draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-08.txt 
SIDR P. Mohapatra SIDR P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft Sproute Networks Internet-Draft Sproute Networks
Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel
Expires: May 15, 2016 Cisco Expires: June 16, 2016 Cisco
J. Scudder J. Scudder
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
D. Ward D. Ward
Cisco Cisco
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
November 12, 2015 December 14, 2015
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-08
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system. the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process. policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 15, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system. the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process. policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
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origin validation state extended community. However, if more than origin validation state extended community. However, if more than
one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation
state value. If the value received is greater than the largest state value. If the value received is greater than the largest
specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
and logging the error for further analysis. and logging the error for further analysis.
By default, implementations SHOULD drop the origin validation state By default, implementations SHOULD drop the origin validation state
extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further
processing it. However an implementation MAY be configured to accept processing it. Similarly, by default an implementation SHOULD NOT
the community when warranted, for example when the EBGP session is to send the community to EBGP peers. However it SHOULD be possible to
a neighbor AS under control of the same administration. Similarly, configure an implementation to send or accept the community when
an implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers but MAY warranted. An example of a case where the community would reasonably
be configured to do so if warranted. be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer is when two adjacent ASes
are under control of the same administration. A second example is
documented in [I-D.kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light].
3. Deployment Considerations 3. Deployment Considerations
In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous
system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this
document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin
validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811] validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811]
that influences the best path selection the same way as what would that influences the best path selection the same way as what would
have been enabled by an implementation of this extension. have been enabled by an implementation of this extension.
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IANA has assigned a value 0x00 from the "BGP Opaque Extended IANA has assigned a value 0x00 from the "BGP Opaque Extended
Community" type registry in the non-transitive range, which is called Community" type registry in the non-transitive range, which is called
"BGP Origin Validation State Extended Community". "BGP Origin Validation State Extended Community".
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is This document introduces no new security concerns beyond what is
described in [RFC6811]. described in [RFC6811].
7. Normative References 7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
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[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K. [RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages", Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015, RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]
King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
"Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to
Peers", draft-kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-00 (work
in progress), December 2015.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Pradosh Mohapatra Pradosh Mohapatra
Sproute Networks Sproute Networks
Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com
Keyur Patel Keyur Patel
Cisco Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive 170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124 San Jose, CA 95124
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