draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-01.txt 
Individual Submission G. Huston Individual Submission G. Huston
Internet-Draft T. Manderson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track G. Michaelson Intended status: Standards Track APNIC
Expires: February 8, 2009 APNIC Expires: April 8, 2009 T. Manderson
August 7, 2008 October 5, 2008
A Profile for Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs) A Profile for Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs)
draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-00.txt draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-01.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2009. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 8, 2009.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Bogon Origin This document defines a standard profile for Bogon Origin
Attestations (BOAs). A BOA is a digitally signed object that Attestations (BOAs). A BOA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has not provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has not
authorized any Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes that are authorized any Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes that are
equivalent to any of the addresses listed in the BOA, and also equivalent to any of the addresses listed in the BOA. A BOA also
provides a means of verifying that BGP speaker is not using an AS as provides a means of verifying that BGP speaker is not using an AS
a BGP speaker without appropriate authority to use that AS. The without appropriate authority to use that AS. The proposed
proposed application of BOAs is intended to fit within the application of BOAs is intended to fit within the requirements for
requirements for adding security measures to inter-domain routing, adding security measures to inter-domain routing, including the
including the ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment of such
of such measures, and does not require any changes to the measures, and does not require any changes to the specification of
specification of BGP. the Border Gateway Protocol.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Basic Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Basic Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Signed-Data Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Signed-Data Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. digestAlgorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.2. digestAlgorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.3. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.3. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.4. certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.4. certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.5. crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.5. crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6. signerInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.6. signerInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. BOA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. BOA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. BOA Use Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. BOA Use Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. BOA Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. BOA Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the attestations of Internet Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the attestations of Internet
Registries that certain addresses are currently neither allocated nor Registries that certain addresses are currently neither allocated nor
assigned to any party, and any appearance of such addresses or ASes assigned to any party, and any appearance of such addresses or AS's
in a routing advertisement in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) in a routing advertisement in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[RFC4271] should be considered an invalid use of such addresses or [RFC4271] should be considered an invalid use of such addresses or
ASes. AS's.
The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates
are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],
and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].
A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a
list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the
Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the
Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource
Certificate. The RPKI is structured such that each current Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured such that each current Resource
Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment. Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.
This is described in [ID.ietf-sidr-arch]. This is described in [ID.ietf-sidr-arch].
BOAs can be regarded as a logical opposite of a Route Origin BOAs can be regarded as a logical opposite of a Route Origin
Authorization (ROA) [ID.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and allows a resource Authorization (ROA) [ID.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and allows a resource
holder to explicitly list those IP addresses and ASes that are holder to explicitly list those IP addresses and AS's that are
denoted by the holder as not validly appearing in any routing denoted by the holder as not validly appearing in any routing
advertisement, and to make this attestation in a manner that a advertisement, and to make this attestation in a manner that a
relying party can validate under the framework of the RPKI. relying party can validate under the framework of the RPKI.
A BOA is a digitally signed object that makes use of Cryptographic A BOA is a digitally signed object that makes use of Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] as a standard encapsulation format. Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] as a standard encapsulation format.
CMS was chosen to take advantage of existing open source software CMS was chosen to take advantage of existing open source software
available for processing messages in this format. available for processing messages in this format.
2. Basic Format 2. Basic Format
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SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo
2.1.1. version 2.1.1. version
The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3, The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3,
corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3. corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3.
2.1.2. digestAlgorithms 2.1.2. digestAlgorithms
The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID for which The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID for which
is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. [RFC4055] It MUST NOT contain any other is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. [RFC4055]. It MUST NOT contain any other
algorithms. algorithms.
2.1.3. encapContentInfo 2.1.3. encapContentInfo
encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
identifier and the content itself. identifier and the content itself.
EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
eContentType ContentType, eContentType ContentType,
eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
2.1.3.1. eContentType 2.1.3.1. eContentType
The ContentType for a BOA is defined as id-ct-rpkiBOA, and has the The ContentType for a BOA is defined as id-ct-rpkiBOA, and has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]. [This value has to numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]. [This value needs
be assigned via an OID registration.] to be assigned via an OID registration.]
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 } rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
id-ct OBJECT INDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 } id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
id-ct-rpkiBOA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct [TBD] } id-ct-rpkiBOA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct [TBD] }
2.1.3.2. eContent 2.1.3.2. eContent
The content of a BOA identifies a list of one or more ASes and a list The content of a BOA identifies a list of one or more AS's and one or
of one or more IP address prefixes that are asserted to be "bogons" more IP address prefixes that are asserted to be "bogons" and,
and, accordingly, BOAs are intended to act as a constraint on the accordingly, BOAs are intended to act as a constraint on the routing
routing system to signal that no route object that that relates to system to signal that no route object that that relates to these AS's
these ASes or IP addresses should be interpreted as representing a or IP addresses should be interpreted as representing a valid routing
valid routing attestation. A BOA is formally defined as: attestation. A BOA is formally defined as:
id-ct-rpkiBOA ::= { id-ct-rpkiBOA ::= {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asIDs SEQUENCE OF asIdsOrRange, asIDs SEQUENCE OF asIdsOrRange,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE OF BOAIPAddressFamily } ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE OF BOAIPAddressFamily }
ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE { ASIdOrRange ::= CHOICE {
id ASId, id ASId,
range ASRange } range ASRange }
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IPAddress ::= BIT STRING IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
2.1.3.2.1. version 2.1.3.2.1. version
The version number of the BogonOriginAttestation MUST be 0. The version number of the BogonOriginAttestation MUST be 0.
2.1.3.2.2. asIDs 2.1.3.2.2. asIDs
The asIDs field contains the AS numbers that are to be regarded as The asIDs field contains the AS numbers that are to be regarded as
Bogon ASes. The set of AS numbers may be explicitly listed, or Bogon AS's. The set of AS numbers may be explicitly listed, or
specified as a continuous range of values. The field is to be specified as a continuous range of values. The field is to be
formatted as per the canonical format specified in [RFC3779]. formatted as per the canonical format specified in [RFC3779].
2.1.3.2.3. BOAIPAddressFamily 2.1.3.2.3. BOAIPAddressFamily
The BOAIPAddressFamily field encodes the set of IP address prefixes The BOAIPAddressFamily field encodes the set of IP address prefixes
that are to be regarded as Bogon IP addresses that are to be that are to be regarded as Bogon IP addresses that are to be
constrained from appearing in any routing advertisement. The constrained from appearing in any routing advertisement. The
intended semantics of an address prefix in a BOA is that any route intended semantics of an address prefix in a BOA is that any route
object that has the same address prefix as that listed as a Bogon IP object that has the same address prefix as that listed as a Bogon IP
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at which the digital signature was applied to the content. at which the digital signature was applied to the content.
2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTime Attribute 2.1.6.4.4. BinarySigningTime Attribute
The BinarySigningTime Attribute MAY be present. If it is present it The BinarySigningTime Attribute MAY be present. If it is present it
MUST be ignored by the relying party. The presence of absence of the MUST be ignored by the relying party. The presence of absence of the
BinarySigningTime attribute in no way affects the validation of the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way affects the validation of the
ROA (as specified in Section 3). The attrType OID for the ROA (as specified in Section 3). The attrType OID for the
BinarySigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46. BinarySigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.
The VinarySigningTime attribute is defined as: The BinarySigningTime attribute is defined as:
id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 46 } smime(16) aa(2) 46 }
BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime
BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based on the local system The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based on the local system
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3. BOA Validation 3. BOA Validation
Before a relying party can use a BOA as a constrictor of a routing Before a relying party can use a BOA as a constrictor of a routing
announcement, the relying party must use the RPKI to validate the announcement, the relying party must use the RPKI to validate the
BOA. To do this the relying party performs the following steps: BOA. To do this the relying party performs the following steps:
1. Verify that the BOA syntax complies with this specification. In 1. Verify that the BOA syntax complies with this specification. In
particular, verify the following: particular, verify the following:
1.a The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID a. The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)
1.b The eContentType of the CMS object is id-ct-rpkiBOA (OID b. The eContentType of the CMS object is id-ct-rpkiBOA (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]) 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD])
1.c The version of the SignedData object is 3.
1.d The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID c. The version of the SignedData object is 3.
d. The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1). 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).
1.e The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
e. The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier
(SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object. (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object.
1.f The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.
1.g The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is rid-ct- f. The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.
g. The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is rid-ct-
rpkiBOA (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]) rpkiBOA (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD])
1.h The version of the BOA is 0. h. The version of the BOA is 0.
1.i The addressFamily in the BOAIPAddressFamily is either IPv4 i. The addressFamily in the BOAIPAddressFamily is either IPv4 or
or IPv6 (0001 and 0002, respectively). IPv6 (0001 and 0002, respectively).
1.j The version of the SignerInfo is 3. j. The version of the SignerInfo is 3.
1.k The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID k. The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID
2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1). 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).
1.l The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID l. The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.1.1). 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1).
1.m The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present m. The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
and contains both the ContentType attribute (OID contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). . 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). .
1.n The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted. n. The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.
2. Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature 2. Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature
on the BOA. on the BOA.
3. Verify that the EE certificate has an IP Address Delegation 3. Verify that the EE certificate has an IP Address Delegation
extension [RFC3779] and that the IP address prefixes in that extension [RFC3779] and that the IP address prefixes in that
extension exactly match the IP address prefixes in the BOA, and extension exactly match the IP address prefixes in the BOA, and
the AS numbers in that extension exactly match the AS numbers in the AS numbers in that extension exactly match the AS numbers in
the BOA. the BOA.
4. Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate 4. Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate
in the resource PKI by constructing a valid certificate path to a in the resource PKI by constructing a valid certificate path to a
trust anchor. (See [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] for more details.) trust anchor. (See [ID.ietf-sidr-res-certs] for more details.)
Note that requiring an exact match between the IP address prefixes Note that requiring an exact match between the IP address prefixes
and ASes in a BOA and the IP address prefixes and ASes in the and AS's in a BOA and the IP address prefixes and AS's in the
corresponding EE certificate does not place any limitations on BOA corresponding EE certificate does not place any limitations on BOA
use. Since each EE certificate in the RPKI architecture is used to use. Since each EE certificate in the RPKI architecture is used to
verify only a single BOA, it is natural to have the IP address verify only a single BOA, it is natural to have the IP address
prefixes in the certificate match those in the corresponding BOA. prefixes in the certificate match those in the corresponding BOA.
4. BOA Use Practices 4. BOA Use Practices
BOAs are intended to allow relying parties a means of validating BOAs are intended to allow relying parties a means of validating
whether route origination information as described in a route whether route origination information as described in a route
advertisement refers to an IP address or AS number that has not been advertisement refers to an IP address or AS number that has not been
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have the current BOA in the local cache. have the current BOA in the local cache.
5. BOA Interpretation 5. BOA Interpretation
A BOA can be used to check a route object to determine if the A BOA can be used to check a route object to determine if the
origination information in the route object refers to invalid IP origination information in the route object refers to invalid IP
addresses or an invalid AS number. addresses or an invalid AS number.
If a route object has an AS origination that refers to an AS number If a route object has an AS origination that refers to an AS number
that is included in a valid BOA then the route object can be regarded that is included in a valid BOA then the route object can be regarded
as a Bogon object, and local policies that apply to Bogon ASes can be as a Bogon object, and local policies that apply to Bogon AS's can be
applied to the object. This holds whether or not the address prefix applied to the object. This holds whether or not the address prefix
of the route object is described by a valid ROA or not. of the route object is described by a valid ROA or not.
If a route object has an address prefix that is equal to, or is a If a route object has an address prefix that is equal to, or is a
more specific prefix of an IP address that is included in a valid BOA more specific prefix of an IP address that is included in a valid BOA
then the route object can be regarded as a Bogon object, and local then the route object can be regarded as a Bogon object, and local
policies that apply to Bogon ASes can be applied to the object, policies that apply to Bogon AS's can be applied to the object,
unless the address prefix and AS origination of the route object is unless the address prefix and AS origination of the route object is
also described by a valid ROA, in which case the BOA is to be also described by a valid ROA, in which case the BOA is to be
disregarded. In other words a valid ROA SHOULD infer a higher trust disregarded. In other words a valid ROA SHOULD infer a higher trust
preference than a ROA if a valid ROA and BOA exist for the same preference than a ROA if a valid ROA and BOA exist for the same
address prefix and AS number. address prefix and AS number.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a BOA; it There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a BOA; it
is anticipated that BOAs will be stored in repositories that are is anticipated that BOAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a BOA, since the RPKI used no explicit authentication associated with a BOA, since the RPKI used
for BOA validation provides authorization but not authentication. for BOA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the BOA is a signed, application layer object, there is no Although the BOA is a signed, application layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a BOA. intent to convey non-repudiation via a BOA.
The purpose of a BOA is to convey an attestation by an address holder The purpose of a BOA is to convey an attestation by an address holder
that there is no authority for the generation of a route object that that there is no authority for the generation of a route object that
refers to specified addresses or origination from specified ASes. refers to specified addresses or origination from specified AS's.
The integrity of a BOA must be established in order to validate the The integrity of a BOA must be established in order to validate the
authority of the Bogon Attestation. The BOA makes use of the CMS authority of the Bogon Attestation. The BOA makes use of the CMS
signed message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security signed message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security
considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the
BOA signer to authorize the attestation of specified IP addresses and BOA signer to authorize the attestation of specified IP addresses and
ASes as Bogons is established through use of the address space and AS AS's as Bogons is established through use of the address space and AS
number PKI described in [ID.ietf-sidr-arch]. Specifically, a relying number PKI described in [ID.ietf-sidr-arch]. Specifically, a relying
party must verify the signature on the BOA using an X.509 certificate party must verify the signature on the BOA using an X.509 certificate
issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the BOA match issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the BOA match
those in the address space extension in the certificate. those in the address space extension in the certificate.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
[None] [None]
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
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(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Terry Manderson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: terry@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Terry Manderson
Email: terry@terrym.net
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
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attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
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