draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-15.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-16.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP March 10, 2012 Intended status: BCP May 24, 2012
Expires: September 11, 2012 Expires: November 25, 2012
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-15 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-16
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them.
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed
and the dynamics are better understood. and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
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Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network,
those which border other networks/ASs. those which border other networks/ASs.
A validating router will use the result of origin validation to A validating router will use the result of origin validation to
influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In
deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy,
preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy
validation-capable border routers. validation-capable border routers.
The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as
any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network.
And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has
tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as
having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be
specified by the operator's local policy. specified by the operator's local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes
due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect
certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable
relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a
low preference, MAY occur. low preference, MAY occur.
Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no
matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them
as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/
16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be
Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest
match forwarding will send packets to AS 666 no matter the value of
local preference.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be
overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a
lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and
dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements. dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-04 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-04 (work in progress),
December 2011. December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-03 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-05 (work in progress),
October 2011. April 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26 (work in progress),
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS [RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS
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