draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-14.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP November 14, 2011 Intended status: BCP March 8, 2012
Expires: May 17, 2012 Expires: September 9, 2012
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-13 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-14
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
and the dynamics are better understood. and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is
the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
from many aspects. aspects.
The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA
and the RIRs, and there is a technical testbed. It is thought that and the RIRs, and there are technical testbeds. It is thought that
origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally
over the next year to five years. over the next year to five years. It is assumed that eventually
there will be a single root trust anchor for the public address
space.
Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing: originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/ large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
enterprise/edge routers. enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border
routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/ routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
edge networks. edge networks.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
of the global RPKI, see Section 5. of the global RPKI, see Section 5.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], ROAs,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router Protocol, see
the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], RPKI-based [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see
Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], and Ghostbusters [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], and Ghostbusters Records, see
Records, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]. [RFC6493].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be
global distributed database using the rsync protocol, [RFC5781], and gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync
a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic]. protocol, [RFC5781], and a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic].
Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database. Of course, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. database. Of course, the recipient relying parties SHOULD re-
validate the data.
Timing of inter-cache synchronization is outside the scope of this Timing of inter-cache synchronization, and synchronization between
document, but depends on things such as how often routers feed from caches and the global RPKI, is outside the scope of this document,
the caches, how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes and depends on things such as how often routers feed from the caches,
significantly, etc. how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes significantly,
etc.
As inter-cache synchronization within an operator does not impact As inter-cache synchronization within an operator's network does not
global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize quite impact global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize
frequently. quite frequently.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should
consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency, consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency,
etc. etc.
If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their
router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] SHOULD be followed. In particular,
operators MUST NOT use insecure transports between their routers and
RPKI caches located in other Autonomous Systems.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also
trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this
places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and
reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And, reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And,
as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that
any sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a
ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub- ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-
allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate].
Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less
specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix should protect specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect
it. it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of
excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary. excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues
skipping to change at page 5, line 26 skipping to change at page 5, line 35
likely to be noticed because of its size. likely to be noticed because of its size.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one AS, ROAs for Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may
all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are considered Valid. announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one
AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are
considered Valid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may
announce P.
Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own
prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though
the work to manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. Operators the work to manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. Operators
SHOULD offer to provision the RPKI data for these customers just as SHOULD offer to provision the RPKI data for these customers just as
they provision many other things for them. they provision many other things for them.
While an operator using RPKI data MAY choose any polling frequency While an operator using RPKI data MAY choose any polling frequency
they wish for ensuring they have a fresh RPKI cache. However, if they wish for ensuring they have a fresh RPKI cache. However, if
they use RPKI data as an input to operational routing decisions, they they use RPKI data as an input to operational routing decisions, they
SHOULD ensure local cache freshness at least every four to six hours. SHOULD ensure local caches inside their AS are synchronized with each
other at least every four to six hours.
4. Within a Network 4. Within a Network
Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In
deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy,
preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy
validation-capable border routers. validation-capable border routers.
eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/down-streams are
candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical
received announcements should be considered in partial deployment.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as
having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid. See having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be
specified by the operator's local policy. specified by the operator's local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
local policy to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes
to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect
data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable
data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a
MAY occur. low preference, MAY occur.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be
overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a
preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and
or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements. dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI
validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation
result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers
would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that
is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is
evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide such options to operators. provide such options to operators.
Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a
skipping to change at page 7, line 25 skipping to change at page 7, line 30
NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be
used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the
announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid
or NotFound. or NotFound.
Validity state signialing SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS. Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS.
The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope
due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
6. Notes 6. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized,
even within a single AS. Thus, changes to the validity state of
prefixes could be different within an operator's network. In
addition, there is no guaranteed interval from when an RPKI cache is
updated to when that new information may be pushed or pulled into a
set of routers via this protocol. This may result in sudden shifts
of traffic in the operator's network, until all of the routers in the
AS have reached equilibrium with the validity state of prefixes
reflected in all of the RPKI caches.
It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on
relying party cache loading and timing. relying party cache loading and timing.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets].
As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and
possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an
operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report
changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation
of such prefixes.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters
Records (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]) with each publication Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control.
point they control. These are publication points holding the CRL, These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed
ROAs, and other signed objects issued by the operator, and made objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in
available to other ASs in support of routing on the public Internet. support of routing on the public Internet.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour.
It is not reasonable to expect RPKI-based validation to run on
routers which do not support Four-octet AS Numbers (see [RFC4893], as
it is not reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456.
Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client
routers.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
As the BGP origin AS of an update is not signed, origin validation is As the BGP origin AS of an update is not signed, origin validation is
open to malicious spoofing. Therefore, RPKI-based origin validation open to malicious spoofing. Therefore, RPKI-based origin validation
is designed to deal only with inadvertent mis-advertisement. is expected to deal only with inadvertent mis-advertisement.
Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation. Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation.
Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or
accidental. accidental.
As BGP does not ensure that traffic will flow via the paths it As BGP does not ensure that traffic will flow via the paths it
advertises, the data plane may not follow the control plane. advertises, the data plane may not follow the control plane.
Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
skipping to change at page 8, line 36 skipping to change at page 9, line 20
The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin,
Jay Borkenhagen, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Jay Borkenhagen, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy
Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder,
Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13 (work in
progress), May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ghostbusters]
Bush, R., "The RPKI Ghostbusters Record",
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-15 (work in progress),
October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-02 (work in progress), June 2011. draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-04 (work in progress),
December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress),
October 2011. October 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-09 (work in progress),
July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format]
Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",
draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-12 (work in progress),
May 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-19 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26 (work in progress),
October 2011. February 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS
Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]
Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.",
draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress),
September 2010. September 2010.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[rcynic] "rcynic read-me", [rcynic] "rcynic read-me",
<http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>. <http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
 End of changes. 36 change blocks. 
94 lines changed or deleted 126 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/