draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-19.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-20.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice August 2012 Intended status: Best Current Practice February 21, 2013
Expires: January 31, 2013 Expires: August 25, 2013
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-19 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-20
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present the considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those
most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin which are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based
validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are
better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without any normative meaning. case as English words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is
distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
aspects. aspects.
The global RPKI is in very initial stages of deployment, there is no While the global RPKI is in the early stages of deployment, there is
single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the IANA no single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the
and the RIRs, and there are technical testbeds. It is thought that RIRs, and there are technical testbeds. It is thought that origin
origin validation based on the RPKI will be deployed incrementally validation based on the RPKI will continue to be deployed
over the next year to five years. It is assumed that eventually incrementally over the next few years. It is assumed that eventually
there will be a single root trust anchor for the public address there must be a single root trust anchor for the public address
space. space.
Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing: originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/ large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
enterprise/edge routers. enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border
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RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent
local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as local routing policies, there is little risk that what is seen as
today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment today's normal Internet routing is threatened by imprudent deployment
of the global RPKI, see Section 5. of the global RPKI, see Section 5.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router Origin Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router
Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, Protocol, see [RFC6810], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [RFC6811],
see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate], and Ghostbusters Records, see and Ghostbusters Records, see [RFC6493].
[RFC6493].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481]. manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere. maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
The RPKI repository design [RFC6481] anticipated an hierarchic The RPKI repository design [RFC6481] anticipated an hierarchic
organization of repositories, as this seriously affects the organization of repositories, as this seriously affects the
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A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be
gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync
protocol, [RFC5781], and a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic]. protocol, [RFC5781], and a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic].
Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database. Of course, the recipient relying parties SHOULD re- database. Of course, the recipient relying parties SHOULD re-
validate the data. validate the data.
As Trust Anchor Locators (TALs), see [RFC6490], are critical to the
RPKI trust model, operators should be very careful in their initial
selection and vigilant in their maintenance.
Timing of inter-cache synchronization, and synchronization between Timing of inter-cache synchronization, and synchronization between
caches and the global RPKI, is outside the scope of this document, caches and the global RPKI, is outside the scope of this document,
and depends on things such as how often routers feed from the caches, and depends on things such as how often routers feed from the caches,
how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes significantly, how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes significantly,
etc. etc.
As inter-cache synchronization within an operator's network does not As inter-cache synchronization within an operator's network does not
impact global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize impact global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize
quite frequently. quite frequently.
As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require
these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should these data and services. 'Close' is, of course, complex. One should
consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency, consider trust boundaries, routing bootstrap reachability, latency,
etc. etc.
If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their
router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in [I-D.ietf-sidr- router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in [RFC6810] SHOULD
rpki-rtr] SHOULD be followed. In particular, operators MUST NOT use be followed. In particular, operators MUST NOT use insecure
insecure transports between their routers and RPKI caches located in transports between their routers and RPKI caches located in other
other Autonomous Systems. Autonomous Systems.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also
trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this
places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and
reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And, reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And,
as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that
all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a
ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub- ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-
allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [I-D.ietf-sidr- allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [RFC6811].
pfx-validate].
Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less
specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect
it. it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use
of excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally of excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally
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validation-capable border routers. validation-capable border routers.
The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as
any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network. any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network.
And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has
tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc. tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as
having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [I-D.ietf- having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [RFC6811].
sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in routing SHOULD be specified How this is used in routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's
by the operator's local policy. local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes
due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect
certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable
relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a
low preference, MAY occur. low preference, MAY occur.
Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no
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NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be
used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the
announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid
or NotFound. or NotFound.
When first deploying origin validation, it may be prudent to not drop
announcements with Invalid orgins until inspection of logs, SNMP, or
other data indicate that the correct result would be obtained.
Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS. Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS.
The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope
due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and [I-D.ietf- due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and
sidr-ltamgmt]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
6. Notes 6. Notes
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized, Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized,
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set of routers via this protocol. This may result in sudden shifts set of routers via this protocol. This may result in sudden shifts
of traffic in the operator's network, until all of the routers in the of traffic in the operator's network, until all of the routers in the
AS have reached equilibrium with the validity state of prefixes AS have reached equilibrium with the validity state of prefixes
reflected in all of the RPKI caches. reflected in all of the RPKI caches.
It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on
relying party cache loading and timing. relying party cache loading and timing.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [RFC6472].
As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and
possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an
operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report
changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation
of such prefixes. of such prefixes.
Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of
an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's
content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to
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Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in
Section 5 above. Section 5 above.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments 9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin,
Jay Borkenhagen, Wes George, Steve Kent, Pradosh Mohapatra, Chris Jay Borkenhagen, Wes George, Seiichi Kawamura, Steve Kent, Pradosh
Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Eric Osterweil, Keyur Patel,
Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram,
Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M., Kent, S. and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr- Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-07 (work in
ltamgmt-05, June 2012. progress), October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R. and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", Internet-Draft
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-08, July 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26, February 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS [RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS
Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007. Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D. and R. Housley, "The rsync URI [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R. and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S. and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6490] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
"Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
Locator", RFC 6490, February 2012.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012. Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
10.2. Informative References [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
January 2013.
[I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
Internet-Draft draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01, 2013.
September 2010.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T. and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 10.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J. and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[rcynic] "rcynic read-me", , <http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic [RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
/README>. AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
December 2011.
[rcynic] , "rcynic read-me", ,
<http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
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