draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11.txt   rfc8097.txt 
SIDR P. Mohapatra Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft Sproute Networks Request for Comments: 8097 Sproute Networks
Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel Category: Standards Track K. Patel
Expires: July 14, 2017 Cisco ISSN: 2070-1721 Arrcus, Inc.
J. Scudder J. Scudder
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
D. Ward D. Ward
Cisco Cisco
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
January 10, 2017 March 2017
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system. the origination Autonomous System (AS) validation state inside an
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local autonomous system. Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this
policies allowing it to influence their decision process. validation state can configure local policies that allow it to
influence their decision process.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2017. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system. the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process. policies that allow it to influence their decision process.
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community 2. Origin Validation State Extended Community
The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
community [RFC4360] with the following encoding: community [RFC4360] with the following encoding:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved | | 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |validationstate| | Reserved |validationstate|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43, The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x43,
which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order
octet of the extended type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00. The octet of the extended Type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00. The
Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this
community. The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned community. The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned
integer that gives the route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can integer that gives the route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can
assume the following values: assume the following values:
+-------+-----------------------------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning | | Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------------------------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
| 0 | Lookup result = "valid" | | 0 | Lookup result = "valid" |
| 1 | Lookup result = "not found" | | 1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
| 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" | | 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
+-------+-----------------------------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
draft, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended document, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended
community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
computed validation state in the last octet of the extended computed validation state in the last octet of the extended
community. Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation community. Similarly, a receiving BGP speaker, in the absence of
state of an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet validation state set based on local data, SHOULD derive a validation
of the extended community, if present. state from the last octet of the extended community, if present.
An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
origin validation state extended community. However, if more than origin validation state extended community. However, if more than
one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation instances other than the one with the numerically greatest validation
state value. If the value received is greater than the largest state value. If the value received is greater than the largest
specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
and logging the error for further analysis. and logging the error for further analysis.
By default, implementations MUST drop the origin validation state By default, implementations MUST drop the origin validation state
extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further extended community if received from an External BGP (EBGP) peer,
processing it. Similarly, by default an implementation SHOULD NOT without processing it further. Similarly, by default, an
send the community to EBGP peers. However it SHOULD be possible to implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers. However,
configure an implementation to send or accept the community when it SHOULD be possible to configure an implementation to send or
warranted. An example of a case where the community would reasonably accept the community when warranted. An example of a case where the
be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer is when two adjacent ASes community would reasonably be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer
are under control of the same administration. A second example is is when two adjacent ASes are under control of the same
documented in [I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]. administration. A second example is documented in [SIDR-RPKI].
3. Deployment Considerations 3. Deployment Considerations
In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous In deployment scenarios in which not all the speakers in an
system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this autonomous system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in
document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin this document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the
validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811] origin validation extended community and set another BGP attribute
that influences the best path selection the same way as what would [RFC6811] that influences selection of the best path in the same way
have been enabled by an implementation of this extension. that an implementation of this extension would.
4. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano and Bruno Decraene on
this document.
5. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the value 0x00 from the "Non-Transitive Opaque IANA has registered the value 0x00, with the name "BGP Origin
Extended Community Sub-Types" registry. The value is called "BGP Validation State Extended Community", in the "Non-Transitive Opaque
Origin Validation State Extended Community". Extended Community Sub-Types" registry.
6. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
to apply. Since this document introduces an extended community that to apply. Because this document introduces an extended community
will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in that will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis
Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant. These issues in Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant. These
are neither new, nor unique to the origin validation extended issues are neither new nor unique to the origin validation extended
community. community.
The security considerations provided in [RFC6811] apply equally to The security considerations provided in [RFC6811] apply equally to
this application of origin validation. In addition, this document this application of origin validation. In addition, this document
describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some
router B. If this scheme is used, the participating routers should router B. If this scheme is used, the participating routers should
have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A either have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A either
because they are under the same administrative control or for some because they are under the same administrative control or for some
other reason (for example, consider other reason (for example, consider [SIDR-RPKI]). The security
[I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]). The security properties of properties of the TCP connection between the two routers should also
the propagation path between the two routers should also be be considered. See Section 5.1 of [RFC7454] for advice regarding
considered. See [RFC7454] Section 5.1 for advice regarding protection of the TCP connection.
protection of the propagation path.
7. References 6. References
7.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>. DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 6.2. Informative References
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
7.2. Informative References [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light] [RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux, Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
"Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route- October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.
Server to Peers", draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-
light-01 (work in progress), December 2016.
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", [RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006, Operations and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>. DOI 10.17487/RFC7454, February 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.
[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to [RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593, Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>. RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
[RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations [SIDR-RPKI] King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454, "Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>. Server to Peers", Work in Progress,
draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01, January
2017.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K. Acknowledgements
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015, The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>. suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano, and Bruno Decraene on
this document.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Pradosh Mohapatra Pradosh Mohapatra
Sproute Networks Sproute Networks
Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com
Keyur Patel
Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124
Email: keyupate@cisco.com Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc.
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
John Scudder John Scudder
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave 1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089 Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Email: jgs@juniper.net Email: jgs@juniper.net
Dave Ward Dave Ward
Cisco Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive 170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124 San Jose, CA 95124
United States of America
Email: dward@cisco.com Email: dward@cisco.com
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
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