an implementation receives a BGPSEC update from a peer
and later receives a second BGPSEC update message from the same peer,
the implementation SHOULD treat the second message as a duplicate
update message if it differs from the first update message only in
the Signature fields (within the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute).
That is, if all the fields in the second update are identical to the
fields in the first update message, except for the Signature fields,
then the second update message should be treated as a duplicate of
the first update message. Note that if other fields (e.g., the
Subject Key Identifier field) within a Signature segment differ
between two update messages then the two updates are not duplicates.
With regards to the processing of duplicate update messages, if the
first update message is valid, then an implementation SHOULD NOT run
the validation procedure on the second, duplicate update message
(even if the bits of the signature field are different). If the
first update message is not valid, then an implementation SHOULD run
the validation procedure on the second duplicate update message (as
the signatures in the second update may be valid even though the
first contained a signature that was invalid).
5.1. Overview of BGPSEC Validation
Validation of a BGPSEC update messages makes use of data from RPKI Validation of a BGPSEC update messages makes use of data from RPKI
certificates and signed Route Origination Authorizations (ROA). In certificates and signed Route Origination Authorizations (ROA). In
particular, to validate update messages containing the particular, to validate update messages containing the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute, it is necessary that the recipient BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute, it is necessary that the recipient
have access to the following data obtained from valid RPKI have access to the following data obtained from valid RPKI
certificates and ROAs: certificates and ROAs:
o For each valid RPKI end-entity certificate containing an AS Number o For each valid RPKI end-entity certificate containing an AS Number
extension, the AS Number, Public Key and Subject Key Identifier extension, the AS Number, Public Key and Subject Key Identifier
are required, are required,
skipping to change at page 22, line 4 skipping to change at page 25, line 40
Note that the BGPSEC speaker could perform the validation of RPKI Note that the BGPSEC speaker could perform the validation of RPKI
certificates and ROAs on its own and extract the required data, or it certificates and ROAs on its own and extract the required data, or it
could receive the same data from a trusted cache that performs RPKI could receive the same data from a trusted cache that performs RPKI
validation on behalf of (some set of) BGPSEC speakers. (The latter validation on behalf of (some set of) BGPSEC speakers. (The latter
case in analogous to the use of the RPKI-RTR protocol [13] for origin case in analogous to the use of the RPKI-RTR protocol [13] for origin
validation.) validation.)
To validate a BGPSEC update message containing the To validate a BGPSEC update message containing the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute, the recipient performs the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute, the recipient performs the
validation steps specified in Section 5.1. The validation procedure validation steps specified in Section 5.2. The validation procedure
results in one of two states: 'Good' and 'Not Good'. results in one of two states: 'Good' and 'Not Good'.
It is expected that the output of the validation procedure will be It is expected that the output of the validation procedure will be
used as an input to BGP route selection. However, BGP route used as an input to BGP route selection. However, BGP route
selection and thus the handling of the two validation states is a selection and thus the handling of the two validation states is a
matter of local policy, and shall be handled using existing local matter of local policy, and shall be handled using existing local
policy mechanisms. It is expected that BGP peers will generally policy mechanisms. It is expected that BGP peers will generally
prefer routes received via 'Good' BGPSEC update messages over routes prefer routes received via 'Good' BGPSEC update messages over routes
received via 'Not Good' BGPSEC update messages as well as routes received via 'Not Good' BGPSEC update messages as well as routes
received via update messages that do not contain the received via update messages that do not contain the
skipping to change at page 22, line 33 skipping to change at page 26, line 21
policy in the AS determines the specific means for conveying the policy in the AS determines the specific means for conveying the
validation status through various pre-existing mechanisms (e.g., validation status through various pre-existing mechanisms (e.g.,
modifying an attribute). As discussed in Section 4, when a BGPSEC modifying an attribute). As discussed in Section 4, when a BGPSEC
speaker chooses to forward a (syntactically correct) BGPSEC update speaker chooses to forward a (syntactically correct) BGPSEC update
message, it SHOULD be forwarded with its BGPSEC_Path_Signatures message, it SHOULD be forwarded with its BGPSEC_Path_Signatures
attribute intact (regardless of the validation state of the update attribute intact (regardless of the validation state of the update
message). Based entirely on local policy settings, an egress router message). Based entirely on local policy settings, an egress router
MAY trust the validation status conveyed by an ingress router or it MAY trust the validation status conveyed by an ingress router or it
MAY perform its own validation. MAY perform its own validation.
Upon receiving a BGPSEC update message, a BGPSEC speaker SHOULD sum 5.2. Validation Algorithm
the pCount values within BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute to
determine the effective length of the AS Path. The BGPSEC speaker
SHOULD use this sum of pCount values in precisely the same way as it
uses the length of the AS Path in non-BGPSEC update messages.
5.1. Validation Algorithm
This section specifies an algorithm for validation of BGPSEC update This section specifies an algorithm for validation of BGPSEC update
messages. A conformant implementation MUST include a BGPSEC update messages. A conformant implementation MUST include a BGPSEC update
validation algorithm that is functionally equivalent to the external validation algorithm that is functionally equivalent to the external
behavior of this algorithm. behavior of this algorithm.
First, the recipient of a BGPSEC update message performs a check to First, the recipient of a BGPSEC update message performs a check to
ensure that the message is properly formed. Specifically, the ensure that the message is properly formed. Specifically, the
recipient performs the following checks: recipient performs the following checks:
o Check to ensure that the entire BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute 1. Check to ensure that the entire BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute
is syntactically correct (conforms to the specification in this is syntactically correct (conforms to the specification in this
document). document).
o Check that each Signature_Block contains one Signature segment for 2. Check that each Signature_Block contains one Signature segment
each Secure_Path segment in the Secure_Path portion of the for each Secure_Path segment in the Secure_Path portion of the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. (Note that the entirety of each BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. (Note that the entirety of
Signature_Block must be checked to ensure that it is well formed, each Signature_Block must be checked to ensure that it is well
even though the validation process may terminate before all formed, even though the validation process may terminate before
signatures are cryptographically verified.) all signatures are cryptographically verified.)
3. Check that the update message does not contain both a
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute and an AS_PATH attribute.
4. If the update message was received from a peer that is not a
member of the BGPSEC speaker's AS confederation, check to ensure
that none of the Secure_Path segments contain a Flags field with
the Confed_Sequence flag set to one.
5. If the update message was received from a peer that is not
expected to set pCount equal to zero (see Section 4.2) then check
to ensure that the pCount field in the most-recently added
Secure_Path segment is not equal to zero.
If there are two Signature_Blocks within the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures If there are two Signature_Blocks within the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures
attribute and one of them is poorly formed (or contains the wrong attribute and one of them is poorly formed (or contains the wrong
number of Signature segments) , then the recipient should log that an number of Signature segments) , then the recipient should log that an
error occurred, strip off that particular Signature_Block and process error occurred, strip off that particular Signature_Block and process
the update message as though it arrived with a single the update message as though it arrived with a single
Signature_Block. If the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute contains a Signature_Block. If the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute contains an
syntax error that is not local to one of two Signature_Blocks, then error that is not local to one of two Signature_Blocks, then the
the recipient should log that an error occurred and drop the update recipient should log that an error occurred and drop the update
message containing the error. Similarly, if an update message message containing the error. (In particular, if any of checks 3-5
contains both the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute and either an above fail, the recipient should log that an error occurred and drop
AS_Path or AS4_Path attribute, then the recipient should log that an the update message containing the error.)
error occurred and drop the update message containing the error.
Next, the BGPSEC speaker verifies that the origin AS is authorized to Next, the BGPSEC speaker verifies that the origin AS is authorized to
advertise the prefix in question. To do this, consult the valid ROA advertise the prefix in question. To do this, consult the valid ROA
data to obtain a list of AS numbers that are associated with the data to obtain a list of AS numbers that are associated with the
given IP address prefix in the update message. Then locate the last given IP address prefix in the update message. Then locate the last
(least recently added) AS number in the Secure_Path portion of the (least recently added) AS number in the Secure_Path portion of the
BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. If the origin AS in the BGPSEC_Path_Signatures attribute. If the origin AS in the
Secure_Path is not in the set of AS numbers associated with the given Secure_Path is not in the set of AS numbers associated with the given
prefix, then the BGPSEC update message is 'Not Good' and the prefix, then the BGPSEC update message is 'Not Good' and the
validation algorithm terminates. validation algorithm terminates.
skipping to change at page 28, line 48 skipping to change at page 32, line 40
matter of local policy. Therefore, a BGPSEC speaker can make no matter of local policy. Therefore, a BGPSEC speaker can make no
assumptions about the validity of a route received from an external assumptions about the validity of a route received from an external
BGPSEC peer. That is, a compliant BGPSEC peer may (depending on the BGPSEC peer. That is, a compliant BGPSEC peer may (depending on the
local policy of the peer) send update messages that fail the validity local policy of the peer) send update messages that fail the validity
test in Section 5. Thus, a BGPSEC speaker MUST completely validate test in Section 5. Thus, a BGPSEC speaker MUST completely validate
all BGPSEC update messages received from external peers. (Validation all BGPSEC update messages received from external peers. (Validation
of update messages received from internal peers is a matter of local of update messages received from internal peers is a matter of local
policy, see Section 5). policy, see Section 5).
Note that there may be cases where a BGPSEC speaker deems 'Good' (as Note that there may be cases where a BGPSEC speaker deems 'Good' (as
per the validation algorithm in Section 5.1) a BGPSEC update message per the validation algorithm in Section 5.2) a BGPSEC update message
that contains both a 'Good' and a 'Not Good' Signature_Block. That that contains both a 'Good' and a 'Not Good' Signature_Block. That
is, the update message contains two sets of signatures corresponding is, the update message contains two sets of signatures corresponding
to two algorithm suites, and one set of signatures verifies correctly to two algorithm suites, and one set of signatures verifies correctly
and the other set of signatures fails to verify. In this case, the and the other set of signatures fails to verify. In this case, the
protocol specifies that if the BGPSEC speaker propagates the route protocol specifies that if the BGPSEC speaker propagates the route
advertisement received in such an update message then the BGPSEC advertisement received in such an update message then the BGPSEC
speaker SHOULD add its signature to each of the Signature_Blocks speaker SHOULD add its signature to each of the Signature_Blocks
using both the corresponding algorithm suite. Thus the BGPSEC using both the corresponding algorithm suite. Thus the BGPSEC
speaker creates a signature using both algorithm suites and creates a speaker creates a signature using both algorithm suites and creates a
new update message that contains both the 'Good' and the 'Not Good' new update message that contains both the 'Good' and the 'Not Good'
skipping to change at page 30, line 25 skipping to change at page 34, line 17
o The BGPSEC speaker chose to propagate an advertisement for this o The BGPSEC speaker chose to propagate an advertisement for this
route to the peer (implicitly) indicated by the 'Target AS' route to the peer (implicitly) indicated by the 'Target AS'
The BGPSEC update validation procedure is a potential target for The BGPSEC update validation procedure is a potential target for
denial of service attacks against a BGPSEC speaker. To mitigate the denial of service attacks against a BGPSEC speaker. To mitigate the
effectiveness of such denial of service attacks, BGPSEC speakers effectiveness of such denial of service attacks, BGPSEC speakers
should implement an update validation algorithm that performs should implement an update validation algorithm that performs
expensive checks (e.g., signature verification) after performing less expensive checks (e.g., signature verification) after performing less
expensive checks (e.g., syntax checks). The validation algorithm expensive checks (e.g., syntax checks). The validation algorithm
specified in Section 5.1 was chosen so as to perform checks which are specified in Section 5.2 was chosen so as to perform checks which are
likely to be expensive after checks that are likely to be likely to be expensive after checks that are likely to be
inexpensive. However, the relative cost of performing required inexpensive. However, the relative cost of performing required
validation steps may vary between implementations, and thus the validation steps may vary between implementations, and thus the
algorithm specified in Section 5.1 may not provide the best denial of algorithm specified in Section 5.2 may not provide the best denial of
service protection for all implementations. service protection for all implementations.
The mechanism of setting the pCount field to zero is included in this The mechanism of setting the pCount field to zero is included in this
specification to enable route servers in the control path to specification to enable route servers in the control path to
participate in BGPSEC without increasing the effective length of the participate in BGPSEC without increasing the effective length of the
AS-PATH. However, entities other than route servers could AS-PATH. However, entities other than route servers could
conceivably use this mechanism (set the pCount to zero) to attract conceivably use this mechanism (set the pCount to zero) to attract
traffic (by reducing the effective length of the AS-PATH) traffic (by reducing the effective length of the AS-PATH)
illegitimately. This risk is largely mitigated if every BGPSEC illegitimately. This risk is largely mitigated if every BGPSEC
speaker drops incoming update messages that set pCount to zero but speaker drops incoming update messages that set pCount to zero but
skipping to change at page 32, line 23 skipping to change at page 36, line 16
weiler+ietf@watson.org weiler+ietf@watson.org
8.2. Acknowledgements 8.2. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Luke Berndt, Sharon Goldberg, Ed The authors would like to thank Luke Berndt, Sharon Goldberg, Ed
Kern, Chris Morrow, Doug Maughan, Pradosh Mohapatra, Russ Mundy, Kern, Chris Morrow, Doug Maughan, Pradosh Mohapatra, Russ Mundy,
Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Mark Reynolds, Heather Schiller, Jason Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Mark Reynolds, Heather Schiller, Jason
Schiller, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk and David Ward for their Schiller, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk and David Ward for their
valuable input and review. valuable input and review.
9. Normative References 9. References
[1] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border [1] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border
Gateway Protocol 4", RFC 4271, January 2006. Gateway Protocol 4", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[2] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter, [2] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, January 2007. "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, January 2007.
[3] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous System [3] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous System
Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007. Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.
[4] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement with [4] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement with
BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009.
[5] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using AS_SET [5] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using AS_SET
and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", RFC 6472, December 2011. and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", RFC 6472, December 2011.
[6] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "Recommendation for Not Using AS_SET [6] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure
and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", RFC 6480, February 2012. Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[7] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "Recommendation for Not [7] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Using AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
February 2012.
[8] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [8] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[9] Patel, K., Ward, D., and R. Bush, "Extended Message support for [9] Patel, K., Ward, D., and R. Bush, "Extended Message support for
BGP", March 2011. BGP", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages, July 2012.
[10] Kent, S., "Threat Model for BGP Path Security", February 2012. [10] Kent, S., and A. Chi, "Threat Model for BGP Path Security",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02, February 2012.
[11] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPSEC [11] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPSEC
Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and
Certification Requests", December 2011. Certification Requests",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03, April 2012.
[12] Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats", [12] Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats",
March 2012. draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-02, March 2012.
[13] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", [13] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
February 2012. draft-ietf-sidr-rtr-26, February 2012.
Author's Address Author's Address
Matthew Lepinski (editor) Matthew Lepinski (editor)
BBN BBN
10 Moulton St 10 Moulton St
Cambridge, MA 55409 Cambridge, MA 55409
US US
Phone: +1 617 873 5939 Phone: +1 617 873 5939
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