draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-20.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-21.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice February 21, 2013 Intended status: Best Current Practice September 06, 2013
Expires: August 25, 2013 Expires: March 10, 2014
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-20 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-21
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those
which are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based which are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based
origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are
better understood. better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is
distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
aspects. aspects.
While the global RPKI is in the early stages of deployment, there is While the global RPKI is in the early stages of deployment, there is
no single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the no single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the
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places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and
reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And, reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And,
as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that
all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a
ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub- ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-
allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [RFC6811]. allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [RFC6811].
Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less
specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect
it. it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of
of excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary.
necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0 max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0/
/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed against 16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed against
10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely 10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely
to be noticed because of its size. to be noticed because of its size.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
RFC EDITOR PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH: The above example does not
use a standard documentation prefix as it needs a /16 so that a /24
can hole punch. As anything longer than a /24 is not globally
routed, a /24 with a /25 (or whatever) hole would not be realistic
and the ops reader would spend their energy on that anomaly instead
of the example.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may
announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one
AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are
considered Valid. considered Valid.
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Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as
having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [RFC6811]. having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [RFC6811].
How this is used in routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's How this is used in routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's
local policy. local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes
due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect
certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable
relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a
low preference, MAY occur. low preference, MAY occur.
Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no Operators should be aware that accepting Invalid announcements, no
matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them matter how de-preffed, will often be the equivalent of treating them
as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/ as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/
16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be 16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be
Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest
match forwarding will send packets to AS 666 no matter the value of match forwarding will send packets toward AS 666 no matter the value
local preference. of local preference.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be
overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a
lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and
dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements. dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Merely de-preffing Invalids is ill-advised, see previous paragraph.
Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI
validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation
result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers
would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that
is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is
evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide such options to operators. provide such options to operators.
Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a
prefix along with it's traffic engineering characteristic(s). It is prefix along with it's traffic engineering characteristic(s). It is
likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have to likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have to
change policy so they can encode these two separate characteristics change policy so they can encode these two separate characteristics
in the same BGP attribute without negatively impact or opening in the same BGP attribute without negatively impact or opening
privilege escalation attacks. privilege escalation attacks.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling MAY NOT upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling SHOULD NOT upgrade an
Invalid announcement to Valid or better. Invalid announcement to Valid or better.
Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with
NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be
used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the
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reflected in all of the RPKI caches. reflected in all of the RPKI caches.
It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on
relying party cache loading and timing. relying party cache loading and timing.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [RFC6472]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [RFC6472].
As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and
possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an
operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report
changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation
of such prefixes. of such prefixes.
Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of
an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's
content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to
maximize control over the repository. On the other hand, if there maximize control over the repository. On the other hand, if there
are reachability problems to the address space, changes in the are reachability problems to the address space, changes in the
repository to correct them may not be easily accessed by others. repository to correct them may not be easily accessed by others.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters
Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control. Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control.
These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed
objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in
support of routing on the public Internet. support of routing on the public Internet.
Routers which perform RPKI-based origin validation must support Four- Routers which perform RPKI-based origin validation must support Four-
octet AS Numbers (see [RFC4893]), as, among other things, it is not octet AS Numbers (see [RFC6793]), as, among other things, it is not
reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456. reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456.
Software which produces filter lists or other control forms for Software which produces filter lists or other control forms for
routers where the target router does not support Four-octet AS routers where the target router does not support Four-octet AS
Numbers (see [RFC4893]) must be prepared to accept Four-octet AS Numbers (see [RFC6793]) must be prepared to accept Four-octet AS
Numbers and generate the appropriate two-octet output. Numbers and generate the appropriate two-octet output.
As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time As a router must evaluate certificates and ROAs which are time
dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of dependent, routers' clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of
approximately an hour. approximately an hour.
Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client Servers should provide time service, such as [RFC5905], to client
routers. routers.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
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The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, The author wishes to thank Shane Amante, Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin,
Jay Borkenhagen, Wes George, Seiichi Kawamura, Steve Kent, Pradosh Jay Borkenhagen, Wes George, Seiichi Kawamura, Steve Kent, Pradosh
Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Eric Osterweil, Keyur Patel, Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Eric Osterweil, Keyur Patel,
Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram, Heather and Jason Schiller, John Scudder, Kotikalapudi Sriram,
Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-07 (work in
progress), October 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS
Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012. February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6490] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, [RFC6490] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
"Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
Locator", RFC 6490, February 2012. Locator", RFC 6490, February 2012.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012. Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
[RFC6793] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793, December
2012.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
January 2013. January 2013.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
2013. 2013.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]
Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust
Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-08 (work in
progress), April 2013.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network [RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using [RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472, AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
December 2011. December 2011.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[rcynic] , "rcynic read-me", , [rcynic] , "rcynic read-me", ,
<http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>. <http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
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