draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-02.txt 
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft R. Loomans Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Best Current G. Michaelson Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Practice APNIC Expires: January 29, 2007 APNIC
Expires: December 21, 2006 June 19, 2006 July 28, 2006
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-01.txt draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-02.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 21, 2006. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a profile for X.509 certificates for the This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to- use" of the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
Numbers). This profile is used to convey the authorization of the Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
subject to be regarded as the current unique controlled of the IP of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
addresses and AS numbers that are described in a Resource use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
Certificate. associated Resource Certificate.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 7 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8
3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . . . . . . 14 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . . . 17 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 19 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 16
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 16
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 26 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a profile for X.509 certificates for use in the This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
context of Resources Certificates. Resource Certificates are X.509 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and to this These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to
additional profile, and attest that the subject has the "right-to- the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints
use" a listed set of IP addresses and Autonomous Numbers. specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the
issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" a listed set of IP
addresses and Autonomous System numbers.
A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a A Resource Certificate describes an action by the certificate issuer
list of IP address blocks and AS numbers to the Subject of a that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
certificate, identified by the unique association of the Subject's of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of
private key with the public key contained in the Resource the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in
Certificate. the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the
certificate's issuer.
In the context of the public Internet it is intended that Resource In the context of the public Internet, and use of public number
Certificates are used in a manner that is aligned to the public resources in this context, it is intended that Resource Certificates
number resource distribution function, Specifically, when a number are used in a manner that is aligned to the public number resource
resource is allocated or assigned by a Registry to an entity, this distribution function. Specifically, when a number resource is
allocation is described by a Resource Certificate issued by the allocated or assigned by a number registry to an entity, this
Registry with a subject corresponding to the entity that is the allocation can be described by a Resource Certificate that is issued
recipient of this assignment or allocation. This corresponds to a by the registry with a subject corresponding to the entity that is
hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource Certificates are only the recipient of this number assignment or allocation. In the
context of the public number distribution function, this corresponds
to a hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource Certificates are only
issued in one 'direction' and there is a single unique path from a issued in one 'direction' and there is a single unique path from a
"Root CA" to any valid certificate. "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate.
Validation of a certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can be Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
undertaken by creating a valid issuer - subject chain from the trust be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject chain from a
anchor allocation authorities to the certificate [RFC4158]. trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with
the additional constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed
resources are fully encompassed by those of the issuer at each step
in the issuer-subject chain.
Resource Certificates may be used in the context of secure inter- Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an IP number secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an
resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, to verify IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related use to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related
contexts include validation of access to Internet Routing Registries use contexts include validation of access to Internet Routing
for nominated routing objects, validation of routing requests, and Registries for nominated routing objects, validation of routing
detection of potential unauthorized used of IP addresses. requests, and detection of potential unauthorized used of IP
addresses.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
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The framework for describing an association between the subject of a The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current
control is described in [RFC3779]. control is described in [RFC3779].
There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
this profile: this profile:
1. RFC 3779 notes that this resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 1. RFC 3779 notes that this resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate
profile further defines that the use of this certificate profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
extension MUST be used and MUST be marked as CRITICAL. extension MUST be used and MUST be marked as CRITICAL.
2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile
MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description
3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
unique value token within the context of certificates issued by validity includes the first condition that the resources
the validity includes the first condition that the resources described in the issuer's resource extension must encompass those
described in the Issuer's resource extension must encompass those of the subject's resource extension. In this context "encompass"
of the Subject's resource extension. In this context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a
allows for the Issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. Appropriate
strict superset of, any subject's resource set. Certificate Resource Certificate management in the context of this profile
validity in the context of this profile also includes a second also includes the constraint that no two (or more) certificates
condition that no two (or more) certificates issued by a single issued by a single issuer to two (or more) different subjects
Issuer to two (or more) different subjects have a non-null have a non-null intersection of resources. In other words an
intersection of resources. In other words an Issuer can certify issuer can certify at most one unique entity as the unique holder
at most one unique subject as the unique holder of a right-to-use of a right-to-use for any particular resource.
for any particular resource.
This implies that a test of certificate validity implies that there A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
exists a set of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain from sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
one, and only one, trust anchor to the certificate in question, and subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
that the resource extensions from the trust anchor to the certificate certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to
the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in
this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate
form a sequence of encompassing relationships. form a sequence of encompassing relationships.
3. Resource Certificate Fields 3. Resource Certificate Fields
A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields
listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value
is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
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field is 2). field is 2).
3.2. Serial number 3.2. Serial number
The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
Issuer. Issuer.
3.3. Signature Algorithm 3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile uses SHA-256 with RSA this certificate. This profile specifies SHA-256 with RSA
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and the value for this field MUST be the (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and, accordingly, the value for this field
OID value 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 [RFC4055]. MUST be the OID value 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 [RFC4055].
3.4. Issuer 3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is an X.501 name. certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
the CA bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the issuer
name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
immediate superior certificate.
3.5. Subject 3.5. Subject
This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
allocated / assigned. The value of this field is an X.500 name. In allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
this profile the subject name is determined by the Issuer.
In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
a subject name that is unique per issuer.
This field MUST be non-empty. This field MUST be non-empty.
3.6. Valid From 3.6. Valid From
The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this
profile the "Valid From" time is to be no earlier than the time of profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280],
Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always
encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as
UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time.
3.7. Valid To 3.7. Valid To
The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime
of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
Issuer and the Subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs
conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
"Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats
are defined in [RFC3280]. are defined in [RFC3280].
In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information
that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time
other than the current time.
Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a
certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity
interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the
issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is
anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate
with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the
CA's certificate.
3.8. Subject Public Key Info 3.8. Subject Public Key Info
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
thus the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. A minimum accordingly, the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. A
key size of 1024 bits is mandated in this profile. Regional Registry minimum key size of 1024 bits is mandated in this profile. In the
CAs MUST use a key size of 2048 bits. context of certifying resources it is recommended that certificates
that are intended to be used as root certificates, and their
immediate subordinates SHOULD use a key size of 2048 bits.
Subordinates of these subordinate certificates, in the context of
continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a key size of 2048 bits.
[Note - not for publication. One alternative option is to specify In the application of this profile to certification of public number
"no less than 2048 bits" and allow for longer key sizes. On the resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the
other hand it may be preferable to move to EC-DSA instead of RSA, in Regional Internet Registries used a key size of 2048 bits, and that
which case allowing for the option of longer RSA key sizes may be their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key
considered inappropriate.] size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key
size of 1024 bits.
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate
is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-
using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension
MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC3280]. MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC3280].
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate. Resource Certificate.
3.9.1. Basic Constraints 3.9.1. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate. paths that include this certificate.
The Issuer determines whether the cA boolean is set. If this bit is The issuer determines whether the cA boolean is set. If this bit is
set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue resources set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue resources
certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the subject is certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the subject is
permitted be a CA). permitted be a CA).
The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
NOT be present. NOT be present.
The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present.
[note - not for publication. It is unclear whether the CA bit should
be set on in all cases.
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate
certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical.
The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
certificates issued by the subject of this certificate. immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the
subject of this certificate).
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.2 of[RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.2 of[RFC3280].
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
certificates that are signed by a particular issuer's private key, by certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by
providing a hash value of the corresponding Issuer's public key. To providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate
facilitate path construction, this extension MUST appear in all path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
Resource Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present. Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all
The authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MAY Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-
be present. This extension is non-critical. signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and
authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present. This
extension is non-critical.
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
3.9.4. Key Usage 3.9.4. Key Usage
This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical
extension, and it MUST be present. extension, and it MUST be present.
In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits
are set to TRUE. In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature are set to TRUE and must be the only bits set to TRUE. In end-entity
bit MUST be set and MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and MUST be the
only bit set to TRUE.
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single "rsync" URL that references a single inclusive mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
CRL for each issuer. a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the
distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield
MUST be omitted. MUST be omitted.
The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST
be of type URI. Furthermore, as the scope of the CRL is all be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
certificates issued by this issuer, the sequence of distributionPoint to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of
values MUST contain only a single DistributionPointName set. The distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
DistributionPointName set MAY contain more than one URI value. An DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain
rsync URI MUST be present in the DistributionPointName set. more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
DistributionPointName set.
This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical.
[NOTE - not for publication. The reason for the specification of an
RSYNC URI as a MUST in this profile is to ensure that relying parties
who wish to maintain a local copy of a synchronized repository are
not forced to maintain a retrieval capability using a potentially
unbounded set of URI types. The profile is attempting to ensure that
rsync should be all that is required to perform a repository
synchronization operation. A more restrictive potential condition
here (and also in the SIA and AIA extensions) is that one and only
one RSYNC URI is permitted. This would reduce some of the potential
variations in certificates and also stress that certificate access
and use by relying parties is critically dependent on RSYNC access,
and that other forms of access are not necessarily available to
relying parties.]
3.9.6. Authority Information Access 3.9.6. Authority Information Access
This field (AIA) identifies the location of all certificates that are This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of all
issued by this Issuer that are signed with the Issuer's private key certificates that are issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA.
that signed this certificate. This profile uses a URI form of object This is specified in RFC3280 as a sequence of reference objects. In
identification. The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and this profile a single reference object to the immediate superior's
an rsync URI MUST be specified with an accessMethod value of id-ad- publication location MUST be used.
caIssuers. Other access method URIs MAY also be included in the
value sequence of this extension.
This field MUST be present, and is non-critical. This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of all objects published by the
issuer's immediate superior issuer. Other access method URIs
referencing the same publication point MAY also be included in the
value sequence of this extension.
[Note - not for publication rfc3280 defines only two OIDs for the In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a
access method, id-ad-caIssuers and id-ad-ocsp. It would appear that "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension
id-ad-ocsp is not relevant here in that OCSP is not included as part field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be
of the resource certificate profile - which leaves id-ad-caIssuers. present, and is non-critical.
The text in 4.2.2.1 of RFC3280 notes that: "the id-ad-caIssuers OID
is used when the additional information lists CAs that have issued
certificates superior to the CA that issued the certificate
containing this extension. The referenced CA issuers description is
intended to aid certificate users in the selection of a certification
path that terminates at a point trusted by the certificate user"
However there is no intention to require that such a list be included
in this subfield in this profile. The question is: What accessMethod
OID should be used here in the Access Description?]
3.9.7. Subject Information Access 3.9.7. Subject Information Access
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
appears that relate to the subject public key that is certified in appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
this certificate. Where the Subject is a CA for Resource and service collection will include all current valid certificates
Certificates this information and service collection will include all that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
current valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that subject's corresponding private key.
are signed with the subject's corresponding private key. This
profile uses a URI form of location identification. The preferred This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an rsync URI SHOULD be preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
subject of the certificate is a CA. Other access method URIs MAY subject of the certificate is a CA. Other access method URIs that
also be included in the value sequence of this extension. reference the same location MAY also be included in the value
sequence of this extension.
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
critical. Where the subject is not a CA this field MUST NOT be critical. Where the subject is not a CA this field MUST NOT be
present. present.
[Note - not for publication. RFC3280 defines only two OIDs for the
access method, id-ad-caRepository and id-ad-timeStamping, with the
difference being whether the subject is a CA or not. The access
method id-ad-caRepository appears to be appropriate where the subject
is a CA. Where the subject is NOT a CA would it be useful to have
the SIA extension point to where the subject stores digital objects
that have been signed by the subject? If this were considered to be
desirable, then the id-ad-timeStamping appears to be inappropriate in
this context. The general question is: What accessMethod OID should
be used here in the Access Description? The approach currently used
in this draft is that SIA should only be present for CAs and must be
absent in the case of End Entity certificates.]
3.9.8. Certificate Policies 3.9.8. Certificate Policies
This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field
MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
Certificates. Certificates.
PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.
This extension MUST be present and it is critical. This extension MUST be present and it is critical.
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name
This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as
supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request or as assigned by supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by
the Issuer CA. the issuer.
3.9.10. IP Resources 3.9.10. IP Resources
This field contains the list of IP address resources as per This field contains the list of IP address resources as per
[RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
particular AFI value and an optional SAFI value. All Resource particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates
Certificates MUST include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
extension, or both extensions. the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
3.9.11. AS Resources 3.9.11. AS Resources
This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779],
or may specify the "inherit" element. All Resource Certificates MUST or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported
in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST
include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
extensions. RDI values are NOT supported in this profile and MUST extensions.
NOT be used.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
Each Resource CA MUST issue a version 2Certificate Revocation List Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
(CRL), consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
indirect CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be
MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a
CRL are a list of all unexpired certificates issued by the CA that list of all unexpired certificates issued by the CA that have been
have been revoked by the CA. revoked by the CA.
An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period. validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
different scope by a single CA. different scope by a single CA.
No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs
issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a
single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the
highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other extant highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs
CRLs issued by this CA.. issued by this CA.
4.1. Version 4.1. Version
Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
integer value of this field is 1). integer value of this field is 1).
4.2. Issuer Name 4.2. Issuer Name
The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
the Resource Certificates. the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.
4.3. This Update 4.3. This Update
This is the date and time that this CRL was issued. The value of This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The
this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year
2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year
2050 or later.
4.4. Next Update
This is the date and time by which the next CRL will be issued. The
value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
year 2050 or later. year 2050 or later.
4.4. Next Update
This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in
the year 2050 or later.
4.5. Signature 4.5. Signature
This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The
signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be
present. present.
4.6. Revoked Certificate List 4.6. Revoked Certificate List
When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
list MUST be absent. list MUST be absent.
For each revoked resource certificate ONLY the following fields MUST For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile. be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.
4.6.1. Serial Number 4.6.1. Serial Number
The serial number of the revoked certificate. The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.
4.6.2. Revocation Date 4.6.2. Revocation Date
The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a
future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for
dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime
for dates in the year 2050 or later. for dates in the year 2050 or later.
4.7. CRL Extensions 4.7. CRL Extensions
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sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
This extension is non-critical. This extension is non-critical.
4.7.2. CRL Number 4.7.2. CRL Number
The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
number for a given CA. This extension allows users to easily number for a given CA. This extension allows users to easily
determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The higher determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The highest
CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within
the scope of this profile. the scope of this profile.
This extension is non-critical. This extension is non-critical.
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile
This profile refines the specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile
Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
formatted according to the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF),
is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in issuing a
certificate.
[Note - not for publication. RFC2986 references PKCS #10: This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
Certification Request Syntax Specification, Version 1.7. Given the Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
relative wide support of CMC, the extension of PKCS#10 that is formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority
roughly equivalent to CMP, then it would appear that a CMC profile as the initial step in issuing a certificate.
should also be included here. It is unclear at this point whether a
PCKS#10 profile is also necessary in this profile.]
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.
[Note - not for publication: There are no profile-based With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
qualifications regarding Proof-of-Possession. This may be refined in permitted to alter any requested field.
subsequent iterations of this draft.]
5.1. Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:
Version
This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.
Subject
The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but
the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name
MUST be unique per issuer. This field MAY be empty, in which case
the issuer MUST generate a subject name that is unique in the
context of the issuer.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA,
and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field
also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public
key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the
DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey.
Attributes
[RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.
The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3
Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate
requests is specified in Section 5.3.
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a CertificationRequest Object:
signatureAlgorithm
Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption).
Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value
1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
5.2. CRMF Profile
This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in
issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field.
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:
Version Version
This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
3 Certificate. 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted.
SerialNumber SerialNumber
As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile. omitted in this profile.
SigningAlgorithm SigningAlgorithm
As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
omitted in this profile. omitted in this profile.
Issuer Issuer
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dates as determined by the CA. dates as determined by the CA.
Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be
omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the
CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's
suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion.
PublicKey PublicKey
This field MUST be present. This field MUST be present.
This profile applies the following additional constraints to X509 v3 extensions
Certificate extension fields that may appear in a Certificate This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The
Request: profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
Section 5.3.
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
The following control fields are supported in this profile:
Authenticator Control
It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
subject in a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
is that the Authenticator Control field be used.
[Note - not for publication: The method of generation and
authentication of this field is to be specified. The desirable
properties include the ability to validate the subject and the
authenticity of the provided public key.]
Resource Class
The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate
Requests, namely a Resource Class control.
The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by
the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a
certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match
the subject's right-of-use of these resources with the class of
resources specified by the Resource Class control value.
[Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource
class is related the various forms of resource allocation which
imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing
validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the
entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single
'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not
be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing
resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure
where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a
set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject
(i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")]
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests
This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10
and CRMF Certificate Request:
BasicConstraints BasicConstraints
If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA.
The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit
is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
resources certificates within this overall framework. resource certificates within this overall framework.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity
certificate request). certificate request).
[Note - not for publication. There are some potential variants on
this model, where the CA bit may be considered as being set in all
circumstances. For example, if the generation of signed resource
objects, such as routing origination authorities requires the
generation of special purpose resource certificates whose validity
dates are implicitly the validity dates of the associated
authority, then the subject needs to be able to issue certificates
- i.e. there is a CA requirement. In this version of the draft
this is left as a subject suggestion in the request that the CA
may, or may not, honor in the issued certificate. In this model
all the entities are CAs, except for the users of ROA signing
shadow certs. In both cases, the CA knows the intended purpose
(i.e. issue to others: CA, issue shadow to yourself: non-CA). ]
SubjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
AuthorityKeyIdentifier AuthorityKeyIdentifier
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
KeyUsage KeyUsage
The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and
CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the
BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified. BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified.
CRLDistributionPoints SubjectInformationAccess
This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.
If specified, this field contains a sequence of URIs that If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
references a CRL that will be published by the subject for RSYNC URI that references a single publication point that will be
subordinate certificates. This sequence MUST include a rsync URI. used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
This field MAY be honoured by the CA if present. subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
CA.
If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning
then the CA MUST generate a CRLDistributionPoint URL based on out- then the CA MUST generate a URI value for the
of-band information that has been passed between the CA and the SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information
requester. that has been passed between the CA and the requester.
[Note - not for publication. The issue of where and how to [Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is
specify where the subject will publish the CRL if the CA bit is also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a
set and honored by the issuer is described here as information certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.]
that is either provided in this field in the certificate request
or provided via an "out-of-band" exchange. An alternative is to SubjectAlternateName
say that this field MUST be provided if the CA bit is set in the This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
request.] SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.
CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile.
AuthorityInformationAccess AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
SubjectInformationAccess SubjectInformationAccess
This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.
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This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
ASResources ASResources
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to
alter any requested field. alter any requested field.
5.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
The following control fields are supported in this profile:
Authenticator Control
It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
subject in a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
is that the Authenticator Control field be used.
[Note - not for publication: The method of generation and
authentication of this field is to be specified. The desirable
properties include the ability to validate the subject and the
authenticity of the provided public key.]
Resource Class
The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate
Requests, namely a Resource Class control.
The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by
the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a
certificate with the IPAddress and AS Number resources that match
the subject's right-of-use of these resources with the class of
resources specified by the Resource Class control value.
[Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource
class is related the various forms of resource allocation which
imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing
validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the
entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single
'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not
be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing
resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure
where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a
set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject
(i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")]
6. Resource Certificate Validation 6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described in [RFC3280]: This refines the generic procedure described in [RFC3280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1; issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
skipping to change at page 19, line 7 skipping to change at page 20, line 23
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and
4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time
in question. in question.
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates
The trust model used in the resource certificate framework in the The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate
context of validation of assertions of public number resources in framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number
public-use contexts is a top-down delegated CA model that mirrors the resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-
delegation of resources from a registry distribution point to the down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
entities that are the direct recipients of these resources. Within a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
the trust model these recipient entities may, in turn, operate a recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these
registry and perform further allocations or assignments. This is a recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
strict hierarchy, in that any number resource and a corresponding further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in
recipient entity has only one 'parent' issuing registry for that that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
number resource (i.e. there is always a unique parent entity for any only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
resource and corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
not a direct or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
recipient entity in question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
only exception to the "no loop" condition are the nominated trust question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the
anchors, where a self-signed certificate is issued. "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue
a self-signed root certificate.
At the time of preparing this draft there are proposed to be multiple
roots of this public number resource hierarchy, corresponding to
multiple trust anchors. These trust anchors are the self-signed
certificates that are issued by the Regional Internet Registries.
Each self-signed certificate issued by a RIR contains a resource set
that describes those resources where the RIR is administratively
responsible. There MUST NOT be overlap of resources in the IP
resource extensions across the collection of RIR self-signed
certificates. This implies that a validation path for any valid
certificate is unique, in the sense that the path will terminate with
a single trust anchor.
Cross-certification of these trust anchors, where one trust anchor
entity issues a certificate with a subject of another trust anchor is
not seen as providing any further substance to the integrity or ease
of validation in this trust model, so cross-certification is not used
in the trust anchor structure for this Resource Certificate
framework.
The adoption of a single trust anchor as a unique distinguished root The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is
of this certificate hierarchy is a potential future option here, and a role undertaken by relying parties, and the structure of the
within the proposed framework some care has been taken not to resource certificate profile admits the same variety of trust models
preclude the potential for a single distinguished root for this as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on the
certificate framework that could issue a certificate to each RIR with general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely
a resource extension that matches the resource sets that fall under that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of
the administrative responsibility of each RIR. certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation
property, as described in Section 6.2.
6.2. Resource Extension Validation 6.2. Resource Extension Validation
The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded
representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.
Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource
skipping to change at page 20, line 28 skipping to change at page 21, line 23
more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A
and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP
addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is
larger than range A. larger than range A.
equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B,
A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B.
The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this
"equality" comparison. "equality" comparison.
encompass Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
"encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or
AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more
specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the
set X.
Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
ordered certification path of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust
anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, implies that each of the anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of
contiguous resource sets of IP addresses and AS Numbers described in certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that
certificate x, for 'x' is greater than , are more specific or equal the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than
to the resources described in certificate x-1. 1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1.
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation
Validation of signed resource data using a target resource Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust
anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the
following conditions hold: following conditions hold:
1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and
skipping to change at page 21, line 12 skipping to change at page 22, line 16
contains field values as specified in this profile for all field contains field values as specified in this profile for all field
values that MUST be present. values that MUST be present.
4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the
certificate. certificate.
5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate
Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid. Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid.
6. That the resource extension data is equal to or more specific 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource
than the resource extension data contained in a valid certificate extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer
where this Issuer is the Subject (the previous certificate in the is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)
ordered sequence)
7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there
exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the
Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the
Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path.
Validation of a certificate may perform these tests in any chosen A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
order. chosen order.
A Resource Certificate may have a number of potential parent A Resource Certificate may have a number of potential parent
certificates, where a potential parent certificate is one where the certificates, where a potential parent certificate is one where the
subject name matches the issuer name of the resource certificate. A subject name matches the issuer name of the resource certificate. A
candidate parent certificate is any member of the parent certificate candidate parent certificate is any member of the parent certificate
set where the resource extension validity constraint is satisfied, set where the resource extension validity constraint of
and a valid candidate parent certificate is any candidate parent "encompassing" is satisfied, and a valid candidate parent certificate
certificate that also matches validity conditions 1 through 6. A is any candidate parent certificate that also matches validity
valid parent certificate is a valid candidate parent certificate that conditions 1 through 6. A valid parent certificate is a valid
also matches validity condition 7. candidate parent certificate that also matches validity condition 7.
Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found on a single Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found on a single
repository, maintained by a regular top-down walk from the Root Trust repository, maintained by a regular top-down walk from the Root Trust
Anchors via Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward Anchors via Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward
pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed
using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the
AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process. AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process.
There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
skipping to change at page 22, line 7 skipping to change at page 23, line 10
process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts
to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of
Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if
the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration
parameter. parameter.
In the context of Resource Certificates that are generated in respect In the context of Resource Certificates that are generated in respect
of public resources and with the framework of the associated resource of public resources and with the framework of the associated resource
distribution process, it is suggested that this configuration distribution process, it is suggested that this configuration
parameter of maximum certificate path length be set to a value of parameter of maximum certificate path length be set to a value of
100. (There is no particular reason for suggesting this value other 100.
than the observation that it appears to be comfortably longer than
any real distribution chain for public number resources, without [Note - not for publication: There is no particular reason for
being too long so as to pose potential DOS concerns for relying suggesting this value other than the observation that it appears to
parties performing a validation operation.) be comfortably longer than any real distribution chain for public
number resources, without being too long so as to pose potential DOS
concerns for relying parties performing a validation operation.]
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
[to be completed] [to be completed]
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
[An OID for a resource class option in a certificate request may need [There are no IANA considerations stated in this version of the
to be defined.] document.]
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
this document. this document.
10. Normative References 10. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981. September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
November 2000.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002. April 2002.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
skipping to change at page 23, line 19 skipping to change at page 24, line 32
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.
[RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
September 2005. September 2005.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
[rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,
<http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/>.
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate
The following is an example Resource Certificate. The following is an example Resource Certificate.
Certificate Name: UDkyh1nUjIjk5_WpdkZMh3KuvYo-25f7.crt Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer
Data: Data:
Version: 3 Version: 3
Serial: 9719 (0x25f7) Serial: 3
Signature Algorithm: Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
Issuer: CN=APNIC-AP-IANA E=ca@apnic.net
Validity: Validity:
Not Before: Fri May 12 05:37:43 2006 GMT Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT
Not After: Thu Aug 10 05:37:43 2006 GMT Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT
Subject: CN=FC9B85ADDF5B Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources
Subject Key Identifier:
86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d:
8b:97:49:14
Subject Key Identifier g(SKI):
hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
Subject Public Key Info: Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) RSA Public Key: Modulus:
Modulus (1024 bit): c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1:
00:f2:e5:63:d6:e3:89:45:47:02:13:90:b7:e5:39: 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a:
a3:f0:8c:3b:27:0d:d1:90:92:46:9b:45:d0:52:34: 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3:
f1:7c:c7:34:9f:be:d0:41:18:ab:35:43:62:89:2e: f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb:
3e:32:ab:01:e2:86:76:2a:44:83:49:4c:83:02:b4: b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4:
0c:2a:b0:b2:82:c6:35:24:7b:16:7a:35:42:36:15: 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe:
18:50:fe:8b:7f:c9:04:18:69:6b:ed:59:0d:61:ea: e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e:
20:ef:cd:19:30:9f:ce:b8:4a:f5:fb:ad:81:42:ab: 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c:
57:72:0c:47:b0:d8:30:c0:0c:5b:52:dc:aa:94:95: 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5:
3e:fe:44:ac:d5:b0:f4:d5:cb c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba:
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c:
X509v3 extensions: f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d:
Basic Constraints: 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03:
d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87:
CA:TRUE 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27:
Subject Key Identifier: 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7
keyid: 50:39:32:87:59:D4:8C:88:E4:E7:F5:A9: RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537
76:46:4C:87:72:AE:BD:8A Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE
Authority Key Identifier: Subject Info Access:
keyid: 19:54:CD:F2:81:C6:4E:31:09:6D:3A:15: caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
E6:88:39:30:21:A6:56:73
Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
CRL Distribution Points:
URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM/ q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM.crl hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ
Authority Information Access: Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/ CRL Distribution Points:
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/
Subject Information Access: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
CA Repository - URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/ Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/
pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/
GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM/ q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
UDkyh1nUjIjk5_WpdkZMh3KuvYo Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
Certificate Policies: critical ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 51:c2:a9:1c
ipAddrBlock: critical Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
192.0.0.0/24 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
autonomousSysNum: critical Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
64512 IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24,
Subject Alternative Name: 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23
DirName:/CN=<subject_supplied_string> IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32
ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370
Signature: Signature:
72:27:9c:bc:a8:7f:c0:f0:27:62:a1:1f:55:b3:c7:b1:31:c9:fc: c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b:
42:84:71:30:3b:0d:c0:d6:ad:79:b1:f6:1d:14:e8:f3:0f:f3:dd: 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59:
40:3d:ae:28:a6:33:96:b6:d3:7d:d2:f3:ac:d3:8e:d4:2e:ad:ab: 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2:
71:4d:05:74:20:ed:bc:e3:bd:85:7f:af:8b:70:3e:b8:90:b6:2d: a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7:
a5:e3:9d:2a:c8:a9:9b:73:3c:03:43:d2:b8:d2:4e:68:34:eb:db: 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3:
3c:44:eb:eb:1e:3b:03:d9:3b:e0:64:a6:31:90:9b:2c:4a:26:8e: 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28:
0e:36:4c:ee:c8:e9:29:6b:78:61:87:05:e2:f9 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f:
e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51:
26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0:
4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12:
5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4:
81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28:
33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3:
bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c:
1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54:
52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List
The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.
Certificate Name: GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM.crl CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl
Data: Data:
Version: 2 Version: 2
Issuer: CN=APNIC-AP-IANA Signature Algorithm:
Effective Date: Fri May 12 05:37:43 2006 GMT
Next Update: Fri May 26 05:37:43 2006 GMT
Signature algorithn
Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
CRL V2 Extensions: Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
Authority Key Identifier: E=ca@apnic.net
Keyid: 19:54:cd:f2:81:c6:4e:31:09:6d:3a:15: This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
e6:88:39:30:21:a6:56:73 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
Certificate Issuer: Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
CN=APNIC-AP-IANA ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
Certificate Serial Number: 1b 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
CRL Number: 1097 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
Revocation List: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
Revoked Certificates CRLNumber: 4
Serial Number: 0b Revoked Certificates: 1
Revocation Date: Mon May 8 05:10:19 2006 GMT Serial Number: 1
Serial Number: 0c Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
Revocation Date: Mon May 8 05:10:19 2006 GMT Serial Number: 2
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
Serial Number: 4
Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
Signature:
b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
d9
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Geoff Huston Geoff Huston
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: gih@apnic.net Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Robert Loomans George Michaelson
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: robertl@apnic.net Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson Robert Loomans
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: ggm@apnic.net Email: robertl@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
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