draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-10.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11.txt 
SIDR P. Mohapatra SIDR P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft Sproute Networks Internet-Draft Sproute Networks
Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel
Expires: June 3, 2017 Cisco Expires: July 14, 2017 Cisco
J. Scudder J. Scudder
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
D. Ward D. Ward
Cisco Cisco
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
November 30, 2016 January 10, 2017
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-10 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system. the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process. policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 3, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved | | 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |validationstate| | Reserved |validationstate|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43, The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43,
which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order
octet of the extended type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00. The octet of the extended type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00. The
Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this
community. The last octet of the extended community encodes the community. The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned
route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can assume the following integer that gives the route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can
values: assume the following values:
+-------+-----------------------------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning | | Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------------------------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
| 0 | Lookup result = "valid" | | 0 | Lookup result = "valid" |
| 1 | Lookup result = "not found" | | 1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
| 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" | | 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
+-------+-----------------------------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
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An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
origin validation state extended community. However, if more than origin validation state extended community. However, if more than
one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation
state value. If the value received is greater than the largest state value. If the value received is greater than the largest
specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
and logging the error for further analysis. and logging the error for further analysis.
By default, implementations SHOULD drop the origin validation state By default, implementations MUST drop the origin validation state
extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further
processing it. Similarly, by default an implementation SHOULD NOT processing it. Similarly, by default an implementation SHOULD NOT
send the community to EBGP peers. However it SHOULD be possible to send the community to EBGP peers. However it SHOULD be possible to
configure an implementation to send or accept the community when configure an implementation to send or accept the community when
warranted. An example of a case where the community would reasonably warranted. An example of a case where the community would reasonably
be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer is when two adjacent ASes be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer is when two adjacent ASes
are under control of the same administration. A second example is are under control of the same administration. A second example is
documented in [I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]. documented in [I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light].
3. Deployment Considerations 3. Deployment Considerations
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Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light] [I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]
King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux, King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
"Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route- "Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
Server to Peers", draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki- Server to Peers", draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-
light-00 (work in progress), June 2016. light-01 (work in progress), December 2016.
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006, RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to [RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593, Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>. October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.
[RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations [RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
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