draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-20.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-21.txt 
Network Working Group M. Lepinski, Ed. Network Working Group M. Lepinski, Ed.
Internet-Draft NCF Internet-Draft NCF
Intended status: Standards Track K. Sriram, Ed. Intended status: Standards Track K. Sriram, Ed.
Expires: June 8, 2017 NIST Expires: June 26, 2017 NIST
December 5, 2016 December 23, 2016
BGPsec Protocol Specification BGPsec Protocol Specification
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-20 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-21
Abstract Abstract
This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway This document describes BGPsec, an extension to the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of autonomous Protocol (BGP) that provides security for the path of autonomous
systems through which a BGP update message passes. BGPsec is systems (ASes) through which a BGP update message passes. BGPsec is
implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that implemented via an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute that
carries a digital signature produced by each autonomous system that carries digital signatures produced by each autonomous system that
propagates the update message. propagates the update message. The digital signatures provide
confidence that every AS on the path of ASes listed in the update
message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 8, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 26, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 16 skipping to change at page 2, line 18
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. BGPsec Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. BGPsec Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. The BGPsec Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. The BGPsec Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Negotiating BGPsec Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Negotiating BGPsec Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The BGPsec_Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. The BGPsec_Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Secure_Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Secure_Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Signature_Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Signature_Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. BGPsec Update Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. BGPsec Update Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. General Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. General Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Constructing the BGPsec_Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . 13 4.2. Constructing the BGPsec_Path Attribute . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members . . . . 17 4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members . . . . 18
4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Processing a Received BGPsec Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Processing a Received BGPsec Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Overview of BGPsec Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Overview of BGPsec Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. Validation Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. Algorithms and Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Algorithms and Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. Algorithm Suite Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.1. Algorithm Suite Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2. Extensibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.2. Extensibility Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Operations and Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 28 7. Operations and Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 29
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.1. Security Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.1. Security Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.2. On the Removal of BGPsec Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 31 8.2. On the Removal of BGPsec Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.3. Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . 32 8.3. Mitigation of Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . 33
8.4. Additional Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 33 8.4. Additional Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.1. Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 10.1. Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.2. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 10.2. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes BGPsec, a mechanism for providing path This document describes BGPsec, a mechanism for providing path
security for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] route security for Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] route
advertisements. That is, a BGP speaker who receives a valid BGPsec advertisements. That is, a BGP speaker who receives a valid BGPsec
update has cryptographic assurance that the advertised route has the update has cryptographic assurance that the advertised route has the
following property: Every AS on the path of ASes listed in the update following property: Every AS on the path of ASes listed in the update
message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route to message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route to
the subsequent AS in the path. the subsequent AS in the path.
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capability to send BGPsec update messages. capability to send BGPsec update messages.
The remaining three bits of the first octet are unassigned and for The remaining three bits of the first octet are unassigned and for
future use. These bits are set to zero by the sender of the future use. These bits are set to zero by the sender of the
capability and ignored by the receiver of the capability. capability and ignored by the receiver of the capability.
The second and third octets contain the 16-bit Address Family The second and third octets contain the 16-bit Address Family
Identifier (AFI) which indicates the address family for which the Identifier (AFI) which indicates the address family for which the
BGPsec speaker is advertising support for BGPsec. This document only BGPsec speaker is advertising support for BGPsec. This document only
specifies BGPsec for use with two address families, IPv4 and IPv6, specifies BGPsec for use with two address families, IPv4 and IPv6,
AFI values 1 and 2 respectively. BGPsec for use with other address AFI values 1 and 2 respectively [RFC4760]. BGPsec for use with other
families may be specified in future documents. address families may be specified in future documents.
2.2. Negotiating BGPsec Support 2.2. Negotiating BGPsec Support
In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec In order to indicate that a BGP speaker is willing to send BGPsec
update messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker update messages (for a particular address family), a BGP speaker
sends the BGPsec Capability (see Section 2.1) with the Direction bit sends the BGPsec Capability (see Section 2.1) with the Direction bit
(the fifth bit of the first octet) set to 1. In order to indicate (the fifth bit of the first octet) set to 1. In order to indicate
that the speaker is willing to receive BGP update messages containing that the speaker is willing to receive BGP update messages containing
the BGPsec_Path attribute (for a particular address family), a BGP the BGPsec_Path attribute (for a particular address family), a BGP
speaker sends the BGPsec capability with the Direction bit set to 0. speaker sends the BGPsec capability with the Direction bit set to 0.
In order to advertise the capability to both send and receive BGPsec In order to advertise the capability to both send and receive BGPsec
update messages, the BGP speaker sends two copies of the BGPsec update messages, the BGP speaker sends two copies of the BGPsec
capability (one with the direction bit set to 0 and one with the capability (one with the direction bit set to 0 and one with the
direction bit set to 1). direction bit set to 1).
Similarly, if a BGP speaker wishes to use BGPsec with two different Similarly, if a BGP speaker wishes to use BGPsec with two different
address families (i.e., IPv4 and IPv6) over the same BGP session, address families (i.e., IPv4 and IPv6) over the same BGP session,
then the speaker includes two instances of this capability (one for then the speaker includes two instances of this capability (one for
each address family) in the BGP OPEN message. A BGP speaker MAY each address family) in the BGP OPEN message. A BGP speaker MUST NOT
announce BGPsec capability only if it supports the BGP multiprotocol announce BGPsec capability if it does not support the BGP
extension [RFC4760]. Additionally, a BGP speaker MUST NOT advertise multiprotocol extension [RFC4760]. Additionally, a BGP speaker MUST
the capability of BGPsec support for a particular AFI unless it has NOT advertise the capability of BGPsec support for a particular AFI
also advertised the multiprotocol extension capability for the same unless it has also advertised the multiprotocol extension capability
AFI [RFC4760]. for the same AFI [RFC4760].
In a BGPsec peering session, a peer is permitted to send update In a BGPsec peering session, a peer is permitted to send update
messages containing the BGPsec_Path attribute if, and only if: messages containing the BGPsec_Path attribute if, and only if:
o The given peer sent the BGPsec capability for a particular version o The given peer sent the BGPsec capability for a particular version
of BGPsec and a particular address family with the Direction bit of BGPsec and a particular address family with the Direction bit
set to 1; and set to 1; and
o The other (receiving) peer sent the BGPsec capability for the same o The other (receiving) peer sent the BGPsec capability for the same
version of BGPsec and the same address family with the Direction version of BGPsec and the same address family with the Direction
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The Secure_Path contains AS path information for the BGPsec update The Secure_Path contains AS path information for the BGPsec update
message. This is logically equivalent to the information that is message. This is logically equivalent to the information that is
contained in a non-BGPsec AS_PATH attribute. The information in contained in a non-BGPsec AS_PATH attribute. The information in
Secure_Path is used by BGPsec speakers in the same way that Secure_Path is used by BGPsec speakers in the same way that
information from the AS_PATH is used by non-BGPsec speakers. The information from the AS_PATH is used by non-BGPsec speakers. The
format of the Secure_Path is described below in Section 3.1. format of the Secure_Path is described below in Section 3.1.
The BGPsec_Path attribute will contain one or two Signature_Blocks, The BGPsec_Path attribute will contain one or two Signature_Blocks,
each of which corresponds to a different algorithm suite. Each of each of which corresponds to a different algorithm suite. Each of
the Signature_Blocks will contain a signature segment for each AS the Signature_Blocks will contain a signature segment for each AS
number (i.e., Secure_Path segment) in the Secure_Path. In the most number (i.e., Secure_Path Segment) in the Secure_Path. In the most
common case, the BGPsec_Path attribute will contain only a single common case, the BGPsec_Path attribute will contain only a single
Signature_Block. However, in order to enable a transition from an Signature_Block. However, in order to enable a transition from an
old algorithm suite to a new algorithm suite (without a flag day), it old algorithm suite to a new algorithm suite (without a flag day), it
will be necessary to include two Signature_Blocks (one for the old will be necessary to include two Signature_Blocks (one for the old
algorithm suite and one for the new algorithm suite) during the algorithm suite and one for the new algorithm suite) during the
transition period. (See Section 6.1 for more discussion of algorithm transition period. (See Section 6.1 for more discussion of algorithm
transitions.) The format of the Signature_Blocks is described below transitions.) The format of the Signature_Blocks is described below
in Section 3.2. in Section 3.2.
3.1. Secure_Path 3.1. Secure_Path
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| Secure_Path Length (2 octets) | | Secure_Path Length (2 octets) |
+-----------------------------------------------+ +-----------------------------------------------+
| One or More Secure_Path Segments (variable) | | One or More Secure_Path Segments (variable) |
+-----------------------------------------------+ +-----------------------------------------------+
Figure 4: Secure_Path format. Figure 4: Secure_Path format.
The specification for the Secure_Path field is provided in Figure 4 The specification for the Secure_Path field is provided in Figure 4
and Figure 5. The Secure_Path Length contains the length (in octets) and Figure 5. The Secure_Path Length contains the length (in octets)
of the entire Secure_Path (including the two octets used to express of the entire Secure_Path (including the two octets used to express
this length field). As explained below, each Secure_Path segment is this length field). As explained below, each Secure_Path Segment is
six octets long. Note that this means the Secure_Path Length is two six octets long. Note that this means the Secure_Path Length is two
greater than six times the number Secure_Path Segments (i.e., the greater than six times the number Secure_Path Segments (i.e., the
number of AS numbers in the path). number of AS numbers in the path).
The Secure_Path contains one Secure_Path Segment (see Figure 5) for The Secure_Path contains one Secure_Path Segment (see Figure 5) for
each Autonomous System in the path to the originating AS of the each Autonomous System in the path to the originating AS of the
prefix specified in the update message. (Note: Repeated Autonomous prefix specified in the update message. (Note: Repeated Autonomous
Systems are compressed out using the pCount field as discussed Systems are compressed out using the pCount field as discussed
below). below).
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| pCount (1 octet) | | pCount (1 octet) |
+----------------------------+ +----------------------------+
| Flags (1 octet) | | Flags (1 octet) |
+----------------------------+ +----------------------------+
| AS Number (4 octets) | | AS Number (4 octets) |
+----------------------------+ +----------------------------+
Figure 5: Secure_Path Segment format. Figure 5: Secure_Path Segment format.
The AS Number (in Figure 5) is the AS number of the BGP speaker that The AS Number (in Figure 5) is the AS number of the BGP speaker that
added this Secure_Path segment to the BGPsec_Path attribute. (See added this Secure_Path Segment to the BGPsec_Path attribute. (See
Section 4 for more information on populating this field.) Section 4 for more information on populating this field.)
The pCount field contains the number of repetitions of the associated The pCount field contains the number of repetitions of the associated
autonomous system number that the signature covers. This field autonomous system number that the signature covers. This field
enables a BGPsec speaker to mimic the semantics of prepending enables a BGPsec speaker to mimic the semantics of prepending
multiple copies of their AS to the AS_PATH without requiring the multiple copies of their AS to the AS_PATH without requiring the
speaker to generate multiple signatures. Note that Section 9.1.2.2 speaker to generate multiple signatures. Note that Section 9.1.2.2
("Breaking Ties") in [RFC4271] mentions "number of AS numbers" in the ("Breaking Ties") in [RFC4271] mentions "number of AS numbers" in the
AS_PATH attribute that is used in the route selection process. This AS_PATH attribute that is used in the route selection process. This
metric (number of AS numbers) is the same as the AS path length metric (number of AS numbers) is the same as the AS path length
obtained in BGPsec by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path obtained in BGPsec by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path
attribute. The pCount field is also useful in managing route servers attribute. The pCount field is also useful in managing route servers
(see Section 4.2) and AS Number migrations, see (see Section 4.2) and AS Number migrations, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] for details. [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] for details.
The left most (i.e. the most significant) bit of the Flags field in The left most (i.e. the most significant) bit of the Flags field in
Figure 5 is the Confed_Segment flag. The Confed_Segment flag is set Figure 5 is the Confed_Segment flag. The Confed_Segment flag is set
to one to indicate that the BGPsec speaker that constructed this to one to indicate that the BGPsec speaker that constructed this
Secure_Path segment is sending the update message to a peer AS within Secure_Path Segment is sending the update message to a peer AS within
the same Autonomous System confederation [RFC5065]. (That is, the the same Autonomous System confederation [RFC5065]. (That is, a
Confed_Segment flag is set in a BGPsec update message whenever, in a sequence of consecutive the Confed_Segment flags are set in a BGPsec
non-BGPsec update message, the BGP speaker's AS would appear in a update message whenever, in a non-BGPsec update message, an AS_PATH
AS_PATH segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.) In all other cases the segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE occurs.) In all other cases the
Confed_Segment flag is set to zero. Confed_Segment flag is set to zero.
The remaining seven bits of the Flags are unassigned and MUST be set The remaining seven bits of the Flags are unassigned and MUST be set
to zero by the sender, and ignored by the receiver. Note, however, to zero by the sender, and ignored by the receiver. Note, however,
that the signature is computed over all eight bits of the flags that the signature is computed over all eight bits of the flags
field. field.
As stated earlier in Section 2.2, BGPsec peering requires that the
peering ASes must each support four-byte AS numbers. Currently-
assigned two-byte AS numbers are converted into four-byte AS numbers
by setting the two high-order octets of the four-octet field to zero
[RFC6793].
3.2. Signature_Block 3.2. Signature_Block
A detailed description of the Signature_Blocks in the BGPsec_Path A detailed description of the Signature_Blocks in the BGPsec_Path
attribute is provided here using Figure 6 and Figure 7. attribute is provided here using Figure 6 and Figure 7.
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
| Signature_Block Length (2 octets) | | Signature_Block Length (2 octets) |
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
| Algorithm Suite Identifier (1 octet) | | Algorithm Suite Identifier (1 octet) |
+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------------------------------+
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Authorization (ROA), that authorizes a given AS to originate routes Authorization (ROA), that authorizes a given AS to originate routes
to a given set of prefixes (see RFC 6482 [RFC6482]). It is expected to a given set of prefixes (see RFC 6482 [RFC6482]). It is expected
that most relying parties will utilize BGPsec in tandem with origin that most relying parties will utilize BGPsec in tandem with origin
validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]). validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]).
Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that a BGPsec speaker only originate a Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that a BGPsec speaker only originate a
BGPsec update advertising a route for a given prefix if there exists BGPsec update advertising a route for a given prefix if there exists
a valid ROA authorizing the BGPsec speaker's AS to originate routes a valid ROA authorizing the BGPsec speaker's AS to originate routes
to this prefix. to this prefix.
If a BGPsec router has received only a non-BGPsec update message If a BGPsec router has received only a non-BGPsec update message
(without the BGPsec_Path attribute), containing the AS_PATH containing the AS_PATH attribute (instead of the BGPsec_Path
attribute, from a peer for a given prefix then it MUST NOT attach a attribute) from a peer for a given prefix, then it MUST NOT attach a
BGPsec_Path attribute when it propagates the update message. (Note BGPsec_Path attribute when it propagates the update message. (Note
that a BGPsec router may also receive a non-BGPsec update message that a BGPsec router may also receive a non-BGPsec update message
from an internal peer without the AS_PATH attribute, i.e., with just from an internal peer without the AS_PATH attribute, i.e., with just
the NLRI in it. In that case, the prefix is originating from that the NLRI in it. In that case, the prefix is originating from that
AS, and if it is selected for advertisement, the BGPsec speaker AS, and if it is selected for advertisement, the BGPsec speaker
SHOULD attach a BGPsec_Path attribute and send a signed route (for SHOULD attach a BGPsec_Path attribute and send a signed route (for
that prefix) to its external BGPsec-speaking peers.) that prefix) to its external BGPsec-speaking peers.)
Conversely, if a BGPsec router has received a BGPsec update message Conversely, if a BGPsec router has received a BGPsec update message
(with the BGPsec_Path attribute) from a peer for a given prefix and (with the BGPsec_Path attribute) from a peer for a given prefix and
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successfully validated. (See Section 5 for more information on successfully validated. (See Section 5 for more information on
validation, and Section 8 for the security ramifications of removing validation, and Section 8 for the security ramifications of removing
BGPsec signatures.) BGPsec signatures.)
4.2. Constructing the BGPsec_Path Attribute 4.2. Constructing the BGPsec_Path Attribute
When a BGPsec speaker receives a BGPsec update message containing a When a BGPsec speaker receives a BGPsec update message containing a
BGPsec_Path attribute (with one or more signatures) from an (internal BGPsec_Path attribute (with one or more signatures) from an (internal
or external) peer, it may choose to propagate the route advertisement or external) peer, it may choose to propagate the route advertisement
by sending it to its other (internal or external) peers. When by sending it to its other (internal or external) peers. When
sending said route advertisement to an internal BGPsec-speaking peer, sending the route advertisement to an internal BGPsec-speaking peer,
the BGPsec_Path attribute SHALL NOT be modified. When sending said the BGPsec_Path attribute SHALL NOT be modified. When sending the
route advertisement to an external BGPsec-speaking peer, the route advertisement to an external BGPsec-speaking peer, the
following procedures are used to form or update the BGPsec_Path following procedures are used to form or update the BGPsec_Path
attribute. attribute.
To generate the BGPsec_Path attribute on the outgoing update message, To generate the BGPsec_Path attribute on the outgoing update message,
the BGPsec speaker first generates a new Secure_Path Segment. Note the BGPsec speaker first generates a new Secure_Path Segment. Note
that if the BGPsec speaker is not the origin AS and there is an that if the BGPsec speaker is not the origin AS and there is an
existing BGPsec_Path attribute, then the BGPsec speaker prepends its existing BGPsec_Path attribute, then the BGPsec speaker prepends its
new Secure_Path Segment (places in first position) onto the existing new Secure_Path Segment (places in first position) onto the existing
Secure_Path. Secure_Path.
The AS number in this Secure_Path segment MUST match the AS number in The AS number in this Secure_Path Segment MUST match the AS number in
the Subject field of the Resource PKI router certificate that will be the Subject field of the Resource PKI router certificate that will be
used to verify the digital signature constructed by this BGPsec used to verify the digital signature constructed by this BGPsec
speaker (see Section 3.1.1.1 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] speaker (see Section 3.1.1.1 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
and RFC 6487 [RFC6487]). and RFC 6487 [RFC6487]).
The pCount field of the Secure_Path Segment is typically set to the The pCount field of the Secure_Path Segment is typically set to the
value 1. However, a BGPsec speaker may set the pCount field to a value 1. However, a BGPsec speaker may set the pCount field to a
value greater than 1. Setting the pCount field to a value greater value greater than 1. Setting the pCount field to a value greater
than one has the same semantics as repeating an AS number multiple than one has the same semantics as repeating an AS number multiple
times in the AS_PATH of a non-BGPsec update message (e.g., for times in the AS_PATH of a non-BGPsec update message (e.g., for
skipping to change at page 14, line 35 skipping to change at page 14, line 42
pCount of k -- and a single corresponding Signature Segment. pCount of k -- and a single corresponding Signature Segment.
A route server that participates in the BGP control plane, but does A route server that participates in the BGP control plane, but does
not act as a transit AS in the data plane, may choose to set pCount not act as a transit AS in the data plane, may choose to set pCount
to 0. This option enables the route server to participate in BGPsec to 0. This option enables the route server to participate in BGPsec
and obtain the associated security guarantees without increasing the and obtain the associated security guarantees without increasing the
length of the AS path. (Note that BGPsec speakers compute the length length of the AS path. (Note that BGPsec speakers compute the length
of the AS path by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path of the AS path by summing the pCount values in the BGPsec_Path
attribute, see Section 5.) However, when a route server sets the attribute, see Section 5.) However, when a route server sets the
pCount value to 0, it still inserts its AS number into the pCount value to 0, it still inserts its AS number into the
Secure_Path segment, as this information is needed to validate the Secure_Path Segment, as this information is needed to validate the
signature added by the route server. (See signature added by the route server. (See
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] for a discussion of setting pCount to 0 [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] for a discussion of setting pCount to 0
to facilitate AS Number Migration.) BGPsec speakers SHOULD drop to facilitate AS Number Migration.) BGPsec speakers SHOULD drop
incoming update messages with pCount set to zero in cases where the incoming update messages with pCount set to zero in cases where the
BGPsec speaker does not expect its peer to set pCount to zero. (That BGPsec speaker does not expect its peer to set pCount to zero. (That
is, pCount is only to be set to zero in cases such as route servers is, pCount is only to be set to zero in cases such as route servers
or AS Number Migration where the BGPsec speaker's peer expects pCount or AS Number Migration where the BGPsec speaker's peer expects pCount
to be set to zero.) to be set to zero.)
Next, the BGPsec speaker generates one or two Signature_Blocks. Next, the BGPsec speaker generates one or two Signature_Blocks.
Typically, a BGPsec speaker will use only a single algorithm suite, Typically, a BGPsec speaker will use only a single algorithm suite,
and thus create only a single Signature_Block in the BGPsec_Path and thus create only a single Signature_Block in the BGPsec_Path
attribute. However, to ensure backwards compatibility during a attribute. However, to ensure backwards compatibility during a
period of transition from a 'current' algorithm suite to a 'new' period of transition from a 'current' algorithm suite to a 'new'
algorithm suite, it will be necessary to originate update messages algorithm suite, it will be necessary to originate update messages
that contain a Signature_Block for both the 'current' and the 'new' that contain a Signature_Block for both the 'current' and the 'new'
algorithm suites (see Section 6.1). algorithm suites (see Section 6.1).
If the received BGPsec update message contains two Signature_Blocks If the received BGPsec update message contains two Signature_Blocks
skipping to change at page 15, line 39 skipping to change at page 15, line 45
which is not deemed 'Valid' (e.g., contains signatures that BGPsec which is not deemed 'Valid' (e.g., contains signatures that BGPsec
does not successfully verify). Nonetheless, such Signature_Blocks does not successfully verify). Nonetheless, such Signature_Blocks
MUST NOT be removed. (See Section 8 for a discussion of the security MUST NOT be removed. (See Section 8 for a discussion of the security
ramifications of this design choice.) ramifications of this design choice.)
For each Signature_Block corresponding to an algorithm suite that the For each Signature_Block corresponding to an algorithm suite that the
BGPsec speaker does support, the BGPsec speaker MUST add a new BGPsec speaker does support, the BGPsec speaker MUST add a new
Signature Segment to the Signature_Block. This Signature Segment is Signature Segment to the Signature_Block. This Signature Segment is
prepended to the list of Signature Segments (placed in the first prepended to the list of Signature Segments (placed in the first
position) so that the list of Signature Segments appears in the same position) so that the list of Signature Segments appears in the same
order as the corresponding Secure_Path segments. The BGPsec speaker order as the corresponding Secure_Path Segments. The BGPsec speaker
populates the fields of this new signature segment as follows. populates the fields of this new signature segment as follows.
The Subject Key Identifier field in the new segment is populated with The Subject Key Identifier field in the new segment is populated with
the identifier contained in the Subject Key Identifier extension of the identifier contained in the Subject Key Identifier extension of
the RPKI router certificate corresponding to the BGPsec speaker the RPKI router certificate corresponding to the BGPsec speaker
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. This Subject Key Identifier [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. This Subject Key Identifier
will be used by recipients of the route advertisement to identify the will be used by recipients of the route advertisement to identify the
proper certificate to use in verifying the signature. proper certificate to use in verifying the signature.
The Signature field in the new segment contains a digital signature The Signature field in the new segment contains a digital signature
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The elements in this sequence (Figure 8) MUST be ordered exactly The elements in this sequence (Figure 8) MUST be ordered exactly
as shown. The 'Target AS Number' is the AS to whom the BGPsec as shown. The 'Target AS Number' is the AS to whom the BGPsec
speaker intends to send the update message. (Note that the speaker intends to send the update message. (Note that the
'Target AS Number' is the AS number announced by the peer in the 'Target AS Number' is the AS number announced by the peer in the
OPEN message of the BGP session within which the update is sent.) OPEN message of the BGP session within which the update is sent.)
The Secure_Path and Signature Segments (1 through N-1) are The Secure_Path and Signature Segments (1 through N-1) are
obtained from the BGPsec_Path attribute. Finally, the Address obtained from the BGPsec_Path attribute. Finally, the Address
Family Identifier (AFI), Subsequent Address Family Identifier Family Identifier (AFI), Subsequent Address Family Identifier
(SAFI), and Prefix fields are obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI (SAFI), and Prefix fields are obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI
attribute. Additionally, in the Prefix field all of the trailing attribute [RFC4760]. Additionally, in the Prefix field all of the
bits MUST be set to zero when constructing this sequence. trailing bits MUST be set to zero when constructing this sequence.
o Apply to this octet sequence (in Figure 8) the digest algorithm o Apply to this octet sequence (in Figure 8) the digest algorithm
(for the algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain a (for the algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain a
digest value. digest value.
o Apply to this digest value the signature algorithm, (for the o Apply to this digest value the signature algorithm, (for the
algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain the digital algorithm suite of this Signature_Block) to obtain the digital
signature. Then populate the Signature Field (in Figure 7) with signature. Then populate the Signature Field (in Figure 7) with
this digital signature. this digital signature.
The Signature Length field (in Figure 7) is populated with the length The Signature Length field (in Figure 7) is populated with the length
(in octets) of the value in the Signature field. (in octets) of the value in the Signature field.
4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members 4.3. Processing Instructions for Confederation Members
Members of autonomous system confederations [RFC5065] MUST Members of autonomous system confederations [RFC5065] MUST
additionally follow the instructions in this section for processing additionally follow the instructions in this section for processing
BGPsec update messages. BGPsec update messages.
When a BGPsec speaker in an AS confederation receives a BGPsec update
from a peer that is external to the confederation and chooses to
propagate the update within the confederation, then it first adds a
signature signed to its own member AS (i.e. the Target AS number is
the BGPsec speaker's confederation-member AS number). In this
internally modified update, the newly added Secure_Path Segment
contains the public AS number of the confederation, the Segment's
pCount value is set to 0, and Confed_Segment flag is set to one.
Setting pCount = 0 in this case helps ensure that the AS path length
is not unnecessarily incremented. The newly added signature is
generated using a private key corresponding to the public AS number
of the confederation. The BGPsec speaker propagates the update
modified in this manner to its peers within the confederation.
The reason for the internal modification (i.e. adding a Secure_Path
Segment with pCount = 0) described above is to ensure that the
sequence of (signer AS number, Target AS number) pairs associated
with consecutive signatures in the update are contiguous within the
confederation. The signer AS number is the AS number that is found
in the Secure_Path Segment. By contiguous here we mean that the
Target AS number of each signature in the sequence equals the signer
AS number of the next signature. Without the modification, this
chain would be broken at the boundary of the confederation.
Any modifications mentioned below in the context of propagation of
the update within the confederation are in addition to the
modification described above (with pCount = 0).
When a confederation member sends a BGPsec update message to a peer When a confederation member sends a BGPsec update message to a peer
that is a member of the same Member-AS, the confederation member that is a member of the same Member-AS, the confederation member
SHALL NOT modify the BGPsec_Path attribute. When a confederation SHALL NOT modify the BGPsec_Path attribute. (Note that the only
member sends a BGPsec update message to a peer that is a member of exception to this is the internal modification described above.)
the same confederation but is a different Member-AS, the When a confederation member sends a BGPsec update message to a peer
confederation member puts its (private) Member-AS Number (as opposed that is a member of the same confederation but is a different Member-
to the public AS Confederation Identifier) in the AS Number field of AS, the confederation member puts its (private) Member-AS Number (as
the Secure_Path Segment that it adds to the BGPsec update message. opposed to the public AS Confederation Identifier) in the AS Number
Additionally, in this case, the confederation member that generates field of the Secure_Path Segment that it adds to the BGPsec update
the Secure_Path Segment sets the Confed_Segment flag to one. This message. Additionally, in this case, the confederation member that
means that in a BGPsec update message, an AS number appears in a generates the Secure_Path Segment sets the Confed_Segment flag to
Secure_Path Segment with the Confed_Segment flag set whenever, in a one. Further, the signature is generated with a private key
non-BGPsec update message, the AS number would appear in a segment of corresponding to the (private) Member-AS Number.
type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.
Within a confederation, the verification of BGPsec signatures added Within a confederation, the verification of BGPsec signatures added
by other members of the confederation is optional. If a by other members of the confederation is optional. If a
confederation chooses not to have its members verify signatures added confederation chooses not to have its members verify signatures added
by other confederation members, then when sending a BGPsec update by other confederation members, then when sending a BGPsec update
message to a peer that is a member of the same confederation, the message to a peer that is a member of the same confederation, the
confederation members MAY set the Signature field within the confederation members MAY set the Signature field within the
Signature Segment that it generates to be zero (in lieu of Signature Segment that it generates to be zero (in lieu of
calculating the correct digital signature as described in calculating the correct digital signature as described in
Section 4.2). Note that if a confederation chooses not to verify Section 4.2). Note that if a confederation chooses not to verify
digital signatures within the confederation, then BGPsec is able to digital signatures within the confederation, then BGPsec is able to
provide no assurances about the integrity of the (private) Member-AS provide no assurances about the integrity of the (private) Member-AS
Numbers placed in Secure_Path segments where the Confed_Segment flag Numbers placed in Secure_Path Segments where the Confed_Segment flag
is set to one. is set to one.
When a confederation member receives a BGPsec update message from a When a confederation member receives a BGPsec update message from a
peer within the confederation and propagates it to a peer outside the peer within the confederation and propagates it to a peer outside the
confederation, it needs to remove all of the Secure_Path Segments confederation, it needs to remove all of the Secure_Path Segments
added by confederation members as well as the corresponding Signature added by confederation members as well as the corresponding Signature
Segments. To do this, the confederation member propagating the route Segments. To do this, the confederation member propagating the route
outside the confederation does the following: outside the confederation does the following:
o First, starting with the most recently added Secure_Path segment, o First, starting with the most recently added Secure_Path Segment,
remove all of the consecutive Secure_Path segments that have the remove all of the consecutive Secure_Path Segments that have the
Confed_Segment flag set to one. Stop this process once a Confed_Segment flag set to one. Stop this process once a
Secure_Path segment is reached which has its Confed_Segment flag Secure_Path Segment is reached which has its Confed_Segment flag
set to zero. Keep a count of the number of segments removed in set to zero. Keep a count of the number of segments removed in
this fashion. this fashion.
o Second, starting with the most recently added Signature Segment, o Second, starting with the most recently added Signature Segment,
remove a number of Signature Segments equal to the number of remove a number of Signature Segments equal to the number of
Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step. (That is, Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step. (That is,
remove the K most recently added signature segments, where K is remove the K most recently added signature segments, where K is
the number of Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.) the number of Secure_Path Segments removed in the previous step.)
o Finally, add a Secure_Path Segment containing, in the AS field, o Finally, add a Secure_Path Segment containing, in the AS field,
the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the the AS Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the
confederation) as well as a corresponding Signature Segment. Note confederation) as well as a corresponding Signature Segment. Note
that all fields other that the AS field are populated as per that all fields other that the AS field are populated as per
Section 4.2. Section 4.2.
When validating a received BGPsec update message, confederation
members need to make the following adjustment to the algorithm
presented in Section 5.2. When a confederation member processes
(validates) a Signature Segment and its corresponding Secure_Path
Segment, the confederation member must note the following. For a
signature produced by a peer BGPsec speaker outside of a
confederation, the 'Target AS Number' will always be the AS
Confederation Identifier (the public AS number of the confederation)
as opposed to the Member-AS Number.
To handle this case, when a BGPsec speaker (that is a confederation
member) processes a current Secure_Path Segment that has the
Confed_Segment flag set to zero, if the next most recently added
Secure_Path segment has the Confed_Segment flag set to one then, when
computing the digest for the current Secure_Path segment, the BGPsec
speaker takes the 'Target AS Number' to be the AS Confederation
Identifier of the validating BGPsec speaker's own confederation.
(Note that the algorithm in Section 5.2 processes Secure_Path
Segments in order from most recently added to least recently added,
therefore, this special case will apply to the first Secure_Path
segment that the algorithm encounters that has the Confed_Segment
flag set to zero.)
Finally, as discussed above, an AS confederation may optionally Finally, as discussed above, an AS confederation may optionally
decide that its members will not verify digital signatures added by decide that its members will not verify digital signatures added by
members. In such a federation, when a confederation member runs the members. In such a federation, when a confederation member runs the
algorithm in Section 5.2, the confederation member, during the algorithm in Section 5.2, the confederation member, during the
process of error checking, first checks whether the Confed_Segment process of error checking, first checks whether the Confed_Segment
flag in the corresponding Secure_Path segment is set to one. If the flag in the corresponding Secure_Path Segment is set to one. If the
Confed_Segment flag is set to one in the corresponding Secure_Path Confed_Segment flag is set to one in the corresponding Secure_Path
segment, the confederation member does not perform any further checks Segment, the confederation member does not perform any further checks
on the Signature Segment and immediately moves on to the next on the Signature Segment and immediately moves on to the next
Signature Segment (and checks its corresponding Secure_Path segment). Signature Segment (and checks its corresponding Secure_Path Segment).
Note that as specified in Section 5.2, it is an error when a BGPsec Note that as specified in Section 5.2, it is an error when a BGPsec
speaker receives from a peer, who is not in the same AS speaker receives from a peer, who is not in the same AS
confederation, a BGPsec update containing a Confed_Segment flag set confederation, a BGPsec update containing a Confed_Segment flag set
to one. to one.
4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute 4.4. Reconstructing the AS_PATH Attribute
BGPsec update messages do not contain the AS_PATH attribute. BGPsec update messages do not contain the AS_PATH attribute.
However, the AS_PATH attribute can be reconstructed from the However, the AS_PATH attribute can be reconstructed from the
BGPsec_Path attribute. This is necessary in the case where a route BGPsec_Path attribute. This is necessary in the case where a route
skipping to change at page 19, line 50 skipping to change at page 20, line 31
the latter peer does not support BGPsec). Note that there may be the latter peer does not support BGPsec). Note that there may be
additional cases where an implementation finds it useful to perform additional cases where an implementation finds it useful to perform
this reconstruction. Before attempting to reconstruct an AS_PATH for this reconstruction. Before attempting to reconstruct an AS_PATH for
the purpose of forwarding an unsigned (non-BGPsec) update to a peer, the purpose of forwarding an unsigned (non-BGPsec) update to a peer,
a BGPsec speaker MUST perform the basic integrity checks listed in a BGPsec speaker MUST perform the basic integrity checks listed in
Section 5.2 to ensure that the received BGPsec update is properly Section 5.2 to ensure that the received BGPsec update is properly
formed. formed.
The AS_PATH attribute can be constructed from the BGPsec_Path The AS_PATH attribute can be constructed from the BGPsec_Path
attribute as follows. Starting with an empty AS_PATH attribute, attribute as follows. Starting with an empty AS_PATH attribute,
process the Secure_Path segments in order from least-recently added process the Secure_Path Segments in order from least-recently added
(corresponding to the origin) to most-recently added. For each (corresponding to the origin) to most-recently added. For each
Secure_Path segment perform the following steps: Secure_Path Segment perform the following steps:
1. If the Confed_Segment flag in the Secure_Path segment is set to 1. If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount = 0, then do nothing (i.e.
one, then look at the most-recently added segment in the AS_PATH. move on to process the next Secure_Path Segment).
2. If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount greater than 0 and the
Confed_Segment flag is set to one, then look at the most-recently
added segment in the AS_PATH.
* In the case where the AS_PATH is empty or in the case where * In the case where the AS_PATH is empty or in the case where
the most-recently added segment is of type AS_SEQUENCE then the most-recently added segment is of type AS_SEQUENCE, add
add (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. This segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. This segment of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE
shall contain a number of elements equal to the pCount field shall contain a number of elements equal to the pCount field
in the current Secure_Path segment. Each of these elements in the current Secure_Path Segment. Each of these elements
shall be the AS number contained in the current Secure_Path shall be the AS number contained in the current Secure_Path
segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment Segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment
of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the
Secure_Path segment's AS Number field.) Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field.)
* In the case where the most-recently added segment in the * In the case where the most-recently added segment in the
AS_PATH is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the AS_PATH is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the
segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
current Secure_Path segment. The value of each of these current Secure_Path Segment. The value of each of these
elements shall be the AS number contained in the current elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
Secure_Path segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then Secure_Path Segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
add X copies of the Secure_Path segment's AS Number field to add X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field to
the existing AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.) the existing AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE.)
2. If the Confed_Segment flag in the Secure_Path segment is set to 3. If the Secure_Path Segment has pCount greater than 0 and the
zero, then look at the most-recently added segment in the Confed_Segment flag is set to zero, then look at the most-
AS_PATH. recently added segment in the AS_PATH.
* In the case where the AS_PATH is empty, and the pCount field * In the case where the AS_PATH is empty or in the case where
in the Secure_Path segment is greater than zero, add (prepend the most-recently added segment is of type AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE,
to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type AS_SEQUENCE. add (prepend to the AS_PATH) a new AS_PATH segment of type
This segment of type AS_SEQUENCE shall contain a number of AS_SEQUENCE. This segment of type AS_SEQUENCE shall contain a
elements equal to the pCount field in the current Secure_Path number of elements equal to the pCount field in the current
segment. Each of these elements shall be the AS number Secure_Path Segment. Each of these elements shall be the AS
contained in the current Secure_Path segment. (That is, if number contained in the current Secure_Path Segment. (That
the pCount field is X, then the segment of type AS_SEQUENCE is, if the pCount field is X, then the segment of type
contains X copies of the Secure_Path segment's AS Number AS_SEQUENCE contains X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS
field.) Number field.)
* In the case where the most recently added segment in the * In the case where the most recently added segment in the
AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the AS_PATH is of type AS_SEQUENCE then add (prepend to the
segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the segment) a number of elements equal to the pCount field in the
current Secure_Path segment. The value of each of these current Secure_Path Segment. The value of each of these
elements shall be the AS number contained in the current elements shall be the AS number contained in the current
Secure_Path segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then Secure_Path Segment. (That is, if the pCount field is X, then
add X copies of the Secure_Path segment's AS Number field to add X copies of the Secure_Path Segment's AS Number field to
the existing AS_SEQUENCE.) the existing AS_SEQUENCE.)
As part of the above described procedure, the following additional As part of the above described procedure, the following additional
actions are performed in order not to exceed the size limitations of actions are performed in order not to exceed the size limitations of
AS_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. While adding the next AS_SEQUENCE and AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE. While adding the next
Secure_Path segment (with its prepends, if any) to the AS_PATH being Secure_Path Segment (with its prepends, if any) to the AS_PATH being
assembled, if it would cause the AS_SEQUENCE (or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE) assembled, if it would cause the AS_SEQUENCE (or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE)
at hand to exceed the 255 ASN per segment limit [RFC4271] [RFC5065], at hand to exceed the limit of 255 AS numbers per segment [RFC4271]
then the BGPsec speaker would follow the recommendations in RFC 4271 [RFC5065], then the BGPsec speaker would follow the recommendations
[RFC4271] and RFC 5065 [RFC5065] of creating another segment of the in RFC 4271 [RFC4271] and RFC 5065 [RFC5065] of creating another
same type (AS_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE) and continue filling segment of the same type (AS_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE) and
that. continue filling that.
5. Processing a Received BGPsec Update 5. Processing a Received BGPsec Update
Upon receiving a BGPsec update message from an external (eBGP) peer, Upon receiving a BGPsec update message from an external (eBGP) peer,
a BGPsec speaker SHOULD validate the message to determine the a BGPsec speaker SHOULD validate the message to determine the
authenticity of the path information contained in the BGPsec_Path authenticity of the path information contained in the BGPsec_Path
attribute. Typically, a BGPsec speaker will also wish to perform attribute. Typically, a BGPsec speaker will also wish to perform
origin validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]) on origin validation (see RFC 6483 [RFC6483] and RFC 6811 [RFC6811]) on
an incoming BGPsec update message, but such validation is independent an incoming BGPsec update message, but such validation is independent
of the validation described in this section. of the validation described in this section.
skipping to change at page 23, line 32 skipping to change at page 24, line 24
protocol violation errors are checked. The error checks specified in protocol violation errors are checked. The error checks specified in
Section 6.3 of [RFC4271] are performed, except that for BGPsec Section 6.3 of [RFC4271] are performed, except that for BGPsec
updates the checks on the AS_PATH attribute do not apply and instead updates the checks on the AS_PATH attribute do not apply and instead
the following checks on BGPsec_Path attribute are performed: the following checks on BGPsec_Path attribute are performed:
1. Check to ensure that the entire BGPsec_Path attribute is 1. Check to ensure that the entire BGPsec_Path attribute is
syntactically correct (conforms to the specification in this syntactically correct (conforms to the specification in this
document). document).
2. Check that AS number in the most recently added Secure_Path 2. Check that AS number in the most recently added Secure_Path
segment (i.e. the one corresponding to the peer from which the Segment (i.e. the one corresponding to the peer from which the
update message was received) matches the AS number of that peer update message was received) matches the AS number of that peer
(as specified in the BGP OPEN message). (as specified in the BGP OPEN message).
3. Check that each Signature_Block contains one Signature segment 3. Check that each Signature_Block contains one Signature segment
for each Secure_Path segment in the Secure_Path portion of the for each Secure_Path Segment in the Secure_Path portion of the
BGPsec_Path attribute. (Note that the entirety of each BGPsec_Path attribute. (Note that the entirety of each
Signature_Block must be checked to ensure that it is well formed, Signature_Block must be checked to ensure that it is well formed,
even though the validation process may terminate before all even though the validation process may terminate before all
signatures are cryptographically verified.) signatures are cryptographically verified.)
4. Check that the update message does not contain an AS_PATH 4. Check that the update message does not contain an AS_PATH
attribute. attribute.
5. If the update message was received from an BGPsec peer that is 5. If the update message was received from an BGPsec peer that is
not a member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to not a member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to
ensure that none of the Secure_Path segments contain a Flags ensure that none of the Secure_Path Segments contain a Flags
field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one. field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one.
6. If the update message was received from a BGPsec peer that is a 6. If the update message was received from a BGPsec peer that is a
member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to ensure member of the BGPsec speaker's AS confederation, check to ensure
that the Secure_Path segment corresponding to that peer contains that the Secure_Path Segment corresponding to that peer contains
a Flags field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one. a Flags field with the Confed_Segment flag set to one.
7. If the update message was received from a peer that is not 7. If the update message was received from a peer that is not
expected to set pCount equal to zero (see Section 4.2) then check expected to set pCount equal to zero (see Section 4.2 and
to ensure that the pCount field in the most-recently added Section 4.3) then check to ensure that the pCount field in the
Secure_Path segment is not equal to zero. most-recently added Secure_Path Segment is not equal to zero.
If any of these checks fail, it is an error in the BGPsec_Path If any of these checks fail, it is an error in the BGPsec_Path
attribute. BGPsec speakers MUST handle any syntactical or protocol attribute. BGPsec speakers MUST handle any syntactical or protocol
errors in the BGPsec_Path attribute using the "treat-as-withdraw" errors in the BGPsec_Path attribute using the "treat-as-withdraw"
approach as defined in RFC 7606 [RFC7606]. approach as defined in RFC 7606 [RFC7606].
Next, the BGPsec speaker examines the Signature_Blocks in the Next, the BGPsec speaker examines the Signature_Blocks in the
BGPsec_Path attribute. A Signature_Block corresponding to an BGPsec_Path attribute. A Signature_Block corresponding to an
algorithm suite that the BGPsec speaker does not support is not algorithm suite that the BGPsec speaker does not support is not
considered in validation. If there is no Signature_Block considered in validation. If there is no Signature_Block
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then in order to consider the update in the route selection process, then in order to consider the update in the route selection process,
the BGPsec speaker MUST strip the Signature_Block(s), reconstruct the the BGPsec speaker MUST strip the Signature_Block(s), reconstruct the
AS_PATH from the Secure_Path (see Section 4.4), and treat the update AS_PATH from the Secure_Path (see Section 4.4), and treat the update
as if it was received as an unsigned BGP update. as if it was received as an unsigned BGP update.
For each remaining Signature_Block (corresponding to an algorithm For each remaining Signature_Block (corresponding to an algorithm
suite supported by the BGPsec speaker), the BGPsec speaker iterates suite supported by the BGPsec speaker), the BGPsec speaker iterates
through the Signature segments in the Signature_Block, starting with through the Signature segments in the Signature_Block, starting with
the most recently added segment (and concluding with the least the most recently added segment (and concluding with the least
recently added segment). Note that there is a one-to-one recently added segment). Note that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Signature segments and Secure_Path segments correspondence between Signature segments and Secure_Path Segments
within the BGPsec_Path attribute. The following steps make use of within the BGPsec_Path attribute. The following steps make use of
this correspondence. this correspondence.
o (Step 1): Let there be K AS hops in a received BGPsec_Path o (Step 1): Let there be K AS hops in a received BGPsec_Path
attribute that is to be validated. Let AS(1), AS(2), ..., AS(K+1) attribute that is to be validated. Let AS(1), AS(2), ..., AS(K+1)
denote the sequence of AS numbers from the origin AS to the denote the sequence of AS numbers from the origin AS to the
validating AS. Let Secure_Path Segment N and Signature Segment N validating AS. Let Secure_Path Segment N and Signature Segment N
in the BGPsec_Path attribute refer to those corresponding to AS(N) in the BGPsec_Path attribute refer to those corresponding to AS(N)
(where N = 1, 2, ..., K). The BGPsec speaker that is processing (where N = 1, 2, ..., K). The BGPsec speaker that is processing
and validating the BGPsec_Path attribute resides in AS(K+1). Let and validating the BGPsec_Path attribute resides in AS(K+1). Let
Signature Segment N be the Signature Segment that is currently Signature Segment N be the Signature Segment that is currently
being verified. being verified.
o (Step 2): Locate the public key needed to verify the signature (in o (Step 2): Locate the public key needed to verify the signature (in
the current Signature segment). To do this, consult the valid the current Signature segment). To do this, consult the valid
RPKI router certificate data and look up all valid (AS, SKI, RPKI router certificate data and look up all valid (AS, SKI,
Public Key) triples in which the AS matches the AS number in the Public Key) triples in which the AS matches the AS number in the
corresponding Secure_Path segment. Of these triples that match corresponding Secure_Path Segment. Of these triples that match
the AS number, check whether there is an SKI that matches the the AS number, check whether there is an SKI that matches the
value in the Subject Key Identifier field of the Signature value in the Subject Key Identifier field of the Signature
segment. If this check finds no such matching SKI value, then segment. If this check finds no such matching SKI value, then
mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not Valid' and proceed to the mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not Valid' and proceed to the
next Signature_Block. next Signature_Block.
o (Step 3): Compute the digest function (for the given algorithm o (Step 3): Compute the digest function (for the given algorithm
suite) on the appropriate data. suite) on the appropriate data.
In order to verify the digital signature in Signature Segment N, In order to verify the digital signature in Signature Segment N,
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as shown. For the first segment to be processed (the most as shown. For the first segment to be processed (the most
recently added segment (i.e. N = K) given that there are K hops recently added segment (i.e. N = K) given that there are K hops
in the Secure_Path), the 'Target AS Number' is AS(K+1), the AS in the Secure_Path), the 'Target AS Number' is AS(K+1), the AS
number of the BGPsec speaker validating the update message. Note number of the BGPsec speaker validating the update message. Note
that if a BGPsec speaker uses multiple AS Numbers (e.g., the that if a BGPsec speaker uses multiple AS Numbers (e.g., the
BGPsec speaker is a member of a confederation), the AS number used BGPsec speaker is a member of a confederation), the AS number used
here MUST be the AS number announced in the OPEN message for the here MUST be the AS number announced in the OPEN message for the
BGP session over which the BGPsec update was received. BGP session over which the BGPsec update was received.
For each other Signature Segment (N smaller than K), the 'Target For each other Signature Segment (N smaller than K), the 'Target
AS Number' is AS(N+1), the AS number in the Secure_Path segment AS Number' is AS(N+1), the AS number in the Secure_Path Segment
that corresponds to the Signature Segment added immediately after that corresponds to the Signature Segment added immediately after
the one being processed. (That is, in the Secure_Path segment the one being processed. (That is, in the Secure_Path Segment
that corresponds to the Signature segment that the validator just that corresponds to the Signature segment that the validator just
finished processing.) finished processing.)
The Secure_Path and Signature Segment are obtained from the The Secure_Path and Signature Segment are obtained from the
BGPsec_Path attribute. The Address Family Identifier (AFI), BGPsec_Path attribute. The Address Family Identifier (AFI),
Subsequent Address Family Identifier (SAFI), and Prefix fields are Subsequent Address Family Identifier (SAFI), and Prefix fields are
obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute. Additionally, in the obtained from the MP_REACH_NLRI attribute [RFC4760].
Prefix field all of the trailing bits MUST be set to zero when Additionally, in the Prefix field all of the trailing bits MUST be
constructing this sequence. set to zero when constructing this sequence.
o (Step 4): Use the signature validation algorithm (for the given o (Step 4): Use the signature validation algorithm (for the given
algorithm suite) to verify the signature in the current segment. algorithm suite) to verify the signature in the current segment.
That is, invoke the signature validation algorithm on the That is, invoke the signature validation algorithm on the
following three inputs: the value of the Signature field in the following three inputs: the value of the Signature field in the
current segment; the digest value computed in Step 3 above; and current segment; the digest value computed in Step 3 above; and
the public key obtained from the valid RPKI data in Step 2 above. the public key obtained from the valid RPKI data in Step 2 above.
If the signature validation algorithm determines that the If the signature validation algorithm determines that the
signature is invalid, then mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not signature is invalid, then mark the entire Signature_Block as 'Not
Valid' and proceed to the next Signature_Block. If the signature Valid' and proceed to the next Signature_Block. If the signature
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here. The Best Current Practice concerning operational deployment of here. The Best Current Practice concerning operational deployment of
BGPSec is provided in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]. BGPSec is provided in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops].
Section 2.2 describes the negotiation required to establish a BGPsec- Section 2.2 describes the negotiation required to establish a BGPsec-
capable peering session. Not only must the BGPsec capability be capable peering session. Not only must the BGPsec capability be
exchanged (and agreed on), but the BGP multiprotocol extension exchanged (and agreed on), but the BGP multiprotocol extension
[RFC4760] for the same AFI and the four-byte AS capability [RFC6793] [RFC4760] for the same AFI and the four-byte AS capability [RFC6793]
must also be exchanged. Failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec must also be exchanged. Failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec
session, due to a missing capability, for example, may still result session, due to a missing capability, for example, may still result
in the exchange of BGP (unsigned) updates. While the BGP chain of in the exchange of BGP (unsigned) updates. While the BGP chain of
ASNs is not broken, the security can be reduced and a contiguous set ASes is not broken, the security can be reduced and a contiguous set
of BGPsec peers may not exist anymore. It is RECOMMENDED that an of BGPsec peers may not exist anymore. It is RECOMMENDED that an
implementation log the failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec session implementation log the failure to properly negotiate a BGPsec session
if the local BGP speaker is configured for it. Also, an if the local BGP speaker is configured for it. Also, an
implementation MUST have ability to prevent a BGP session from being implementation MUST have ability to prevent a BGP session from being
established if configured for only BGPsec use. established if configured for only BGPsec use.
A peer that is an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) (i.e. Route Server) A peer that is an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) (i.e. Route Server)
with a transparent AS is expected to set pCount = 0 in its with a transparent AS is expected to set pCount = 0 in its
Secure_Path segment while forwarding an update to a peer (see Secure_Path Segment while forwarding an update to a peer (see
Section 4.2). Clearly, such an IXP SHOULD configure itself to set Section 4.2). Clearly, such an IXP SHOULD configure itself to set
its own pCount = 0. As stated in Section 4.2, "BGPsec speakers its own pCount = 0. As stated in Section 4.2, "BGPsec speakers
SHOULD drop incoming update messages with pCount set to zero in cases SHOULD drop incoming update messages with pCount set to zero in cases
where the BGPsec speaker does not expect its peer to set pCount to where the BGPsec speaker does not expect its peer to set pCount to
zero." This means that a BGPsec speaker SHOULD be configured so that zero." This means that a BGPsec speaker SHOULD be configured so that
it permits pCount =0 from an IXP peer and never permits pCount = 0 it permits pCount =0 from an IXP peer and never permits pCount = 0
from a peer that is not an IXP. from a peer that is not an IXP.
During the validation of a BGPsec update, route processor performance During the validation of a BGPsec update, route processor performance
speedup can be achieved by incorporating the following observations. speedup can be achieved by incorporating the following observations.
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In Section 2.2, is was stated that a BGPsec speaker SHOULD announce In Section 2.2, is was stated that a BGPsec speaker SHOULD announce
support for the capability to receive BGP extended messages. Lack of support for the capability to receive BGP extended messages. Lack of
negotiation of this capability is not expected to pose a problem in negotiation of this capability is not expected to pose a problem in
the early years of BGPsec deployment. However, as BGPsec is deployed the early years of BGPsec deployment. However, as BGPsec is deployed
more and more, the BGPsec update messages would grow in size and some more and more, the BGPsec update messages would grow in size and some
messages may be dropped due to their size exceeding the current 4K messages may be dropped due to their size exceeding the current 4K
bytes limit. Therefore, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that all BGPsec bytes limit. Therefore, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that all BGPsec
speakers negotiate the extended message capability within a speakers negotiate the extended message capability within a
reasonable period of time after initial deployment of BGPsec. reasonable period of time after initial deployment of BGPsec.
It is possible that a stub customer of an ISP employs a private AS
number. Such a stub customer cannot publish a ROA in the global RPKI
for the private AS number and the prefixes that they use. Also, the
stub customer cannot become a BGPsec speaker. If a BGPsec speaker in
the ISP's AS receives an announcement for a prefix from the stub
customer and chooses to propagate it to BGPsec peers, then it MUST
strip the private AS and re-originate the prefix. In order to do
this, the prefix MUST have a ROA authorizing the ISP's AS to
originate it.
It is possible that one or more private AS numbers are used in an AS
confederation [RFC5065]. BGPsec protocol requires that when a BGPsec
update propagates through a confederation, each member AS that
forwards it must sign the update (see Section 4.3). However, the
global RPKI cannot support private AS numbers. In order for the
BGPsec speakers in ASes with private AS numbers to have digital
certificates, there must be a mechanism in place in the confederation
that allows establishment of a local, customized view of the RPKI,
augmenting the global RPKI repository data as needed. Since this
mechanism (for augmenting and maintaining a local image of RPKI data)
operates locally within an AS or AS confederation, it need not be
standards based. However, a standards based mechanism can be used
and is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]. Recall that in order to
prevent exposure of the internals of AS confederations, a BGPsec
speaker exporting to a non-member removes all intra-confederation
Secure_Path Segments and Signatures (see Section 4.3).
How will migration from BGP to BGPsec look like? What are the How will migration from BGP to BGPsec look like? What are the
benefits for the first adopters? Initially small groups of benefits for the first adopters? Initially small groups of
contiguous ASes would be doing BGPsec. There would be possibly one contiguous ASes would be doing BGPsec. There would be possibly one
or more such groups in different geographic regions of the global or more such groups in different geographic regions of the global
Internet. Only the routes originated within each group and Internet. Only the routes originated within each group and
propagated within its borders would get the benefits of cryptographic propagated within its borders would get the benefits of cryptographic
AS path protection. As BGPsec adoption grows, each group grows in AS path protection. As BGPsec adoption grows, each group grows in
size and eventually they join together to form even larger BGPsec size and eventually they join together to form even larger BGPsec
capable groups of contiguous ASes. The benefit for early adopters capable groups of contiguous ASes. The benefit for early adopters
starts with AS path security within the contiguous-AS regions spanned starts with AS path security within the contiguous-AS regions spanned
skipping to change at page 33, line 41 skipping to change at page 35, line 10
between colluding ASes. For example, say, AS-X does not peer with between colluding ASes. For example, say, AS-X does not peer with
AS-Y, but colludes with AS-Y, signs and sends a BGPsec update to AS-Y AS-Y, but colludes with AS-Y, signs and sends a BGPsec update to AS-Y
by tunneling. AS-Y can then further sign and propagate the BGPsec by tunneling. AS-Y can then further sign and propagate the BGPsec
update to its peers. It is beyond the scope of the BGPsec protocol update to its peers. It is beyond the scope of the BGPsec protocol
to detect this form of malicious behavior. BGPsec is designed to to detect this form of malicious behavior. BGPsec is designed to
protect messages sent within BGP (i.e. within the control plane) - protect messages sent within BGP (i.e. within the control plane) -
not when the control plane in bypassed. not when the control plane in bypassed.
A variant of the collusion by tunneling mentioned above can happen in A variant of the collusion by tunneling mentioned above can happen in
the context of AS confederations. When a BGPsec router (outside of a the context of AS confederations. When a BGPsec router (outside of a
confederation) is forwarding an update to a member of the confederation) is forwarding an update to a member AS in the
confederation, it signs the update to the public ASN of the confederation, it signs the update to the public AS number of the
confederation and not to the member's ASN (see Section 4.3). Said confederation and not to the member's AS number (see Section 4.3).
member can tunnel the signed update to another member as is (i.e. The member AS can tunnel the signed update to another member AS as
without adding a signature). The update can then be propagated using received (i.e. without adding a signature). The update can then be
BGPsec to other confederation members or to BGPsec neighbors outside propagated using BGPsec to other confederation members or to BGPsec
of the confederation. This kind of operation is possible, but no neighbors outside of the confederation. This kind of operation is
grave security or reachability compromise is feared due to the possible, but no grave security or reachability compromise is feared
following reasons: (1) The confederation members belong to one for the following reasons: (1) The confederation members belong to
organization and strong internal trust is expected; and (2) Recall one organization and strong internal trust is expected; and (2)
that the signatures that are internal to the confederation must be Recall that the signatures that are internal to the confederation
removed prior to forwarding the update to an outside BGPsec router must be removed prior to forwarding the update to an outside BGPsec
(see Section 4.3). router (see Section 4.3).
BGPsec does not provide protection against attacks at the transport BGPsec does not provide protection against attacks at the transport
layer. As with any BGP session, an adversary on the path between a layer. As with any BGP session, an adversary on the path between a
BGPsec speaker and its peer is able to perform attacks such as BGPsec speaker and its peer is able to perform attacks such as
modifying valid BGPsec updates to cause them to fail validation, modifying valid BGPsec updates to cause them to fail validation,
injecting (unsigned) BGP update messages without BGPsec_Path injecting (unsigned) BGP update messages without BGPsec_Path
attributes, injecting BGPsec update messages with BGPsec_Path attributes, injecting BGPsec update messages with BGPsec_Path
attributes that fail validation, or causing the peer to tear-down the attributes that fail validation, or causing the peer to tear-down the
BGP session. The use of BGPsec does nothing to increase the power of BGP session. The use of BGPsec does nothing to increase the power of
an on-path adversary -- in particular, even an on-path adversary an on-path adversary -- in particular, even an on-path adversary
skipping to change at page 35, line 5 skipping to change at page 36, line 23
IANA is also requested to register a new path attribute from IANA is also requested to register a new path attribute from
Section 3 in the BGP Path Attributes registry. The code for this new Section 3 in the BGP Path Attributes registry. The code for this new
attribute is "BGPsec_Path". The reference for the new capability is attribute is "BGPsec_Path". The reference for the new capability is
this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
protocol). protocol).
IANA is requested to define the "BGPsec Capability" registry in the IANA is requested to define the "BGPsec Capability" registry in the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The registry is as Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The registry is as
shown in Figure 10 with values assigned from Section 2.1: shown in Figure 10 with values assigned from Section 2.1:
+------+---------------+------------+ +------+------------------------------------+------------+
| Bits | Field | Reference | | Bits | Field | Reference |
+------+---------------+------------+ +------+------------------------------------+------------+
| 0-3 | Version | [This RFC] | | 0-3 | Version | [This RFC] |
| +---------------+------------+ | +------------------------------------+------------+
| | Value = 0x0 | [This RFC] | | | Value = 0x0 | [This RFC] |
+------+---------------+------------+ +------+------------------------------------+------------+
| 4 | Direction | [This RFC] | | 4 | Direction | [This RFC] |
+------+---------------+------------+ | +------------------------------------+------------+
| 5-7 | Unassigned | [This RFC] | | |(Both possible values 0 and 1 are | [This RFC] |
+------+---------------+------------+ | | fully specified by this RFC) | |
+------+------------------------------------+------------+
| 5-7 | Unassigned | [This RFC] |
| +------------------------------------+------------+
| | Value = 000 (in binary) | [This RFC] |
+------+------------------------------------+------------+
Figure 10: IANA registry for BGPsec Capability. Figure 10: IANA registry for BGPsec Capability.
Future Version values and future values of the Unassigned bits are The Direction bit (4th bit) has value either 0 or 1, and both values
assigned using the "Standards Action" registration procedures defined are fully specified by this document (i.e. the RFC that replaces
in RFC 5226 [RFC5226]. draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol). Future Version values and future
values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the "Standards
Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226 [RFC5226].
IANA is requested to define the "BGPsec_Path Flags" registry in the IANA is requested to define the "BGPsec_Path Flags" registry in the
RPKI group. The registry is as shown in Figure 11 with one value RPKI group. The registry is as shown in Figure 11 with one value
assigned from Section 3.1: assigned from Section 3.1:
+------+---------------------------+------------+ +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
| Flag | Description | Reference | | Flag | Description | Reference |
+------+---------------------------+------------+ +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
| 0 | Confed_Segment | [This RFC] | | 0 | Confed_Segment | [This RFC] |
+------+---------------------------+------------+ +------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
| 1-7 | Unassigned (set to zeros) | | | | Bit value = 1 means Flag set | [This RFC] |
+------+---------------------------+------------+ | | (indicates Confed_Segment) | |
| | Bit value = 0 is default | |
+------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
| 1-7 | Unassigned | [This RFC] |
| +-------------------------------------------+------------+
| | Value: All 7 bits set to zero | [This RFC] |
+------+-------------------------------------------+------------+
Figure 11: IANA registry for BGPsec_Path Flags field. Figure 11: IANA registry for BGPsec_Path Flags field.
Future values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the Future values of the Unassigned bits are assigned using the
"Standards Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226 "Standards Action" registration procedures defined in RFC 5226
[RFC5226]. [RFC5226].
10. Contributors 10. Contributors
10.1. Authors 10.1. Authors
skipping to change at page 36, line 40 skipping to change at page 38, line 24
kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov
Samuel Weiler Samuel Weiler
Parsons Parsons
weiler+ietf@watson.org weiler+ietf@watson.org
10.2. Acknowledgements 10.2. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Michael Baer, Oliver Borchert, David The authors would like to thank Michael Baer, Oliver Borchert, David
Mandelberg, Sean Turner, John Scudder, Wes George, Jeff Haas, Keyur Mandelberg, Sean Turner, John Scudder, Wes George, Jeff Haas, Keyur
Patel, Sandy Murphy, Chris Morrow, Russ Mundy, Wes Hardaker, Sharon Patel, Alvaro Retana, Nevil Brownlee, Matthias Waehlisch, Sandy
Murphy, Chris Morrow, Tim Polk, Russ Mundy, Wes Hardaker, Sharon
Goldberg, Ed Kern, Doug Maughan, Pradosh Mohapatra, Mark Reynolds, Goldberg, Ed Kern, Doug Maughan, Pradosh Mohapatra, Mark Reynolds,
Heather Schiller, Jason Schiller, Ruediger Volk and David Ward for Heather Schiller, Jason Schiller, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward for
their review, comments, and suggestions during the course of this their review, comments, and suggestions during the course of this
work. work.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages] [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages]
Bush, R., Patel, K., and D. Ward, "Extended Message Bush, R., Patel, K., and D. Ward, "Extended Message
support for BGP", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-13 support for BGP", draft-ietf-idr-bgp-extended-messages-14
(work in progress), June 2016. (work in progress), December 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Turner, S., "BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16 (work in Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-16 (work in
progress), November 2016. progress), November 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
skipping to change at page 38, line 29 skipping to change at page 40, line 9
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K. [RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages", Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015, RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration] [I-D.ietf-sidr-as-migration]
George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS George, W. and S. Murphy, "BGPSec Considerations for AS
Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-05 (work in Migration", draft-ietf-sidr-as-migration-06 (work in
progress), April 2016. progress), December 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops]
Bush, R., "BGPsec Operational Considerations", draft-ietf- Bush, R., "BGPsec Operational Considerations", draft-ietf-
sidr-bgpsec-ops-11 (work in progress), December 2016. sidr-bgpsec-ops-12 (work in progress), December 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover]
Gagliano, R., Weis, B., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router Gagliano, R., Weis, B., and K. Patel, "BGPsec Router
Certificate Rollover", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-06 Certificate Rollover", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-rollover-06
(work in progress), October 2016. (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf- Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf-
sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in progress), March sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in progress), March
2016. 2016.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-slurm]
Mandelberg, D. and D. Ma, "Simplified Local internet
nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI", draft-ietf-
sidr-slurm-02 (work in progress), August 2016.
[RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using [RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472, AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6472, December 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6472, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6472>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6472>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
 End of changes. 70 change blocks. 
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