draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-05.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-06.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft IIJ Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP February 1, 2011 Intended status: BCP March 10, 2011
Expires: August 5, 2011 Expires: September 11, 2011
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-05 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-06
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 23 skipping to change at page 2, line 23
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How
the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern
from many aspects. from many aspects.
The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA and some
expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that origin
thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally over the
next year to five years. next year to five years.
Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is
designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by
small stub/enterprise/edge routers. small stub/enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone
backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that normal Internet local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
routing is threatened by imprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
Section 5. of the global RPKI, see Section 5.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format],
the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], and RPKI- the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], RPKI-based
based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], and Ghostbuster
Records, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI
object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the
global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation
skipping to change at page 4, line 16 skipping to change at page 4, line 16
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database. database.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. A router can peer with one or more nearby these data and services. A router can peer with one or more nearby
caches. caches.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they can also If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD
trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and peer with those also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams to those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams
maintain fresh and reliable caches. to maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any
sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g. sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA
super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations
ROAs to be Invalid. with no ROAs to be Invalid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment. environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
"Operators issuing ROAs may have customers announce into global eBGP Operators issuing ROAs may have customers announce their own prefixes
but do not wish to go though the work to manage their own and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though the work to
certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI data manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD
for these customers just as they provision many other things for provision the RPKI data for these customers just as they provision
them. many other things for them.
4. Within a Network 4. Within a Network
Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In
deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy,
preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy
skipping to change at page 5, line 17 skipping to change at page 5, line 17
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would
be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical
received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. received announcements should be considered in partial deployment.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received
announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or
Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in
routing is specified by the operator's local policy. routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in flux, applying local policy uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill- local policy to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due
advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification data. to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification
E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI
routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, may data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference,
be common. MAY occur.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state will be advisable for a long time. As the transition validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be
overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower
preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping
or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements. or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others
might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which
comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling can not upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an
invalid announcement to valid or better. invalid announcement to valid or better.
Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with
NotFound or Invalid origins. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less Announcements with Invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less
preferred than those with Valid or NotFound. preferred than those with Valid or NotFound.
6. Notes 6. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets].
Operators which manage certificates SHOULD have RPKI Ghostbuster
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]), signed indirectly by End
Entity certificates, for those certificates on which others' routing
depends for certificate and/or ROA validation.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to
malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent
mis-advertisement. mis-advertisement.
Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation. Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation.
Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or
accidental. accidental.
skipping to change at page 7, line 4 skipping to change at page 7, line 6
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh
Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason
Schiller, John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Schiller, John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-12 (work in
progress), September 2010. progress), February 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-07 (work in progress),
November 2010. February 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-09 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-10 (work in progress),
November 2010. February 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-07 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-10 (work in progress),
January 2011. March 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-01 (work in progress),
July 2010. February 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-00 (work in progress),
December 2010.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Kent, S. and M. Reynolds, "Local Trust Anchor Management
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-00 (work in progress),
November 2010.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]
Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.",
draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress),
September 2010. September 2010.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
 End of changes. 28 change blocks. 
61 lines changed or deleted 79 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/