draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-01.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Informational February 6, 2014 Intended status: Informational June 29, 2014
Expires: August 10, 2014 Expires: December 31, 2014
RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases
draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-00 draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-01
Abstract Abstract
There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized
routing domain needs to augment or modify its view of the Global routing domain needs to augment or modify its view of the Global
RPKI. This document attempts to outline a few of them. RPKI. This document attempts to outline a few of them.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI),
[RFC6480]. In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation, [RFC6480]. In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation,
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], will be even more reliant on the [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], will be even more reliant on the
Global RPKI. Global RPKI.
But there are critical circumstances in which a local, well-scoped, But there are critical circumstances in which a local, well-scoped,
administrative and/or routing domain will need to augment and/or administrative and/or routing domain will need to augment and/or
modify their internal view of the Global RPKI. modify their internal view of the Global RPKI.
This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is
not intended to be autoritative, complete, or to become a standard. not intended to be authoritative, complete, or to become a standard.
It merely tries to lay out a few critical examples to help scope the It merely tries to lay out a few critical examples to help scope the
issues. issues.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480], It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480],
the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route Origin the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], and Ghostbusters Records, see Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], and GhostBusters Records, see
[RFC6493]. [RFC6493].
3. What is 'Local' 3. What is 'Local'
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481]. manifests, ROAs, and GhostBusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere. maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
Like the DNS, the Global RPKI presents a single global view, although Like the DNS, the Global RPKI presents a single global view, although
only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing, updating, only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing, updating,
fetching, etc. There is no 'fix' for this, it is not broken, it is fetching, etc. There is no 'fix' for this, it is not broken, it is
the nature of distributed data with distributed caches. the nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/ There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/
or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content
provider, a geo-political region, ... may wish to have a specialized provider, an organization, a geo-political region, ... may wish to
view of the RPKI. have a specialized view of the RPKI.
For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view
as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also
because implementation would likely be the local distribution of one because implementation would likely be the local distribution of one
or more specialized trust andchors, [RFC6481]. or more specialized trust anchors, [RFC6481].
4. Example Uses 4. Example Uses
Carol, a RIPE member, is a victim of the "Dutch Court Attack" Carol, a RIPE resource holder (LIR, PI holder, ...), statistically
(someone convinces a Dutch court to force the RIPE/NCC to remove or likely not to actually be in the Netherlands, is a victim of the
modify records) and we all want to save the ability to route to "Dutch Court Attack," i.e. someone convinces a Dutch court to force
Carol's network(s). There is need for some channel through which we the RIPE/NCC to remove or modify some or all of Carol's certificates,
can exchange some local trust command and data gorp necessary to ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent, and the operational
propagate patches local to all our caches. community wants to retain the ability to route to Carol's network(s).
There is need for some channel through which operators can exchange
local trust, command, and data collections necessary to propagate
patches local to all their caches.
Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those
ASs use private ([RFC1918]) or 'borrowed' US military space, and he ASs use private ([RFC1918]) or 'borrowed' address space which is
wishes to certify them for use in his internal routing. otherwise unrouted in the global Internet (US military space is
popular), and he wishes to certify them for use in his internal
routing.
Alice runs the root trust for a large organization where upper Alice runs the root trust for a large organization, commercial or
management has the router geeks pointing their competitors' prefixes geo-political, where upper management requests routing engineering to
to pictures of kittens and unicorns, and Alice is responsible for redirect their competitors' prefixes to socially acceptable data, and
making the CA hierarchy have validated certificates for those Alice is responsible for making the CA hierarchy have validated
redirected resources as well as the rest of the internet. certificates for those redirected resources as well as the rest of
the Internet.
5. Notes 5. Notes
In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates, In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates,
which one wants to modify. But one can't just hack new ROAs as one which one wants to modify. But one can't just hack new ROAs as one
does not have the private keys needed to sign them. Hence one has to does not have the private keys needed to sign them. Hence one has to
first hack the 3779 certificates. first hack the 3779 certificates.
But we should not lose sight of the goal that it is the ROAs and But we should not lose sight of the goal that it is the ROAs and
Ghostbuster Records which need re-issuing under the new 3779 GhostBuster Records which need re-issuing under the new 3779
certificates. certificates.
Further, since we're not the NSA, GCHQ, ..., we can not assume that Further, since we're not the NSA, GCHQ, ..., we can not assume that
we can reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or from we can reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or from
the RIRs' certificates. So we have to create a new trust anchor the RIRs' certificates. So we have to create a new trust anchor
which, for ease of use, will contain the new/hacked certificates and which, for ease of use, will contain the new/hacked certificates and
ROAs as well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI. ROAs as well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI.
And, because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive, And, because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive,
reproduce, and send to friends the data necessary to recreate their reproduce, and send to friends the data necessary to recreate their
hacks, there will need to be a formally defind set of data which is hacks, there will need to be a formally defined set of data which is
input to a well-defind process to take an existing Global RPKI tree input to a well-defind process to take an existing Global RPKI tree
and produce the desired modified re-anchored tree. and produce the desired modified re-anchored tree.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
These use cases are all about violating global security, albeit These use cases are all about violating global security, albeit
within a constrained local context. within a constrained local context.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein. The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Kent, and Karen Seo.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
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