draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-08.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-09.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP May 10, 2011 Intended status: BCP May 23, 2011
Expires: November 11, 2011 Expires: November 24, 2011
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-08 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-09
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
and the dynamics are better understood. and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the
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from many aspects. from many aspects.
The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA and some root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA and some
RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that origin RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that origin
validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally over the validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally over the
next year to five years. next year to five years.
Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is
designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by originated by large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by
small stub/enterprise/edge routers. small stub/enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone
from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
of the global RPKI, see Section 5. of the global RPKI, see Section 5.
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For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they SHOULD
also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with also trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams
to maintain fresh and reliable caches. to maintain fresh and reliable caches.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, downstreams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any
sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA
for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations
with no ROAs to be Invalid. with no ROAs to be Invalid.
Use of RPKI-based origin validation obviates the utility of Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
announcing many longer prefix when the covering prefix would do. more specifics to protect against mis-origination of a less specific
prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix should protect it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of
excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary. excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues
10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed
against 10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more
likely to be noticed.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
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Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In
deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy,
preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy
validation capable border routers. validation capable border routers.
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/down-streams would
be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical
received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. received announcements should be considered in partial deployment.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received
announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or
Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in
routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's local policy. routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's local policy.
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Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh
Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason
Schiller, John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Schiller, John Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and
Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
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