draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-03.txt 
Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) G. Huston Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) T. Manderson
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track APNIC Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: May 2, 2009 T. Manderson Expires: November 26, 2009
October 29, 2008
A Profile for Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs) A Profile for Bogon Origin Attestations (BOAs)
draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-02.txt draft-ietf-sidr-bogons-03.txt
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Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Bogon Origin This document defines a standard profile for Bogon Origin
Attestations (BOAs). A BOA is a digitally signed object that Attestations (BOAs). A BOA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has not provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has not
authorized any Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes that are authorised any Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes that are
equivalent to any of the addresses listed in the BOA. A BOA also equivalent to any of the addresses listed in the BOA. A BOA also
provides a means of verifying that BGP speaker is not using an AS provides a means of verifying that a BGP speaker is not using an AS
without appropriate authority to use that AS. The proposed without appropriate authority. The proposed application of BOAs is
application of BOAs is intended to fit within the requirements for intended to fit within the requirements for adding security measures
adding security measures to inter-domain routing, including the to inter-domain routing, including the ability to support incremental
ability to support incremental and piecemeal deployment of such and piecemeal deployment of such measures, and does not require any
measures, and does not require any changes to the specification of changes to the specification of the Border Gateway Protocol.
the Border Gateway Protocol.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Basic Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Basic Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Signed-Data Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Signed-Data Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. digestAlgorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.2. digestAlgorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.3. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.3. encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.4. certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.4. certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.5. crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.5. crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.6. signerInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.6. signerInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. BOA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. BOA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. BOA Use Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. BOA Use Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. BOA Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. BOA Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key This document defines an application of the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the attestations of Internet Infrastructure (RPKI) to validate the attestations of resource
Registries that certain addresses are currently neither allocated nor holders and Internet Registries that certain addresses are currently
assigned to any party, and any appearance of such addresses or AS's neither allocated to any party, nor in use by any party, and any
in a routing advertisement in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) appearance of such addresses or AS's in a routing advertisement in
[RFC4271] should be considered an invalid use of such addresses or the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] should be considered an
AS's. invalid use of such addresses or Autonomous System Numbers.
The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates The RPKI is based on Resource Certificates. Resource Certificates
are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280],
and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779].
A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a
list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the list of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the
Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the Subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the
Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource Subject's private key with the public key contained in the Resource
Certificate. The RPKI is structured such that each current Resource Certificate. The RPKI is structured such that each current Resource
Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment. Certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.
This is described in [ID.sidr-arch]. This is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
BOAs can be regarded as a logical opposite of a Route Origin BOAs can be regarded as a logical opposite of a Route Origin
Authorization (ROA) [ID.sidr-roa-format], and allows a resource Authorization (ROA) [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], however are not
holder to explicitly list those IP addresses and AS's that are contradictory to a ROA and allows a resource holder to explicitly
denoted by the holder as not validly appearing in any routing list those IP addresses and AS's that are denoted by the holder as
advertisement, and to make this attestation in a manner that a not validly appearing in any routing advertisement, and to make this
relying party can validate under the framework of the RPKI. attestation in a manner that a relying party can unambiguously
validate under the framework of the RPKI.
A BOA is a digitally signed object that makes use of Cryptographic A BOA is a digitally signed object that makes use of Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] as a standard encapsulation format. Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] as a standard encapsulation format.
CMS was chosen to take advantage of existing open source software CMS was chosen to take advantage of existing open source software
available for processing messages in this format. available for processing messages in this format.
2. Basic Format 2. Basic Format
Using CMS syntax, a BOA is a type of signed-data object. The general Using CMS syntax, a BOA is a type of signed-data object. The general
format of a CMS object is: format of a CMS object is:
skipping to change at page 10, line 46 skipping to change at page 10, line 46
1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). . 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). .
n. The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted. n. The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.
2. Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature 2. Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature
on the BOA. on the BOA.
3. Verify that the EE certificate has an IP Address Delegation 3. Verify that the EE certificate has an IP Address Delegation
extension [RFC3779] and that the IP address prefixes in that extension [RFC3779] and that the IP address prefixes in that
extension exactly match the IP address prefixes in the BOA, and extension cover the IP address prefixes in the BOA, and the AS
the AS numbers in that extension exactly match the AS numbers in numbers in that extension cover the AS numbers in the BOA.
the BOA.
4. Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate 4. Verify that no valid ROA exists which also covers any more or
less specific prefixes, or any AS numbers. In the case that a
ROA does exist which overlaps the BOA in any way, the BOA MUST be
considered invalid.
5. Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate
in the resource PKI by constructing a valid certificate path to a in the resource PKI by constructing a valid certificate path to a
trust anchor. (See [ID.sidr-res-certs] for more details.) trust anchor. (See [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] for more details.)
Note that requiring an exact match between the IP address prefixes
and AS's in a BOA and the IP address prefixes and AS's in the
corresponding EE certificate does not place any limitations on BOA
use. Since each EE certificate in the RPKI architecture is used to
verify only a single BOA, it is natural to have the IP address
prefixes in the certificate match those in the corresponding BOA.
4. BOA Use Practices 4. BOA Use Practices
BOAs are intended to allow relying parties a means of validating BOAs are intended to allow relying parties a means of validating
whether route origination information as described in a route whether route origination information as described in a route
advertisement refers to an IP address or AS number that has not been advertisement refers to an IP address or AS number that has not been
validly allocated for use in the routing system. validly allocated for use in the routing system.
Any party with a validly assigned Internet resource set and a CA Any party with a validly assigned Internet resource set and a CA
certificate that describes this delegation can publish a BOA, certificate that describes this allocation can publish a BOA,
independently of the actions of the actions of the party that independently of the actions of the actions of the party that
assigned the resource set. assigned the resource set.
BOAs are not hierarchically related.
An Internet Registry SHOULD maintain a single BOA in relation to each An Internet Registry SHOULD maintain a single BOA in relation to each
parent registry that has assigned resources to this registry. parent registry that has assigned resources to this registry.
BOAs are not hierarchically related however they are subordinate to
the CA certificate that describes the immediate allocations assigned.
An Internet Registry SHOULD maintain a regular issuance cycle for An Internet Registry SHOULD maintain a regular issuance cycle for
BOAs. BOAs.
For registries that operate on a day-to-day basis in terms of For registries that operate on a day-to-day basis in terms of
resource transactions, it is suggested that a local BOA management resource transactions, it is suggested that a local BOA management
practice would be that a new BOA should be issued on a regular 24 practice would be that a new BOA should be issued on a regular 24
hour basis. The corresponding EE certificate should have a validity hour basis. The corresponding EE certificate should have a validity
period of no more than 72 hours from the time of issuance. Each time period of no more than 72 hours from the time of issuance. Each time
a new EE certificate for a BOA is issued the previous BOA's EE a new EE certificate for a BOA is issued the previous BOA's EE
certificate should be revoked and the previous BOA removed from the certificate should be revoked and the previous BOA removed from the
publication repository. publication repository.
Parties that operate a local cache of RPKI objects should ensure that Parties that operate a local cache of RPKI objects should ensure that
they refresh BOA objects at intervals 24 hours to ensure that they they refresh BOA objects at intervals 24 hours to ensure that they
have the current BOA in the local cache. have the current BOA in the local cache.
5. BOA Interpretation 5. BOA Interpretation
A BOA can be used to check an inter-domain routing advertisement A BOA can be used to check an inter-domain routing advertisement
("route object") to determine if the origination information in the ("route") to determine if the origination information in the route
route object refers to invalid IP addresses or an invalid AS number. object refers to invalid IP addresses or an invalid AS number.
If a route object has an AS origination that refers to an AS number If a route has an AS origination that refers to an AS number that is
that is listed in a valid BOA, then the route object can be regarded listed in a valid BOA, then the route can be regarded as a Bogon, and
as a Bogon object, and local policies that apply to Bogon AS's can be local policies that apply to Bogon AS's can be applied to the route.
applied to the object. This holds whether or not the address prefix However if the AS number of this route is described in a valid ROA
of the route object is described by a valid ROA or not. whose EE certificate lists the AS number, the BOA MUST be considered
invalid
If a route object has an address prefix that is equal to, or is a If a route has an address prefix that is equal to, or is a more
more specific prefix of an IP address that is included in a valid BOA specific prefix of an IP address that is included in a valid BOA then
then the route object can be regarded as a Bogon object, and local the route can be regarded as a Bogon, and local policies that apply
policies that apply to Bogon AS's can be applied to the object, to Bogon prefixes can be applied to the route. However if the
unless the address prefix and AS origination of the route object is address prefix of the route is described (either more or less
also described by a valid ROA, in which case the BOA is to be specific) by a valid ROA, the BOA MUST be considered invalid.
disregarded. In other words, a valid ROA SHOULD infer a higher local
trust preference than a BOA if a valid ROA and a valid BOA both exist
that refer to the same address prefix.
BOA interpretation in the context of validation of origination of BOA interpretation in the context of validation of origination of
route objects is described in [ID.sidr-roa-validation]. route objects is described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation].
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a BOA; it There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a BOA; it
is anticipated that BOAs will be stored in repositories that are is anticipated that BOAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a BOA, since the RPKI used no explicit authentication associated with a BOA, since the RPKI used
for BOA validation provides authorization but not authentication. for BOA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the BOA is a signed, application layer object, there is no Although the BOA is a signed, application layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a BOA. intent to convey non-repudiation via a BOA.
The purpose of a BOA is to convey an attestation by an address holder The purpose of a BOA is to convey an attestation by an address holder
that there is no authority for the generation of a route object that that there is no authority for the generation of a route that refers
refers to specified addresses or origination from specified AS's. to specified addresses or origination from specified AS's. The
The integrity of a BOA must be established in order to validate the integrity of a BOA must be established in order to validate the
authority of the Bogon Attestation. The BOA makes use of the CMS authority of the Bogon Attestation. The BOA makes use of the CMS
signed message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security signed message format for integrity, and thus inherits the security
considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the considerations associated with that data structure. The right of the
BOA signer to authorize the attestation of specified IP addresses and BOA signer to authorize the attestation of specified IP addresses and
AS's as Bogons is established through use of the address space and AS AS's as Bogons is established through use of the address space and AS
number PKI described in [ID.sidr-arch]. Specifically, a relying number PKI described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. Specifically, a
party must verify the signature on the BOA using an X.509 certificate relying party must verify the signature on the BOA using an X.509
issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the BOA match certificate issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in
those in the address space extension in the certificate. the BOA match, or are covered by those in the address space extension
in the certificate.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
[None] It would be anticipated that the IANA maintain a BOA for all
unallocated space or reserved space (IPv4, IPv6 and ASNs) not
intended for public use.
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
The authors are indebted to the authors of Route Origin Authorization The authors are indebted to the authors of Route Origin Authorization
(ROA) [ID.sidr-roa-format], M. Lepinski, S. Kent and D. Kong, as much (ROA) [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], M. Lepinski, S. Kent and D. Kong,
of the text used to define a BOA has been borrowed from the ROA as much of the text used to define a BOA has been borrowed from the
format specification, and Russ Housley for clarification on the CMS ROA format specification, and Russ Housley for clarification on the
profile. CMS profile.
Further the authors wish to thank many security people, too many to
name, for clarifying that negative attestations are a valid and
useful security construct.
Lastly, without the orginal thoughts and words from George Michaelson
and Geoff Huston this document would not exist. Their hands helped
form the concepts of why we need BOAs in the RPKI and historically
were two of the original three authors of this document.
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[ID.sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-06 (work in
progress), February 2008. progress), March 2009.
[ID.sidr-res-certs] [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Internet X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
Draft draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs, August 2008. draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-16 (work in progress),
February 2009.
[ID.sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "An Infrastructure to Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Support Secure Internet Routing", Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format (work in progress), July 2008. draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-04 (work in progress),
November 2008.
[ID.sidr-roa-validation] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-validation]
Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI", Origination in BGP using the Resource Certificate PKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-01 (work in progress),
October 2008. October 2008.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", [RFC3852] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
RFC 3852, July 2004. RFC 3852, July 2004.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
skipping to change at page 14, line 16 skipping to change at page 14, line 19
June 2005. June 2005.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Authors' Addresses Author's Address
Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Terry Manderson Terry Manderson
Email: terry@terrym.net Email: terry@terrym.net
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