draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-12.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP October 31, 2011 Intended status: BCP November 14, 2011
Expires: May 3, 2012 Expires: May 17, 2012
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-12 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
and the dynamics are better understood. and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
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Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database. Of course, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. database. Of course, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
Timing of inter-cache synchronization is outside the scope of this Timing of inter-cache synchronization is outside the scope of this
document, but depends on things such as how often routers feed from document, but depends on things such as how often routers feed from
the caches, how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes the caches, how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes
significantly, etc. significantly, etc.
As inter-cache synchronization within an operator does not impact
global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize quite
frequently.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should
consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency, consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency,
etc. etc.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
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To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of
excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary. excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues
10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed 10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed
against 10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more against 10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more
likely to be noticed. likely to be noticed because of its size.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one AS, ROAs for If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one AS, ROAs for
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or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements. or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI
validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation
result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers
would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that
is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is
evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide such options to operators. provide such options to operators.
Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a
prefix along with it's traffic engineering characteristic(s). It is
likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have to
change policy so they can encode these two separate characteristics
in the same BGP attribute without negatively impact or opening
privilege escalation attacks.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an
Invalid announcement to Valid or better. Invalid announcement to Valid or better.
Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with
NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
6. Notes 6. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on
relying party cache loading and timing.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets].
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]) with each publication Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]) with each publication
point they control. These are publication points holding the CRL, point they control. These are publication points holding the CRL,
ROAs, and other signed objects issued by the operator, and made ROAs, and other signed objects issued by the operator, and made
available to other ASs in support of routing on the public Internet. available to other ASs in support of routing on the public Internet.
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Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Jay The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin,
Borkenhagen, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Jay Borkenhagen, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy
Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder,
Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in
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October 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011. draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-02 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress),
July 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress),
July 2011. July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress),
May 2011. May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-18 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-19 (work in progress),
October 2011. October 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
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