draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-04.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ Internet-Draft IIJ
Intended status: BCP January 21, 2011 Intended status: BCP January 29, 2011
Expires: July 25, 2011 Expires: August 2, 2011
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-03 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-04
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin
validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they
might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and peer with might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and peer with
of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those
upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches. upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate
origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still
may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams. may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any
sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g.
customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the
super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no
ROAs to be Invalid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP MAY
wish to have private RPKI for that space with its own trust anchor.
Operators issuing ROAs may have 'lazy' customers who announce into
global eBGP but who do not wish to go though the work to manage their
own certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI
data for the lazy customer just as they provision many other things
for them.
4. Within a Network 4. Within a Network
Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In
deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy,
preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy
validation capable border routers. validation capable border routers.
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Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh
Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason
John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Schiller, John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
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