draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-22.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-23.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Best Current Practice October 07, 2013 Intended status: Best Current Practice November 21, 2013
Expires: April 10, 2014 Expires: May 25, 2014
RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-22 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-23
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many operational
considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those
which are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based which are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based
origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are
better understood. better understood.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 10, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 25, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Notes and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread deployment of the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. How the RPKI is
distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern from many
aspects. aspects.
While the global RPKI is in the early stages of deployment, there is While the global RPKI is in the early stages of deployment, there is
no single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the no single root trust anchor, initial testing is being done by the
RIRs, and there are technical testbeds. It is thought that origin RIRs, and there are technical testbeds. It is thought that origin
validation based on the RPKI will continue to be deployed validation based on the RPKI will continue to be deployed
incrementally over the next few years. It is assumed that eventually incrementally over the next few years. It is assumed that eventually
there must be a single root trust anchor for the public address there must be a single root trust anchor for the public address
space. space, see [iab].
Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and Origin validation needs to be done only by an AS's border routers and
is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are is designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are
originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing: originated by any network participating in Internet BGP routing:
large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/ large providers, upstreams and down-streams, and by small stub/
enterprise/edge routers. enterprise/edge routers.
Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers
without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border without significant hardware upgrade. It should be used in border
routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/ routers by operators from large backbones to small stub/entetprise/
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2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route see [RFC6480], the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router Origin Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], the RPKI to Router
Protocol, see [RFC6810], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [RFC6811], Protocol, see [RFC6810], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [RFC6811],
and Ghostbusters Records, see [RFC6493]. and Ghostbusters Records, see [RFC6493].
3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481]. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), manifests, ROAs, and
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481]. Policies and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere. considerations for RPKI object generation and maintenance are
discussed elsewhere.
The RPKI repository design [RFC6481] anticipated an hierarchic The RPKI repository design [RFC6481] anticipated a hierarchic
organization of repositories, as this seriously affects the organization of repositories, as this seriously improves the
performance of relying parties gathering data. Publishing parties performance of relying parties gathering data over a non-hierarchic
SHOULD implement hierarchic directory structures. organization. Publishing parties MUST implement hierarchic directory
structures.
A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be A local relying party valid cache containing all RPKI data may be
gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync gathered from the global distributed database using the rsync
protocol, [RFC5781], and a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic]. protocol, [RFC5781], and a validation tool such as rcynic [rcynic].
A validated cache contains all RPKI objects that the RP has verified
to be valid according to the rules for validation RPKI certificates
and signed objects, see [RFC6487] and [RFC6488]. Entities that trust
the cache can use these RPKI objects without further validation.
Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other
validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of
this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI
database. Of course, the recipient relying parties SHOULD re- database. Of course, the recipient relying parties should re-
validate the data. validate the data.
As Trust Anchor Locators (TALs), see [RFC6490], are critical to the As Trust Anchor Locators (TALs), see [RFC6490], are critical to the
RPKI trust model, operators should be very careful in their initial RPKI trust model, operators should be very careful in their initial
selection and vigilant in their maintenance. selection and vigilant in their maintenance.
Timing of inter-cache synchronization, and synchronization between Timing of inter-cache synchronization, and synchronization between
caches and the global RPKI, is outside the scope of this document, caches and the global RPKI, is outside the scope of this document,
and depends on things such as how often routers feed from the caches, and depends on things such as how often routers feed from the caches,
how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes significantly, how often the operator feels the global RPKI changes significantly,
etc. etc.
As inter-cache synchronization within an operator's network does not As inter-cache synchronization within an operator's network does not
impact global RPKI resources, an operator MAY choose to synchronize impact global RPKI resources, an operator may choose to synchronize
quite frequently. quite frequently.
To relieve routers of the load of performing certificate validation, To relieve routers of the load of performing certificate validation,
cryptographic operations, etc., the RPKI-Router protocol, [RFC6810], cryptographic operations, etc., the RPKI-Router protocol, [RFC6810],
does not provide object-based security to the router. I.e. the does not provide object-based security to the router. I.e. the
router can not validate the data cryptographically from a well-known router can not validate the data cryptographically from a well-known
trust anchor. The router trusts the cache to provide correct data trust anchor. The router trusts the cache to provide correct data
and relies on transport based security for the data received from the and relies on transport based security for the data received from the
cache. Therefore the authenticity and integrity of the data from the cache. Therefore the authenticity and integrity of the data from the
cache should be well protected, see Section 7 of [RFC6810]. cache should be well protected, see Section 7 of [RFC6810].
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converge for the router to reach a cache, once a cache is reachable, converge for the router to reach a cache, once a cache is reachable,
the router will then have to reevaluate prefixes already learned via the router will then have to reevaluate prefixes already learned via
BGP. Such configurations should be avoided if reasonably possible. BGP. Such configurations should be avoided if reasonably possible.
If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their If insecure transports are used between an operator's cache and their
router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in [RFC6810] SHOULD router(s), the Transport Security recommendations in [RFC6810] SHOULD
be followed. In particular, operators MUST NOT use insecure be followed. In particular, operators MUST NOT use insecure
transports between their routers and RPKI caches located in other transports between their routers and RPKI caches located in other
Autonomous Systems. Autonomous Systems.
For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the For redundancy, a router should peer with more than one cache at the
same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others same time. Peering with two or more, at least one local and others
remote, is recommended. remote, is recommended.
If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they MAY also If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they may also
trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and SHOULD peer with
caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this caches made available to them by those upstreams. Note that this
places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and places an obligation on those upstreams to maintain fresh and
reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And, reliable caches, and to make them available to their customers. And,
as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data. as usual, the recipient SHOULD re-validate the data.
A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in A transit provider or a network with peers SHOULD validate origins in
announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still announcements made by upstreams, down-streams, and peers. They still
SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. should trust the caches provided by their upstreams.
Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that Before issuing a ROA for a super-block, an operator MUST ensure that
all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs, all sub-allocations from that block which are announced by other ASs,
e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a e.g. customers, have correct ROAs in the RPKI. Otherwise, issuing a
ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub- ROA for the super-block will cause the announcements of sub-
allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [RFC6811]. allocations with no ROAs to be viewed as Invalid, see [RFC6811].
While waiting for all sub-allocatees to register ROAs, the owner of
the super-block may use live BGP data to populate ROAs as a proxy,
and then safely issue a ROA for the super-block.
Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate Use of RPKI-based origin validation removes any need to originate
more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less more specifics into BGP to protect against mis-origination of a less
specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect specific prefix. Having a ROA for the covering prefix will protect
it. it.
To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in To aid translation of ROAs into efficient search algorithms in
routers, ROAs SHOULD be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes routers, ROAs should be as precise as possible, i.e. match prefixes
as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of as announced in BGP. E.g. software and operators SHOULD avoid use of
excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary. excessive max length values in ROAs unless operationally necessary.
One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack
does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long
max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0/ max length. E.g. if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0/
16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed against 16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack can not succeed against
10.0.66.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely 10.0.666.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely
to be noticed because of its size. to be noticed because of its size.
Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the Therefore, ROA generation software MUST use the prefix length as the
max length if the user does not specify a max length. max length if the user does not specify a max length.
RFC EDITOR PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH: The above example does not RFC EDITOR PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH: The above example does not
use a standard documentation prefix as it needs a /16 so that a /24 use a standard documentation prefix as it needs a /16 so that a /24
can hole punch. As anything longer than a /24 is not globally can hole punch. As anything longer than a /24 is not globally
routed, a /24 with a /25 (or whatever) hole would not be realistic routed, a /24 with a /25 (or whatever) hole would not be realistic
and the ops reader would spend their energy on that anomaly instead and the ops reader would spend their energy on that anomaly instead
of the example. of the example.
Operators SHOULD be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g., Operators should be conservative in use of max length in ROAs. E.g.,
if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple if a prefix will have only a few sub-prefixes announced, multiple
ROAs for the specific announcements SHOULD be used as opposed to one ROAs for the specific announcements should be used as opposed to one
ROA with a long max length. ROA with a long max length.
Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may Operators owning prefix P should issue ROAs for all ASs which may
announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one announce P. If a prefix is legitimately announced by more than one
AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are AS, ROAs for all of the ASs SHOULD be issued so that all are
considered Valid. considered Valid.
An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the In an environment where private address space is announced in eBGP
operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private the operator may have private RPKI objects which cover these private
spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that
environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. environment, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own Operators issuing ROAs may have customers which announce their own
prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though prefixes and ASs into global eBGP but who do not wish to go though
the work to manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. Operators the work to manage the relevant certificates and ROAs. Operators
SHOULD offer to provision the RPKI data for these customers just as SHOULD offer to provision the RPKI data for these customers just as
they provision many other things for them. they provision many other things for them.
While an operator using RPKI data MAY choose any polling frequency While an operator using RPKI data MAY choose any polling frequency
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The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as The operator should be aware that RPKI-based origin validation, as
any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network. any other policy change, can cause traffic shifts in their network.
And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has And, as with normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has
tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc. tools and methods to predict, measure, modify, etc.
5. Routing Policy 5. Routing Policy
Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as Origin validation based on the RPKI marks a received announcement as
having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [RFC6811]. having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or Invalid, see [RFC6811].
How this is used in routing SHOULD be specified by the operator's How this is used in routing should be specified by the operator's
local policy. local policy.
Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the
uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying uncertainty associated with a system in early deployment, applying
local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes local policy to eliminate the threat of unreachability of prefixes
due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect due to ill-advised certification policies and/or incorrect
certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable certification data. E.g. until the community feels comfortable
relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a relying on RPKI data, routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a
low preference, MAY occur. low preference, MAY occur.
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as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/ as fully Valid. Consider having a ROA for AS 42 for prefix 10.0.0.0/
16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be 16-24. A BGP announcement for 10.0.666.0/24 from AS 666 would be
Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest Invalid. But if policy is not configured to discard it, then longest
match forwarding will send packets toward AS 666 no matter the value match forwarding will send packets toward AS 666 no matter the value
of local preference. of local preference.
As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will
be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound
validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition validity state SHOULD be done for a long time. As the transition
moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state
NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy should not be
overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a overly strict, and should prefer Valid announcements, attaching a
lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and lower preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and
dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements. dropping or giving a very low preference to Invalid announcements.
Merely de-preffing Invalids is ill-advised, see previous paragraph. Merely de-preffing Invalids is ill-advised, see previous paragraph.
Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI Some providers may choose to set Local-Preference based on the RPKI
validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation validation result. Other providers may not want the RPKI validation
result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers result to be more important than AS-path length -- these providers
would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that would need to map RPKI validation result to some BGP attribute that
is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is is evaluated in BGP's path selection process after AS-path is
evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST evaluated. Routers implementing RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide such options to operators. provide such options to operators.
Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a Local-Preference may be used to carry both the validity state of a
prefix along with it's traffic engineering characteristic(s). It is prefix along with its traffic engineering (TE) characteristic(s). It
likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have to is likely that an operator already using Local-Preference will have
change policy so they can encode these two separate characteristics to change policy so they can encode these two separate
in the same BGP attribute without negatively impact or opening characteristics in the same BGP attribute without negative impact or
privilege escalation attacks. opening privilege escalation attacks. E.g. do not encode validation
state in higher bits than used for TE.
When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy,
an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade an operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade
vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity
state, be careful that peer community signaling SHOULD NOT upgrade an state, be careful that peer community signaling SHOULD NOT upgrade an
Invalid announcement to Valid or better. Invalid announcement to Valid or better.
Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with Announcements with Valid origins should be preferred over those with
NotFound or Invalid origins, if the latter are accepted at all. NotFound or Invalid origins, if Invalid origins are accepted at all.
Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those Announcements with NotFound origins should be preferred over those
with Invalid origins. with Invalid origins.
Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but MAY be Announcements with Invalid origins SHOULD NOT be used, but may be
used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the used to meet special operational needs. In such circumstances, the
announcement SHOULD have a lower preference than that given to Valid announcement should have a lower preference than that given to Valid
or NotFound. or NotFound.
When first deploying origin validation, it may be prudent to not drop When first deploying origin validation, it may be prudent to not drop
announcements with Invalid orgins until inspection of logs, SNMP, or announcements with Invalid orgins until inspection of logs, SNMP, or
other data indicate that the correct result would be obtained. other data indicate that the correct result would be obtained.
Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS. Validity state signaling SHOULD NOT be accepted from a neighbor AS.
The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope The validity state of a received announcement has only local scope
due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and due to issues such as scope of trust, RPKI synchrony, and
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt]. [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
6. Notes 6. Notes and Recommendations
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized, Operators should beware that RPKI caches are loosely synchronized,
even within a single AS. Thus, changes to the validity state of even within a single AS. Thus, changes to the validity state of
prefixes could be different within an operator's network. In prefixes could be different within an operator's network. In
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It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on It is hoped that testing and deployment will produce advice on
relying party cache loading and timing. relying party cache loading and timing.
There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what,
if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the
deprecation of AS-SETs, see [RFC6472]. deprecation of AS-SETs, see [RFC6472].
As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and As reliable access to the global RPKI and an operator's caches (and
possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an possibly other hosts, e.g. DNS root servers) is important, an
operator SHOULD take advantage of relying party tools which report operator should take advantage of relying party tools which report
changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation changes in BGP or RPKI data which would negatively affect validation
of such prefixes. of such prefixes.
Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of Operators should be aware that there is a trade-off in placement of
an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's an RPKI repository in address space for which the repository's
content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to content is authoritative. On one hand, an operator will wish to
maximize control over the repository. On the other hand, if there maximize control over the repository. On the other hand, if there
are reachability problems to the address space, changes in the are reachability problems to the address space, changes in the
repository to correct them may not be easily accessed by others. repository to correct them may not be easily accessed by others.
Operators who manage certificates SHOULD associate RPKI Ghostbusters Operators who manage certificates should associate RPKI Ghostbusters
Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control. Records (see [RFC6493]) with each publication point they control.
These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed These are publication points holding the CRL, ROAs, and other signed
objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in objects issued by the operator, and made available to other ASs in
support of routing on the public Internet. support of routing on the public Internet.
Routers which perform RPKI-based origin validation must support Four- Routers which perform RPKI-based origin validation must support Four-
octet AS Numbers (see [RFC6793]), as, among other things, it is not octet AS Numbers (see [RFC6793]), as, among other things, it is not
reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456. reasonable to generate ROAs for AS 23456.
Software which produces filter lists or other control forms for Software which produces filter lists or other control forms for
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Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using [RFC6472] Kumari, W. and K. Sriram, "Recommendation for Not Using
AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472, AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", BCP 172, RFC 6472,
December 2011. December 2011.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[rcynic] , "rcynic read-me", , [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
<http://subvert-rpki.hactrn.net/rcynic/README>. X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
2012.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.
[iab] , "IAB statement on the RPKI", , <http://www.iab.org/
documents/correspondence-reports-documents/docs2010/iab-
statement-on-the-rpki/>.
[rcynic] , "rcynic read-me", , <http://rpki.net/rcynic>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US US
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
 End of changes. 31 change blocks. 
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