draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-03.txt 
SIDR G. Huston SIDR G. Huston
Internet-Draft G. Michaelson Internet-Draft G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans
Expires: January 29, 2007 APNIC Expires: August 15, 2007 APNIC
July 28, 2006 February 11, 2007
A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-02.txt draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-03.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
skipping to change at page 1, line 35 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use"
of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
associated Resource Certificate. associated Resource Certificate.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8
3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 16 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 16
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 16 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 17
5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21
6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 26 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 29 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers.
These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to
the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints
specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the
issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" a listed set of IP issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of
addresses and Autonomous System numbers. IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.
A Resource Certificate describes an action by the certificate issuer A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of
the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in
the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the
certificate's issuer. certificate's issuer.
In the context of the public Internet, and use of public number In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
resources in this context, it is intended that Resource Certificates resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
are used in a manner that is aligned to the public number resource Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
distribution function. Specifically, when a number resource is public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a
allocated or assigned by a number registry to an entity, this number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
allocation can be described by a Resource Certificate that is issued entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
by the registry with a subject corresponding to the entity that is Certificate. This Certificate is issued by the number registry, and
the recipient of this number assignment or allocation. In the the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer
context of the public number distribution function, this corresponds corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair
to a hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource Certificates are only that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the
issued in one 'direction' and there is a single unique path from a number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the
certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or
assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public
number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI
structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one
'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificated from a
"Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate. "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate.
Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject chain from a be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate
trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with chain from a trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate
the additional constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed [RFC4158], with the additional constraint of ensuring that each
resources are fully encompassed by those of the issuer at each step subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the
in the issuer-subject chain. issuer at each step in the issuer-subject chain.
Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an
IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related
use contexts include validation of access to Internet Routing use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects,
Registries for nominated routing objects, validation of routing validation of routing requests, and detection of potential
requests, and detection of potential unauthorized used of IP unauthorised used of IP addresses.
addresses.
This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
skipping to change at page 5, line 32 skipping to change at page 5, line 35
2. Describing Resources in Certificates 2. Describing Resources in Certificates
The framework for describing an association between the subject of a The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current
control is described in [RFC3779]. control is described in [RFC3779].
There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
this profile: this profile:
1. RFC 3779 notes that this resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate
profile further specifies that the use of this certificate profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
extension MUST be used and MUST be marked as CRITICAL. extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be
marked as CRITICAL.
2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource
set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix
masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile
MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in
the resource extension field.
3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
validity includes the first condition that the resources validity includes the condition that the resources described in
described in the issuer's resource extension must encompass those the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the
of the subject's resource extension. In this context "encompass" certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a
allows for the issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must
strict superset of, any subject's resource set. Appropriate encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this
Resource Certificate management in the context of this profile context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be
also includes the constraint that no two (or more) certificates the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set.
issued by a single issuer to two (or more) different subjects The constraints imposed by this profile a certificate furthermore
have a non-null intersection of resources. In other words an require that a the encompassing issuer's resource set be
issuer can certify at most one unique entity as the unique holder described in a single certificate, and not in two or more
of a right-to-use for any particular resource. certificates.
A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a
sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the
subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to
the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in
this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate
form a sequence of encompassing relationships. form a sequence of encompassing relationships.
3. Resource Certificate Fields 3. Resource Certificate Fields
skipping to change at page 6, line 39 skipping to change at page 6, line 45
field is 2). field is 2).
3.2. Serial number 3.2. Serial number
The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
Issuer. Issuer.
3.3. Signature Algorithm 3.3. Signature Algorithm
This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
this certificate. This profile specifies SHA-256 with RSA this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with
(sha256WithRSAEncryption), and, accordingly, the value for this field RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
MUST be the OID value 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 [RFC4055]. SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 11 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be
taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.4. Issuer 3.4. Issuer
This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
the CA bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the issuer the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
immediate superior certificate. immediate superior certificate.
This field MUST be non-empty.
3.5. Subject 3.5. Subject
This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using
a subject name that is unique per issuer. a subject name that is unique per issuer.
This field MUST be non-empty. This field MUST be non-empty.
skipping to change at page 8, line 14 skipping to change at page 8, line 27
interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the
issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is
anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate
with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the
CA's certificate. CA's certificate.
3.8. Subject Public Key Info 3.8. Subject Public Key Info
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
accordingly, the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. A accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
minimum key size of 1024 bits is mandated in this profile. In the 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024
context of certifying resources it is recommended that certificates bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that
that are intended to be used as root certificates, and their certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and
immediate subordinates SHOULD use a key size of 2048 bits. their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048
Subordinates of these subordinate certificates, in the context of bits. Immediate subordinates of these certificates, when used in the
continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a key size of 2048 bits. context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key
size of 2048 bits.
In the application of this profile to certification of public number In the application of this profile to certification of public number
resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the
Regional Internet Registries used a key size of 2048 bits, and that Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that
their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key
size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key
size of 1024 bits. size of 1024 bits.
It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be
taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.
3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields
As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate
is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-
using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension
MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC3280]. MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280].
The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
Resource Certificate. Resource Certificate.
3.9.1. Basic Constraints 3.9.1. Basic Constraints
The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
paths that include this certificate. paths that include this certificate.
The issuer determines whether the cA boolean is set. If this bit is The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit
set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue resources is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the subject is resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
permitted be a CA). subject is permitted be a CA).
The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
NOT be present. NOT be present.
The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present.
3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier
The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
skipping to change at page 9, line 47 skipping to change at page 10, line 17
The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280].
3.9.4. Key Usage 3.9.4. Key Usage
This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical
extension, and it MUST be present. extension, and it MUST be present.
In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits
are set to TRUE and must be the only bits set to TRUE. In end-entity are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE.
certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and MUST be the
only bit set to TRUE. In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and
MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.
3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points
This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile
uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access
mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.
In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
skipping to change at page 10, line 25 skipping to change at page 10, line 42
distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield
MUST be omitted. MUST be omitted.
The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT
contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST
be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified
to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of
distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain
more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
DistributionPointName set. DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs
MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.
This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical.
3.9.6. Authority Information Access 3.9.6. Authority Information Access
This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of all This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
certificates that are issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA. certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
This is specified in RFC3280 as a sequence of reference objects. In where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a
this profile a single reference object to the immediate superior's single reference object to publication location of the immediate
publication location MUST be used. superior certificate MUST be used.
This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred
URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST
reference the point of publication of all objects published by the reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
issuer's immediate superior issuer. Other access method URIs issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
referencing the same publication point MAY also be included in the Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
value sequence of this extension. included in the value sequence of this extension.
When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate,the subordinate
certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all
subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies
that re-issued certificates overwrite prevously issued certificates
to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously
issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can
maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due
solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers'
policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued
certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice
Statement.
Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a
persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each
subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the
most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the
subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this
subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate.
In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a
"root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension
field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be
present, and is non-critical. present, and is non-critical.
3.9.7. Subject Information Access 3.9.7. Subject Information Access
This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services
relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension
appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information
and service collection will include all current valid certificates and service collection will include all current valid certificates
that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
subject's corresponding private key. subject's corresponding private key.
This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The
preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the
subject of the certificate is a CA. Other access method URIs that subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an
reference the same location MAY also be included in the value object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
sequence of this extension. trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the
same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this
extension.
This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
critical. Where the subject is not a CA this field MUST NOT be critical. For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a
present. CA, this field MUST NOT be present.
3.9.8. Certificate Policies 3.9.8. Certificate Policies
This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field
MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
Certificates. Certificates.
PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile.
skipping to change at page 12, line 21 skipping to change at page 13, line 14
extensions. extensions.
This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.
4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile
Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be
"all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a
list of all unexpired certificates issued by the CA that have been list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA that have been
revoked by the CA. revoked by the CA.
An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
validity period. validity period.
This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.
The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with
different scope by a single CA. different scope by a single CA.
skipping to change at page 14, line 38 skipping to change at page 15, line 28
This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object,
formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority
as the initial step in issuing a certificate. as the initial step in issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field. permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate.
5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:
Version Version
This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.
Subject Subject
The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but
the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name
MUST be unique per issuer. This field MAY be empty, in which case MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer.
the issuer MUST generate a subject name that is unique in the This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a
context of the issuer. subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued
by this issuer.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo
This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA,
and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field
also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public
key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the
DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey.
Attributes Attributes
[RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.
The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3
Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate
requests is specified in Section 5.3. requests is specified in Section 5.3.
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a CertificationRequest Object: that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:
signatureAlgorithm signatureAlgorithm
Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption). Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption).
Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value
1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
5.2. CRMF Profile 5.2. CRMF Profile
This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in
issuing a certificate. issuing a certificate.
This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
(RA), acting under the direction of a subject. (RA), acting under the direction of a subject.
With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
permitted to alter any requested field. permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
certificate..
5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields
This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:
Version Version
This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version
3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted.
skipping to change at page 17, line 7 skipping to change at page 17, line 42
This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The
profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
Section 5.3. Section 5.3.
5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields
The following control fields are supported in this profile: The following control fields are supported in this profile:
Authenticator Control Authenticator Control
It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
subject in a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211]
is that the Authenticator Control field be used. is that the Authenticator Control field be used.
[Note - not for publication: The method of generation and [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and
authentication of this field is to be specified. The desirable authentication of this field is not specified in this document.
properties include the ability to validate the subject and the It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have
authenticity of the provided public key.] securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the
Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The
desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject
and the authenticity of the provided public key.]
Resource Class Resource Class
The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate
Requests, namely a Resource Class control. Requests, namely a Resource Class control.
The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by
the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a
certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match
the subject's right-of-use of these resources with the class of the subject's right-of-use of these resources within the class of
resources specified by the Resource Class control value. resources specified by the Resource Class control value.
[Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource [Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource
class is related the various forms of resource allocation which class is related the various forms of resource allocation which
imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing
validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the
entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single
'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not 'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not
be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing
resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure
skipping to change at page 18, line 48 skipping to change at page 19, line 37
SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information
that has been passed between the CA and the requester. that has been passed between the CA and the requester.
[Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is [Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is
also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a
certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.] certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.]
SubjectAlternateName SubjectAlternateName
This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the
SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate.
CRLDistributionPoints CRLDistributionPoints
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
AuthorityInformationAccess AuthorityInformationAccess
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this
profile. profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the
AIA field.
SubjectInformationAccess SubjectInformationAccess
This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA
issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit
set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning.
If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single
rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be
used by the subject for all certificates that published by the used by the subject for all certificates that published by the
subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the
skipping to change at page 20, line 4 skipping to change at page 20, line 43
ASResources ASResources
This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
profile. profile.
With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to
alter any requested field. alter any requested field.
6. Resource Certificate Validation 6. Resource Certificate Validation
This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
This refines the generic procedure described insection 6 of
This refines the generic procedure described in [RFC3280]: [RFC3280]:
To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n
certificates) satisfies the following conditions: certificates) satisfies the following conditions:
1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the
issuer of certificate x+1; issuer of certificate x+1;
2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor;
3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and
4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.
in question.
6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates
The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate
framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number
resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-
down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from
a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct
recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these
recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform
skipping to change at page 20, line 41 skipping to change at page 21, line 34
that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has
only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e.
there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and
corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct
or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in
question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the
"no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue
a self-signed root certificate. a self-signed root certificate.
The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is
a role undertaken by relying parties, and the structure of the a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the resource
resource certificate profile admits the same variety of trust models certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust
as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on the models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on
general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely
that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of
certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation
property, as described in Section 6.2. property, as described in Section 6.2.
6.2. Resource Extension Validation 6.2. Resource Extension Validation
The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded
representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.
skipping to change at page 22, line 28 skipping to change at page 23, line 21
is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence)
7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there
exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the
Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the
Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path.
A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
chosen order. chosen order.
A Resource Certificate may have a number of potential parent Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
certificates, where a potential parent certificate is one where the maintained repository, maintained by a regular top-down
subject name matches the issuer name of the resource certificate. A synchronization pass from the Root Trust Anchors via reference to
candidate parent certificate is any member of the parent certificate Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus
set where the resource extension validity constraint of the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a
"encompassing" is satisfied, and a valid candidate parent certificate bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and
is any candidate parent certificate that also matches validity CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process.
conditions 1 through 6. A valid parent certificate is a valid
candidate parent certificate that also matches validity condition 7.
Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found on a single
repository, maintained by a regular top-down walk from the Root Trust
Anchors via Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward
pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed
using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the
AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process.
There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator.
Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation
process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts
to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of
Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if
the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration
parameter. parameter.
In the context of Resource Certificates that are generated in respect 7. Example Use Cases
of public resources and with the framework of the associated resource
distribution process, it is suggested that this configuration
parameter of maximum certificate path length be set to a value of
100.
[Note - not for publication: There is no particular reason for [1 - signing a Route Registry Object] [2 - signing a Route
suggesting this value other than the observation that it appears to Origination Authority - note validity time] [3 - performing a
be comfortably longer than any real distribution chain for public resource (sub) allocation - An example of this in situations where
number resources, without being too long so as to pose potential DOS there are contractual period differences between the entity and its
concerns for relying parties performing a validation operation.] resource supplier, and the entity and its resource allocation
subjects.]
7. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
[to be completed] [To be completed]
8. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
[There are no IANA considerations stated in this version of the [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
document.] considerations stated in this version of the document.]
9. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from
Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo
Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of
this document. this document.
10. Normative References 11. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981. September 1981.
[RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
skipping to change at page 29, line 7 skipping to change at page 29, line 7
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Robert Loomans Robert Loomans
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
Email: robertl@apnic.net Email: robertl@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net URI: http://www.apnic.net
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
 End of changes. 62 change blocks. 
174 lines changed or deleted 213 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.33. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/