draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-10.txt   rfc6811.txt 
Network Working Group P. Mohapatra Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Request for Comments: 6811 Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track J. Scudder Category: Standards Track J. Scudder
Expires: April 02, 2013 Juniper Networks ISSN: 2070-1721 Juniper Networks
D. Ward D. Ward
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
R. Austein R. Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
October 2012 January 2013
BGP Prefix Origin Validation BGP Prefix Origin Validation
draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-10
Abstract Abstract
To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis- To help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis-
announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security
requirements is the ability to validate the origination AS of BGP requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous
routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate
claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as
attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact
holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a
mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 02, 2013. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Prefix-to-AS Mapping Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Prefix-to-AS Mapping Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Pseudo-Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Pseudo-Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Policy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Interaction with Local Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Interaction with Local Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
A BGP route associates an address prefix with a set of autonomous A BGP route associates an address prefix with a set of Autonomous
systems (AS) that identify the interdomain path the prefix has Systems (ASes) that identify the interdomain path the prefix has
traversed in the form of BGP announcements. This set is represented traversed in the form of BGP announcements. This set is represented
as the AS_PATH attribute in BGP [RFC4271] and starts with the AS that as the AS_PATH attribute in BGP [RFC4271] and starts with the AS that
originated the prefix. To help reduce well-known threats against BGP originated the prefix. To help reduce well-known threats against BGP
including prefix mis-announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one including prefix mis-announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one
of the security requirements is the ability to validate the of the security requirements is the ability to validate the
origination AS of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to origination AS of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to
validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix
(as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact
authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a
simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement.
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) describes an approach The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) describes an approach
to build a formally verifiable database of IP addresses and AS to build a formally verifiable database of IP addresses and AS
numbers as resources. The overall architecture of RPKI as defined in numbers as resources. The overall architecture of RPKI as defined in
[RFC6480] consists of three main components: [RFC6480] consists of three main components:
o A public key infrastructure (PKI) with the necessary certificate o a public key infrastructure (PKI) with the necessary certificate
objects, objects,
o Digitally signed routing objects, o digitally signed routing objects, and
o A distributed repository system to hold the objects that would o a distributed repository system to hold the objects that would
also support periodic retrieval. also support periodic retrieval.
The RPKI system is based on resource certificates that define The RPKI system is based on resource certificates that define
extensions to X.509 to represent IP addresses and AS identifiers extensions to X.509 to represent IP addresses and AS identifiers
[RFC3779], thus the name RPKI. Route Origin Authorizations (ROA) [RFC3779], thus the name RPKI. Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
[RFC6482] are separate digitally signed objects that define [RFC6482] are separate digitally signed objects that define
associations between ASes and IP address blocks. Finally the associations between ASes and IP address blocks. Finally, the
repository system is operated in a distributed fashion through the repository system is operated in a distributed fashion through the
IANA, RIR hierarchy, and ISPs. IANA, Regional Internet Registry (RIR) hierarchy, and ISPs.
In order to benefit from the RPKI system, it is envisioned that In order to benefit from the RPKI system, it is envisioned that
relying parties either at AS or organization level obtain a local relying parties at either the AS or organization level obtain a local
copy of the signed object collection, verify the signatures, and copy of the signed object collection, verify the signatures, and
process them. The cache must also be refreshed periodically. The process them. The cache must also be refreshed periodically. The
exact access mechanism used to retrieve the local cache is beyond the exact access mechanism used to retrieve the local cache is beyond the
scope of this document. scope of this document.
Individual BGP speakers can utilize the processed data contained in Individual BGP speakers can utilize the processed data contained in
the local cache to validate BGP announcements. The protocol details the local cache to validate BGP announcements. The protocol details
to retrieve the processed data from the local cache to the BGP to retrieve the processed data from the local cache to the BGP
speakers is beyond the scope of this document (refer to [I-D.ietf- speakers is beyond the scope of this document (refer to [RFC6810] for
sidr-rpki-rtr] for such a mechanism). This document proposes a means such a mechanism). This document proposes a means by which a BGP
by which a BGP speaker can make use of the processed data in order to speaker can make use of the processed data in order to assign a
assign a "validation state" to each prefix in a received BGP UPDATE "validation state" to each prefix in a received BGP UPDATE message.
message.
Note that the complete path attestation against the AS_PATH attribute Note that the complete path attestation against the AS_PATH attribute
of a route is outside the scope of this document. of a route is outside the scope of this document.
Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent
view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache
or router may have different data about a particular prefix than or router may have different data about a particular prefix than
another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this; it is the
nature of distributed data with distributed caches. nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
Although RPKI provides the context for this draft, it is equally Although RPKI provides the context for this document, it is equally
possible to use any other database which is able to map prefixes to possible to use any other database that is able to map prefixes to
their authorized origin ASes. Each distinct database will have its their authorized origin ASes. Each distinct database will have its
own particular operational and security characteristics; such own particular operational and security characteristics; such
characteristics are beyond the scope of this document. characteristics are beyond the scope of this document.
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] only when they
appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed
case as English words, without any normative meaning. case as English words, without special meaning.
2. Prefix-to-AS Mapping Database 2. Prefix-to-AS Mapping Database
The BGP speaker loads validated objects from the cache into local The BGP speaker loads validated objects from the cache into local
storage. The objects loaded have the content (IP address, prefix storage. The objects loaded have the content (IP address, prefix
length, maximum length, origin AS number). We refer to such a locally length, maximum length, origin AS number). We refer to such a
stored object as a "Validated ROA Payload" or "VRP". locally stored object as a "Validated ROA Payload" or "VRP".
We define several terms in addition to "VRP". Where these terms are We define several terms in addition to "VRP". Where these terms are
used, they are capitalized: used, they are capitalized:
o Prefix: (IP address, prefix length), interpreted as is customary o Prefix: (IP address, prefix length), interpreted as is customary
(see [RFC4632]). (see [RFC4632]).
o Route: Data derived from a received BGP UPDATE, as defined in o Route: Data derived from a received BGP UPDATE, as defined in
[RFC4271], Section 1.1. The Route includes one Prefix and an [RFC4271], Section 1.1. The Route includes one Prefix and an
AS_PATH; it may include other attributes to characterize the AS_PATH; it may include other attributes to characterize the
prefix. prefix.
o VRP Prefix: The Prefix from a VRP. o VRP Prefix: The Prefix from a VRP.
o VRP ASN: The origin AS number from a VRP. o VRP ASN: The origin AS number from a VRP.
o Route Prefix: The Prefix derived from a route. o Route Prefix: The Prefix derived from a route.
o Route Origin ASN: The origin AS number derived from a Route as o Route Origin ASN: The origin AS number derived from a Route as
skipping to change at page 5, line 21 skipping to change at page 5, line 8
* the BGP speaker's own AS number if that segment is of type * the BGP speaker's own AS number if that segment is of type
AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SET or if the AS_PATH is empty, AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE or AS_CONFED_SET or if the AS_PATH is empty,
or or
* the distinguished value "NONE" if the final segment of the * the distinguished value "NONE" if the final segment of the
AS_PATH attribute is of any other type. AS_PATH attribute is of any other type.
o Covered: A Route Prefix is said to be Covered by a VRP when the o Covered: A Route Prefix is said to be Covered by a VRP when the
VRP prefix length is less than or equal to the Route prefix VRP prefix length is less than or equal to the Route prefix
length, and the VRP prefix address and the Route prefix address length, and the VRP prefix address and the Route prefix address
are identical for all bits specified by the VRP prefix are identical for all bits specified by the VRP prefix length.
length.(I.e. the Route prefix is either identical to the VRP (That is, the Route prefix is either identical to the VRP prefix
prefix or a more specific of the VRP prefix.) or more specific than the VRP prefix.)
o Matched: A Route Prefix is said to be Matched by a VRP when the o Matched: A Route Prefix is said to be Matched by a VRP when the
Route Prefix is Covered by that VRP and in addition, the Route Route Prefix is Covered by that VRP, the Route prefix length is
prefix length is less than or equal to the VRP maximum length and less than or equal to the VRP maximum length, and the Route Origin
the Route Origin ASN is equal to the VRP ASN. ASN is equal to the VRP ASN.
Given these definitions, any given BGP Route will be found to have Given these definitions, any given BGP Route will be found to have
one of the following "validation states": one of the following validation states:
o NotFound: No VRP Covers the Route Prefix. o NotFound: No VRP Covers the Route Prefix.
o Valid: At least one VRP Matches the Route Prefix. o Valid: At least one VRP Matches the Route Prefix.
o Invalid: At least one VRP Covers the Route Prefix, but no VRP o Invalid: At least one VRP Covers the Route Prefix, but no VRP
Matches it. Matches it.
We observe that no VRP can have the value "NONE" as its VRP ASN. Thus We observe that no VRP can have the value "NONE" as its VRP ASN.
a Route whose Origin ASN is "NONE" cannot be Matched by any VRP. Thus, a Route whose Origin ASN is "NONE" cannot be Matched by any
Similarly, no valid Route can have an Origin ASN of zero [I-D.ietf- VRP. Similarly, no valid Route can have an Origin ASN of zero [AS0].
idr-as0]. Thus no Route can be Matched by a VRP whose ASN is zero. Thus, no Route can be Matched by a VRP whose ASN is zero.
When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD
perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the
UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes which UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are
are redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol
protocol or a locally defined static route. An implementation MAY or a locally defined static route. An implementation MAY provide
provide configuration options to control which routes the lookup is configuration options to control which routes the lookup is applied
applied to. The "validation state" of the Route MUST be set to to. The validation state of the Route MUST be set to reflect the
reflect the result of the lookup. The implementation should consider result of the lookup. The implementation should consider the
the "validation state" as described in the document as a local validation state as described in the document as a local property or
property or attribute of the Route. If validation is not performed attribute of the Route. If validation is not performed on a Route,
on a Route, the implementation SHOULD initialize the "validation the implementation SHOULD initialize the validation state of such a
state" of such a route to "NotFound". route to "NotFound".
Use of the validation state is discussed in Section 3 and Section 5. Use of the validation state is discussed in Sections 3 and 5. An
An implementation MUST NOT exclude a route from the Adj-RIB-In or implementation MUST NOT exclude a route from the Adj-RIB-In or from
from consideration in the decision process as a side-effect of its consideration in the decision process as a side effect of its
validation state, unless explicitly configured to do so. validation state, unless explicitly configured to do so.
We observe that a Route can be Matched or Covered by more than one We observe that a Route can be Matched or Covered by more than one
VRP. This procedure does not mandate an order in which VRPs must be VRP. This procedure does not mandate an order in which VRPs must be
visited; however, the "validation state" output is fully determined. visited; however, the validation state output is fully determined.
2.1. Pseudo-Code 2.1. Pseudo-Code
The following pseudo-code illustrates the procedure above. In case The following pseudo-code illustrates the procedure above. In case
of ambiguity, the procedure above, rather than the pseudo-code, of ambiguity, the procedure above, rather than the pseudo-code,
should be taken as authoritative. should be taken as authoritative.
result = BGP_PFXV_STATE_NOT_FOUND; result = BGP_PFXV_STATE_NOT_FOUND;
//Iterate through all the Covering entries in the local VRP //Iterate through all the Covering entries in the local VRP
//database, pfx_validate_table. //database, pfx_validate_table.
entry = next_lookup_result(pfx_validate_table, route_prefix); entry = next_lookup_result(pfx_validate_table, route_prefix);
while (entry != NULL) { while (entry != NULL) {
prefix_exists = TRUE; prefix_exists = TRUE;
if (route_prefix_length <= entry->max_length) { if (route_prefix_length <= entry->max_length) {
if (route_origin_as != NONE if (route_origin_as != NONE
&& entry->origin_as != 0 && entry->origin_as != 0
&& route_origin_as == entry->origin_as) { && route_origin_as == entry->origin_as) {
result = BGP_PFXV_STATE_VALID; result = BGP_PFXV_STATE_VALID;
return (result); return (result);
} }
} }
entry = next_lookup_result(pfx_validate_table, input.prefix); entry = next_lookup_result(pfx_validate_table, input.prefix);
} }
//If one or more VRP entries Covered the route prefix, but //If one or more VRP entries Covered the route prefix, but
//no one Matched, return "Invalid" validation state. //none Matched, return "Invalid" validation state.
if (prefix_exists == TRUE) { if (prefix_exists == TRUE) {
result = BGP_PFXV_STATE_INVALID; result = BGP_PFXV_STATE_INVALID;
} }
return (result); return (result);
3. Policy Control 3. Policy Control
An implementation MUST provide the ability to match and set the An implementation MUST provide the ability to match and set the
validation state of routes as part of its route policy filtering validation state of routes as part of its route policy filtering
function. Use of validation state in route policy is elaborated in function. Use of validation state in route policy is elaborated in
Section 5. For more details on operational policy considerations, see Section 5. For more details on operational policy considerations,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]. see [ORIGIN-OPS].
An implementation MUST also support Four-Octet AS Numbers, [RFC4893]. An implementation MUST also support four-octet AS numbers [RFC6793].
4. Interaction with Local Cache 4. Interaction with Local Cache
Each BGP speaker supporting prefix validation as described in this Each BGP speaker supporting prefix validation as described in this
document is expected to communicate with one or more RPKI caches, document is expected to communicate with one or more RPKI caches,
each of which stores a local copy of the global RPKI database. The each of which stores a local copy of the global RPKI database. The
protocol mechanisms used to gather and validate these data and protocol mechanisms used to gather and validate these data and
present them to BGP speakers are described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki- present them to BGP speakers are described in [RFC6810].
rtr].
The prefix-to-AS mappings used by the BGP speaker are expected to be The prefix-to-AS mappings used by the BGP speaker are expected to be
updated over time. When a mapping is added or deleted, the updated over time. When a mapping is added or deleted, the
implementation MUST re-validate any affected prefixes and run the BGP implementation MUST re-validate any affected prefixes and run the BGP
decision process if needed. An "affected prefix" is any prefix that decision process if needed. An "affected prefix" is any prefix that
was matched by a deleted or updated mapping, or could be matched by was matched by a deleted or updated mapping, or could be matched by
an added or updated mapping. an added or updated mapping.
5. Deployment Considerations 5. Deployment Considerations
Once a Route is selected for validation, it is categorized according Once a Route is selected for validation, it is categorized according
the procedure given in Section 2. Subsequently, routing policy as the procedure given in Section 2. Subsequently, routing policy as
discussed in Section 3 can be used to take action based on the discussed in Section 3 can be used to take action based on the
validation state. validation state.
Policies which could be implemented include filtering routes based on Policies that could be implemented include filtering routes based on
validation state (for example, rejecting all "invalid" routes) or validation state (for example, rejecting all "invalid" routes) or
adjusting a route's degree of preference in the selection algorithm adjusting a route's degree of preference in the selection algorithm
based on its validation state. The latter could be accomplished by based on its validation state. The latter could be accomplished by
adjusting the value of such attributes as LOCAL_PREF. Considering adjusting the value of such attributes as LOCAL_PREF. Considering
invalid routes for BGP decision process is a pure local policy matter invalid routes for BGP decision process is a purely local policy
and should be done with utmost care. matter and should be done with utmost care.
In some cases (particularly when the selection algorithm is In some cases (particularly when the selection algorithm is
influenced by the adjustment of a route property that is not influenced by the adjustment of a route property that is not
propagated into IBGP) it could be necessary for routing correctness propagated into Internal BGP (IBGP)) it could be necessary for
to propagate the validation state to the IBGP peer. This can be routing correctness to propagate the validation state to the IBGP
accomplished on the sending side by setting a community or extended peer. This can be accomplished on the sending side by setting a
community based on the validation state, and on the receiving side by community or extended community based on the validation state, and on
matching the (extended) community and setting the validation state. the receiving side by matching the (extended) community and setting
the validation state.
6. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Rex Fernando, Hannes Gredler, Mouhcine
Guennoun, Russ Housley, Junaid Israr, Miya Kohno, Shin Miyakawa, Taka
Mizuguchi, Hussein Mouftah, Keyur Patel, Tomoya Yoshida, Kannan
Varadhan, Wes George, Jay Borkenhagen, and Sandra Murphy. The
authors are grateful for the feedback from the members of the SIDR
working group.
Junaid Israr's contribution to this specification was part of his PhD
research work and thesis at University of Ottawa.
7. IANA Considerations
[Note to RFC Editor: This section may be removed on publication]
This document has no IANA considerations.
8. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
Although this specification discusses one portion of a system to Although this specification discusses one portion of a system to
validate BGP routes, it should be noted that it relies on a database validate BGP routes, it should be noted that it relies on a database
(RPKI or other) to provide validation information. As such, the (RPKI or other) to provide validation information. As such, the
security properties of that database must be considered in order to security properties of that database must be considered in order to
determine the security provided by the overall solution. If determine the security provided by the overall solution. If
"invalid" routes are blocked as this specification suggests, the "invalid" routes are blocked as this specification suggests, the
overall system provides a possible denial-of-service vector, for overall system provides a possible denial-of-service vector; for
example if an attacker is able to inject or remove one or more example, if an attacker is able to inject (or remove) one or more
records in the validation database, it could lead an otherwise valid records into (or from) the validation database, it could lead an
route to be marked as invalid. otherwise valid route to be marked as invalid.
In addition, this system is only able to provide limited protection In addition, this system is only able to provide limited protection
against a determined attacker -- the attacker need only prepend the against a determined attacker -- the attacker need only prepend the
"valid" source AS to a forged BGP route announcement in order to "valid" source AS to a forged BGP route announcement in order to
defeat the protection provided by this system. defeat the protection provided by this system.
This mechanism does not protect against "AS in the middle attacks" or This mechanism does not protect against "AS-in-the-middle attacks" or
provide any path validation. It only attempts to verify the origin. provide any path validation. It only attempts to verify the origin.
In general, this system should be thought of more as a protection In general, this system should be thought of more as a protection
against misconfiguration than as true "security" in the strong sense. against misconfiguration than as true "security" in the strong sense.
9. References 7. Acknowledgments
9.1. Normative References The authors wish to thank Rex Fernando, Hannes Gredler, Mouhcine
Guennoun, Russ Housley, Junaid Israr, Miya Kohno, Shin Miyakawa, Taka
Mizuguchi, Hussein Mouftah, Keyur Patel, Tomoya Yoshida, Kannan
Varadhan, Wes George, Jay Borkenhagen, and Sandra Murphy. The
authors are grateful for the feedback from the members of the SIDR
working group.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Junaid Israr's contribution to this specification was part of his PhD
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. research work and thesis at University of Ottawa.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S. and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 8. References
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T. and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 8.1. Normative References
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.
[RFC4893] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-octet AS [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for
Number Space", RFC 4893, May 2007. IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S. and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
9.2. Informational References [RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.
[I-D.ietf-idr-as0] [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for
Kumari, W., Bush, R., Schiller, H. and K. Patel, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
"Codification of AS 0 processing.", Internet-Draft draft- February 2012.
ietf-idr-as0-06, August 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] [RFC6793] Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet
Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793,
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-19, August 2012. December 2012.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] 8.2. Informational References
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26, February 2012.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [AS0] Kumari, W., Bush, R., Schiller, H., and K. Patel,
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. "Codification of AS 0 processing.", Work in Progress,
August 2012.
[ORIGIN-OPS] Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation",
Work in Progress, August 2012.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol",
RFC 6810, January 2013.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Pradosh Mohapatra Pradosh Mohapatra
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive 170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA USA
Email: pmohapat@cisco.com EMail: pmohapat@cisco.com
John Scudder John Scudder
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave 1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089 Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA USA
Email: jgs@juniper.net EMail: jgs@juniper.net
David Ward David Ward
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive 170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA USA
Email: dward@cisco.com EMail: dward@cisco.com
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110 Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
USA USA
Email: randy@psg.com EMail: randy@psg.com
Rob Austein Rob Austein
Dragon Research Labs Dragon Research Labs
Email: sra@hactrn.net EMail: sra@hactrn.net
 End of changes. 69 change blocks. 
190 lines changed or deleted 178 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/