draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-16.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-17.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: BCP May 24, 2012 Intended status: Best Current Practice June 2012
Expires: November 25, 2012 Expires: December 01, 2012
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-16 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-17
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present them. considerations. This document attempts to collect and present the
It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation is deployed most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin
and the dynamics are better understood. validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 01, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
publication of this document. Please review these documents Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is
distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
aspects. aspects.
The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no
single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA
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without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border
routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/ routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
edge networks. edge networks.
RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
of the global RPKI, see Section 5. of the global RPKI, see Section 5.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], ROAs, see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], ROAs,
see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router Protocol, see see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see rtr], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate],
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], and Ghostbusters Records, see and Ghostbusters Records, see [RFC6493].
[RFC6493].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481]. manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere. maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be
gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync
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impact global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize impact global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize
quite frequently. quite frequently.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should
consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency, consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency,
etc. etc.
If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their
router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in [I-D.ietf-sidr-
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] SHOULD be followed. In particular, rpki-rtr] SHOULD be followed. In particular, operators MUST NOT use
operators MUST NOT use insecure transports between their routers and insecure transports between their routers and RPKI caches located in
RPKI caches located in other Autonomous Systems. other Autonomous Systems.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also
trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this
places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and
reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And, reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And,
as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that
all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a
ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub- ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-
allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. pfx-validate].
Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less
specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect
it. it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use
excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary. of excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally
necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0
10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed /16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed against
against 10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more 10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely
likely to be noticed because of its size. to be noticed because of its size.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may
announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one
AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are
considered Valid. considered Valid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own
prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though
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validation-capable border routers. validation-capable border routers.
The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as
any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network. any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network.
And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has
tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc. tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as
having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [I-D.ietf-
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be specified
specified by the operator's local policy. by the operator's local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes
due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect
certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable
relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a
low preference, MAY occur. low preference, MAY occur.
Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no
matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them
as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/ as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/
16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be 16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be
Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest
match forwarding will send packets to AS 666 no matter the value of match forwarding will send packets to AS 666 no matter the value of
local preference. local preference.
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Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a
prefix along with it's traffic engineering characteristic(s). It is prefix along with it's traffic engineering characteristic(s). It is
likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have to likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have to
change policy so they can encode these two separate characteristics change policy so they can encode these two separate characteristics
in the same BGP attribute without negatively impact or opening in the same BGP attribute without negatively impact or opening
privilege escalation attacks. privilege escalation attacks.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an
Invalid announcement to Valid or better. Invalid announcement to Valid or better.
Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with
NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be
used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the
announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid
or NotFound. or NotFound.
Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS. Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS.
The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope
due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and [I-D.ietf-
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. sidr-ltamgmt].
6. Notes 6. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized, Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized,
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There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets].
As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and
possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an
operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report
changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation
of such prefixes. of such prefixes.
Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of
an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's
content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to
maximize control over the repository. On the other hand, if there
are reachability problems to the address space, changes in the
repository to correct them may not be easily accessed by others.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters
Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control. Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control.
These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed
objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in
support of routing on the public Internet. support of routing on the public Internet.
Routers which perform RPKI-based origin validation must support Four-
octet AS Numbers (see [RFC4893]), as, among other things, it is not
reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456.
Software which produces filter lists or other control forms for
routers where the target router does not support Four-octet AS
Numbers (see [RFC4893]) must be prepared to accept Four-octet AS
Numbers and generate the appropriate two-octet output.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. approximately an hour.
It is not reasonable to expect RPKI-based validation to run on
routers which do not support Four-octet AS Numbers (see [RFC4893], as
it is not reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456.
Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client
routers. routers.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
As the BGP origin AS of an update is not signed, origin validation is As the BGP origin AS of an update is not signed, origin validation is
open to malicious spoofing. Therefore, RPKI-based origin validation open to malicious spoofing. Therefore, RPKI-based origin validation
is expected to deal only with inadvertent mis-advertisement. is expected to deal only with inadvertent mis-advertisement.
Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation. Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation.
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Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin,
Jay Borkenhagen, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Jay Borkenhagen, Wes George, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris
Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John
Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management Reynolds, M., Kent, S. and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-04 (work in progress), Infrastructure", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-
December 2011. ltamgmt-05, June 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R. and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Internet-Draft
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-05 (work in progress), draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-06, May 2012.
April 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26 (work in progress), Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26, February 2012.
February 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS [RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS
Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007. Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D. and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R. and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S. and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012. Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]
Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.",
draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), Internet-Draft draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01,
September 2010. September 2010.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T. and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J. and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[rcynic] "rcynic read-me", [rcynic] "rcynic read-me", , <http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic
<http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>. /README>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
 End of changes. 35 change blocks. 
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