draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-04.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-05.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ Internet-Draft IIJ
Intended status: BCP January 29, 2011 Intended status: BCP February 1, 2011
Expires: August 2, 2011 Expires: August 5, 2011
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-04 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-05
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and
present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin
validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How
the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern
from many aspects. from many aspects.
The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and
some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is
expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is
thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the
next year to five years. next year to five years.
Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is
designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by
small stub/entetprise/edge routers. small stub/enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large
backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that normal Internet local routing policies, there is little risk that normal Internet
routing is threatened by unprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see routing is threatened by imprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see
Section 5. Section 5.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format],
the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], and RPKI- the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], and RPKI-
based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
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The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI
object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the
global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation
tool such as rcynic. tool such as rcynic.
Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. An operator should take maximum advantage of this validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI database. this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators will likely want border routers to have one or more data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
nearby caches. these data and services. A router can peer with one or more nearby
caches.
For redundancy, a router may peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is
recommended. recommended.
If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they can also
might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and peer with trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and peer with those
of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams to
upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches. maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate
origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still
may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any
sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g. sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g.
customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the
super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no
ROAs to be Invalid. ROAs to be Invalid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP MAY An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
wish to have private RPKI for that space with its own trust anchor. operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment.
Operators issuing ROAs may have 'lazy' customers who announce into "Operators issuing ROAs may have customers announce into global eBGP
global eBGP but who do not wish to go though the work to manage their but do not wish to go though the work to manage their own
own certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI data
data for the lazy customer just as they provision many other things for these customers just as they provision many other things for
for them. them.
4. Within a Network 4. Within a Network
Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In
deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy,
preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy
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Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received
announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or
Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in
routing is specified by the operator's local policy. routing is specified by the operator's local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in flux, applying local policy uncertainty associated with a system in flux, applying local policy
to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill- to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill-
advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification data. advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification data.
E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data,
routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, will routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, may
likely be prevalent for a long time. be common.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state will be advisable for a long time. As the transition validity state will be advisable for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy should not be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be
overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower
preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and giving preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping
very low preference to, but still using, Invalid announcements. or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others
might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which
comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling can not upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling can not upgrade an
invalid announcement to valid or better. invalid announcement to valid or better.
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There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets].
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to
malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent
mis-advertisement. mis-advertisement.
Origin validation does nothing about AS-Path validation and therefore Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation.
is open to monkey in the middle path attacks. Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or
accidental.
The data plane may not follow the control plane. The data plane may not follow the control plane.
Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
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