draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-11.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-12.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP October 9, 2011 Intended status: BCP October 31, 2011
Expires: April 11, 2012 Expires: May 3, 2012
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-11 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-12
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
and the dynamics are better understood. and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 11, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How
the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern
from many aspects. from many aspects.
The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA
and the RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that and the RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that
origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally
over the next year to five years. over the next year to five years.
Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
small stub/enterprise/edge routers. large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border
routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/ routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
edge networks. edge networks.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
of the global RPKI, see Section 5. of the global RPKI, see Section 5.
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A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the
global distributed database using the rsync protocol, [RFC5781], and global distributed database using the rsync protocol, [RFC5781], and
a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic]. a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic].
Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database. Of course, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. database. Of course, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
Timing of inter-cache synchronization is outside the scope of this
document, but depends on things such as how often routers feed from
the caches, how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes
significantly, etc.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. A router can peer with one or more nearby these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should
caches. consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency,
etc.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also
trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with those trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams to caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this
maintain fresh and reliable caches. And, as usual, the recipient places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and
SHOULD re-validate the data. reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And,
as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that
any sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, any sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a
ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub- ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-
allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
more specifics to protect against mis-origination of a less specific more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less
prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix should protect it. specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix should protect
it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of
excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary. excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues
10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed 10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed
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likely to be noticed. likely to be noticed.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one AS, ROAs for
all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are considered Valid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may
announce P. announce P.
Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own
prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though
the work to manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. Operators the work to manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. Operators
SHOULD offer to provision the RPKI data for these customers just as SHOULD offer to provision the RPKI data for these customers just as
they provision many other things for them. they provision many other things for them.
While a an operator using RPKI data MAY choose any polling frequency While an operator using RPKI data MAY choose any polling frequency
they wish for ensuring they have a fresh RPKI cache. However, if they wish for ensuring they have a fresh RPKI cache. However, if
they use RPKI data as an input to operational routing decisions, they they use RPKI data as an input to operational routing decisions, they
SHOULD ensure local cache freshness at least every four to six hours. SHOULD ensure local cache freshness at least every four to six hours.
4. Within a Network 4. Within a Network
Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
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As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be
overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower
preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping
or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements. or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI
might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation
comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers
would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that
is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is
evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide such options to operators.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an
Invalid announcement to Valid or better. Invalid announcement to Valid or better.
Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with
NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be
used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the
announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid
or NotFound. or NotFound.
Validity state signialing SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS.
The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope
due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
6. Notes 6. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
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Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Steve Kent, The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Jay
Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather Borkenhagen, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy
and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder,
Stillman, and Dave Ward. Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in
progress), May 2011. progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record", Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-14 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-15 (work in progress),
September 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011. draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-02 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-02 (work in progress),
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July 2011. July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress),
May 2011. May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-17 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-18 (work in progress),
October 2011. October 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
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